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VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA
OF
NIMBĀRKA
AND
VEDĀNTA-KAUSTUBHA
OF
ŚRĪNIVĀSA
(COMMENTARIES ON THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS)

TRANSLATED AND ANNOTATED BY
ROMA BOSE, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxon.)

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(ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS)

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PREFACE

Nimbārka's commentary on the Brahma-Sūtras known as the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha, and that of his immediate disciple Śrīnivāsa styled the Vedānta-Kaustubha are the chief works of the school of philosophy associated with the name of Nimbārka. The latter is not, however, a mere commentary on the former, as is sometimes wrongly supposed, but a full exposition of the views expressed in the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha which is very terse and concise and is not always clear. Both the treatises are therefore essential for the proper understanding of the doctrine of Nimbārka.

Hitherto no translation of either of these works was available in the English language, and the task was undertaken by Dr. Rama Bose (Chaudhuri) at the suggestion of Prof. F. W. Thomas, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford, under whose supervision it was carried out during 1934-1936, as part of the thesis for the Degree of D.Phil. of that University.

This authoritative English Edition of the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha has been prepared after carefully comparing the manuscripts Nos. E164, 2480, 2481 and 3273 of the India Office Library and the printed Sanskrit texts of the Kāśī, Brindāban and Chowkhāmbā Series. The translation of the Vedānta-Kaustubha was based on the Sanskrit texts of the Kāśī and Brindāban editions. Differences of readings of the various manuscripts and printed texts of both the treatises have been noted in the footnotes.

As is well-known the doctrine of Advaita, as developed by Śaṅkara, was the earliest of the Vedāntic systems, and in the great efflorescence of philosophic thought in India during the 9th-16th centuries, various schools of thought arose, mostly as protests against the extreme views held by the Advaita school. There is no doubt that by reason of its great metaphysical appeal and the rigid application of logical canons, Śaṅkara's Advaita-vāda exercised the most profound influence on Indian thought and marked him out as the greatest philosophical genius born in this country. His insistence, however, on the sole reality of 'Abheda' or non-difference and the unreality of Bheda or difference evoked strong reactions, the foremost of which was the Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda of Rāmānuja, whose importance was only second to that of Śaṅkara. According to him the reality is not an abstract

concept in the Śaṅkarite sense in which the non-difference completely loses its identity, but is a synthetic unity of both—the relation between the two being that of the substance-attribute. That is, the attribute is different from the substance in the sense that it inheres in it though the latter cannot be equated with any particular attribute and is not a mere assemblage of them all, but is something over and above. In other words, the substance and the attribute, or the unity and plurality are both real and form an organic whole, and the relation between them is the relation of non-difference, and not of absolute identity. Rāmānuja's doctrine is hence known as Viśiṣṭādvaita-vāda or qualified monism as against the absolutism of Śaṅkara.

Śrīkaṇṭha, who followed Rāmānuja, agreed that the relation between the Brahman and the Universe was that of non-difference, but while the latter identified Brahman with Viṣṇu, according to Śrīkaṇṭha it was Śiva. His theory is therefore called Viśiṣṭa-Śivādvaita-vāda.

The school of Bhāskara holds that both the unity and plurality are real. The relation between the two is one of difference-non-difference during the effected state of Brahman, i.e. during the cosmic existence and creation, but one of complete identity during the causal state of Brahman, i.e. during salvation and dissolution. In other words, the individual Soul or Jīva, during the state of Saṃsāra, is different from Brahman due to the presence of the Upādhis (limiting adjuncts) such as the body, the sense organs, etc., but when these are not present and it is Mūkta, the Jīva becomes absolutely identical with Brahman of which it is only the effect. Similarly, the world is both different and non-different from Brahman during creation, but identical with Him in Pralaya (dissolution). Hence Bhāskara's view is known as 'Aupādhika-Bhedābheda-vāda', i.e. the Bhedābheda relation between Brahman and the Universe is only *Aupādhika* or due to the limiting adjuncts only and therefore lasts as long as these adjuncts last. But when the Saṃsāra is over and the Upādhis are no more, there is no longer any *Bhedābheda* between Brahman and the Universe, the former alone becomes the reality and no separate soul or matter can then exist.

Baladeva's school also admitted the reality of both the unity and plurality. In a sense, both the Jīva and the Jagat are different from Brahman but in another they are non-different as effects of Brahman. This relation of difference-non-difference is transcendental and cannot be comprehended by reason and must be accepted on the authority of the Scriptures (revelation). His doctrine goes, therefore,

under the name of 'Acintya-Bhedābheda-vāda', i.e. the *Bhedābheda* relation of Brahman and the Universe is *Acintya* or incomprehensible by reason.

The doctrine of Nimbārka, which developed in the atmosphere of general reaction against Śaṅkara's Advaitism, shared the views of the above schools in their insistence on the reality of the Many. According to Nimbārka, Brahman and Jīva-Jagat are equally real as was also held by Rāmānuja, but the difference between them is not superseded by non-difference as the latter supposed. In fact, the difference between the two is just as significant as their non-difference. While it is true, as Rāmānuja thought, that the Jīva-Jagat or the entire universe inheres in the unity of Brahman as an organic whole and as such can lay no claim to separate existence, yet as the effect is different from the cause, in the same sense is the Many different from the One, and their difference is as fundamental as their non-difference. Nimbārka's system has therefore been called the *Svābhāvika-Bhedābheda-vāda* in which the relation between Brahman and the Jīva-Jagat is regarded as one of eternal difference-non-difference during Saṃsāra or the cosmic existence as well as Pralaya or dissolution, and not only during the former state as Bhāskara thought. According to his view even the freed Soul (Mūkta-Jīvātman) is both different and non-different from Brahman and even in Pralaya does the Jagat inhere in Brahman as a distinct entity.

In her English rendering of the Vedānta-Pārijāta-Saurabha and Vedānta-Kaustubha, Dr. Bose has not only given Nimbārka's reading and interpretation of each Sūtra, but has compared them with those of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, Bhāskara and Baladeva belonging to the antagonistic and allied schools of the Vedānta Philosophy. Differences from the religious and ethical grounds have not either been ignored. The present work therefore is not to be considered as a mere translation, but it gives also reviews of the main tenets of the post-Śaṅkara theistic schools which arose in opposition to Advaita-Vedāntism, though the full philosophical exposition of Nimbārka's doctrine and the comparative study of the development of Indian thought during this period has been discussed by her in a separate work which will form the third and concluding volume of this series.

The work consists of four chapters. In Chapter I (*Samanvayādhyaḥ*), it is sought to establish that Brahman is the sole subject of all Scriptures. The nature of Brahman, His attributes and

the sources of our knowledge of Him are discussed in this chapter. In Chapter II (*Avirodhādhyāya*), Nimbārka first refutes the rival views of Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, Śaivism and Śāktaism, and considers the problems of Jīva and Jagat, their natures and attributes and the manner in which they are related to Brahman. These two chapters are purely metaphysical and supply the philosophical foundations of the doctrine of Nimbārka. The remaining ones are chiefly of devotional and ethical interests. In Chapter III (*Sādhanaādhyāya*), for example, the means of attaining Mokṣa (salvation), the nature and importance of meditations as mentioned in the Upanishads are discussed. In Chapter IV (*Phalādhyāya*), Nimbārka gives his views on Mokṣa, the fruit and the conditions of the Mūkta (released) Jīvātman or soul, etc. According to him Mokṣa or salvation implies two conditions, namely, the attainment of qualities and nature similar to Brahman (Brahma-Svarūpa-lābha), and the full development of one's own individuality (Ātma-Svarūpa-lābha). This full development means the complete manifestation of one's real nature as consciousness (Jñāna-Svarūpa) and bliss (Ānanda), untainted and unimpeded by matter which screens it during Saṃsāra, and deceives it into believing that it is self-sufficient and independent of Brahman. When, however, Mokṣa is attained, it is realized that it is dependent on Brahman as His organic part and in that sense non-different from Him. It implies the destruction of narrow egoity, but not the annihilation of individuality as is the goal of the Advaita school. Nimbārka's ideas on Mokṣa or salvation therefore are the logical outcome of his theistic mind which seeks to find a place for the devotional soul without completely merging it in Brahman.

The first two chapters containing the metaphysical portion of the work is now issued as Volume I consisting of 474 pages. Volume II will comprise the remaining two chapters and indexes for both the volumes. The latter is expected also to be published during this year.

B. S. GUHA,

General Secretary,

Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal.

29th February, 1940.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'Enquiry'.
(Sūtra 1)

SŪTRA 1

" THEN, THEREFORE, AN ENQUIRY INTO BRAHMAN."

THE EXPLANATION OF THE BRAHMA-SŪTRAS ENTITLED VEDĀNTA-PĀRIJĀTA-SAURABHA, COMPOSED BY THE REVEREND NIMBĀRKA.

An enquiry is to be instituted, at all times, into the Highest Person,—Ramā's Husband, denoted by the term "Brahman", the greatest of all because of His infinite, inconceivable and innate nature, qualities, powers and so on,—by one who has studied the Veda with its six parts¹; who has been assailed with doubt, arising from texts which teach² that the fruits of works are both transitory and eternal³; who has, for that very reason, enquired into the science which is concerned with the consideration of religious duties,⁴ and has, thereby, gained the knowledge determined therein⁵ regarding works, their kinds and their fruits; in whom, as a consequence, there arisen a disregard (for worldly objects), that is the result of a discrimination between the finitude and eternity of the

¹ The six parts are:—(a) *S'ikṣā* or the science of proper articulation and pronunciation, comprising the knowledge of letters, accents, quantity, the use of the organs of pronunciation, and phonetics generally, but especially the laws of euphony peculiar to the Veda; (b) *Chandaḥs* or treatises on metre; (c) *Vyākaraṇa* or treatises on grammar; (d) *Nirukta* or treatises on the explanation of difficult words; (e) *Jyotiṣa* or treatises on astronomy; and (f) *Kalpa* or treatises on ceremonials. The first and second of these *Vedāṅgas* are said to be intended to secure the correct recitation of the Veda, the third and fourth the understanding of it, the fifth and sixth its proper employment at sacrifice. M.W., p. 1016.

² *Prakṛṣṭeṇa karoti iti prakaraṇam, tad-vaś vākyam.*

³ I.e. Whose mind is assailed with doubt owing to the contradictory teachings regarding the fruits of works, some texts declaring that the fruits of works are transitory, while others declaring that they are eternal. Cf. V.K., I.1.1.

⁴ I.e. the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

⁵ I.e. the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

fruits of the knowledge of works and Brahman respectively, the former being surpassable, the latter non-surpassable¹; who wishes for the grace of the Lord; who is covetous of having a vision of Him; to whom the spiritual preceptor is the only God; who has whole-hearted devotion for the holy spiritual teacher; and who is desirous of final release—this is the sense of the introductory text.

The commentary entitled 'Vedānta-kaustubha', composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

Panegyric

1. I worship the holy Swan², Sanaka and others³, the Divine Sage⁴, and Nimbabhāskara⁵: May a devotion for Lord Kṛṣṇa arise in us through their grace.
2. I bow down to the feet of Lord Kṛṣṇa, in reference to whom alone the mass of scriptural texts does not come into mutual conflict, whom those who are engaged in meditation and Yoga obtain, and who is to be worshipped constantly by Varuṇa and Indra with mind and speech.

Finding that the people on earth were being deluded by various sorts of false arguments, Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, the Lord of all, and the one identical material and efficient cause of the entire universe, assumed the form of the son of Parāśara⁶ and composed the Vedānta-treatise, called the 'Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā'⁷, with a

¹ I.e. in whose mind has arisen a disgust for all worldly pursuits and objects, since he has apprehended the great distinction between the fruits of works, viz. ordinary worldly objects and heaven, and the fruit of the knowledge Brahman, viz. salvation. Even heaven has an end, but not so salvation, and even heaven is not the highest end, but salvation is. See V.K. 1.1.1.

² The Swan Incarnation of *Brahmā* is supposed to be the Founder of the sect of *Nimbārka*.

³ The Four *Kumāras*, Sanaka and others, the second spiritual teachers of the sect.

⁴ I.e. *Nārada*, supposed to be the third spiritual teacher of the sect and the immediate *guru* of *Nimbārka*.

⁵ I.e. *Nimbārka*.

⁶ *Parāśara* is supposed to be the father of *Vyāsa*, the reputed author of the *Brahma-sūtras*.

⁷ There is difference of opinion as to why the *Vedānta-sūtras* or the *Brahma-sūtras* are called the 'Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā'. According to the *Ratna-*

view to augmenting in the people knowledge and devotion regarding Himself and establishing the Highest Brahman in a manner beyond doubt. Then, the supremely merciful reverend Nimbārka, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra, composed a commentary, very difficult to understand, called the 'Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha' (Fragrance of the Heavenly Flower of the Vedānta), as an explanation of the texts of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā. Then, again, through his command, and with a view to benefiting the wise, the 'Vedānta-kaustubha' (Gem of the Vedānta), which is easy, concise and explains the sense of the 'Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha', is being composed by me, his disciple, following the path recommended by him and wishing to obtain his favour.

If it be argued : our purpose being served through an enquiry into religious duties simply, what is the use of an enquiry into Brahman?—we reply: since religious duties yield non-permanent fruits, an enquiry into Him is to be undertaken for the sake of obtaining unsurpassed and infinite bliss.

Here the word "then" implies 'succession', and not any other sense, there being no previous distinct mention. It cannot be said that in conformity with the statement, viz. 'The word "om" and the word "atha" formerly issued forth from the throat of Brahman, and hence both are auspicious', (the word "atha") here indicates auspiciousness,—because this treatise being auspicious by itself in sound as well as in meaning, does not await any other auspiciousness; because good luck is obtained through the mere hearing of it; and because in the very same way, the other meanings of the term "then", viz. special prerogative and the rest¹ are not appropriate here. Moreover, a word, pronounced with one particular sense in view, should not be employed in any other sense. Here the intended sense is 'succession', since the word "therefore" refers to something

prabhā commentary on Ś.B., they are so called because they treat of the Brahman-hood of the embodied soul. ('*Śārīrako jīvas tasya Brahmatva vicāro mīmāṃsā*.' P. 64, Kāśī ed., Part I.)

According to Baladeva, however, Brahman is 'śārīra' or embodied since Scripture declares that the whole universe is the body of the Lord. Hence the *Vedānta-sūtras* are called the '*Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā*', because they deal with Brahman, the śārīra (the embodied). G.B. 1.1.12.

¹ For the different meanings of the term 'atha' vide A.K., p. 311, line 8.

previous. Hence, the word “then” has the sense of ‘succession’ only; the word “therefore” implies the reason.

The reality which is obtainable by one who is devoted to the sound-Brahman,—in accordance with the following and other scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. ‘He who does not know the Veda does not know Him, the Great’, ‘There are two Brahmanas to be known, the sound-Brahman and what is Higher. Those who know the sound-Brahman go to the Higher Brahman’. (Maitrī 6.22),—and which is possessed of the characteristics to be mentioned hereafter, is the object denoted by the term ‘Brahman’. The word “enquiry” denotes a desire for the knowledge of the desired Brahman.

Although the suppliance of the verb (in the indicative mood, viz. ‘arises’) is appropriate here thus: “Then”, i.e. afterwards, “therefore”, i.e. for this reason, an “enquiry into Brahman” *arises*, it being possible for people with insight to have a spontaneous desire for enquiring into a particular object (viz. Brahman) (without being definitely told or enjoined by Scripture to do so), yet in concordance with the text: ‘O, the self verily is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated on, it is to be enquired into’ (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), we must understand here a grammatical concordance with a word implying injunction, viz. ‘should arise’.¹ In accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Desiring for release, one should see the self in the self alone’ (Bṛh. 4.4.23), the words ‘one who desires for release’ in the instrumental case, are implied here—such is the construction of the words (in the sūtra)².

Here the term “then”, implying ‘succession’, means: *After the knowledge regarding the nature of religious duties, the means thereto, the mode of performing them and their fruits—which form the subject of the enquiry into religious duties.*³ Thus, having studied the Veda with its parts,⁴—being first properly

¹ That is, we can of course make the sūtra complete thus: ‘Then, therefore, an enquiry into *Brahman* (arises)’, but it is better to complete it thus: ‘Then, therefore, an enquiry into *Brahman* (should arise)’, and make the sūtra an injunction and not a plain statement.

² Thus, the entire sūtra really means: ‘(*Mumukṣuṇā*) *athāto Brahma-jijñāsā (kartavyā)*’, or ‘(By one who desires salvation) then, therefore, an enquiry into *Brahman* (should be made)’.

³ I.e. the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

⁴ See footnote (1), p. 1.

initiated, as enjoined by the text 'One's own scripture should be studied'¹; having found, in a general way, the texts which are mutually contradictory, some depicting the non-permanence and others the permanence of the fruits of works thus: 'Undecaying, indeed, is the good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsyā² sacrifices' (Āp.Ś.S. 8.1.1³), 'We have drunk the soma-juice, we have become immortal' (Rg. V. 8.48.3⁴), 'Where there would be no heat, no cold, no weakness, no opponents' and so on⁵, and, 'Just as here the world, obtained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.6.1), 'That (work) of his has an end' (Brh. 3.8.10), 'The permanent, verily, cannot be obtained through the non-permanent (Kaṭha 1.2.10), 'What is not made is not (obtained) through what is made' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12), 'Frail, indeed, are these boats of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7), and so on;⁶ being thereby assailed with doubt; and unable to determine (the exact nature of the fruits of works) in particular, one, with a view to removing it (viz. the doubt), proceeds to make an enquiry into religious duties, and having, through such an enquiry, determined properly the nature of works, the mode of performing them and their fruits, one comes to have such a knowledge,—*after that*, this is the sense.⁷

The word "therefore" means 'because of the reason'. That is, the enquiry into Brahman should be undertaken, because the fruit of works are ascertained to be finite and surpassable from the scriptural passage: 'Just as here the world acquired by work perishes, so exactly hereafter, the world acquired by merit perishes' (Chānd. 8.1.6), and from the Smṛti passage: "The worlds beginning with the world of Brahmā come and go, O Arjuna" (Gītā 8.16); secondly, because

¹ A similar passage is found in Tait. Ār. 2.15, p. 153.

² Name of the three sacrifices performed at the beginning of the three seasons of four months. Vide Ved. In., p. 259, vol. 1.

³ P. 1, vol. 1.

⁴ P. 139, line 3.

⁵ These texts denote the permanence of the fruits of work.

⁶ These texts denote the non-permanence of the fruits of works.

⁷ That is, first a man studies (a) the *Veda* and finds mutually contradictory statements about the fruits of works. (b) This leads him to study the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, with a view to learning the real nature of works and their fruits, and he finds that the fruits of works are not everlasting. (c) This leads him to study the *Vedānta*, with a view to attaining what is permanent, viz. salvation. Hence the term '*atha*' means that the *Vedānta* is to be studied after the study of the *Veda* and the *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*.

that the knowledge of Brahman has a fruit which is unsurpassed and endless is ascertained from the following scriptural and Smṛti passages: 'Knowing him alone, one surpasses death, there is no other road to salvation' (Śvet. 3.8.), 'When men will roll up the sky like a piece of leather, then there will be an end of misery, (even) without knowing the Deity'¹ (Śvet. 6.20), 'Knowing the Deity, they are free from all fetters' (Śvet. 1.8; 2.15), 'He who, having searched the self, knows it, attains all the worlds and all objects of desires' (Chānd. 8.7.1.3), 'The person, of the size of a thumb only, abides in the self' (Kāṭha 4.12), 'Knowing him one surpasses death, there is no other path to salvation', '“Many people, purified by the penance of knowledge, have come to be of my nature”' (Gītā 4.10), 'He who possesses knowledge attains me' (Gītā 7.19), '“Knowing me one attains peace”' (Gītā 5.20) and so on; and, finally, because we find that one who is unacquainted with the self has been censured in Scripture as a wretched fellow and a self-killer, in the passages: 'Verily he who, O Gārgī, departs from this world, without knowing this Imperishable, is a vile and wretched creature' (Brh. 3.18.10); 'Those worlds are said to be sunless, surrounded by blind darkness. To them they go, after death, whosoever are destroyers of the self.' (Īśā. 3) and so on.²

Anticipating the question: By whom (is this enquiry to be undertaken)? (we reply): By one, who has grown indifferent to the fruits of works and so on because of those reasons (stated above); who, on hearing that the direct vision of the Lord is the special cause of salvation, has come to be seized with a strong inclination to have such a direct vision, which inclination is generated by proper discrimination, itself generated through it (viz. hearing); who is desirous of the grace of the Highest Person alone; who looks upon the spiritual preceptor as the only God; who has approached the spiritual teacher; who has whole-hearted devotion for the spiritual teacher; and who is desirous of final

¹ I.e. When the impossible will be possible, the sense being that the knowledge of *Brahman* is the only means of putting an end to miseries.

² That is, the enquiry into *Brahman* is to be undertaken because of three reasons, viz.: (1) because the fruits of works are not lasting and unsurpassed, (2) because the knowledge of *Brahman* leads to infinite bliss, i.e. salvation, and (3) because those who do not know *Brahman*, their self, are censured as worthless creatures. The word "*ataḥ*" (=therefore) in the *sūtra* implies these three reasons.

release,—such is the construction,—in accordance with the following scriptural passages: viz. ‘Having examined the worlds acquired by work, let a Brāhmaṇa be indifferent to them’ (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12), ‘When the seer sees the golden-coloured Creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā, the wise man, having discarded merit and demerit, and stainless, attains supreme identity’ (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), ‘When he sees the other, the Lord who is propitious and His greatness, he comes to be freed from sorrow’ (Muṇḍ. 3.1.2; Śvet. 4.7), ‘Thinking itself and the Mover as different, then favoured by Him, it goes to immortality’ (Śvet. 1.6), ‘The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and his works perish, when He, who is high and low, is seen’ (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), ‘He can be obtained by him alone whom He chooses. To him this self reveals its own form’ (Kāṭha 2.23), ‘One who has come to be freed from sorrow sees Him who is without active will and His greatness, through the grace of the Lord’ (Śvet. 3.20), ‘For the sake of this knowledge, let him, with fuel in hand, approach the teacher alone, who is versed in Scripture, and devoted to Brahman. To him, who has approached him, whose mind is completely calm, and who is endowed with tranquillity, the wise teacher truly told that knowledge of Brahman, through which he knows the Imperishable, the Person, the True’ (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12-13), ‘Be one to whom the preceptor is a God’ (Tait. 1.11), ‘To one who has the highest devotion for the Lord, as for God so for his teacher, to that great-souled one these matters which have been declared become manifest’ (Śvet. 6.23).

The compound “Brahma-jijñāsā” is to be explained as ‘The enquiry concerning Brahman!’¹ The genitive case: ‘concerning Brahman’² expresses the object, in accordance with the rule ‘The subject and the object (take the genitive case) when they are used along with a word ending with a *kṛt*-affix’ (Pāṇ. 2.3.65, SD.K. 623).³ ‘The enquiry concerning Brahman’ is a compound with the object-genitive,⁴ in accordance with the rule ‘The genitive is compounded, when used along with a word ending with the *kṛt*-affix (and the compound comes under the category of the *Ṣaṣṭhī-tat-puruṣa*)’ (K.V.S. 1317, quoted in SD.K. 703).⁵

¹ *Brahmaṇo jijñāsā*.

² P. 452, vol. 1.

⁴ I.e. a genitive denoting an object.

² *Brahmaṇah*.

⁵ P. 496, vol. 1.

Brahman is none but Lord Kṛṣṇa, the substratum of inconceivable, infinite, unsurpassed, natural and greatest nature and qualities and so on, omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, the cause of all, without an equal or a superior, all-pervading, and the one topic of all the Vedas, as known from the following scriptural and Smṛti passages, viz.: 'He grows and causes to grow, hence He is called the supreme Brahman', 'Who is omniscient, all-knowing' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), 'Supreme is his power, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and strength' (Śvet. 6.8), 'This is the Lord of all' (Bṛh. 4.4.22), 'Him, the supreme and great Lord among the lords; Him, the great God among the gods' (Śvet. 6.7), 'He has no work or organ, nothing is seen to be equal or superior to Him' (Śvet. 6.8), 'The Lord of matter and soul, the Lord of the attributes' (Śvet. 6.16), 'The One God is hidden in all beings, all-pervading, and the inner soul of all beings' (Śvet. 6.1.1), 'Kṛṣṇa alone alone is the Supreme Deity. Let one meditate on Him' (G.P.T.¹), '"I am the source of all, everything originates from me"' (Gītā 10.8), '"There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya"' (Gītā 7.7), '"I alone am to be known through all the Vedas"' (Gītā 15.15) and so on. (This explains the term "Brahman".)

(Now, the explanation of the term "jijñāsā":) Knowledge with regard to Him (viz. such Brahman) alone, i.e. the desire with regard to the knowledge of one so desired (viz. Brahman),—this is the sense. Scripture declares this in the Brhadāraṇyaka passage: 'O, the self is to be seen, to be heard, to be thought, to be meditated on' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), as well as in the Chāndogya passage: 'But the Plenty alone is to be enquired into' (Chānd. 7.23.1). In the passage: 'O Maitreyī, the self is to be seen' the suffix 'tavya' has the sense of 'fitness' simply, in accordance with the aphorism 'The suffixes "kṛt" and "tṛc" are used in the sense of fitness' (Pāṇ. 3.3.169; SD.K. 2822²), because the direct vision of Brahman is not something to be enjoined,³ it being established to be the intimate and inner means to salvation by the following texts:—"The knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and his works perish, when the soul,

¹ P. 205.

² P. 569.

³ That is, the above quotation simply means that the Self (*Brahman*) is *fit or worthy* to be seen, and not that the Self *should* be seen,—no injunction here with regard to seeing. See p. 9, footnote 4.

the Lord¹ is seen' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), 'Stainless, he attains a supreme identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'When he sees his glory, he becomes freed from grief' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.2; Śvet. 4.7), "'Then knowing me in truth, he forthwith enters into that'" (Gītā 18.55), and so on. Thus, with a view to having an access to 'seeing',²—which is known from another text, which consists in a direct vision of the Lord, and which is the unique means to salvation,—it is 'meditation',³—which is an intimate and inner means to it (viz. 'seeing'),—that is enjoined here.⁴ By the term 'knowledge', the reverend Bādarāyaṇa designated, in the aphorisms, the very same thing (viz. meditation), which is a synonym for the words 'contemplation', 'knowledge', 'supreme devotion', 'steadfast remembrance', the rule being that the aphorism and the text indicating the subject-matter (viz. the Upaniṣad-texts) must both have the same meaning. Now, here also, the texts denoting the subject-matter are of a greater weight, as they, as the primary object, are authoritative by themselves; and hence, the meaning of the aphorisms is to be interpreted in accordance with them alone, otherwise they cannot stand in a relation of subject-matter and what treats of the subject-matter.⁵ In Scripture, 'hearing'⁶ and 'thinking'⁷ are laid down as means to 'meditation',⁸ since these two also are indirect means to the attainment of salvation. Thus, having ascertained that the Vedānta-texts are concerned with demonstrating the nature, attributes and the rest of the Lord, one approaches a preceptor, who has directly intuited the nature and the rest of Brahman, the object to be worshipped demonstrable by the Vedānta-texts, and learns the meaning of those texts from him who has himself realized

1 Correct reading '*Tasmin dṛṣṭe parāvare*', or when he, who is high and low, is seen. Vide Muṇḍ. 2.2.8, p. 31; C.U., p. 528.

3 *Nididhyāsana*.

2 *Sravaṇa*.

4 That is, in the above text (Bṛh.), the Lord is not enjoined to be seen but to be meditated on, meditation leading to seeing or direct vision which is the immediate cause of salvation.

5 That is, the *Vedānta-sūtras* lay down what is contained in the *Upaniṣads*. Hence the *Vedānta-sūtras* are the *viśayin* or what treat of the subject-matter, and the *Upaniṣad*-texts are the *viśaya*, or the subject treated. Now, the *viśayin* and the *viśaya* must, evidently, refer to the same thing. And here, the *viśaya* being of a greater force, the *viśayin* must be understood in accordance with the *viśaya*, or the *sūtras* are to be understood in the light of the *Upaniṣads*. Hence as the latter enjoin meditation, the former must also do so.

8 *Nididhyāsana*.

7 *Manana*.

6 *Sravaṇa*.

that meaning directly. This is 'hearing'.¹ 'Thinking' is a kind of reflection, by means of arguments which are in conformity with Scripture, with a view to making the meaning of what has been 'heard' and taught, the object of one's own realization.² 'Meditating' means a ceaseless contemplation on the object of 'thinking', which (contemplation) is the unique cause of a direct vision (of the Lord). Accordingly, this (viz. the above *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*-text) is an *apūrva-vidhi*³ concerning 'meditation', since (salvation is) absolutely unobtainable (without meditation).⁴

The explanation of the (above-quoted *Chāndogya*) text 'The Plenty', etc., may be seen under the explanation of the aphorism 'The Plenty', etc. (Br. Sū. 1.3.7).

The resulting meaning is that salvation can be obtained by an individual, eternally fettered, and desiring for salvation, who was, by chance, looked upon (with favour) by Madhusūdāna at the time of his birth,⁵ who has practised the group of means (to salvation), who has worshipped the feet of his preceptor, and who has a direct vision of Brahman, obtained through the hearing of, thinking upon and meditating on Him, knowable through the Vedānta.

¹ That is, a man first ascertains that the *Vedānta*-texts demonstrate the Lord, and then approaches a teacher and learns the meaning of those texts from him.

² That is, for realizing directly for himself what he has so far accepted on the authority of his preceptor.

³ An '*apūrva-vidhi*' is a *vidhi* which enjoins something that is absolutely necessary and indispensable for the production of the desired result, e.g. when it is enjoined : 'The rice-grains are to be sprinkled over with water', it is meant that without this sprinkling, the desired result, viz. the *saṃskāra* of these rice-grains or making them fit for being used in a sacrifice cannot be attained by any other means. Hence, here the *vidhi* with regard to the sprinkling is an '*apūrva-vidhi*'. In the very same manner, the above *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text : 'The self should be seen, be heard, be thought, be meditated on', lays down an '*apūrva-vidhi*' regarding meditation, since without meditation, the desired result, viz. salvation, cannot be attained by any other means.

For the different kinds of *vidhis*—viz. *apūrva*, *niyama* and *pari-saṃkhyā*, see V.R.M., pp. 41-43.

⁴ This finishes the explanation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text 'O friend, the self should be seen', etc.

⁵ Vide V.R.M., p. 133 ; also p. 142, where it is said that only one man in a thousand is looked at with favour by *Madhusūdāna* at the time of his birth, and that not by chance, but because of the merits accumulated through thousands of previous births.

Salvation means attaining the nature of the Lord, resulting from the cessation of the bondage of matter in its causal¹ and effected forms,² as known from the scriptural text: 'Having attained the form of supreme light, he is completed in his own form' (Chānd. 8.3.4 ; 8.12.2, 3); as well as from the aphorisms: 'Because release is taught of him who takes his stand upon it' (Br. Sū. 1.1.7), 'And (Scripture) teaches in it the union of this with that' (Br. Sū. 1.1.20) and so on; and from the Smṛti passage, viz.: 'The attainment of the Lord, characterized by a feeling of unsurpassed joy and happiness, exclusive and absolute, is supposed to be an antidote (to the disease of transmigratory existence)', '“Many people, purified by the penance of knowledge have come to attain my nature”' (Gītā 4.10) and so on. The word 'nature'³ has been explained by the Lord Himself in the passage '“Resorting to this knowledge, they have come to have similarity with me”' (Gītā 14.2). This we shall expound more clearly in the chapter dealing with the fruit.⁴

Then, in answer to the enquiry:—Of what nature is the individual, desiring salvation? Of what nature is his bondage?—the scriptural truth is being considered now, in order that those who desire for salvation may have an easy access to Scripture.

Now, there are three kinds of reality, distinguished as the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman, because in the aphorisms as well, a trinity of reals has been mentioned, viz. the object to be enquired into (i.e. Brahman), the enquirer (i.e. the sentient), and māyā (i.e. the non-sentient) which consists in the three guṇas and is the original cause of his (viz. the enquirer's) nescience, as otherwise the very enquiry will be impossible; and also because of the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'By knowing the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, everything has been said. This is the three-fold Brahman' (Śvet. 1.21). 'Perishable are all beings, the changeless is called the Imperishable' (Gītā 15.16), 'But the Highest Person is another, declared to be the supreme self' (Gītā 15.17) and so on.

Among these, the sentient substance is different from the class of non-sentient substances; is of the nature of knowledge; possessed of the attributes of being a knower, being an agent and so on; of the

¹ I.e. *pradhāna*, the primal matter.

² I.e. the body, an effect of *pradhāna*.

³ *Bhāva*.

⁴ Viz. the fourth chapter.

form of an Ego; has its very nature, existence and activity under the control of the Lord; is atomic in size; different in every body; and subject to bondage and release. As has been said: 'The individual soul is of the nature of knowledge, under the control of the Lord, fit to be associated with and dissociated from a body, atomic, different in every body, possessed of the quality of being a knower and that which they call, endless. But through the grace of the Lord, verily they know it, the form of which is associated with beginningless *Māyā*.¹ The (ever-) free, the bound and the bound-freed,² (such are the three broad classes of souls); and then again it should be known that there is a multitude of divisions (of these, viz. the ever-free, etc.)'. (D.Ś. 1-2).³ There are scriptural and *Smṛti* texts, as well as aphorisms to this effect, viz.: 'Verily, different from this (soul) consisting of the mind is another internal soul, consisting of intelligence' (Tait. 2.4), 'Just as a lump of salt is without an inside and an outside, and is entirely a mass of savour simply, so, verily, O! this self is without an inside or an outside, and is entirely a mass of intelligence simply' (Bṛh. 4.5.13), 'Here this person becomes self-illuminating' (Bṛh. 4.3.9.14), 'O! undecaying, verily, is this self, possessing indestructibility as its attribute' (Bṛh. 4.5.14), 'Now he who knows: "Let me smell this", which self is he?' 'This person who among the senses is made of knowledge, who is the light within the heart' (Bṛh. 4.3.7). 'This, verily, is the person of the essence of intelligence who sees, hears, tastes, smells, thinks and knows' (Praśna 4.9),⁴ 'There is, verily, no cessation of the seeing of the seer, because it (i.e. the soul) is indestructible; there is, verily, no cessation of the hearing of the hearer, because it is indestructible; there is, verily, no cessation of the thinking of the thinker, because it is indestructible; there is, verily, no cessation of the knowing of the knower, because it is indestructible' (Bṛh. 4.3.23), "'By whom, O! should the knower be known?"' (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5.15), 'This person simply knows', 'The seer does not see death, nor disease, nor, again, suffering'

¹ That is, the real nature of the soul is distorted through its connection with *māyā* or matter and *karma*, yet individuals can know the real nature of their selves through the grace of the Lord. See V.R.M., pp. 20-21.

² That is, the souls which were bound once, but are freed now.

³ For details, see V.R.M.

⁴ Quotation incomplete. The correct quotation is ' who sees, touches, hears, smells, tastes, thinks, knows and acts'. Vide Praśna 4.9, pp. 41-42.

(Chānd. 7. 26. 2). 'He is the best person, . . . not remembering this appendage of the body' (Chānd. 8.12.3), 'So exactly do the seer's sixteen parts, going to the Person, on attaining the Person, merge in (Him)' (Prašna 6.5), "'Just as the one sun manifests the entire world, so O Bhārata, does the owner of the field (viz. the individual soul) manifest the whole field (viz. the body)'" (Gītā 13.34), 'A knower, for that very reason' (Br. Sū. 2.3.19), 'An agent, on account of scripture having a sense (Br. Sū. 2.3.32).¹ 'I am thou, verily, O Deity! he is I, I am Brahman, thus I bow down to the Death of death', 'He shining alone, everything shines after him; through his light all this shines' (Kaṭha 2.2.15), 'He alone makes him, whom he wishes to lead upwards from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes him, whom he wishes to lead downwards from these worlds, do evil deeds' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'Whether He may make him do good or evil, not even thereby is the Lord in fault', 'The individual soul is small in power, not independent and insignificant';² 'Atomic, verily, is this soul. These two, merit and demerit, bind it', 'The individual soul should be known as the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold, yet it is capable of infinity' (Śvet. 5.9), 'Verily, (the soul) is perceived to be like the tip of the spoke of a wheel only, and insignificant, through its quality of buddhi, and through its own attributes' (Śvet. 5.8), '(There is the mention, of departing, going and returning' (Br. Sū. 2.3.19), 'If it be said, not atomic, because Scripture declares what is not that, (we reply:) no, because the topic is something else' (Br. Sū. 2.3.21), 'That designation is on account of having that quality for its essence, as in the case of the Intelligent soul' (Br. Sū. 2.3.28);³ 'The Eternal among the eternal, the Conscious among the conscious, the One among the many, who bestows objects of desire' (Kaṭha 5.13), 'A part, on account of the designation of a plurality' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42),⁴ 'There is indeed another different soul, called the elemental soul,—

¹ These texts and aphorisms set forth the essential nature of the individual soul, viz. that it is knowledge by nature, a knower, an agent and an enjoyer.

² These texts also set forth the essential nature of the soul, viz. its dependence on the Lord for its activity and its non-difference from Him in that sense.

³ These texts and sūtras set forth the size of the soul, viz. its atomicity.

⁴ These texts and aphorisms set forth the number of the souls, viz. that there is a plurality of souls.

he who being overcome by the white or dark fruits of works, attains a good or bad birth. . . . Because of being deluded, he does not see the Lord, the causer of action and dwelling within the self. He is borne along and defiled by the properties of matter' (Maitrī. 3.2),¹ 'An unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying. Another unborn one discards her, who has been enjoyed' (Śvet. 4.15), 'Stainless, he attains a supreme identity' (Mund. 3.1.3), 'He does not return again' (K.R. 2), 'Non-return, on account of scriptural texts' (Br. Sū. 4.4.22)² and so on.

The non-sentient substance is of three kinds, viz. what is derived from matter, what is not derived from matter and time.³ As has been said:—'What is derived from matter, what is not derived from matter and time,—these are held to be the non-sentient. (The second is) denotable by the term 'māyā', 'pradhāna' and the rest, and there are distinctions of white and the rest in it, although it is the same' (D.Ś. 3.). Among these, the substance which is the substratum of the three guṇas is the prākṛta. It is eternal as well as subject to changes like transformation and so on, as declared by the following scriptural texts:—'A cow she is white, black and red, without beginning and end,⁴ the progenitress, and the source of all beings, milking all wishes for the Lord' (Cūl. 5), 'There is an unborn one red, white and black, producing many progeny of the same nature' (Śvet. 4.5) and so on; by the Smṛti passages, viz.: 'This, consisting of the three guṇas, is the source of the world and is without beginning and end' (V.P. 1.2.21a),⁵ 'Non-sentient, for the sake of another, ever-changing, consisting of the three guṇas, the field of works—such is said to be the form of prakṛti' and so on; as well as by the following aphorisms: 'It has a sense, on account of its subordination to Him' (Br. Sū. 1.4.3), 'As in the case of the sacrificial ladle, for want of any specification' (Br. Sū. 1.4.8), 'But that which has light for its cause, because thus, in fact, some read' (Br. Sū. 1.4.9) and so on. The

¹ Quotation incorrect. Vide *Maitrī.*, pp. 369, 371. Correct quotation translated.

² These texts and aphorisms set forth the liability of the souls to bondage and release.

³ *Prākṛta*, *aprākṛta* and *kāla*.

⁴ Correct reading '*anāda-vatī*' or without sound. For correct quotation, vide Cūl. 5, p. 230.

⁵ P. 14.

guṇas are sattva, rajas and tamas. That very prakṛti, being transformed, through its own guṇas, into the body, the sense-organs, the mind and intelligence of the individual souls, and through being a hindrance to salvation, is said to be the cause of the bondage of the individual soul. It is the cause of the universe, beginning with the mahat and ending with the cosmic egg, and its products are to be known as non-permanent.

Next, the aprākṛta is a non-sentient substance, absolutely different from prakṛti consisting of three guṇas and time, occupies a region different from the sphere of prakṛti, and is denoted by the terms 'eternal manifestation', 'the region of Viṣṇu', 'the supreme void', 'the supreme place', 'the world of Brahman' and so on, as declared by the following scriptural texts and aphorisms:— 'Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness' (Śvet. 3.8; Gītā 8.9), 'He who is its Master in the supreme void', 'That supreme region of Viṣṇu the wise see always' (Nṛ. Pūr. 5.10; Skanda 15; Mukti 2.77; Vāsu 4), 'But the man whose charioteer is intelligence, and the mind, the reins, attains the end of the road, the supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kāṭha 3.9), 'Having obtained the soul, I become united with the uncreated world of Brahman' (Chānd. 8.13.1), 'He does not return again' (K.R. 2), 'Non-return, on account of scriptural texts' (Br. Sū. 4.4.22) and so on; as well as by the following verses in the Mahā-bhārata—viz.: 'Whom they call prakṛti, the eternal, because He is the original source of all beings—the Divinity, without beginning and end, the Lord Nārāyaṇa, Hari. His supreme place is manifested beyond the abode of Brahmā. That celestial, luminous place which the gods do not see, more brilliant than the sun and fire, is the place of Viṣṇu the Great, and through its own rays, O king! it is difficult to be seen by gods and demons. The ascetics endowed with penance, infused with auspicious deeds, perfected by Yoga, great-souled, and devoid of ignorance and delusion, go there to Lord Nārāyaṇa, Hari, the adorable. Having gone there, they do not, O Bhārata, return to this world again. This place is, O king, eternal and undecaying, for this, O Yudhiṣṭhira, is always the proof of the Lord. Higher than the seat of Brahmā is that supreme place of Viṣṇu, which some people who are endowed with knowledge and intelligence, and want to reach the supreme place, know to be pure, eternal, luminous and the supreme Brahman. That place is immensely holy, full of holy families, going where men do not grieve, do not return, do not feel pain. But those Sattvatas attain

here the place of Brahman'. The same thing is found in the Gītā. Compare, e.g. the statement by the Lord, viz.: "'Through His grace,¹ you shall obtain supreme peace and an eternal place"' (Gītā 18.62). And through the beginningless desire of the Lord, it is manifold in forms, as the objects of His enjoyment and of His ever-free souls, and not liable to any alternations of evolution and the rest; since it is beyond time, in accordance with the text: 'That manifestation, of which time, composed of Kalās² and minutes, is not the cause of transformation. Your eight-fold attributes and lordship, O Lord, are natural and supreme'. Next, time is a species of non-sentient substance, different from both the prākṛta and the aprākṛta, eternal and all-pervading, in accordance with the scriptural text; 'Now, eternal, verily, are the soul, matter and time'; and also because in the text: "'Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning"' (Chānd. 6.2.1), the existence of time, denoted by the term 'beginning', is declared; as well as on account of the Smṛti passage:—'The Lord Time is beginningless, and has, O Brahmin, no end' (V.P. 1.2.26a³). 'There can be no apprehension in the world which does not involve time.' It is the special cause of the conventional uses (of such terms) as 'past', 'future', 'present', 'simultaneous', 'lasting', 'quick' and so on; assisting in the creation and the rest; and the special cause of the conventional use (of different measures of time), beginning with the paramāṇu and ending with the parārdha.⁴ Since it is well-known from the Purāṇas, no detailed account is given here. All objects derived from prakṛti are dependent on time. But although time is the regulator of everything, it is itself regulated by the Supreme Lord, in accordance with the text: 'Who is a knower, the Time of time, possessor of attributes, omniscient' (Śvet. 6.2).

The meaning of the word "Brahman" has already been expounded above. He is Lord Kṛṣṇa, an abode of groups of qualities like Creatorship of the world and the rest, to be mentioned hereafter, and is denoted by the words 'Supreme Brahman', 'Nārāyaṇa', 'Vāsudeva' and so on. As has been said: 'Let us meditate on Kṛṣṇa, on Hari, with eyes like

¹ Correct quotation 'tat-prasādāt' and not 'mat-prasādāt'.

² Kalā is a particular division of time. M.W., p. 261.

³ P. 15.

⁴ A paramāṇu is the time taken by the sun to traverse past an atom of matter and so on. Vide V.R.M., p. 38, for details.

lotus, on Brahman, supreme and adorable, free by nature from all faults, and one mass of infinite auspicious qualities, and having the vyūhas¹ as His limbs' (D.Ś. 4).

The mutual differences among these (three) substances, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman are taught by the texts contained respectively in the different chapters (treating of these three) and indicating the respective peculiarities of their qualities and nature. The non-difference of the sentient and the non-sentient is taught in the following texts:—"Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second" (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Ait. 1.1.1), 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.31; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), 'This soul is Brahman' (Bṛh. 4.4.5), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'I am you, verily, O reverend Deity', 'Then he knows the self alone: "I am Brahman"'.²

In this way, the two kinds of texts being both authoritative in their primary and literal import, the sentient and the non-sentient, though of different natures (from Brahman), yet are non-different from Brahman, because they have their existence and activity under His control,—just as the sense-organs, though of different natures (from the vital-breath) are yet non-different from the vital-breath, because they are under its control, as is well-known from the dialogue between the vital-breath and the sense-organs in the Chāndogya: 'Verily, they are not called speech, eyes, or mind, but called the vital-breath alone' (Chānd. 5.1.15). Hence the view of the author of the aphorisms is that Brahman, the object to be enquired into, is both different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient. For that very reason, there is no necessity for enquiring into the two realities (viz. the sentient and the non-sentient), and the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all² fits in well. As has been said: 'Hence, all knowledge concerning all objects is true, since they, as declared by Scripture and Smṛti, have Brahman

¹ The vyūhas are Vāsudeva, Saṅkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Vide V.R.M., pp. 47-49, for details.

² Vide Chānd. 6.1 ff. The sense is that the sūtras recommend an enquiry into Brahman alone, and not into the sentient and the non-sentient, not because these two are unreal, but simply because by enquiring into Brahman, the Cause, we come to know of the sentient and the non-sentient too, the effects, and hence no separate enquiry is necessary.

for their essence,—this is the view of those who are versed in the Vedas, and the Trinity of Reals too is established by Scripture and aphorisms' (D.Ś.7). The following aphorisms may be referred to: 'A part, on account of the mention of variety, and otherwise, some even read the status of a fisherman, a knave and so on' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42), 'But on account of the mention of both, as in the case of a snake and its coil' (Br. Sū. 3.2.27), 'Or, like the substratum of light, because of being light' (Br. Sū. 3.2.28) and so on. Detailed explanations may be seen further on.

Since this aphorism (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), ascertaining the meaning of Scripture, is of the nature of an introduction, the indispensable factors (in the study of a particular subject) are also mentioned virtually by it, with a view to encouraging people with insight to (the study of) Scripture. These are: the person entitled (to the study), the topic, the relation and the purpose.¹ Among these, one who is desirous of release and possessed of the stated marks² is the person entitled (to the study of the Vedānta). The topic is the Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, denoted by the term 'Brahman' and the rest, omniscient, the substratum of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes and powers persisting as long as He Himself does, the Controller of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra, matter, atoms, time, karma, and Nature, who is absolutely untouched by faults and who is the substratum of a natural difference—non-difference from the sentient and the non-sentient. The relation is that between a topic and what treats of the topic.³ The purpose here is salvation, characterized by attaining the state of the Lord.

Here ends the section entitled 'The enquiry' (1).

Comparison of Nimbārka's reading and interpretation with the readings and interpretations of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva.⁴

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different. According to Nimbārka, the term "atha" (=then) signifies: 'after the study of the Veda and the Pūrva-

¹ *Adhikārin, viṣaya, sambandha, prayojana.*

² See above, pp. 11-14.

³ See above, p. 9 of the book and footnote 5 there.

⁴ Only the points of differences will be noted.

mīmāṃsā'. But according to Śaṅkara, this is not the case. He points out that the study of the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā is by no means an essential pre-requisite to the study of Brahman.¹ There is no essential connection between the enquiry into religious duties and that into Brahman. On the contrary, there is an absolute difference between them as regards the result and the object of enquiry.² The result of the former is the attainment of worldly and heavenly enjoyment, which is something to be accomplished; while the result of the latter is salvation, which is not something to be accomplished, being eternal and ever-accomplished. This being so, the essential pre-requisite to the enquiry into Brahman is not the enquiry into religious duties, but the acquisition of the four qualifications³,—viz. (1) discrimination between eternal and non-eternal objects, (2) aversion to the enjoyment of the objects of sense, here or hereafter, (3) possession of self-restraint, tranquillity and the rest⁴ and (4) the desire of emancipation.⁵

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same, only much more elaborate. Rāmānuja points out that the two Mīmāṃsās—viz. the Karma-mīmāṃsā and the Brahma-mīmāṃsā constitute one connected whole, the first naturally leading to the second,⁶ and criticises at length, in this connection, the Śaṅkarite view that the enquiry into Brahman does not necessarily presuppose the enquiry into religious duties.⁷

Bhāskara

Literal interpretation same, but *import* different. Bhāskara develops here his peculiar doctrine of jñāna-karma-samuccaya, or

¹ Ś.B. 1.1.1. 'Dharma-jijñāsāyāḥ prāg api adhūta-Vedāntasya Brahma-jijñāsopapatteḥ', p. 71.

² Ś.B. 1.1.1. 'Dharma-brahma-jijñāsāyoh phala-jijñāsya-bhedācca' (p. 74).

³ Sādhana-catustaya.

⁴ I.e. śama (control of the internal organ, viz. the mind), dama (control of the external sense-organs), uparati (indifference to worldly pursuits), titikṣā (endurance of the opposite extremes, like heat and cold, pleasure and pain, etc.), śraddhā (faith in the scripture and the spiritual teachers), and samādhāna (deep concentration).

⁵ Ś.B. 1.1.1. 'Nityānitya-vastu-vivekaḥ, ihāmutrārtha-phalabhoga-virāgaḥ, śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat, mumukṣutvaṇ ca'.

⁶ Śrī. B. 1.1.1. 'Vakṣyati ca Karma-brahma-mīmāṃsāyor aikauśtryam', etc., p. 2, vol. 1 (Madras ed.).

⁷ Op. cit., pp. 5-13, vol. 1.

combination of knowledge and work. Thus, according to both Nimbārka and Bhāskara, the enquiry into Brahman should be undertaken *after* an enquiry into religious duties, *but for different reasons*. According to Nimbārka, the prior study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā convinces us of the transitory nature of the fruits of karmas, and this naturally leads us to the study of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, with a view to attaining a permanent fruit therefrom, viz. salvation. For this reason, we study *first* the Pūrva-mīmāṃsā, and *then* the Uttara-mīmāṃsā or the Vedānta.

But according to Bhāskara, we enquire into Karmas *before* enquiring into Brahman for quite different reasons, viz. (1) We do not enquire into Karmas first and then into Brahman, because the former are transitory, the latter not; but we enquire into both Karmas and Brahman, for the very same reason, viz. because we know that they both play an equal part in the attainment of salvation. Salvation can be obtained through a proper combination of knowledge and works, and unless we *first* know the nature of the works themselves, we cannot possibly decide which kinds of works are to be resorted to and combined with knowledge, and which kinds to be avoided and not to be so combined. It is for this reason, that we *first* study the Karma-mīmāṃsā, and *then* the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, and combine the obligatory works with knowledge, avoiding those that are undertaken for selfish ends.

(2) Further, the Vedānta deals with various kinds of meditations on the subordinate parts of sacrifices—, e.g. the meditation on the udgītha and so on. But unless we are first acquainted with the nature of those sacrifices themselves, such meditations are not possible. It is for this reason also that we first study the Karma-mīmāṃsā, and then the Brahma-mīmāṃsā.¹

Bhāskara also criticises here the Śāṃkarite interpretation of the term “*atha*”.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Literal interpretation same, but *import* different. That is, Nimbārka and Śrīkaṇṭha both agree that the Brahma-mīmāṃsā is to be studied after the study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā, but the *reason* for this, as given by Śrīkaṇṭha, is different from that given by Nimbārka. We have already seen the reason given by Nimbārka. But

¹ Bh. B. 111, p. 2.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 3–5.

according to Śrīkaṇṭha, we must first study religious duties and then Brahman, because the two stand in a relation of worship (ārādhana) and the worshipped (ārādhyā),¹ cause (hetu) and effect,² means (sādhana) and end (sādhya)³. The proper performance of Karmas purifies the mind. But unless we first know the nature, etc. of Karmas, we cannot perform them properly, i.e. choose the right ones (nitya and naimittika ones) and avoid others (kāmya ones), and unless we perform karmas properly, our mind is not purified, and unless our mind is purified, there can be no rise of knowledge in it. It is for this reason that we should first study the Karma-mīmāṃsā and then the Brahma-mīmāṃsā.⁴ Like Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha holds that the Karma-mīmāṃsā and the Brahma-mīmāṃsā form one and the same treatise.⁵

Baladeva

Interpretation different. According to Baladeva also, the word “*atha*” means ‘immediate sequence’, but he points out that it cannot be said that the study of the Karma-mīmāṃsā is an essential prerequisite to the study of the Brahma-mīmāṃsā, for it is often found that even one who knows the Karma-mīmāṃsā by heart, but who is deprived of the company of the good, has no desire to enquire into Brahman, while one who does not know the Karma-mīmāṃsā, but is purified by truthfulness, prayer, etc. and associates with the good, has a natural inclination to enquire into Brahman. It cannot be said also that the term “*atha*” means that the enquiry into Brahman can be undertaken only after the acquisition of the four-fold qualifications, viz. discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal and the rest, as held by Śaṅkara, for these cannot be acquired unless one first associates with the good and the holy.⁶

Hence, what the term “*atha*” means is as follows:—A man who has properly studied the Veda and has understood its meaning in a general way, who has faithfully performed the duties incumbent on

¹ ŚK.B. 1.1.1, p. 34, Part 1.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 37, 39, Part 1.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 39, 43, Part 1.

⁴ ŚK.B. 1.1.1, pp. 33, 39, 43, 50, 68, 70, Part 1. Of course Śrīkaṇṭha is

not a *Jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vādin* like *Bhāskara*.

⁵ ŚK.B. 1.1.1, p. 33, Part 1.

⁶ G.B. 1.1.1, pp. 24-25, chap. 1.

his own stage of life, who is truthful and so on, whose mind has become purified by the performance of duties in a disinterested spirit and who has come into contact with a knower of truth, should then commence an enquiry into Brahman, for then he is convinced that the fruits of works undertaken with selfish ends in view are but transitory, while Brahman alone is the cause of eternal happiness.¹

Thus, the five pre-requisites to the enquiry into Brahman are:—
(1) Study of the Veda. (2) Proper performance of the duties incumbent on one's own stage of life. (3) Purification of the mind by such performance of works in a disinterested spirit. (4) Association with the good and the holy. (5) The consequent acquirement of the faculty of discriminating between the permanent and the non-permanent, disgust for non-permanent worldly objects and desire to know the permanent in details.

All the commentators agree in holding that the word “atah” means ‘because the fruits of Karmas are transitory, while the knowledge of Brahman alone leads to eternal bliss’.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled ‘The Origin’.
(Sūtra 2)

SŪTRA 2

“(BRAHMAN IS THAT) FROM WHOM (ARISE) THE ORIGIN AND THE REST OF THIS (WORLD).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Now, with regard to the characteristics of Brahman, the author states the correct conclusion:

That very Lord—the substratum of infinite attributes like omniscience, etc. and the ruler of Brahmā, Śiva time and the rest,—from whom arise the origination, subsistence and dissolution “of this”, i.e. of the universe,—endowed with manifold combinations, the abode of innumerable peculiarities of names and forms and the like; and the form of which is inconceivable,—is Brahman, the object of the above statement (viz. Sū. 1.1.1)—this is the meaning of the characterizing text.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 19-20, chap. 1.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman, called Lord Kṛṣṇa, great in qualities, powers and nature, has been established in the previous section. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What are His characteristics?—the same Being (viz. Brahman) is being demonstrated, as having the qualities of 'being the agent of the origin and the rest of the world', 'being omniscient', 'being true' and so on.

Here the words "of this" denote the effect, viz. the world; and the words "from whom" denote the cause. The word 'Brahman' is to be supplied here from the previous aphorism. And, there being an universal correlation between the terms 'yat' and 'tat', the term 'tat' too must be supplied here.¹

(Next the compound "janmādi" is explained:—) 'That of which "origin" is the beginning'—is "janmādi", i.e. creation, subsistence, dissolution and salvation. This is a Bahuvrīhi compound of the tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna type.²

That "from whom",—i.e. the Lord, the Highest Person, the Lord of all, omniscient, omnipotent, the supreme cause and the ruler of all,—arise the origination, subsistence, dissolution, and salvation "of this", i.e. of the world, which is manifested by names and forms connected with enjoyers (viz. the souls) divided variously; which is the constant abode of the enjoying of place, time and fruits; and the composition of which is beyond the grasp of reasoning—is Brahman. He alone is to be enquired into by those who desire for salvation,—this is the construction of the words in the aphorism.

¹ Thus the construction of the sūtra is:—'Janmādy asya yataḥ Brahmanāḥ tataḥ'.

² There are two kinds of Bahuvrīhi, viz. tad-guṇa-saṃjñāna and atad-guṇa-saṃjñāna. In the former case, the compounds, the noun (*viśeṣya*) has direct connection with and implies the words compounded (*viśeṣaṇas*), e.g. when it is said 'Bring the man with long ears' (*Lamba-karṇam ānaya*), the bringing of the man implies the bringing of his attribute, viz. the ears, as well and the man (*viśeṣya*) and his ears (*viśeṣaṇas*) are directly connected. In the latter case, there is no such direct connection between the compound and the words compounded, e.g. when it is said 'Bring the man who has seen the sea' (*Dṛṣṭa-sāgaram ānaya*), the bringing of the man does not imply the bringing of his attribute, viz. the sea, and there is no direct connection between the two.

Now, 'Janmādi' is a Bahuvrīhi of the first kind and hence it includes in its meaning 'janma' too.

There are scriptural texts to this effect,—beginning:—‘Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa approached his father, (with the request) “Sir, teach me Brahman”’ (Tait. 3.1), and continuing:—‘“From, whom, verily, all these beings arise, by whom they, so born, live and to whom they go forth and enter,—enquire into that, that is Brahman”’ (Tait. 3.1), ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2.1) and so on. (The meaning of the first of the above two texts is:—) ‘From whom’, i.e. from Lord Puruṣottama, ‘all these beings’, i.e. all objects from the mahat down to a tuft of grass, ‘arise’,—hereby the origination (of the world from the Lord) is indicated. ‘By whom, they, so born, live’,—hereby the subsistence (of the world in Brahman) is indicated. ‘They enter’,—hereby the dissolution (of the world into the Lord) is shown. ‘To whom they go forth,’—meaning—‘whom they attain after the destruction of all karmas’,—hereby salvation (of the souls) is indicated. Here ‘origination’ means the expansion of the manifold consciousness of the sentient being, due to its connection with a body and the rest; and ‘dissolution’ means its entrance into the Cause (viz. Brahman), resulting from the contraction of its consciousness. This will be made clear under the explanations of the two aphorisms, viz. ‘Dependent on the movable and the immovable’ (Br. Sū. 2.3.16) and so on. The distinction (between the sentient and the non-sentient) is that the non-sentient is more primary, having a different form at the beginning of creation.¹

The meaning of the second text, on the other hand, is that Brahman possesses the attributes of truth, knowledge and infinitude. Here, the word ‘truth’ distinguishes the Lord from what is not true, the word ‘knowledge’ from the group of the non-sentient, and the word ‘infinite’ from the group of the sentient.

And, thus it is established that the characteristic mark of Brahman is that He, being the one non-distinct material and efficient cause of the universe, is possessed of truth and the rest. He is the material cause² in the sense of being the manifestor, in a gross form, of His own

¹ That is, the non-sentient is more primary than the sentient in the sense that it is prior to the sentient in point of time. Right in the beginning of creation, the individual soul does not exist, in the sense that there is nobody with which it may be connected, but *pradhāna* does, though not in the form of particular non-sentient substances like stones and houses, etc., and the body comes to be evolved later on. Cf. *Sāṃkhya* theory of evolution.

² *Upādānatva*.

natural powers, denoted by the terms 'higher', 'lower' and so on, and reduced to a subtle state; as well as of the effects, existent and inherent in them respectively. He is the efficient cause¹ in the sense of bringing about a union of the sentient beings,—whose attribute of knowledge is in a state of absolute contraction being under the influence of the past impressions of their own karmas which are beginningless, and is, thereby, unfit for bringing about the recollection (in their minds) of the retributive experiences (to be undergone in the present birth),—with their respective karmas, and the respective instruments for experiencing them, through manifesting (in them) knowledge, enabling them to experience the fruits of karmas.²

There is a Smṛti passage too, conformable to the text dealing with the topic in hand, (i.e. the above Taittirīya text, 3.1) in the Mokṣa-dharma.³ It begins: 'The Scripture which was mentioned by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked' (Mahā. 12.6769b⁴), and continues: '“He, verily, is the Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite, abiding as the inner Soul of all beings, and difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self, who is the creator of the principle of egoity for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been asked by you here”' (Mahā. 12.6784b-6786a⁵).

¹ *Nimittatva*.

² The Lord is the material cause of the universe in the sense that creation means the manifestation of His subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient into gross effects. That is, during dissolution, the entire universe of the sentient and the non-sentient merges in the Lord and exists in Him in a subtle state as His natural powers. Then, in the beginning of a new creation, the Lord manifests these powers of the sentient and the non-sentient (*cit-śakti* and *acit-śakti*), developing them into grosser effects and producing, thereby, the universe of names and forms.

And the Lord is the efficient cause of the universe in the sense that He unites individual souls with their respective *karmas*, the results of these *karmas*, and the instruments for experiencing them—that is, the Lord is the efficient cause in the sense that He regulates the destinies of individual souls in accordance with strict justice. During dissolution, the beginningless impressions of past karmas get dimmed and confused; and at the time of a new creation, the Lord revives these impressions in particular individuals, thereby making each individual undergo the fruits of his past works. Vide V.R.M., p. 63.

³ 'Mokṣa-dharma' is the name of a section of the twelfth book of the *Māhā-bhārata*, from *adhyaya* 174 to the end.

⁴ P. 604, line 7, vol. 3.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, lines 22-24.

If it be objected:—In the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, a multitude of causes is spoken of in the passage: ‘Time, nature, destiny, accident, elements and the Person should be known as the Cause’ (Śvet. 1.2), so what authority is there for separating specifically Vāsudeva, the Highest Person alone as the cause of the world?—(then we reply:) Listen. A multitude of scriptural and Smṛti passages is our authority for specifying the cause of the world. Compare the following:— ‘He, the One, who governs all these causes, connected with time and soul’ (Śvet. 1.3), ‘He who is a knower, the Time of time, possessed of attributes, omniscient’ (Śvet. 6.2), ‘Of whom there is neither a creator, nor a lord’ (Śvet. 6.9), ‘Verily, Nārāyaṇa was One’ (Mahā. Up. 1.2), ‘Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts’, ‘From Nārāyaṇa is born Brahmā, from Nārāyaṇa is born Rudra’ (Nār. 1), ‘From the forehead of this being, wrapt up within himself in meditation, was born the Person, with three-eyes, trident in hand’ (Mahā. Up. 1.7), ‘Kṛṣṇa, the One, the ruler, moving everywhere, is an object of worship, He who, though one, yet appears as many’. “‘Ka’ is the name of Brahman, I am the ‘Īśa’, i.e. the Lord, of all beings. We two have sprung up from your body, hence you have the name ‘Keśava’”, ‘I, Brahmā, the primary Lord of people, am born from Him, and you have sprung up from me’, ‘Kṛṣṇa alone is the source of the worlds, and of their dissolution too’, ‘Being created by Kṛṣṇa the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient has originated’. ‘In the Veda, and in Rāmāyaṇa, verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end, and in the middle’ (Hari V. 16232¹). “‘I am the origin of the entire world, dissolution similarly”’ (Gītā 7.6), “‘There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya”’ (Gītā 7.7), “‘I am the source of everything, everything originates from me”’ (Gītā 10.8) and so on. The terms ‘Hiraṇyagarbha’ and the rest, which we find sometimes in certain texts concerning the origin and so on of the world, should be known to be referring to Brahman. Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the Soul of all, the Lord of all, the one topic of all the Vedas, is the cause of the world.

Here ends the section entitled ‘The Origin’ (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading and interpretation same. Of course, consistently with his doctrine, Śaṅkara must hold that here the term 'Brahman' denotes 'Īśvara' or the lower Brahman.

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source'. (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"BECAUSE (BRAHMAN HAS) SCRIPTURE FOR HIS SOURCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With reference to the enquiry: What is the proof of His existence? The author states the correct conclusion:—

Of Whom "Scripture" alone is "the source", i.e. the cause of knowing,¹—that very reality, characterized as having the stated marks, is denoted by the term 'Brahman'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning enquiry² that Brahman is the object to be enquired into, and it has been pointed out by the aphorism concerning characteristic mark³ that the characteristic mark of Brahman is to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world and possess truth, etc. Now, with reference to the enquiry: What is the proof with regard to Him—the proof is being stated.

On the doubt, viz. whether Brahman, having the stated marks, is to be arrived at through inference, or has the Veda alone for His proof,—the *prima facie* view being that He is to be arrived at through inference, since we know from the scriptural text: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4; 2.9) that Brahman cannot be known through speech (i.e. texts),—

1 This explains the compound 'śāstra-yoni'.

2 Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.1.

3 Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2.

(We reply:) Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, but has the Veda for His proof. Why? "Because (Brahman has) Scripture for His source". That means: "Scripture", i.e. the Veda, is the "source", i.e. the cause, the informant, the proof, with regard to whom,—that object is "Śāstra-yoni"; and "Śāstra-yonitva" is the state of being "Śāstra-yoni"—on account of that, i.e. on account of having Scripture for His proof.¹ The correct conclusion is that Brahman has the Veda alone for His proof.

If it be said: For the sake of simplicity, it is well-said that Brahman has Scripture for His source; and thus to say that Brahman has Scripture for His source, i.e. has the Veda for its proof, serves our purpose, (i.e. is not in conflict with our view),—(we reply:) No, Brahman cannot be arrived at through inference, because the phrase: "Because (He has) Scripture for (His) source" indicates a reason which excludes any other proof except Scripture.

If it be said: How is it known that He cannot be arrived at through inference?—(we reply:) There has been some room for the suspicion that Brahman can be arrived at through inference, since the middle term (or the reason), viz. 'the state of being an effect'², stated above, proves the world to be due to a creator.³ With a view to removing it, that significant word⁴ is used here (in this sūtra), in accordance with the following scriptural texts:—Viz.: 'The word which all the Vedas declare' (Kāṭha 2.15), 'That with regard to which all the Vedas become one' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1⁵), "'I ask you about Brahman, set forth in the Upaniṣads"' (Brh. 3. 9.26⁶), 'He who does not know the Veda, does not know Him, the great' (Tait. Br. 3.12.9.7⁷) and so on, and the following Smṛti passages: "'By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known"' (Gītā 15.15), "'In the Veda, in the Rāmāyaṇa,

¹ This explains the compound 'śāstra-yonitvāt'.

² Kāryyatva.

³ That is, it has been laid down in Sūtra 1.1.2 that the world is an effect. This suggests the inference:—Whatever is an effect has a creator.

The world is an effect.

∴ the world has a creator (viz. Brahman).

This suggestion is negated by Sūtra 1.1.3, which explicitly says that the Brahman has Scripture alone for His proof, and never inference.

⁴ Viz. 'śāstra-yoni'.

⁵ P. 19. Reading 'yatraikam'.

⁶ Correct reading: 'prcchāmi'.

⁷ P. 292, vol. 3.

verily, in the Bhārata and in the Pañca-rātra, Hari is celebrated everywhere, in the beginning, in the end and in the middle'” (Hariv. 16232¹), ‘We bow down to that wherein lies the eternal basis of all speech’ and so on.

If it be said: On the ground of the inference: ‘All objects having parts, like the earth and the rest, have a cause, because they are effects, like pots and the rest’, Brahman is established to be the cause of the world, since none else can be such a cause, and this being so, why trouble about the Veda?—(we reply:) no, because, the very fact that the elements like the ether and the rest have an origin being not known by anyone without the Veda, that they are effects is not established, and hence the reason² is itself unestablished.³

It cannot be said also that the origin of the elements is to be known through the Veda, and the fact that they are effects being proved through this, the reason⁴ is not unestablished—, for, in that case too, Brahman, the cause of the world being known through the Veda alone, the inference becomes futile, and you virtually come to our side. Thus, even in the case of well-known effects like a house or a shoot, Brahman cannot be inferred from the reason ‘producibleness’, it being possible to suppose the earth, the seed, water, men and so on to be their causes; and unreasonable to imagine an unseen cause (viz. Brahman).

This should be understood here: wherever something is found to be an effect, there it is possible also to arrive, by means of inference, at an individual soul, corresponding to effect, as the agent. But that the entire universe is an effect is not known without the help of the Veda. Hence, the creator of the world, too, can be known through the Veda alone, and never through a thousand inferences. Further, Brahman cannot be known through the evidence of perception, since the ordinary sense-organs are incapable of grasping Him, as declared

¹ P. 1002.

² Viz. *Kāryyatva* or state of being an effect.

³ That is, it has been argued:—

Whatever is an effect has a cause.

The world is an effect.

∴ the world has a cause.

Now, we cannot know that the world is an *effect*, unless we have recourse to Scripture, and hence Scripture is needed even here too.

⁴ Viz. *Kāryyatva* or producibleness.

by the scriptural texts: 'Not the sense-organs, nor inference,' "' This knowledge is not attainable through inference, dearest! It leads to proper knowledge only being told by another'" (Kāṭha 2.9). That is, 'Dearest!' 'this knowledge' concerning Brahman, is not to be overthrown by reason, or, is not capable of being attained thereby. 'Told' by 'another', i.e. by an omniscient teacher who is versed in the Veda, it leads to right knowledge, as declared by the aphorism 'On account of reasoning having no ground' (Br. Sū. 2.1.11); by the Manu Smṛti: 'One should not apply reasoning to those conceptions which are verily inconceivable'; and by the Mahā-bhārata: 'One should not arrive at those conceptions which are verily inconceivable through reasoning. There can be no ascertainment of any deep meaning through reasoning which is without a basis'. Moreover, who but a mad man should say that Brahman, the cause of the world, who is not known entirely and in every way even by omniscient mantras and sages, who is difficult to be understood and who is possessed of infinite inconceivable qualities and powers, can be known through inference.

It is not to be apprehended: what then will become of such texts as: 'From whom speech turns back' (Tait. 2.4 ; 2.9) and so on?—for the meaning of these is that Brahman is not limited as being so much. This the author will state under the aphorism: 'For the so-muchness of the topic mentioned' and so on (Br. Sū. 3.2.22).

(An alternative explanation of the sūtra:) If the compound "Śāstra-yoni" be disjoined as: 'The source of Scripture', then, too, the very same meaning is arrived at.¹ The resulting meaning is that Brahman can be known through the Vedas alone,—breathed forth by Him, the omniscient, and (as such) standing in an intimate and internal relation with Him,—and not through any external inference and the rest, imagined by others. In that case, (i.e. on the second interpretation), the topic of this aphorism will be the scriptural text, viz. 'Breathed forth by this Great Being is the Ṛg-veda, the Yajur-veda and the Sāma-veda' (Brh. 2.4.10 ; Maitrī. 6.32). And, on this interpretation, the eternity of the Vedas are not negated, for what we admit is the issuing forth only (and not new creation) of what is eternally established, in accordance with the following scriptural

¹ Cf. Ś.B. 1.1.3.

and Smṛti passages, viz.: 'By means of speech, which is devoid of form and eternal' (Rg. V. 8.75.6¹; Tait. Saṃ. 2.6.11.2²), 'Speech, without beginning and end, eternal, consisting of the Veda and celestial, was created by the Self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities' (Mahā. 12.8534³). Hereby, the eternal and non-derived form of Brahman is indicated, since the Veda, which is prior to all derivative creation, was breathed forth by Him.⁴ This we shall explain later on.⁵ Hence, it is established that Brahman has the Veda as His sole proof.

Here ends the section entitled 'That which has Scripture for its source' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Concordance'. (Sūtra 4)

SŪTRA 4

"BUT THAT (VIZ. THAT BRAHMAN HAS SCRIPTURE AS HIS SOLE PROOF) FOLLOWS FROM THE CONCORDANCE (OF ALL SCRIPTURAL TEXTS WITH REGARD TO BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If an objection be raised, viz.: In as much as the entire Veda is concerned with action (i.e. injunctions and prohibitions), the Vedānta-texts too, which are concerned with a different topic, are solely concerned with injunctions by way of establishing the excellence of the agent, who is a part of sacrifices,—just as the artha-vāda texts⁶ are indirectly unanimous with the injunctive-texts, by way of establishing their excellence. Hence, how can Brahman have Scripture as His sole proof?⁷—the correct conclusion is as follows:

² P. 241, vol. 1.

¹ P. 162.

³ P. 666, line 22, vol. 3.

⁴ That is, if *Brahman* were to breathe forth the *Vedas*, He must have a body (nose, etc.), but this body is not evidently composed of matter, but is non-material, since when He breathes forth the *Vedas*, there is no matter.

⁵ See V.K. 1.3.28-30.

⁶ An *artha-vāda* is the explanation of the meaning of a precept, or eulogism.

⁷ The sense of the objection is: All *Vedas* set forth injunctions or prohibitions with regard to action. But besides the texts which directly or explicitly set forth the above, there are in the *Vedas* some texts which are merely *indicative*,

'That', i.e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the universe, has Scripture for His proof, and not action and the rest, since the entire Veda is in concordance in proving Him alone. (The word) "samanvayāt" is to be explained thus: "Samanvaya" means concordance in respect of the primary import,—on account of that—"samanvayāt". Or else, because there is concordance among the Vedas in point of proving Him alone,—so much in brief.

It cannot be said that such a concordance exists with regard to actions, since actions fulfil their purpose by simply giving rise to a desire for knowledge.¹ To say that Brahman is a subsidiary factor of sacrifices is a mere childish prattle, since He is an independent Being as the regulator of all works, their agents and so on, and their instruments; and is the giver of fruits. On the contrary, works themselves are in concordance (with regard to Brahman) as assisting indirectly the rise of knowledge—which is a means to attaining Him,—by way of generating a desire for knowledge.² This is ascertained from the text concerning the desire for knowledge.³

If it be objected: It being established in Scripture that Brahman is not an object of the proof, viz. Word, just as He is not an object of the proofs, viz. perception and the rest,—Brahman has not Scripture as His sole proof,—we reply: Brahman, the object of enquiry, has Scripture alone as His proof and not anything else, on account of the concordance of all the scriptural texts, directly or indirectly, with regard to Him alone. Among these, there is a direct concordance among the texts concerning His characteristic marks, proof and the

and not *injunctive*. And, these latter kind of texts are to be explained, not literally, but as eulogising the direct *injunctive* texts and thereby indirectly forming a part of *injunctions*, etc., otherwise the integrity of the *Vedas* cannot be maintained. Hence, the *Vedānta*-texts too must be taken as not establishing *Brahman*, but as simply extolling the sacrificer by identifying him with the Supreme Soul and so on, and as such really concerned with sacrificial acts.

¹ That is, the proper function of *karmas* is simply to purify the mind, and thereby create a desire for knowledge. *Karma*, thus, is a *means* and not an *end*, the way to truth and not truth itself. Hence the *Vedānta*-texts, dealing as they do, with the Supreme Truth, cannot be concerned with mere *karmas*. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.26.

² I.e. knowledge is not an *aṅga* of *karma*, on the contrary, *karma* is an *aṅga* of knowledge. Vide V.P.S. 3.4.8.

³ Viz. Brh. 4.4.22.

rest, since they are (directly) concerned with Him; and there is an indirect concordance among the texts concerning the Śāṇḍilya-vidyā,¹ the Pañcāgni-vidyā,² the Madhu-vidyā³ and so on, as well as among those which are symbolic in nature.⁴ Or rather, there is a direct concordance alone among all the texts whatsoever, though leading to different procedures,⁵ since the topics of all these different texts being equally Brahman in essence, they are all to be understood in their primary and literal sense.⁶ It is not to be feared that in that case, the texts which are concerned with the denial of the object (viz. Brahman) will be precluded,⁷ since they too, as being concerned with denying any limit with regard to Brahman's nature, attributes and the rest, refer to the very same topic (viz. Brahman).⁸

Moreover, we ask your Worship: Do you or do you not mean that Brahman is the object of the statement: 'Brahman is not an object of knowledge'? If the first, then Brahman is proved to be describable and hence the proposition that He is not describable is set aside. If the second, then Brahman is describable all the more. Hence, the object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the soul of all. All Scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone—this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upaniṣads (viz. the Vedāntins).

¹ Vide Bṛh. 5.6.1; Chānd. 3.14.1-4.

² Vide Chānd. 5.5.4-10. Also V.K. 3.1.1.

³ Vide Bṛh. 2.5.1-19 (whole section); Chānd. 3.1-11.

⁴ Vide e.g. Bṛh. 5.7-9, etc.; Chānd. 3.18-21; 7.1-12, etc.

⁵ The sense is that the various kinds of texts may impel a man to different procedures. Some may lead a man to meditate on *Brahman* directly as the self, others to meditate on Him as the sun and so on.

⁶ That is, even the texts concerning the various meditations and symbols, are to be understood as directly referring to *Brahman*, i.e. to be interpreted literally, and not as referring to *Brahman* indirectly, i.e. to be interpreted figuratively, as suggested before. This modifies the statement made immediately before that *some* texts are direct and primary, *some* indirect and secondary, and takes *all* to be equally direct and primary.

⁷ Viz. 'Neti, neti' (Bṛh. 2.3.6) and so on.

⁸ That is, the view that *all* texts are concerned with *Brahman* directly in no way precludes the negative texts, since these negative texts also are concerned with *Brahman* equally.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been said that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the substratum of great qualities and powers and the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, has the Veda alone for His proof. Now, with a view to confirming it, the author, by showing the concordance of the entire Veda with regard to that very Brahman, refutes the following objection, viz.; The entire Veda has been associated with action by Jaimini who holds: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1¹). Hence, what is not concerned with action being laid down as purportless, the Vedānta-texts, too, all refer to action (otherwise they will all become purportless). Consequently, how can Brahman have the Veda as His sole proof?

The term "but" disposes of the (above) *prima facie* view. "That", i.e. Brahman alone, the object of enquiry and the cause of the world, has Scripture for His sole proof. Why? "On account of concordance", i.e. because there is concordance among all the Vedas with regard to Him alone. (The word "samanvayāt" is to be explained as follows:) "Samanvaya" means: 'Concordance in point of entirety of statement',—on account of that,—"samanvayāt", i.e. the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to denoting Brahman entirely or Lord Kṛṣṇa, the object to be enquired into by one who desires salvation, the one identical material and efficient cause of the world, having Scripture as His source (i.e. proof), the controller of matter, soul, time and works, having His footstool honoured by the crowns (i.e. the bowed heads) of Brahmā, Rudra, Indra and the rest, having His greatness untouched by any odour of fault, the abode of infinite qualities like omniscience and the rest and to be approached by the freed. The following groups of texts are in concordance with regard to Him alone:—'From whom verily all these beings arise' (Tait. 3.1), 'From bliss alone, verily, do these beings arise' (Tait. 3.6), 'From Him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), "'The existent alone, my child, was this in the beginning, One only, without a second'" (Chānd. 6.2.1). "He thought: May I be many, may I procreate"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'From Nārāyaṇa arises the vital-breath, . . . from Nārāyaṇa arises Brahmā, from

Nārāyaṇa arises Rudra' (Nār. 1), 'There was verily, Nārāyaṇa alone, neither Brahmā nor Īśāna (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Bṛh. 1.4.10.11). 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning; he knew that self alone thus: "I am Brahman"', 'From Him arose all this', 'The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only' (Ait. 1.1.1), 'From this self, verily, the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1), 'The word which all the Vedas record' (Kāṭha 2.15), 'That, in regard to which all the Vedas are unanimous' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1¹), 'Entered within, the ruler of man' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1.2²), 'To whom all the gods bow down', 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1), 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman' (Tait. 2.9), 'Brahman is knowledge and bliss' (Bṛh. 3.9.28), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'The self that is free from sins, without decay, without death, without grief, without hunger, without thirst' (Chānd. 8.7.1.3), 'Who is omniscient, all-knowing' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), 'Brahman, verily, is all this' (Bṛh. 2.5.1-14, 14 times) and so on.

(*Prima facie* view.)

An objection may be raised here:—The entire Veda is but a collection of five kinds of texts, called, injunction, prohibition, explanation or eulogy, sacred formulæ and name.³ Of these, 'One, who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma⁴ sacrifice' and so on, are injunctive texts. 'A Brāhmaṇa should not be killed' and so on, are prohibitive texts. 'The wind, verily, is the quickest deity' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.1.1⁵), and so on are explanations or eulogisms. 'Oblation to you' (Tait. Saṃ. 1.1.1⁶), 'O, heavens, having the fire as your head' (Ṛg. V. 8.44.16a; 7 Śat. Br. 2.3.4.11a⁸), and so on are sacred formulæ. 'Jyotiṣṭoma',⁹ 'Aśva-medha'¹⁰ and the rest are names,—thus we distinguish them. Thus, in the beginning, in the aphorism: 'Then,

¹ P. 19. Reading: 'Yatraikaṇ'.

² P. 181.

³ *Vidhi, niṣedha, artha-vāda, mantra, nāmadheya.*

⁴ Name of a *Soma-sacrifice*, consisting divisions, *Agniṣṭoma* and the rest.

M.W., p. 427.

⁵ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1.

⁷ P. 132, line 7.

⁹ See footnote 4, above.

⁶ P. 1, line 1, vol. 1.

⁸ P. 163, line 16.

¹⁰ The horse-sacrifice.

therefore, an enquiry into religious duties' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.1¹), it is said that the Veda has meaning as possessing the fruit to be attained through the injunctions regarding conceptions which are instrumental to the Vedic studies. In the second aphorism which is concerned with mark, viz. 'A religious duty has injunction for its mark' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.1.2²), it is established, on the ground of the vyāpti: 'Whatever has the Veda for its proof, refers to action', that in the sphere of religious duties, injunction is the authority.³ Here a doubt arises as to whether the artha-vāda-texts like 'The wind is the swiftest deity' (Tait. Sam. 2.1.1⁴) are authoritative in the sphere of religious duties, or not. With regard to it, the *prima facie* view is as follows: We have a text: 'Since Scripture is concerned with action, there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it (viz. action)' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 1.2.1⁵). (It means:)—'Scripture, i.e. the Veda, is 'kriyārtha', i.e. has 'action' alone as its 'purport', or subject-matter or topic,—for this reason, the artha-vāda-texts are not authoritative. What then are they?—anticipating this question, the text goes on to say that 'there is purportlessness of what does not refer to it', i.e. let there be simply 'purportlessness' or 'meaninglessness' of that which has not 'action' for its 'purport', viz. of artha-vāda and the rest, and in the very same manner, of the Vedānta-texts as well. Even those (Vedānta-) texts which comprise injunctions regarding study: viz. 'One's own text should be studied', cannot be reasonably said to be authoritative, since they are (really) concerned with Brahman, leading to no fruit.⁶ (Here ends the *prima facie* view within the original *prima facie* view.) With regard to this, we state the correct conclusion: 'Because of their unanimity with the injunctions, let (them be authoritative) through having the glorification of injunctions as their

¹ P. 1, vol. 1.

² P. 3, vol. 1.

³ That is, the inference is as follows:—

Whatever has the *Veda* for its proof, refers to action.

A religious duty has the *Veda* for its proof.

∴ a religious duty refers to action, i.e. is concerned with injunctions and prohibitions.

⁴ P. 125, lines 1-2, vol. 1.

⁵ P. 39, vol. 1.

⁶ That is, there are some *Vedānta*-texts, which do refer to action, i.e. to injunction, yet they are not to be taken as authoritative, since they really refer to *Brahman* who is outside the sphere of actions and fruits.

purport' (Pū. Mi. Sū. 1.2.7¹). That is, since the artha-vādas are unanimous with the injunctive texts, let them be authoritative 'through having glorification as their purport', i.e. by way of glorifying the matters to be enjoined. Similarly, in order to prevent the absolute purportlessness of the Vedānta-texts which are wanting in injunction and prohibition and teach an accomplished object (viz. Brahman), it is reasonable to take them too as indirectly connected with action,—which is something to be accomplished,—as included under the very mantras and artha-vādas, since they (viz. the Vedānta-texts) admit injunctions regarding the study of the Veda. But if they be taken to be independent (of action) they would lead to no fruit, and hence they must be understood to have fulfilled their purpose through establishing the agent, who is a part of a sacrifice (and not to be independent of action). Among these, the texts concerning the 'that' (viz. Brahman) and 'thou' (viz. the individual soul)² glorify the deity and the agent of the sacrificial act; and the knowledge concerning it (viz. the 'that') called the 'higher knowledge',³ glorify the fruit. (Thus, we conclude :) The Vedānta-texts are not concerned with Brahman, but are like the artha-vāda-texts, since they are concerned with proclaiming the excellence of the agent, who is a subordinate factor in a sacrifice. (Here ends the original *prima facie* view.⁴)

(Author's conclusion.)

To this we reply:⁵ No, because this is a mere imagination, invented by you; and because (on the contrary), works, being generative of knowledge which is a means to salvation, indirectly refer to Brahman alone, as declared by the scriptural text:—'The Brāhmaṇas desire to know this self through the study of the Veda, through sacrifice, through penance, through fasting' (Brh. 4.4.22). Here, if in the statement 'They desire to know through sacrifice', there be a direct connection of the instrument, viz. 'sacrifice', with the meaning of the root,⁶ as in the sentence 'He desires to go by the horse', then the sacrificial act should be known to be serving the purpose of knowledge (i.e. helping the rise of knowledge), and thereby referring to Brahman.

¹ P. 42, vol. 1.

² Cf. the famous text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.).

³ Vide e.g. Muṇḍ. 1.1.4-5.

⁴ It began on p. 35.

⁵ The correct conclusion begins here.

⁶ Viz. 'vid' = to know.

If, on the other hand, owing to the primacy of the desiderative suffix,¹ there be a connection with the meaning of the suffix, it should be known to be serving the purpose of desire, (i.e. helping the rise of a desire for knowledge), to be a subordinate factor of knowledge through that desire and to be referring to Brahman thereby. And, the fact that action is a part of knowledge will be stated under the aphorism: 'And, there is dependence on all, on account of the text concerning sacrifice, as in the case of a horse' (Br. Sū. 3.4.26).

It cannot be said, also, that the reality to be known from the Vedānta (viz. Brahman) is a subordinate factor of sacrifices,—since He is self-dependent as the controller of all works, their agents and their instruments. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts are subsidiary parts of injunctions like the artha-vādas, since the former have been referred to in a different context and are not in proximity to injunctions. Nor can it be said that the Vedānta-texts lead to no fruit, teaching, as they do, something which is neither an injunction nor a prohibition,—since the knowledge of Brahman, who is to be known from the Vedānta, leads to a supremely excellent fruit, viz. salvation.

If it be said: As we read in texts like 'Undecaying, verily, is the good deed of one who performs the Cātur-māsyā² sacrifice' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1.1³) that works too have the same fruit like it (viz. knowledge), so there is nothing objectionable (in taking the scriptural texts) to be referring to works,—

(We reply :) No, because the scriptural text: 'Just as here, the world gained through work perishes, so exactly does hereafter the world gained through merit perish' (Chānd. 8.1.6⁴) is of a greater force; is in conformity with the inference, viz. 'The world gained through mere work is non-permanent, because it is gained through work alone, as in the case of tilling and the rest'; and is confirmed by another scriptural text as well, viz. 'Frail, indeed, are these boats of sacrifices' (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7); because the text: 'Undecaying, verily' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) and so on is a weaker one; and because it is improper to (take the scriptural texts) to be referring to works, which form the object of such texts wanting in force. On the other hand, the

¹ Viz. 'san', implying 'desire'.

² See footnote 2, p. 5.

³ P. 1, vol. 1.

⁴ Correct quotation: '*Karma-cita*' and not '*karma-jīta*', which is translated here. Vide Chānd. 8.1.6, p. 415.

texts: 'Those who know this, become immortal' (Brh. 4.4.14; Kaṭha 6.2.9; Śvet. 3.1.10.13; 4.17.20), 'The knower of Brahman attains the highest' (Tait. 2.1), are not contradicted by any scriptural text, and cannot be set aside by a thousand inferences. Further, the text: 'Undecaying, indeed' and so on (Āp. Ś.Ś. 8.1.1) is not really set aside, since it refers to the relative (permanence of works)¹, and since the holy Bhāgavata-smṛti (i.e. the Bhāgavad-gītā), which is a version of the Veda, is the authority in both the cases (viz. regarding the non-permanence of karma, and the permanence of Brahman) thus:—
 "The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahman, come and go, O Arjuna! But, on attaining me, O Son of Kuntī! there is no re-birth"²
 (Gītā 8.16).

If it be objected: It may be that the Upaniṣadic portion is somehow or other concerned with Brahman, since we see it to be so. But the prior portion (viz. the Karma-kāṇḍa) is known from the texts: 'He performs the Agnihotra² as long as he lives', 'One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice' (Āp. Ś.Ś. 10.2.1) and so on, to fulfil its purpose by enjoining obligatory and optional works and the rest; and hence how can they be concerned with Brahman?—

(We reply :) Not so. The entire Veda is concerned only with Brahman, and although some part of it is found to refer to action somehow, its complete concordance is found in Brahman alone. Among these the Upaniṣadic portion refers directly to Brahman, directly concerned, as it is, with demonstrating His nature, attributes and the rest. Among these, again, the statements of difference refer to Brahman by way of being concerned with the nature of the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman; the statements of non-difference, by being concerned with proving that everything has Brahman for its essence; the statements of creation and the rest, by being concerned with proving attributes like creatorship and the rest; the statements that Brahman is non-qualified, by being concerned with the denial of the qualities due to māyā; the statements that Brahman is qualified, by being concerned with proving the natural qualities of the Lord;

¹ That is, this text simply shows that the deeds of one who performs the *Cātur-māsya* sacrifice are relatively more permanent than the deeds of one who does not, and not that they are absolutely permanent.

² Sacrificing to Agni. Cf. Athar. V. 6.97.1, p. 130.

and the statements like: 'That which is not manifested through speech' (Kena 1.4), by being concerned with proving that Brahman is not limited by so-muchness.

The texts, concerned with the daily and occasional duties,¹ too, refer to Brahman alone, by way of effecting the purification of the nature of the person entitled (to the study of Brahman) and being thereby co-operative towards the rise of knowledge and so on concerning Brahman; while (the texts) concerned with the optional duties,² by way of being an atomic bit of the bliss of Brahman, since the text: 'Other beings subsist on a portion only of His bliss alone' (Bṛh. 4.3.32) declares even worldly pleasure to be an atomic portion of the bliss of Brahman. Moreover, the optional duties are in concordance (with regard to Brahman), since they are concerned with the knowledge of Brahman by way of giving rise to a pure body, like that of a god and the rest, entitled to salvation. Moreover, just as in accordance with the maxim of 'connection and disconnection',³ curd, used in connection with daily duties (*nitya*),—as laid down in the passage: 'He performs a sacrifice with curd',—brings about the attainment of objects of sense,—as laid down in the passage: 'One who desires for objects of sense should perform a sacrifice with curd' (Tait. Br. 2.1.5.6⁴),—so the sacrificial acts, though bringing about heaven and the rest, should yet be known to be serving the purpose (i.e. helping the rise) of knowledge.⁵ And (finally) texts like: 'Golden right from the tip of His nails' (Chānd. 1.6.6⁶) refer to Brahman as being concerned with His divine body.

Or else, since the entire mass of objects has Brahman for its essence, the mass of texts, denoting them, directly refer to Him.⁷

¹ The daily or *nitya karmas* are ablution, prayer and so on, to be performed every day; while the occasional or *naimittaka karmas* are the ceremony in honour of the dead and so on, to be performed on special occasions. Both of these kinds are obligatory.

² The optional or *kāmya karmas* are sacrifices and the rest, undertaken with special objects in view, viz. heaven and the rest.

³ A term applied to express the disconnection of what is optional from what is a necessary constituent of anything. Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 4.3.5, and *Śābara's* commentary, pp. 493 and ff., vol. 1.

⁴ P. 180, line 3, vol. 2.

⁵ Vide V.K. 3.4.26.

⁶ Correct quotation '*Apranakhāt sarva eva suvarṇah*'. Vide Chānd. 1.6.6, p. 43.

⁷ That is, instead of the laborious explanation given above, it is simpler to accept this alternative explanation.

Hence it is established that the entire Veda is in concordance with regard to Brahman alone or Lord Kṛṣṇa the Highest Person, omniscient, possessing infinite natural and inconceivable powers, the cause of the world, and different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage: “By all the Vedas, I alone am to be known” (Gītā 15.15).

The four aphorisms constituting the basis of Scripture are hereby explained. This treatise (viz. the Vedānta) is but an expounding of these.

Here ends the section entitled ‘Concordance’ (4).

Here ends the explanation of the four aphorisms in the first quarter of the first chapter in the commentary Vedānta-kaustubha, composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, the incarnation of the Pāñcājanya and dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Lord Nimbāditya, the founder of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled ‘He sees’.
(Sūtras 5-12)

SŪTRA 5

“BECAUSE (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD) SEES, (PRADHĀNA IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) (SINCE) IT IS NON-SCRIPTURAL.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, is “non-scriptural”, i.e. is devoid of scriptural evidence. Hence it is “not” the cause of the world, as in Scripture seeing, which is a characteristic of a sentient being, is predicated of the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out that Brahman, great in attributes, powers and nature, omniscient, and the one object of all the Vedas, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, the Sāṃkhyas,—who hold that Brahman is not the cause of the world, since He is of a dissimilar form; while the non-sentient pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, is the cause of the world, since it is of a form

similar to the effect,—also relate the Vedānta-texts like “The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning” (Chānd. 6.2.1) and so on, to it alone (viz. *pradhāna*). The reverend author of the aphorisms is now refuting this view.

Pradhāna, which is derived through inference,¹ is not fit to be the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Why? Because it is “non-scriptural”, i.e. that with regard to which there is no “word”, i.e. Scripture, as authority. This adjective denotes the reason.

If it be objected that in the Chāndogya, *pradhāna* is meant by the term ‘existent’ in the passage: “The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning” (Chānd. 6.2.1). Hence, how can it be said that *pradhāna* is non-scriptural?—we reply: “Because (the creator) sees”, i.e. because from the text, beginning: “Existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning” (Chānd. 6.2.1), and continuing: ‘He thought, “May I be many, may I procreate”’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), we find that the creator of the world perceives. The same thing is mentioned in the Aitareya as well in the passage: ‘The self, verily, was this in the beginning, one only. Nothing else was apparent. He thought: “Let me create worlds”. He created these worlds’ (Ait. 1.1.1). Here the word “sees”, denotative of the root, must be understood, by indirect application, to be referring to ‘seeing’, which is the meaning of the root. ‘Seeing’ means deliberating, i.e. determination; and that, being the attribute of a conscious being, is not appropriate on the part of the *pradhāna*. Hence, *pradhāna*, devoid of perception, is not mentioned by Scripture. Accordingly, it has been rightly said by his Holiness that it is “non-scriptural”. Therefore, it is neither the cause of the world, nor knowable through the Veda.

It cannot be said also that *pradhāna* possesses the power of knowledge through its attribute of *sattva*, and as such, perceiving is appropriate on its part,—since it is impossible that a non-sentient substance and a non-sentient attribute can possess knowledge, and be knowledge (respectively). Nor should it be said that this is appropriate through the connection of *pradhāna* with *puruṣa*,—because there being (at hand) Brahman, mentioned before and possessed of

¹ That is, we cannot directly perceive the primary matter, but we argue that every effect must have a cause, that cause too another cause and so on, and thus finally, we must admit a primary cause which has no cause. This is the *pradhāna*.

ever-present knowledge, as a simple (explanation of the fact in hand),—it involves unnecessary complications to drag in something which is the substratum of knowledge, only through its conjunction with another, (and not by itself); because such a view is utterly negligible; and, finally because during its state of equilibrium, it does not possess that attribute.¹ So stop labouring the point. Hence, the cause corresponding to the effect, viz. the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, is none but Brahman, who is denoted by the term 'existent' and is capable of perceiving, possessed as He is of natural, inconceivable and infinite powers, as declared by the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His powers, declared to be of various kinds, and natural is the action of His knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8.) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading and interpretation same, but Śaṅkara develops, in this connection, his doctrine of upādhi, or limiting adjunct, viz.—that there is really nothing besides Brahman, the individual soul and the rest being due to the limiting adjuncts of body, and the rest, like the all-pervading ether, limited by pots and the rest. Hence difference is mithyā through and through.²

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same, but Rāmānuja also develops his own view, viz. that the universe of the sentient and the non-sentient constitutes the body of the Lord.³

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different,—viz. 'Because (Brahman is) seen (i.e. designated by Scripture), (He is) not inexpressible'.⁴

¹ That is, if knowledge arises through the pre-dominance of the *sattva-guṇa*, then prior to creation, all the *guṇas* being in a state of equilibrium, no knowledge can arise in *pradhāna*.

² Ś.B. 1.1.5, p. 203.

³ Śrī. B. 1.1.5, p. 160, Part 1.

⁴ G.B. 1.1.5, pp. 46-47, Chap. 1.

SŪTRA 6

“ IF IT BE SAID THAT (THE WORD ‘SEEING’ IN THE ABOVE CHĀNDOGYA-TEXT) IS SECONDARY, (THEN WE REPLY) NO, BECAUSE OF THE TERM ‘SELF’ (BEING APPLIED TO THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not reasonable to say that the ‘seeing’ is (only) “secondary”. Why? “On account of the term ‘self’.”

Vedānta-kaustubha

Anticipating the objection, viz.—

As we often find the metaphorical transference of the qualities of a sentient being to non-sentient objects like a bank or tilling, e.g. when referring to a bank about to fall, it is said: ‘The bank is about to fall’,¹ or when referring to the tilling of dry soil, it is said: ‘Tilling is awaiting rain’; and as we read in Scripture about perception on the part of non-sentient objects like water and light, in the passages: ‘That light perceived’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), ‘Those waters perceived’ (Chand. 6.2.4),—there may very well be a metaphorical perception on the part of pradhāna in the very same manner,—the author disposes of it here.

If it be said that the attribute of perception, belonging to pradhāna is “secondary”, (we reply:) “No.” Why? “On account of the term ‘self’”, i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of the term ‘self’ which establishes the absence of perception on the part of pradhāna. Thus, if by taking the term ‘existence’ to mean the non-sentient pradhāna, a metaphorical perception be admitted on its part, then in the texts: ‘All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self’ (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), the term ‘self’ must refer to the non-sentient substance, which is the meaning of the terms ‘existent’ and ‘perceiver’, mentioned before in the texts: “‘The existent, alone, my dear!’” (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘He perceived’ (Chānd. 6.2.3). That is, on the view, viz. ‘He alone is the existent and the perceiver, the self which is pradhāna’,—the identity between the terms ‘existent’ and the rest denoting the non-sentient and bearing a different sense and the term ‘self’ denoting the

¹ Here the desiderative suffix does not imply ‘wish’ but ‘imminent danger’ (āśaṃkā), in accordance with K.V.S. 1707 quoted in SD.K. 2622, pp. 335, vol. 2.

Supreme Self and bearing a different sense, will involve a contradiction, it being impossible for the term 'self' denotative of the Supreme Lord, to refer to pradhāna. Hence, to say that the perception is even metaphorical is unreasonable. And owing to the entering of the Deity (into them), (the perception) on the part of water and light is not metaphorical ¹—this is the sum and substance.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—‘If it be said (that the creator of the world is) the gaṇa (or the Saṅga Brahman, connected with the guṇas of prakṛti, possessing the sattva guṇa as his vesture), (then we reply,) No, on account of the term “self”’. That is, the term ‘self’ has been used in Scripture in connection with the creator of the world, and this term can be applied only to the infinite Nirguṇa Brahman, unconnected with the guṇas of prakṛti.²

SŪTRA 7

“(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE MEANT BY THE TERM ‘SELF’,) BECAUSE SALVATION IS TAUGHT OF ONE WHO RELIES UPON THAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As salvation, characterized by the attainment of His (i.e. Brahman's) nature, is taught of a knower, who relies on the cause, the meaning of the terms ‘existent’, ‘perceiver’, ‘self’ and the rest,—so pradhāna cannot be denoted by the terms ‘existent’ and ‘self’.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. in that case, let the term ‘self’ stand equally for the sentient and the non-sentient, like the term ‘light’³ which

¹ That is, it is not water or fire that really perceives, but the Lord who has entered into them, as mentioned in the passage: ‘That Divinity thought:—“Come, let me enter these three divinities” (i.e. fire, water and food)’ and so on. (Chānd. 6.3.2.)

² G.B. 1.1.6 (p. 48, Chap. 1.).

³ *Jyotiḥ*.

denotes equally a sacrifice¹ and fire; hence, no inconsistency is involved here,—the reverend Bādarāyaṇa replies here:

The non-sentient pradhāna is not the object denoted by the term 'self'. Why? "Because salvation is taught of one who relies on Him" i.e. of one who has reliance (or devotion), otherwise called 'meditation', with regard to Him, i.e. with regard to one who is denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, who is a perceiver and who is the creator of fire, water and food.² Thus, after having taught an investigation, by one who is desirous of salvation, into the effect as consisting of the Cause (viz. Brahman) in essence, in the text: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), Scripture goes on to teach salvation, characterized by the attainment of the nature of Brahman, in the text: 'For him there is delay, so long as I am not freed, then I shall attain (Brahman)' (Chānd. 6.14.2). (The meaning of this text is:) So long as a person, who desires for salvation, is not freed from his body and is impeded, being compelled to undergo the fruits of works which have already begun to produce results, there is delay for him; but when the fruits of works will be fully enjoyed, he will attain the nature of Brahman at once, owing to the absence of impediments. The use of the first person in both the cases, viz. 'I shall be free', and 'I shall attain' should be known to be implying the third person in accordance with Vedic use.

If in the text 'He is the Self' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the term 'self' is to refer to pradhāna, then in the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), the very same thing must be referred to by the term 'that'. Hence the text: 'Thou art that' would mean: 'Thou hast pradhāna for thy soul', whereby a great mishap would take place, since through the meditation: 'I have the non-sentient as my soul', one would be obstructed from salvation for ever. In the present case, on the other hand, Brahman, having the stated characteristics, is denoted by the term 'that'; and the meaning of the term 'thou' is the individual soul, His part, otherwise called His power, and possessed of the stated marks. Here, between the part and the whole, there is a relation of difference and non-difference,—well-known everywhere in ordinary life and in the Veda,—as between the attribute and its substratum.

¹ Viz. *Jyotiṣṭoma*.

² This explains the compound: '*tan-niṣṭhasya*'.

Although the individual soul is different from Brahman in nature, it is also non-different from Him, having no existence and activity apart from Him. On account of being enveloped by the beginningless māyā, the individual soul has no knowledge of such a non-difference. Hence it is said 'Thou art that', i.e. you are non-different from the object denoted by the term 'that'. Even during the state of salvation, one who has attained the nature of Brahman is of a different nature (from Brahman), but should yet be known to be non-different from Him, because of having no existence and activity separately from Him; because from the text: 'He attains the highest identity' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3) we learn that Brahman alone is one that is to be approached, while the individual soul only one that approaches; and, finally, because we find the words 'together with' in the text: 'He enjoys all objects of desire together with Brahman, the all-knowing' (Tait. 2.1). Hence, Brahman alone is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different—viz:—'(The creator of the world is not the Saṁguṇa Brahman, but the Nirguṇa Brahman¹), for salvation is taught of him who relies on Him (viz. the Nirguṇa Brahman)'.²

SŪTRA 8

"AND (PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE DENOTED BY THE TERMS 'EXISTENT', 'SELF' AND THE REST), BECAUSE THERE IS NO (SCRIPTURAL) STATEMENT OF ITS HAVING TO BE ABANDONED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That the non-sentient substance, taught by the terms 'existent' and the rest and to be abandoned in salvation, is to be abandoned, as well as the purpose of the teaching³ ought to have been pointed out

¹ For the explanation of the terms *Saṁguṇa* and *Nirguṇa*, see G.B.

² G.B. 1.1.7, pp. 49-50, Chap. 1.

³ That is, if *pradhāna* be denoted by the terms 'existent', 'self' and the rest, then evidently, such a self, etc., cannot serve the purpose of salvation. Hence there must be some other purpose for the teaching of *pradhāna*, since Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil an end. But there is no indication in Scripture what this other purpose is.

by Scripture, omniscient and the well-wisher of men. Because of the absence of these two kinds of texts, pradhāna is not denoted by the terms 'existent' and the like.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If the non-sentient pradhāna alone were taught as that which is denoted by the terms 'existent', 'perceiver' and the like, then, in order to prevent reliance upon that, Scripture, omniscient, well-wishing, and intending to instruct Brahman, should have told that it is to be rejected, just as a mother says to her son, about to take something not good, 'Son, this is not good'. But there is no statement that it is to be rejected; on the contrary, an identity with it is taught in the passage: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.8; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3). The term "and" is meant for including (another reason, viz.) the absence of statement indicating the purpose of such a teaching.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading same, interpretation same on the whole. Only, while Nimbārka interprets the term "Ca" to mean 'the purpose of such a teaching', Śaṅkara takes it to mean 'the contradiction of the initial proposition', viz. the cause being known, the effects are also known.¹ Evidently, through the knowledge of the non-sentient pradhāna, there can be no knowledge of the sentient souls. Hence pradhāna cannot be the cause of the universe.²

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same. He gives no special meaning of the term "ca", but takes it to mean simply 'also', and not a second reason.³

Bhāskara

Reading and interpretation same on the whole. Bhāskara interprets this sūtra exactly after Śaṅkara, taking the term "ca" to mean 'contradiction of the initial proposition'.⁴

¹ Vide Chānd. 6.1.

³ Śrī. B. 1.1.8, p. 163, vol. 1.

² Ś.B. 1.1.8, p. 209.

⁴ Bh. B. 1.1.8, p. 23.

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because there is no statement of the rejectibility (of the *Saguṇa Brahman*)'. That is, Scripture declares the inferiority and worthlessness of all *saguṇa* objects, or objects connected with the *guṇas* of *prakṛti*, viz. all worldly objects. Hence, if the *Saguṇa Brahman* were the creator of the world, then Scripture would have designated him as inferior and fit to be rejected.¹

SŪTRA 9

“(PRADHĀNA CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, “on account of the contradiction of the initial proposition” as well, viz. through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all²,—the doctrine of the causality of the non-sentient is not right.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Pradhāna is not the cause of the world. Why? “On account of the contradiction of the initial proposition”, viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. Thus, the scriptural text “‘Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?’” “What is that instruction, my reverend Sir?” (Chānd. 6.1.2-3), introduces the doctrine that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, and this will be contradicted. Although, through the knowledge of *pradhāna*, there may be knowledge of its effects, yet the proposition that there is knowledge of all the effects, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is not established, since the sentient not being the effect of *pradhāna*, its knowledge is not possible (through the knowledge of *pradhāna*).

¹ G.B. 1.1.8, pp. 50-51, Chap. 1.

² Vide Chānd. 6.1.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries. The argument contained herein is included by them, as we have seen, in the previous sūtra.

Baladeva

This sūtra is not found in his commentary as well.

SŪTRA 10

“(BRAHMAN ALONE CAN BE THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL'S) ENTRANCE INTO ITSELF (DURING DEEP SLEEP).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As it is impossible that the object,—mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world which is denoted by the term ‘existent’, viz. ‘Understand from me, my dear, the state of deep sleep. When a person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent’ (Chānd. 6.8.1¹), can be understood as a non-sentient cause,² it is reasonable to hold that Brahman alone is the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the (soul's) “entrance”, i.e. dissolution, into “itself”,³ i.e. into its own cause, viz. Brahman, introduced in the text: “The existent alone, my dear!” (Chānd. 6.2.1), Brahman alone is denoted by the terms ‘existent’ and the rest, and not pradhāna. If it be the cause, then the text concerning dissolution would be contradicted. Thus, there is a scriptural text to this effect, viz.

¹ Ś.R. Bh. Śk.

² A slightly different reading is given in the C.S.S. ed.—which, when translated, is as follows:—As the ‘entering’, which relates to a sentient being and is mentioned in the passage referring to the cause of the world, denoted by the term ‘existent’—viz. ‘Understand from me, my dear, . . .’ is possible in the case of *Brahman* alone, etc. (P. 3.)

³ This explains the word ‘*svāpyayāt*’.

“When this person sleeps here, as we say, my dear, then he has become united with the Existent, he has entered into his own. Hence they say of him “He sleeps”, for he has entered into his own” (Chând. 6.8.1). There is also another scriptural text, viz. ‘Just as a man, when embraced by his dear wife, knows nothing external or internal, so this person, when embraced by the intelligent soul, knows nothing external or internal’ (Bṛh. 4.3.21).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. ‘Svāpyāt’. Interpretation too different, viz. ‘(The creator of the world is not the Saṁyā Brahman), because the Creator merges into himself, (not so the Saṁyā Brahman, who merges into something other than himself).’¹

SŪTRA 11

“(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNIVERSALITY OF KNOWING (HIM AS THE CAUSE).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As a sentient cause is known from all the Vedāntas, the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is untenable.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, pradhāna is not denoted by the term ‘existent’, viz. on account of the universality of ‘knowing’, i.e. apprehending. One sentient cause of the world being known from all the Upaniṣads, the sentient Brahman alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Nor, again, even the slightest inconsistency is found in the Vedāntas, such as, in some places a sentient cause is taught, in others a non-sentient. The sense is that if here a non-sentient object be understood by the term ‘existent’, the multitude of texts, speaking of a sentient cause, will come to be contradicted.

¹ G.B. 1.1.9, pp. 51-52, Chap. 1.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading same. Interpretation too is same, since although according to Rāmānuja, the word 'gati' means 'pravṛtti' or primary meaning and not 'avagati' or apprehension as held by Nimbārka, yet the ultimate meaning is the same, viz. the meaning or import of all the scriptural texts is uniform, i.e. from all of them Brahman alone is known and nothing else, and hence Brahman alone is the cause.¹

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different. He connects this sūtra more particularly with the preceding one, thus: 'On account of the universality of knowing (the term "existent" as denoting the Supreme Lord)'. That is, just as in this Upaniṣad, viz. the Chāndogya, the term 'existent' implies the Lord, and none else, so in all other Upaniṣads as well. Hence it can never stand for pradhāna. According to him also, thus, the word 'gati' means 'avagati'.²

Baladeva

This is sūtra 10 in this commentary. Reading same, interpretation different, viz.—'On account of the universality of knowing (the Nirguṇa Brahman from all Scriptures)'. That is, Scripture uniformly teaches the Nirguṇa Brahman, and never the Saṁguṇa. Hence the Nirguṇa Brahman alone is the cause of the world. According to him also, the term 'gati' means 'avagati'.³

SŪTRA 12

"(BRAHMAN ALONE IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ALSO BECAUSE THIS IS DEFINITELY STATED IN SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Hence, the causality of the Universal Lord,—a sentient Being, denoted by the terms 'existent' and the rest, omniscient, and the

¹ Śrī. B. 1.1.11, p. 165, vol. 1.

² ŚK. B. 1.1.11, p. 202, Part 3.

³ G.B. 1.1.10, p. 53, Chap. 1.

controller of all,—being definitely stated in Scripture, *pradhāna* can by no means be accepted as such a cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(Brahman alone is the cause of the world), because in this Upaniṣad (viz. *Chāndogya*) that which is denoted by the term 'existent' "is definitely stated" to be the cause of all as the self of all, in the passage: 'All this, verily, is from the self' (*Chānd.* 7.26.1); and also because,—as denoted by the term "and",—the same thing is mentioned in other Upaniṣads too. Thus, there is a passage in the mantra-upaniṣad of the *Śvetāśvatara*s: 'Who is a knower, the time of time and omniscient' (*Śvet.* 6.2.16), 'He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of sense-organs.'¹ Of him there is no progenitor, nor lord' (*Śvet.* 6.9). The *Kauṣītaki*ns declare: 'From this self all the vital-breaths depart to their respective places, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the gods the worlds' (*Kauṣ.* 3.3 ; 4.20). Similarly, in other places too. We stop here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book. Hence, the non-sentient *pradhāna*, which is an object of inference,² is not the cause of the world, since it is unfit to be the cause of collocation without an intelligent ruler; and because if *pradhāna* be admitted to have the power of being such a ruler, you come over to our side.³ On the contrary, it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, denoted by the words 'Brahman' and the rest, the one topic of all the Vedas, omniscient, omnipotent, the non-distinct material and efficient cause of the world, and denoted by the term 'existent', is the cause of the world.⁴

Here ends the section entitled 'He sees' (5).

¹ Correct quotation : '*Kāraṇā-dhīpādhipaḥ*', which is translated here. Vide *Śvet.* 6.9.

² See footnote 1, p. 42.

³ That is, then *pradhāna* will become Brahman, and cease to be non-sentient, as held by the *Sāṃkhya*s.

⁴ Note the difference between the interpretations of *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa*. According to *Nimbārka*, the word '*śrutatvāt*' means: 'because this is mentioned in Scripture', and he attaches no special and separate meaning to the word '*Ca*'. But according to *Śrīnivāsa*, the word '*śrutatvāt*' means: 'because this is mentioned in this Upaniṣad (viz. *Chāndogya*)', and the word '*Ca*' means: 'because this is mentioned in other Upaniṣads (viz. *Śvetāśvatara*, *Kauṣītaki* and the rest)'.⁵

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same. Rāmānuja points out in conclusion that this adhikaraṇa is also a refutation of the theory of the Nirguṇa Brahman, since it asserts 'perceiving' or 'willing' on the part of the creator of the world, and 'willing' means being possessed of the *quality* of intelligence.¹

Baladeva

This is sūtra 11 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And because (the Nirguṇa Brahman) is mentioned in Scripture'. That is, Scripture proves the Nirguṇa Brahman to be the creator, and not the Saguṇa Brahman.²

The difference is that while according to Nimbārka (and others too), this section is concerned with the question as to whether Brahman or pradhāna is the creator of the world, according to Baladeva, the question is as to whether the Nirguṇa Brahman or the Saguṇa Brahman is the creator of the world.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'That which consists of bliss'. (Sūtras 13-20)

SŪTRA 13

"(BRAHMAN IS) THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF BLISS, ON ACCOUNT OF REPETITION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"That which consists of bliss" is the Supreme Soul alone, but not the individual soul. Why? On account of the repetition (in Scripture) of the word 'bliss' with reference to the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, by way of refuting the doctrine of pradhāna, it has been shown that scriptural texts like "The existent alone, my dear!",

¹ Śrī. B. 1.1.12, p. 166, vol. 1.

² G.B. 1.1.11, pp. 54-55, Chap. 1.

(Chānd. 6.2.1) and the rest, all refer to Brahman. Now, the author is showing that the texts about that which consists of bliss and the rest also refer to Brahman who, as possessed of unsurpassed bliss, is different in nature from the class of sentient beings also.

In the Taittirīya, four sheaths, viz. that which consists of food, that which consists of the vital-breath, that which consists of mind, and that which consists of understanding, are spoken of in a successive order; and after that it is said: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss. By that this is filled' (Tait. 2.5). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the words 'consisting of bliss', the individual soul is denoted or the Supreme Soul. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: As in the passage: 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2.5), an embodied soul is mentioned; as in another scriptural text: 'May my (sheaths) consisting of food, consisting of the vital-breath, consisting of the mind, consisting of understanding and consisting of bliss, be purified' (Mahānār. 20.21) it is said that what consists of bliss is something to be purified; and as it is impossible for the ever-pure Supreme Soul to be something to be purified, so that which consists of bliss is the individual soul,—

We reply: "that which consists of bliss" is the Highest self alone, possessed of unsurpassed bliss. Why? 'On account of repetition', i.e. because the word 'bliss' has been repeated many times (in Scripture) in reference to the Highest Self alone, the Highest Person, in texts like: 'If there were not bliss in the ether, for this alone causes bliss' (Tait. 2.7),¹ 'He knows that Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6) and so on; and because, beginning thus: 'This is an investigation into bliss' (Tait. 2.8), the concluding text: 'Knowing the bliss of Brahman, he does not fear from anything' (Tait. 2.8), is found to end by establishing that the bliss of Brahman alone is unsurpassable and illimitable.

If it be said that here there is the repetition of the word 'bliss'² only, and not of the words 'consisting of bliss'³—(we reply) no, because just as in the passage: 'In spring, he performs the jyoti-sacrifice'

¹ Complete quotation: 'For who indeed would breathe, who would live, if there were not this bliss in the ether' and so on. Vide Tait. 2.7, p. 70.

² *Ānanda*.

³ *Ānanda-maya*.

the word 'jyoti' stands for the word 'jyotiṣṭoma', so here the word 'bliss' stands for the words 'consisting of bliss'.

To your allegation that as an embodied soul is mentioned in Scripture, the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) the designation of the embodiedness of the Supreme Self fits in, since He abides within all, viz. that which consists of food and the rest, as their controller. On the other hand, the text about that which consists of bliss, viz. 'Of him is this very embodied soul which belongs to the previous one' (Tait. 2.5), shows that it (viz. that which consists of bliss) has no other (inner) soul.¹ The expression 'Let them be purified' (in the above Mahānārāyaṇa passage) means 'Let them be embellished'.

SŪTRA 14

"IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ('ĀNANDA-MAYA') DENOTING MODIFICATION, (THE HIGHEST SELF IS) NOT (DENOTED BY THIS WORD), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ABUNDANCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said that on account of the mention of (the suffix) 'mayat' in the sense of 'modification', the Highest Self is not that which consists of bliss,—(we reply:) no. Why? On account of the mention in Smṛti of (the suffix) 'mayat' as having the sense of 'abundance' as well.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: That which consists of bliss cannot be the Highest Self. Why? "On account of the word denoting modification", i.e. on account of the mention of the suffix 'mayat' as having the sense of 'modification',—beginning: 'Mayat is used optionally in the classical language after any base (to indicate "product" and

¹ That is, the soul consisting of food has the soul consisting of the vital breath as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of mind as its inner soul; this latter again has the soul consisting of understanding as its inner soul; and this latter again has the soul consisting of bliss as its inner soul. But the last one, viz. the soul consisting of bliss, has nothing else as its soul, but is the inmost soul of all.

“part”) when food and dress are meant’ (Pāṇ. 4.3.143; SD.K. 1523¹), Smṛti goes on to designate (the suffix) ‘mayat’ in the sense of modification thus:—‘(The suffix “mayat” is used) invariably after words in which the vowel has been lengthened and after “śara” and the rest’ (Pāṇ. 4.3.144; SD.K. 1524²);—and also because the suffix ‘mayat’ is found used in the sense of ‘modification’ in ordinary life in expressions like: ‘An earthen³ pot’ and so on, as well as in the Veda, in passages like: ‘A large branch of the parṇa⁴ wood⁵ is the sacrificial ladle’, and so on,—

(We reply:) “No.” Why? “On account of abundance”, i.e. because Smṛti depicts (the suffix) ‘mayat’ in the sense of ‘abundance’ as well, in the passage: ‘Mayat’ is added in the sense of ‘made thereof’⁶ and in the sense of ‘having a great portion of’⁷ (Pāṇ. 5.4.21; SD.K. 2089⁸); and because the suffix ‘mayat’ is found used in the sense of ‘abundance’, too, in ordinary expressions like ‘A sacrifice abounding in food’⁹ and so on.

It cannot be said also that since Brahman is admitted to be consisting of bliss, there may be some want of bliss in Him,¹⁰—because here ‘abundance’ is but a synonym for ‘very muchness’. Thus, among (all the effects of prakṛti) beginning with mahat and ending with the body, the body being a transformation of food,¹¹ is said to be the person ‘consisting of food’. Other than and the supporter of it is ‘that which consists of the vital-breath’. Other than and the supporter of these two is ‘that which consists of mind’. Other than and the controller of these three is the individual soul, called ‘the person consisting of understanding’. That which is of the nature of knowledge and has understanding as its attribute (viz. the individual soul) is the controller of the three non-sentient persons. That this

¹ P. 786, vol. 1.

² P. 786, vol. 1.

³ *Mṛn-maya*.

⁴ *Parṇa* is a large-leaved sacred tree, whose wood is used for making sacred vessels, later generally called ‘*palāśa*’. M.W., p. 606.

⁵ *Parṇa-mayī*.

⁶ *Tad-vacana*.

⁷ *Prakṛta-vacana*, meaning ‘*Prācuryyeṇa prastutam prakṛtam, tasya vacanam*’. SD. K. 2089, p. 931, vol. 1.

⁸ *Op. cit.*

⁹ *Anna-maya*.

¹⁰ That is, when it is said: ‘*Anna-maya yajña*’, it is meant that the sacrifice consists *mostly* of food, but not *entirely*. Similarly, it might be thought that the expression: ‘*Ānanda-maya Brahman*’ means that Brahman is *mostly* bliss but not *entirely* bliss, i.e. there is some non-bliss in *Brahman*.

¹¹ That is, it is food which being assimilated produces and keeps the body.

possessor of the attribute of understanding is of the nature of knowledge, will be made clear in the second chapter.¹ But why, then, has the attribute alone been indicated in the text: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice?' (Tait. 2.5). Listen. The very nature, too, of the knower is self-manifesting, and the use of the term 'understanding' or the nominative case-ending should be understood to be referring to it. The use of the neuter gender² is meant for denoting a thing.³ For this very reason, in the Kāṇva recension, viz. 'Who abiding in understanding' (Brh. 3.7.22), and in the Mādhyandina recension, viz. 'Who abiding in the self' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30⁴), in spite of the difference of words, the meaning, viz. the individual soul, is the very same. And for this very reason, the statement: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice, and deeds too' (Tait. 2.5) is perfectly justifiable, it being impossible for the mere attribute of understanding to be an agent. And, it, the individual soul, the knower, should be known to be possessed of bliss, in accordance with the text: 'That is one human bliss' (Tait. 2.8), as well as another scriptural text: 'For verily, on getting this essence, one becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7). The Supreme Person, an ocean of immense bliss in contrast to its (viz. the individual soul's) little bliss, is the controller of all, referred to in the text: 'Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding, is the self which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5). Moreover, the Supreme Person, the One, is indeed established in all the Vedāntas as free from all faults by nature, so there is not even an odour of slightest non-bliss in Him,—so much in brief.

SŪTRA 15

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THE CAUSE OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of being the cause of the bliss of the individual soul too, the Highest Self alone is that which consists of bliss.

¹ Vide V.K. 2.3.18.

² Viz. '*viññānam*' in the text.

³ That is, the word 'understanding' does not stand for a mere abstract attribute here, but for a concrete thing, viz. the individual soul, possessed of the attribute.

⁴ P. 861, line 19.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Scripture designates that He (viz. Brahman) alone is the “cause” of the bliss “of that”, viz. the individual soul,—which, according to the *prima facie* view, was suspected to be that which consists of bliss,—thus:—‘For, verily, this alone causes bliss’ (Tait. 2.7). Here the term “ānandayāti” means ‘ānandayati’. The sense is that as he who gives riches and knowledge to others is himself possessed of immense riches and immense knowledge, so the statement that the Highest Self, too, causes bliss to individual souls means that He is possessed of immense bliss. Just as the term ‘consisting of light’ is applied to Lord Sun, whose very nature is to remove all darkness, so exactly the application of the term ‘consisting of bliss’ to the Lord, the topic of the present discussion, the cause of all, without an equal or a superior, and devoid of even a tinge of non-bliss of any sort, is perfectly reasonable.

SŪTRA 16

“AND THE MANTRA-DESCRIBED (VIZ. BRAHMAN) IS CELEBRATED (TO BE CONSISTING OF BLISS).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is stated in the mantra-text: viz. ‘Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2.1),¹ is “mantra-described”.² That alone is celebrated by the term “consisting of bliss”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

That which is stated in the mantra-text which beginning thus: ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), continues: ‘He who knows Brahman as truth, knowledge and infinite, situated in the cave’ (Tait. 2.1) is the “mantra-described”, i.e. Brahman alone, the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. He is celebrated in the following Brāhmaṇa-text as well—viz. ‘Verily, other than and within that which consists of understanding is the self which consists of bliss’ (Tait. 2.5), since the mantra and the Brāhmaṇa,

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² Mantra-varṇikam.

the object to be explained and the explanation, refer to the same topic. Hence that which consists of bliss is the Highest Self alone.

SŪTRA 17

“NOT THE OTHER, ON ACCOUNT OF INAPPROPRIATENESS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The qualities peculiar to the Lord, which are mentioned in Scripture as relating to that which is signified by the term ‘consisting of bliss’, being “inappropriate” on the part of anything else, “the other”, i.e. the individual soul, is not signified by the term ‘consisting of bliss’.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“The other”, i.e. the individual, soul is not to be understood here by the term ‘consisting of bliss’. Why? “On account of inappropriateness”, i.e. the creatorship of the entire world and the like, mentioned as relating to that which consists of bliss in the scriptural text: “He wished: ‘May I be many, may I procreate’. He created all this” (Tait. 2.6), are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul. Hence that which consists of bliss is Brahman alone.

Or else, the following construction (of the sūtra) may be understood:—The individual soul, “other than” Brahman, is not “mantra-described”, because the qualities which are peculiar to the “mantra-described”, viz. being the object to be attained by the wise and so on, are “inappropriate” on the part of anything else.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading same, interpretation different—‘The other (viz. the individual) (is) not (the object of the text: “Truth, knowledge and infinite”, Tait. 2.1), on account of inappropriateness’. That is, Rāmānuja takes this sūtra as continuing more particularly the theme of the preceding sūtra where it has been shown that Brahman is designated by the text ‘Truth, knowledge and infinite’ (Tait. 2.1). Here it is shown, he points out, that none else than the Lord, not

even the freed soul, can be the object of the above text, for even the freed soul is not absolute ¹ knowledge in the sense the Lord is, as even the freed soul cannot wish to be many and so on. So it is not appropriate that the individual soul can ever be the object of the above text and be identical with Brahman.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'The other (viz. Hiranyagarbha) (is) not (the cause of the world), on account of inappropriateness'. According to Śrīkaṇṭha a new adhikaraṇa begins with this sūtra (sūtras 17-20), concerned with the question whether the Lord is the cause of the world, or someone else, viz. Hiranyagarbha.³

SŪTRA 18

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the designation of a difference" between the obtainer and the object obtained in the text: 'For, verily, on obtaining this essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7) ⁴ the individual soul is not that which consists of bliss.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, that which consists of bliss or the 'mantra-described' one is not the individual soul. Why? Because the individual soul and the Supreme Being are designated as different. Thus, the text: 'He is, verily, the essence. For, verily, on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful' (Tait. 2.7), designates a difference between the Highest Self, consisting of bliss and mantra-described, as the object to be obtained, and the individual soul, as the obtainer, since the obtainer cannot be the object obtained. There is a difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman, otherwise an

¹ *Nirupādhika*.

² Śrī. B. 1.1.17, pp. 193-194, Part 1.

³ ŚK. B. 1.1.17, pp. 230-237, Part 3.

⁴ Ś, Bh.

intermixture of qualities will result,—this is the meaning of the two aphorisms.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 17 in his commentary. Reading and literal interpretation same, quotes the same passage, but in conclusion adds his own view, viz. that really and transcendently, there is no difference between the soul, the obtainer, and Brahman, the obtained.¹

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same, but refers to a different passage, viz. Taittirīya-upaniṣad, 2.5.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.: ‘(If it be said that Hiranyagarbha is identical with the Supreme Lord, then we reply, no), on account of the designation of difference’.³

SŪTRA 19

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF DESIRE (THROUGH WHICH SIMPLY THE LORD IS ABLE TO REALIZE HIS PURPOSES), THERE IS NO DEPENDENCE (OF THE LORD) ON (WHAT IS AN OBJECT OF) INFERENCE (VIZ. PRADHĀNA).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the individual soul be admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, viz. on pradhāna which is an (object of) “inference”, just as a potter has to depend on clay and the rest in creating pots and the like. But the Highest Person, non-material, consisting of bliss and omnipotent, has to depend on nothing. Why? “On account of desire”, i.e. on account of intention, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘He desired: “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6).⁴

¹ Ś.B. 1.1.17, pp. 221-22.

² Cf. also Chānd. 6.2.3. ‘*Sa aikṣata bahu syām*’, etc.

³ ŚK. B. 1.1.19, pp. 237 ff, Part 1.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, B.

Hence that which consists of bliss is different from that (viz. the individual soul).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Pradhāna may very well be denoted by the term 'consisting of bliss', as it contains the quality of sattva which is the cause of bliss, and as it corresponds to the effect ¹,—we reply:—

The term 'consisting of bliss' contains no "reference" to "inference", i.e. to that which is inferred, viz. pradhāna. Why? "On account of desire", i.e. because the text, which refers to that which consists of bliss, viz. 'He desired: "May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6), mentions one who desires. The sense is that desire means volition, and that is not possible on the part of the non-sentient pradhāna, but is possible on the part of the omniscient Lord of all. Although pradhāna has already been set aside by the aphorism 'Because (the creator) sees, not, non-scriptural' (Br. Sū. 1.1.5), it is once more set aside here with a view to confirming the 'universality of knowing' ² and hence there is no fault of repetition.

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra:)—if the individual soul be denoted by the term 'consisting of bliss', the topic of the present discussion, it must be the cause of the world as well; and in that case, just as potters have to depend on clay and the rest for creating pots, etc. so the individual soul too must depend on pradhāna, which is a synonym for 'inference'.³ But if the omnipotent Brahman be the cause of the world, no such fault arises,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 18 in their commentaries. Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'And on account of desiring, there is no reference

¹ That is, *pradhāna*, the non-sentient cause, is similar to the effect, the non-sentient world. Vide V.K. 1.1.5.

² Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.11, where it has been said that *Brahman* is universally known from all texts to be the cause of the world.

³ That is, *pradhāna* has been called 'inference' (*anumāna*) in the *sūtra*, because it is an object of inference.

to (what is an object of) inference (viz. pradhāna) (in the term “ānanda-maya”). That is, Scripture predicates willing on the part of the ānanda-maya, and willing is possible on the part of a conscious being alone.¹

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different—viz. ‘And, (even) on account of desire, (i.e. in spite of the fact that Hiranyagarbha is said to have desired to create the world,) (his being the creator) is not dependent on reasoning (i.e. does not stand to reason,) (because it is the Lord Himself who created the world in the character of Hiranyagarbha)’.²

SŪTRA 20

“AND (SCRIPTURE) TEACHES THE UNION WITH THAT (VIZ. BLISS) OF THIS (VIZ. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IN THIS (VIZ. THE LORD).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Scripture “teaches” the “union with that”, i.e. the union with bliss, in the passage:—‘Verily, he is an essence, for verily, on attaining the essence, he becomes blissful’ (Tait. 2.7). Hence it is established that He, on attaining whom the individual soul comes to be united with bliss, is different from it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also that which consists of bliss is neither the individual soul, nor pradhāna, but Brahman alone, since Scripture “teaches” the “union with that”, i.e. the “union” or ‘connection’, with “that”, or the Highest Self,—i.e. salvation, characterized by the attaining of His nature,³—‘of this’, i.e. of the individual soul, relying on Him, “in this”, i.e. in the Highest Person, the Highest

¹ Ś.B. 1.1.18, p. 222; Bh.B. 1.1.18, p. 26. Note that this is adopted as an alternative explanation of the sūtra by *Śrīnivāsa*, but not by *Nimbārka*. See above.

² Ś.K. B. 1.1.19 (pp. 240-241, Part 3).

³ Note that while according to *Nimbārka*, the word ‘*tad-yogam*’ means ‘union with bliss’, according to *Śrīnivāsa*, it means ‘union with the Highest Self’, or salvation, though ultimately these two interpretations come to the same thing.

Self, consisting of bliss and mantra-described. And the scriptural text to this effect is as follows:—‘For, truly, when he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, and unsupported, then he is gone to fearlessness. When, however, he makes the smallest distinction therein, then he comes to have fear’ (Tait. 2.7). The meaning of this is as follows: ‘When’, i.e. when at the time of birth which took place at a time when there was a causeless kindly glance by the Lord, as mentioned in sacred texts, thus: ‘But should Madhusūdana glance at a person, when he is born, he should be known to be pure and given to the thought of salvation’. “‘Through my grace, he attains an eternal and unchangeable place”’ (Gitā 18.56) and so on, ‘he’, i.e. a knower, devoid of any desire for enjoyments here or hereafter, restoring to the feet of the Lord alone and possessed of the characteristics as stated in Scripture thus: “‘I am easily attainable by one, O Pārtha, by the ever-free ascetic, who constantly remembers me, not thinking ever of another”’ (Gitā 18.14), ‘He who departs, discarding the body, uttering the one syllable “om” and remembering me, goes to a supreme goal’, “‘Knowing me, he goes to peace”’ (Gitā 5.29), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), and so on, becomes fearless, he ‘finds’, i.e. attains, ‘a foundation’, i.e. unfailing, devotion (or reliance) through His grace alone. ‘Then’, i.e. immediately after, ‘he is gone to fearlessness’, on account of the absence of any devotion (on his part) to anyone else, which (alone) is the cause of fear. In whom? ‘In the invisible’, i.e. in that which is different from the group of the non-sentient which is visible. Again, in whom? ‘In the incorporeal’, i.e. in the supremely conscious Being, who is different from the group of souls or conscious beings,—that He is the supremely conscious Being is stated in the Kāṭhāvallī, thus: ‘Conscious among the conscious’ (Kāṭha. 5.13; also Śvet. 6.13);—‘in the undefined’, i.e. in that which is not established as having so-muchness and the nature and qualities of which are to be known from the Vedānta alone; ‘in the unsupported’, i.e. in that which has no basis, which is possessed of infinite, inconceivable powers,—this is the sense. And ‘when’, i.e. when during the period of nescience, ‘he’, i.e. a non-knower, ‘makes’ even the smallest ‘distinction’, i.e. relies on something else, viz. one or other of the ends, connected with means (other than a complete resort to the Lord alone), ‘then he comes to have fear’. Hence, it is

established that that which consists of bliss is Brahman, different from all the sentient and the non-sentient.¹

Here ends the section entitled 'That which consists of bliss' (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary. Reading and interpretation same, quotes the passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa. But here Śaṅkara changes his point of view all of a sudden, and after having given at length the very same interpretation as given by Nimbārka, viz. that the 'ānanda-maya' referred to in the Taittirīya-upaniṣad (Tait. 2.5) is the Highest Self,² and not the individual soul or pradhāna, he finally rejects it, at the end of this sūtra, in favour of another, viz. that the word 'Brahman' in the immediately following phrase: 'Brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā' (Tait. 2.5), refers to Brahman principally, and not as a member of the 'ānanda-maya', for the 'ānanda-maya' would refer to the qualified Brahman, and never to the non-qualified Brahman, which is called 'ānanda', and not 'ānandamaya'.³

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary too. Reading same, interpretation of the word 'tad-yogam' slightly different—viz. 'union with Him (the Lord)', i.e. salvation.⁴ (Cf. Śrīnivāsa.) Quotes a different portion of the same passage (viz. the portion quoted by Śrīnivāsa).

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different—viz. 'Herein (viz. in the Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad) (Scripture) teaches his (i.e. Hiraṇya-

¹ Note that here Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa understand the word 'śāsti' as referring to two different portions of the same passage, viz. Tait. 2.7, Nimbārka to the first part, Śrīnivāsa to the last.

² Vide Ś.B. 1.1.12, p. 217; 'Para evātmā ānanda-mayo bhavitum arhati'. In this very sūtra also, it is said:—'Tasmād ānanda-mayaḥ paramātmā iti sthītam'. Ś.B. 1.1.19, p. 223.

³ Vide Ś.B. 1.1.19, pp. 225-26.

⁴ Bh. B. 1.1.19, p. 26.

garbha's) connection with that (viz. the Supreme Lord)'.¹ While according to Nimbārka, sūtras 13-20 form one section, concerned with the question of the 'ānanda-maya', according to srikanṭha, Śūtras 13-16 form one section, while sūtras 17-20 form another different section, concerned with the question, as noted above, whether Hiraṇya-garbha is the creator of the world, or the Supreme Lord (viz. Śiva).

Baladeva

This is sūtra 19 in his commentary. Reading same, interpretation of the word 'tad-yogam' different, viz. 'union with fearlessness'. Quotes the passage quoted by Śrīnivāsa.²

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'That which is within'. (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

"THAT WHICH IS WITHIN (THE SUN AND THE EYE) (IS NONE BUT THE HIGHEST SELF), ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF HIS QUALITIES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

He who abides "within" the sun and the eye and is to be worshipped by one desiring salvation, is, truly, the Highest Self alone, and not a particular individual soul. Why? "On account of the teaching of the qualities belonging to Him" alone, viz. qualities like 'freedom from sins', 'being the soul of all' and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been shown in a general manner in the two sections that the stated texts all refer to Brahman, who is different from pradhāna as well as from the individual soul and is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world. Now, after having mentioned the peculiar qualities of the Lord, such as, possessing an eternally present, non-celestial body and so on, and then by showing the concordance of those texts (with regard to the Lord), the author denotes, up to the end of the section, the difference

¹ ŚK. B. 1.1.20, pp. 240-241, Part 3.

² G.B. 1.1.19, pp. 76-77, Chap. 1.

of Brahman from particular individual souls who have attained eminence by virtue of supreme merit, as well as from particular non-sentient objects, like time and the like.

In the Chāndogya, we read: 'Now, this golden Person, who is seen within the sun, has a golden beard and golden hair, and is golden through and through, right to the finger-nail tips. His eyes are like the full-blown lotus. His name is High, (because) he has risen above all sins. Verily, he who knows thus rises above all sins. His singers are the *Ṛc* and the *Sāman*. . . .¹ So much with reference to the gods' (Chānd. 1.6.6-1.6.8), 'Now, with reference to the self' (Chānd. 1.7.1), 'Now, this person, who is seen within the eye' (Chānd. 1.7.5) and so on.

Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether this Person, mentioned in Scripture as abiding within the sun and the eye, is a particular individual soul, or the Supreme Lord? What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: An individual soul who has attained eminence. Why? Because the person within the sun and the person within the eye are declared by Scripture to be possessed of a form in the passages (respectively): 'Having a golden beard, golden hair' (Chānd. 1.6.6), 'The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one' (Chānd. 1.7.5); because a limit to the lordship of both is declared respectively by the texts:—'He rules these worlds which are beyond that, as well as the desires of gods' (Chānd. 1.6.8), 'He rules those worlds which are under that, as well as the desires of men' (Chānd. 1.7.6); because the dependence of both on something else is declared (respectively) by the texts: 'Within the sun' (Chānd. 1.6.6), 'Within the eye' (Chānd. 1.7.5); and because the Supreme Self is declared to be just the opposite by the texts 'Without sound, without touch, without form' (Kāṭha 3.15), "'On what, my reverend Sir, is it based?" "On its own greatness"' (Chānd. 7.24.1), 'This is the Lord of beings' (Brh. 4.4.22), etc.—

We reply: The Person, mentioned in Scripture as "within" the sun and the eye is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the teaching of his qualities," i.e. because of the "teaching", in this text, of the qualities "of him", viz. of the Highest Soul alone, such as, being free from sins in every way, being the remover of all the sins

¹ Quotation incomplete—viz.:—'His singers are the *Ṛc* and the *Sāman*. Therefore (they are called) the *udgītha*' and so on. See footnote 1, p. 69.

of His own devotees, and so on, as well as, being the soul of all and the rest, thus: 'He, verily, is the *Ṛc*, the *Sāman*, the *Uktha*, the *Yajus*, He is Brahman'¹ (Chānd. 1.7.5); because in accordance with the scriptural texts: 'When the seer sees the golden-coloured person' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'Of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness' (Śvet. 3.8; Gītā 8.9), 'That on which all these powers are based, O king, is another great form of Hari, different from the form of the world', and so on, like His natural qualities of possessing true desires and the rest, His possessing a form too, involves no contradiction; and because the text: 'Without sound, without touch, without colour' (Kaṭha 3.15) is concerned with denying sound and the like belonging to the material world. Nor is Brahman depicted here as possessed of a limited lordship, since the text setting forth such a limit is concerned with an arrangement of presiding deities. Nor can Brahman be said to be dependent on something else, since He is the support of all, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2²), 'The Inner Soul of all beings' (Kaṭha 5.9, 10, 11; 5.12; Śvet. 6.11; Muṇḍ. 2.1.4), 'Who, abiding within the earth' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), '“And, I am situated within the hearts of all”' (Gītā 15.15), '“I abide, supporting the entire universe with a part of mine”' (Gītā 10.42), and so on. Here, by the Vedic text,—which is omniscient, independent of all proofs and authoritative by itself with regard to its own matter,—viz. 'This golden person who is seen within the sun, having a golden beard' (Chānd. 1.6.6) and so on, the body also of Brahman, the topic of discussion, suitable to Him, is mentioned, on the basis of direct perception alone, as evident from the statement: 'is seen'. From this it is known that the Highest Self is to be meditated on by one who desires salvation as possessed of a body. And, meditation too, to be mentioned hereafter,³ is possible only if the Highest Self be possessed of a body. The multitude of scriptural and Smṛti texts, referring to the body of the Lord, is not quoted here for fear of prolixity.

¹ *Ṛc* is a sacred verse, which is recited in praise of a deity; *Sāman* is a verse which is sung; *Yajus* is a sacred formula which is muttered; *Uktha* is a kind of recitation in sacrifices; *Brahman* is a sacred text or mantra, distinct from *Ṛc*, *Sāman* and *Yajus*. M.W., pp. 172, 225, 737.

² P. 181.

³ Vide V.K. 3.3.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 20 in his commentary. Reading and interpretation same, quotes the same passage. In conclusion, he adds that although the Supreme Lord is really arūpa or formless, yet He may assume various māyāmaya-rūpas for favouring His devotees.¹ That is, all these passages, teaching the worship of the Person within the sun and so on, refer to the qualified Brahman only, and not to the highest Brahman, which of course Nimbārka does not admit.

SŪTRA 22

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE, (THE HIGHEST SELF IS) OTHER THAN (THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS OF THE SUN AND THE REST).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Highest Self is “other” than the group of individual souls of the sun and the rest.² Why? “On account of the designation of difference” in the text ‘Abiding in the sun’ (Brh. 3.7.9³) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, the Highest Self, is “other” than, i.e. different by nature from, the individual souls of the sun and the rest within which He abides. Why? “On account of the designation of difference” between the individual soul and Brahman, in the text: ‘Who abiding within the sun, is other than the sun, whom the sun does not know, of whom the sun is the body, who rules the sun from within, he is your soul, the inner controller, immortal’ (Brh. 3.7.9). Thus,

¹ Ś.B. 1.1.20, p. 232; ‘*Syāt paramēśvarasyāpīchā-vaśān māyāmayaṃ rūpaṃ sādhakānugrahārtham*’.

² C.S.S. ed. slightly different—viz. ‘The Highest Self is other than the group of the individual souls of the sun and the rest, within which He abides’ (p. 5).

³ Ś, R, Bh, B.

the difference of Brahman from the individual soul, within which He abides, is established.

Here ends the section entitled 'That which is within' (7).

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The ether'.
(Sūtra 23)

SŪTRA 23

"(BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) ETHER, ON ACCOUNT OF HIS CHARACTERISTIC MARKS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "What is the final refuge of this world?" "The ether", said he' (Chānd. 1.9.1¹), that which is denoted by the term "ether" is the Highest Self. Why? "On account of his characteristic marks," such as, being the creator of all, and the like, mentioned in the text: 'All these things, verily, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been shown, on the ground of the peculiar qualities of Brahman, the topic of discussion, that the text: 'Now, this golden person who is seen within the sun' (Chānd. 1.6.8) and so on, refers to Brahman, the topic of discussion. Now, it is being shown that the text: "What is the final refuge of this world?" and so on too (Chānd. 1.9.1) refers to Him, on the ground of the characteristic marks of Brahman.

In the Chāndogya, we read the following under the dialogue between Śālāvatya and Jaivali: "What is the final refuge of this world?" "The ether," said he, "All these beings, verily, arise from the ether alone, disappear into the ether; for the ether alone is greater than these, the ether is the supreme refuge" (Chānd. 1.9.1). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether the elemental ether is meant by the term 'ether', or the Highest Self. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: As it is so well-known in the world and as it is declared also by Scripture to be the cause of the elements beginning with the air,

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

and so on, in the passage: 'From the "ether", the "air"' (Tait. 2.1), the elemental ether (is meant here)—

We reply: In this text "the ether", i.e. the object meant by the term 'ether', is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of his characteristic marks," i.e. "his", or the Highest Self's, "characteristic marks", viz. being the creator of all beings, being superior, being the supreme refuge, and so on,—on account of that,¹ i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self. It cannot be said, also, that in accordance with the rule: 'When there is a collocation of scriptural statement, mark, text, topic, place and name, each following one is weaker (than each preceding one), on account of its remoteness from the meaning' (Pū. Mī. Sū. 3.3.14²), the scriptural statement is of a greater force than the mark,—for in accordance with the rule: 'The strength and weakness of those which are spoilt by meaninglessness are in the opposite proportion', the scriptural statement: 'the ether', is set aside by the mark mentioned in the text: 'All these beings, verily, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1). If the word "ether" were to refer to the elemental ether, then no sense would follow, for such a mark (viz. being the creator of all) is not possible on the part of the elemental ether; on the contrary, the elemental ether is declared by Scripture to be created by the Highest Self, in the passage: 'From this soul, verily, the ether arose' (Tait. 2.1). Further, on the ground of the etymological interpretation too (of the word 'ether' or ākāśa), viz. 'The ether is that which shines everywhere',³ as well as on the ground of its conventional meaning, given in the passages: 'If there were not this bliss in the ether' (Tait. 2.7), 'The ether, verily, is the revealer of names and forms' (Chānd. 8.14.1) and so on, it is established that by the term "ether", the Supreme Self alone is denoted.

Here ends the section entitled 'The ether' (8).

¹ This explains the compound 'tal-liṅgāt'.

² P. 284, vol. 1. Vide *Sābara-bhāṣya*.

³ *Ā samantāt kāsata iti ākāśaḥ*.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled 'The vital-breath'. (Sūtra 24)

SŪTRA 24

"FOR THIS VERY REASON (BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) VITAL-BREATH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text also: 'All these beings, verily, enter into the vital-breath alone, arise from the vital-breath' (Chānd. 1.11.5¹), the vital-breath is none but the Highest Self, on account of the characteristic marks of Brahman, viz. entering into and coming out of Him.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been pointed out that the text referring to the ether denotes Brahman, and not the elemental ether. Now, by declaring that the text about the udgītha,² viz. 'O Prastotr!'³ (Chānd. 1.10.9; 1.11.4) and so on, also refers to Brahman, the author extends here the same principle regarding the ether.

In the Chāndogya we find the following concerning the udgītha⁴ under the dialogue between Cākrāyaṇa and the Prastotr: "'O Prastotr! if you shall sing the prastāva⁵ without knowing the Deity who is connected with the prastāva, then your head will fall off'" (Chānd. 1.10.9; 1.11.4), "'Which is that Deity?'" "The vital-breath," said he, "All these beings, verily, enter into the vital-breath alone, arise from the vital-breath. This is the Deity connected with the prastāva" (Chānd. 1.11.4-5). Here a doubt arises, viz. As the entire world is found to exist as dependent on the vital-breath, and as it is so well-known in the world, so by the term 'vital-breath' a modification of the air too may be meant; and as in the text: "'For the mind, my dear, has the vital-breath as its fastening'" (Chānd. 6.8.2) and so on, the term 'vital-breath' is applied to Brahman, so Brahman may also be meant. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: Since everything is found to be dependent on the vital-

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² The word 'udgīthe' is not included under the quotation.

³ A Prastotr is an assistant of the Udgātr, and sings the prastāva or the introductory eulogy or the prelude of a sāman. M.W., p. 699.

⁴ The word 'udgītha' is not included under the quotation.

⁵ The prastāva is the introductory eulogy or the prelude of a sāman. See footnote 3 above.

breath, since popularly the term 'vital-breath' is well-known to be a modification of the air, and since in the text: 'When, verily, a person sleeps, his speech goes to the vital-breath, his eye to the vital-breath, his ear to the vital-breath. When he wakes up, from the vital-breath alone they arise again' (Śat. Br. 10.3.3.6¹), the entrance into a modification of the air and so on are mentioned, the chief vital-breath alone, which is a modification of the air and has five modes, is understood here by the term 'vital-breath',—

We reply: "For this very reason", i.e. on account of the very characteristic marks of the Supreme Lord, viz. the entering into and coming out (of Him) of all the great elements, it is reasonable to hold that the object denoted by the term "vital-breath" is the Supreme Lord, the Highest Person alone. The characteristic marks of the Supreme Lord, viz. the entering into and the rising from Him of all the great elements, as mentioned in the text: 'All the elements enter into, i.e. merge into, and arise from, i.e. come out towards, Him', are not possible in the case of a modification of the air. In the text: 'When, verily, a person sleeps' (Śat. Br. 10.3.3.6), there is no mention of the entering and so on of the great elements, but simply of the entering and the rest of the sense-organs. Hence, on account of the marks of the Supreme Lord, as well as on the ground of the etymological interpretation (of the term 'vital-breath' or *prāṇa*), viz. 'In whom the entire world breathes excellently, i.e. finds a basis', it is established that the Highest Self alone is denoted by the term 'vital-breath'.

Here ends the section entitled "The vital-breath" (9).

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled 'The light'.
(Sūtras 25-28)

SŪTRA 25

"(BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) LIGHT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF FEET."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The light", mentioned in the passage: 'The light (higher) than the heaven' (Chānd. 3.13.7²) is Brahman alone, "on account of the

¹ P. 778, lines 9-11. Cf. a similar passage in Chānd. 4.3.3.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

mention of 'feet', in the passage: "'One foot of him are all the elements"' (Chānd. 3.12.6¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been pointed out that the term 'ether', as well as the term 'vital-breath' refer to Brahman, all-pervading, untouched by any fault and the cause of all life. Now, the author is showing that the term 'light' also refers to Brahman.

In the Chāndogya, it is recorded: 'Now, the light which shines higher than this heaven, on the backs of all, on the backs of everything, in the highest worlds than which there are no higher,—that, verily, is the same light which is within this person' (Chānd. 3.13.7). Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the term 'light' denotes the well-known light of the sun and so on, or the Highest Self. What is reasonable here? The *prima facie* view is as follows: It denotes the light of the sun and the rest. Why? Because that is well-known to be a remover of darkness, because Scripture mentions a limit in the passage: 'The light which shines higher than this heaven' (Chānd. 3.13.7), because no limit is possible on the part of Brahman, because Scripture speaks of a minor fruit in the passage: 'He who knows this becomes agreeable to the eyes, and renowned' (Chānd. 3.13.8), and, finally, because from the passage: 'That, verily, is the same light, which is within this person' (Chānd. 3.13.7), its identity with the fire within the belly is known.

On this suggestion, we reply: Here the object denoted by the term "light" is the Supreme Brahman alone, possessed of unsurpassed splendour. Why? "On account of the mention of feet." Thus, in the text, which precedes the text about the 'light', viz. 'So much is His greatness, and the Person is higher than this. One foot of him are all beings, three feet of him, the immortal in the heaven' (Rg-V. 10.10.3; Chānd. 3.12.6), Brahman is mentioned as having four feet. Thus, all beings constitute His one foot. Having all beings as one foot is possible on the part of the Supreme Brahman alone, and never on the part of any one else. Nor is any contradiction involved in the declaration of His having the heaven as His limit, because, as the word 'higher' in the passage: 'What is higher than this' (Chānd. 3.13.7) denotes superiority, it is not meant to denote non-comprehensiveness;

and because from the passage: 'That the gods worship as the Light of lights, as Life' (Brh. 4.4.16) the term 'light' is known to be referring to Brahman. Nor is any contradiction involved in the declaration of a minor fruit, because Brahman is the giver of fruits in accordance with the fitness of persons. As it is declared in the 'Mystery of Fire'¹ of the Vājasaneyins: 'As one worships him, so he becomes' (Śat. Br. 10.5.2.10²), and by the Lord Himself, in the passage:—"Whosoever, in whatever way, resorts to me, him, in that same way, do I favour"³ (Gitā. 4.11). And, the purpose of the meditation on the identity (of the Lord) with the fire within the belly is to be known from the text: "I, having become the Vaiśvānara³, abide within the bodies of living beings, and united with the prāṇa and the apāna,⁴ I digest the four kinds of food"⁵ (Gitā 15.14).

SŪTRA 26

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF THE METRE, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (DENOTED), (THEN, WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE MIND (TO BRAHMAN) THUS, FOR THUS IT IS SEEN (IN OTHER PASSAGES TOO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that "on account of the mention" of the metre called 'Gāyatrī' in the preceding text, the text referring to the feet may refer to that and not to Brahman,—(we reply:) "No, on account of the declaration of the application of the mind" to the Lord, who is denoted by the term 'Gāyatrī' owing to the connection of the latter with certain qualities.⁵ Compare the word 'virāj' which illustrates a parallel case.⁶

¹ *Agni-rahasya* is the title of the tenth book of the *Śatapatha-brāhmāṇa*.

² P. 725, line 13. Cf. a very similar passage in *Mudg.* 3, p. 384, lines 8-9.

³ That is, the fire of digestion.

⁴ The *prāṇa* is one of the five modes of the chief vital-breath, and *apāna* is another. The first goes upwards the nose, the second goes downwards through the anus. Vide V.R.M.

⁵ That is, the *Gāyatrī* is said to possess certain qualities, which can belong to the Lord alone. Hence, the Lord is really denoted by the term '*Gāyatrī*'. See V.K. below.

⁶ We find that in other passages, too, a word, primarily denoting a metre, may stand for something else, e.g. the word '*virāj*' primarily denotes a kind of

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: As the Gāyatrī metre is referred to in the preceding passage viz.: 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1), the designation of beings as the foot, viz.: 'One foot of him are all beings' (Chānd. 3.12.6), may refer to this very metre. It is not reasonable to hold that this text establishes Brahman,—

(We reply:) "No." Why? "On account of the declaration of the application of the mind thus," i.e. on account of the mention of the fixing of the mind "thus" to Brahman who is denoted by the term 'Gāyatrī', since the latter is predicted to be the soul of all, in the passage: 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1). Here, the term 'Gāyatrī' denotes Brahman who inheres in the metre, it being impossible for a metre, which is a mere collection of letters, to be the soul of all. "For thus it is seen," i.e. in very same manner, a parallel case is mentioned in the Aitariya-upaniṣad, in the passage:—'The Bahvṛcas consider Him in the great-hymn, the Adhvaryus in the sacrificial fire, the Chandogas in the Mahā-vrata ceremony'¹ (Ait. Ār. 3.2.3, 12). The sense is that those who are conversant with the Ṛg-veda, those who are conversant with the Sāma-veda, and those

metre, yet it denotes the 'kṛta' or the group of ten substances in Chānd. 4.3.8. Similarly, though the word 'Gāyatrī' denotes a kind of metre, yet it may denote Brahman too. See V.K. below.

C.S.S. ed. reads: 'Kṛta-para',—meaning comes to the same, viz. the word 'virāj' stands for the 'kṛta'.

¹ A Bahvṛca is one conversant with the Ṛg-veda, a priest of it, or the Hotṛ priest who represents it in the sacrificial ceremonies. M.W., p. 726.

An Adhvaryu is a priest of a particular class, as distinguished from the Hotṛ, the Udgātṛ and the Brāhmaṇa classes. He has to measure the ground, build the altar and so on, and while engaged in these duties, he has to repeat the hymns of the Yajurveda. Vide *op. cit.*, p. 24.

A Chandoga is a chanter of the Sāma-veda, an Udgātṛ priest. Vide *op. cit.*, p. 405.

The Mahat-uktha (great hymn) or the Brhat-uktha forms a series of verses, in three sections, each containing eighty Tṛcas or triple verses, recited at the end of the Agni-cayana. An Uktha is a verse which is recited, as distinguished from the Sāman verse which is sung, and the Yajus or sacred formula which is muttered. It forms a subdivision of the Śāstras. Vide *op. cit.*, p. 172. See footnote 1, p. 78.

Mahā-vrata is the name of a great religious observance. It is also the name of a Sāman or Stotra, appointed to be sung on the last day but one of the Gavām-ayana. Vide M.W., p. 800.

who are conversant with the Yajur-veda consider, respectively in the chief Śāstra¹, sacrificial fire, and the Mahā-vrata, Brahman who inheres in them severally; like this, Brahman inheres in the (Gāyatrī) metre.

Or, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra,) just as the Gāyatrī is a class of metre which consists of four feet, each consisting of six syllables², so Brahman, too, has four feet in accordance with the text: 'One foot of him are all beings, three feet, the immortal in the heaven' (Chānd. 3.12.6). Accordingly, on account of the mention of the fixing of the mind to Brahman who is metaphorically denoted by the word 'Gāyatrī' in virtue of the fact that both possess the quality of having four feet, the Gāyatrī is not recognized here, but Brahman alone. "For thus it is seen," i.e. in the very same manner, a term denoting a metre is found applied,—in a literal (as opposed to a metaphorical) sense,³—even to a different object in virtue of the fact that both possess a common quality. Thus, beginning: 'These five and the other five make ten, and that is the kṛta'⁴ (Chānd. 4.3.8), the text goes on to say: 'That is the Virāj, the eater of food' (Chānd. 4.3.8). Here under the saṃvargavidyā⁵, the term 'Virāj',

¹ A Śāstra is a verse recited by the Hotṛ and his assistants. Vide M.W., p. 1044.

² Vide the verse: 'Indraś śacī-patīḥ / Balena pīḍitah / duscjavano vṛṣā / samitsu sāsahīḥ' / Śrī. B. 1.1.26, p. 216, Part 1.

³ See end of footnote 5 below.

⁴ Kṛta is the name of the die marked with four points.

⁵ The Saṃvarga-vidyā or the knowledge concerning the snatcher-unto-itself, taught by Raikva to Jānaśrutī. Vide Chānd. 4.3. The wind is the snatcher-unto-itself among the gods, the vital-breath is the snatcher-unto-itself among the sense-organs. The wind absorbs fire, the sun, the moon and water. The vital-breath absorbs speech, the eye, the ear and the mind. And, the wind, together with its four kinds of food, viz. fire, the sun, the moon and water—these five, and the vital-breath, together with its four kinds of food, viz. speech, the eye, the ear and the mind—these five, make ten or the 'kṛta', which is called the 'Virāj'. Here, the Kṛta has *actually* ten constituent parts, just as the Virāj metre has *actually* ten syllables. Hence these two are said to resemble each other *in a literal sense*, and not in a figurative one, as opposed to the case of Brahman and Gāyatrī, since when it is said that Brahman has four feet, it is not meant that He has *actually* four feet, but only *metaphorically*, while Gāyatrī has *actually* four feet or parts. Hence, here the term 'gauṇa' has been used in connection with the latter case, and the term 'śakya' in connection with the former. Vide V.K. above.

which is a class of metre of ten syllables, is found applied to a collection of ten objects or the *kṛta*.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Reading same. He gives two alternative explanations of the sūtra. Under the first, he points out that the passage 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1) intimates that by means of the metre Gāyatrī, the mind is to be directed to Brahman who is connected with the Gāyatrī as its cause, just as devout meditation on Brahman under the form of certain effects of Brahman is mentioned in other passages, viz. Aitereya-āranyaka. (See Śrīnivāsa above.) Under the second, he points out that according to some, the term Gāyatrī directly denotes Brahman, since both possess four feet, and quotes a Chāndogya passage as an example. (See Śrīnivāsa above.)¹

Rāmānuja

Reading slightly different—viz. 'nigmāt' in place of 'nigadāt'. Interpretation same.²

Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary too. Reading and interpretation same, only the interpretation of the phrase 'Tathā hi darśanam' different. He does not take it as referring to one specific parallel instance as Nimbārka does but understands 'darśanam' in the sense of 'consistency', and the phrase means, according to him, 'for by such an explanation alone the above passage gives a consistent meaning'.³

SŪTRA 27

"AND BECAUSE THE DESIGNATION OF THE BEINGS AND SO ON AS THE FEET IS APPROPRIATE (ONLY IF BRAHMAN BE DENOTED BY THE TERM "GĀYATRĪ"), THIS IS SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

We hold that the Gāyatrī is Brahman not only 'on account of the declaration of the application of the mind thus' (last part of Br.

² Śrī. B. 1.1.26, p. 215, vol. 1.

¹ S.B. 1.1.25.

³ G.B. 1.1.25, pp. 91-92, Chap. 1.

Sū. 1.1.26), but "this is so also because" (the four feet, viz.) beings, earth, body and heart,¹ are "appropriate" on the part of Brahman, the Lord (alone).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason "also", in the text: 'The Gāyatrī, verily, is all this' (Chānd. 3.12.1), the object denoted by the term 'Gāyatrī' is Brahman. For what reason? "Because the designation of beings and so on as the feet is appropriate", i.e. also because the designation, viz. that the Gāyatrī has four feet,—called beings, earth, body and heart,—is appropriate on the part of Brahman alone, and not on the part of the Gāyatrī metre which is but a collection of letters.

SŪTRA 28

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF TEACHING, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (RECOGNIZED), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING NO CONTRADICTION EVEN IN BOTH CASES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that first the heaven is referred to as a 'locus', and then again, as a 'limit', and there being such "a difference of teaching", Brahman is "not" recognized,—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "Because there is no contradiction," in both the cases, with regard to the oneness of Brahman (i.e. in point of proving the very same Brahman).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected:—The heaven is referred to as a 'locus', by the locative case-ending, in the previous case, viz. : 'The three feet of him are the immortal in the heaven (divi)' (Chānd. 3.12.6), but as a 'limit', by the ablative case-ending, in the text 'Now, the light that shines higher than the heaven (divaḥ)' (Chānd. 3.13.7). Thus, "on account of the difference of teaching", resulting from the difference of the case-endings, Brahman is not recognized in the text concerning the light (viz. Chānd. 3.13.7)—

¹ Vide Chānd. 3.12.1-4.

(We reply:) Such an objection cannot be raised. Why? "In both the cases", i.e. in the case of the locative as well as in the case of the ablative, the oneness of the root-meaning, which is the main thing, is not set aside by the meaning of the case-endings, which is subsidiary only; just as the expressions: 'A hawk on the top of the tree', 'A hawk above the tree' (mean the same thing). Hence, it is established that the object denoted by the term "light" is the Supreme Brahman alone, possessed of unsurpassed splendour.

Here ends the section entitled 'The light' (10).

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled 'Indra and the vital-breath'. (Sūtras 29-32)

SŪTRA 29

"(BRAHMAN IS DENOTED BY THE WORD) VITAL-BREATH, ON ACCOUNT OF INTELLIGIBILITY IN THAT WAY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: 'I am the vital-breath' (Kauṣ. 3.21) and so on, the object denoted by the term 'vital-breath' and the rest, is the Highest Self, because the qualities of highest auspiciousness, endlessness and so on are intelligible only if the Highest Self be understood.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing, in the following four aphorisms, that the Kauṣītaki-texts all refer to Brahman, the author refutes the view that words like 'vital-breath', 'Indra' and so on mean the individual soul.

In the Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa-upaniṣad, the Pratardana-vidyā is recorded, beginning: 'Pratardana, verily, the son of Divodāsa, arrived by fighting and valour at the beloved abode of Indra' (Kauṣ. 3.1). It is said here: Being told by Indra: "I will give you a boon" (Kauṣ. 3.1), Pratardana said: "Do you yourself choose (a boon) for me,² what you consider to be the most beneficial for mankind" (Kauṣ.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² The word '*varam*' is not included in the original text.

3.1), i.e. having considered the boon 'yourself', 'choose', i.e. give that 'to me'. Thus told by Pratardana, Indra said: "'I am the vital-breath, the intelligent Self. Worship me, as life, as immortality"' (Kauṣ. 3.2); and again, later on: "'The vital-breath, verily, is the intelligent self that taking hold of this body, makes it stand up"' (Kauṣ. 3.3), "'Let none desire to enquire after speech, but let him know the speaker"' (Kauṣ. 3.8), and in conclusion also: "'Now, this vital-breath itself, forsooth, is the intelligent self, bliss, ageless and immortal"' (Kauṣ. 3.8). Here, the doubt is, viz. whether a certain individual soul is denoted by the words 'Indra' and 'vital-breath', or the Highest Self? What is reasonable here?

The *prima facie* view is: As the word 'Indra' is well-known to be denoting an individual soul entrusted with a certain office, and as there is a text regarding the object denotable by the term 'Indra', viz. "'I am the vital-breath"' (Kauṣ. 3.2),—the word 'vital-breath' also denotes 'Indra'. From the text: "'Worship me as life, as immortality"' (Kauṣ. 3.2), he alone is known here as the object to be worshipped.

With regard to this, the correct conclusion is as follows: "The vital-breath", i.e. the meaning of the word 'vital-breath' and what is denoted by the words 'Indra' and the rest accompanying it, are the Highest Self alone. Why? "'On account of intelligibility in that way,"' i.e. because qualities like 'highest auspiciousness', 'being the intelligent self', 'bliss', 'agelessness' and the rest are intelligible "'in that way"', i.e. only if the Highest Self be understood. Thus, first, it is said in the beginning: 'The son of Divodāsa went to the beloved abode of Indra'¹ (Kauṣ. 3.1), where Indra, conceiving the dependence of his own self on Brahman for its existence and activity, did not think: 'I am Indra'; but, being merged in the bliss of Brahman and conceiving that the sentient and the non-sentient objects have Brahman as their self, reflected: 'Brahman, alone, is all this, I am Brahman'; and looked upon even those who had committed sins as his own self. And, the object to be attained by the Self (viz. Indra) and by those who were equal to the Self (viz. all other beings whom Indra looked upon as his self) was Brahman alone; the means thereto being simply the worship of His feet. Indra told to Pratardana, who had arrived there, i.e. at his so-beloved place: 'Choose a boon'. And, thus

¹ The word 'tāvat' is not included in the quotation.

requested, Pratardana too, wishing for the highest goal of men, said to him, who was very modest, free from pride, and desirous of intimating the means to the highest goal of men, “Do you yourself choose a boon for me” and so on. Thereupon, the vital-breath was taught to Pratardana as the object to be worshipped, in the passage: “I am the vital-breath” (Kauṣ. 3.2) and so on. How can the vital-breath, taught thus as the highest goal of men, be an individual soul? How can the text: “Worship me” (Kauṣ. 3.2) be intelligible except as designating the worship of the Supreme Brahman? The individual soul, the witness of the three states¹, being a part and not fit to be attained by another individual soul, is not attainable through the intuition of a knower. And (the adjective) ‘most beneficial’ (in the text: “What you consider to be the most beneficial for mankind”) does not apply to anything else except to the attainment of Brahman. (The qualities like) ‘being the intelligent self’, ‘bliss’, ‘agelessness’, and ‘immortality’, mentioned in the passages: “Worship me as life, as immortality”² (Kauṣ. 2.3), ‘This alone, verily, is the intelligent self, bliss, ageless, immortal’ (Kauṣ. 3.8), fit in only if Brahman be understood, and not otherwise. Hence, the words ‘Indra’, ‘vital-breath’ and so on were used by the celebrated Indra with a view to designating Brahman, and not his own self.

SŪTRA 30

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (DENOTED), ON ACCOUNT OF THE SELF OF THE SPEAKER BEING TAUGHT, (WE REPLY:) BECAUSE THERE IS A MULTITUDE OF REFERENCES TO THE SELF IN IT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: The object denoted by the words ‘vital-breath’ and the rest cannot be Brahman. Why? Because in the text: “Know me alone” (Kauṣ. 3.1³), the very self of the speaker is taught,—

¹ Viz. waking, dream, deep sleep.

² Correct quotation translated: ‘*taṁ mām*’.

³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

(We reply:) “In this” chapter, there is a multitude of references to the Highest Self. Hence, the object denoted by the words ‘vital-breath’, ‘Indra’ and the rest is the Highest Self alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: In the aphorism: ‘The vital-breath, on account of intelligibility in that way’ (Br. Sū. 1.1.29), it has been said that the object denoted by the words ‘vital-breath’, ‘Indra’ and so on, is Brahman. That is not the case. Why? “On account of the self of the speaker being taught,” i.e. because the very self of the speaker, viz. Indra, who says at first: “Know me alone” (Kauṣ. 3.1), and later on: “I am the vital-breath, the intelligent self” (Kauṣ. 3.2),—his very individual character, well-known from the passage: “I killed the three-headed son of Tvaṣṭr, I delivered the Arunmukhas, the ascetics, to the wolves” (Kauṣ. 3.1),—is taught as the object to be worshipped. Thus, the introductory text here refers to the individual soul. This being so, the concluding text too, viz. ‘Bliss, ageless, immortal’ (Kauṣ. 3.8), should refer to it,—

We reply: “Because there is a multitude of references to the self in it”, i.e. “because”, i.e. certainly, “in it”, viz. in this chapter, there is “a multitude of references to the self”, i.e. numerous references to that which is above the (individual) self, viz. the Highest Self; that means, in this chapter there are (mentioned) a great many attributes of the Highest Self. Hence there cannot be any reference to any individual soul like Indra here,—this is the resulting meaning. Thus, the worship of what is the most beneficial, mentioned in the introductory text: “What you consider to be the most beneficial for mankind” (Kauṣ. 3.1), is nothing but the worship of the Highest Self, because He alone is the most auspicious Being, as declared by another scriptural text: ‘By knowing Him alone, one surpasses death; there is no other way to salvation’ (Śvet. 6.15). Similarly, making one do good or evil deeds as declared by the text: ‘He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds, perform good action. He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead downwards from these worlds, perform evil action’¹ (Kauṣ. 3.8), is a quality of the Highest Self alone. Likewise, being the support of all sentient and non-sentient

¹ Correct quotation translated: ‘*Eṣa hi eva enam . . . , eṣa u eva enam asādhu karma kārayati taṁ yam adho niniṣate*’. Vide Kauṣ. 3.8, p. 130.

objects,—depicted by the term ‘elements of intelligence’ in the text which, beginning thus: ‘The vital-breath alone is the intelligent self that, taking hold of the body, makes it stand up’ (Kauṣ. 3.3), goes on: ‘As of a chariot the rim of the wheel is fixed on the spokes, and the spokes are fixed on the nave, even so these elements of being are fixed on the elements of intelligence, and the elements of intelligence are fixed on the vital-breath’ (Kauṣ. 3.8);—as well as bliss and the rest, mentioned in the text: ‘Now, this vital-breath, forsooth, is the intelligent self, bliss, ageless, immortal’ (Kauṣ. 3.8), are qualities of the Highest Self alone. ‘Being the Self’ and ‘being the object to be known’, mentioned in conclusion in the text: “Let one know: ‘He is my self’” (Kauṣ. 3.8), are also qualities of the Highest Self. Hence, a great many attributes of the Highest Self being mentioned here, the Highest Self alone is denoted by the terms ‘Indra’, ‘vital-breath’ and the rest.

SŪTRA 31

“BUT THE INSTRUCTION (GIVEN BY INDRA ABOUT HIMSELF) (IS JUSTIFIABLE) THROUGH SCRIPTURAL INSIGHT, AS IN THE CASE OF VĀMADEVA.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Realizing that everything had Brahman for its soul, Indra properly said “through scriptural insight”: “Know me alone” (Kauṣ. 3.1¹)—the scriptural text to this effect is: ‘What sorrow, what delusion is there of him who perceives the unity’ (Īśā. 7²)—, just as Vāmadeva said: “I was Manu and the sun” (Bṛh. 1.4.10; Rg. V. 4.26. 1a³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: Why then did Indra being one, (viz. an individual soul) taught himself as another (viz. Brahman) in the passage: “Worship me” (Kauṣ. 3.2)?—it is replied here:—

No such objection can be raised. Just as a highly favoured royal servant says to the subjects, even like the king himself, ‘I am your

2 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

1 Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

3 P. 285, line 8. Not quoted by others.

ruler to be worshipped by you', so is the case here. "But through scriptural insight." That is, in the passages, "'Know me alone'" (Kauṣ. 3.1), "'Worship me'" (Kauṣ. 3.2), and so on, Indra, who is only an individual soul, taught the Highest Self as his own self, consequent of knowing, "through scriptural insight", i.e. from scriptural texts, that the Supreme Brahman is the inner controller and the soul of all. The scriptural texts are the following:—'All this has that for its self, that is true, that is the self, Brahman' ¹ (Chānd. 6.7.8; 6.9.4; 6.10.3; 6.11.3; 6.12.3; 6.13.3; 6.14.3; 6.15.3; 6.16.3), 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him, breathing in him' (Chānd. 3.1.4.), "'You have, truly, attained freedom from fear, O Janaka'" ² (Bṛh. 4.2.4), 'Who knows himself: "I am Brahman"' ³ (Bṛh. 1.4.10), 'Entered within, the ruler of men, the soul of all' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.2 ³), 'This is your soul, the inner controller, immortal' (Bṛh. 3.7.3, etc.) and so on. Compare the case of Vāmadeva, who intuiting the Highest Self, the Inner Controller of all, through scriptural insight, spoke of Him alone, when he said: 'Seeing this, the sage Vāmadeva understood: "I was Manu and the sun"' (Bṛh. 1.4.10), 'I am the wise Kakṣivān sage' (Ṛg. V. 4.26.1 ⁴). Hence the teaching: "'Know me alone'" (Kauṣ. 3.1), etc. is, indeed, proper.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

He gives two alternative explanations, the last of which tallies with the explanation given by Nimbārka. ⁵

¹ The word 'Brahman' is not included in the original texts.

² Correct quotation: 'ya evam vedāhaṁ Brahmāsmi'. Vide Bṛh. 1.4.10,

p. 45.

³ P. 181.

⁴ The full quotation in Ṛg.V. is: 'I was Manu and the sun, I am the wise Kakṣivān sage'—said by Indra.

⁵ ŚK. 1.1.31 (p. 288, Part 3).

SŪTRA 32

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MARKS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE CHIEF VITAL-BREATH, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (MEANT), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE THREEFOLDNESS OF MEDITATION, ON ACCOUNT OF BEING REFERRED TO (ELSEWHERE), ON ACCOUNT OF (ITS) SUITABILITY HERE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: On account of the characteristic marks of the individual soul, mentioned in the passages:—‘Let none desire to enquire into speech, but let him desire to know the speaker’ (Kauṣ. 3.8¹), ‘I slew the three-headed son of Tvaṣṭī’ (Kaus. 3.1²); as well as on account of the characteristic marks of the chief vital-breath, mentioned in the passage—‘The vital-breath alone is the intelligent self that taking hold of the body makes it stand up’ (Kauṣ. 3.3³), Brahman is not referred to here,—

(We reply:) No, “because of the threefoldness of the meditation” on Brahman, in accordance with the different grades of meditating devotees, viz. (meditation on Brahman) as the Inner Controller of the group of individual souls, as the Inner Controller of the non-sentient objects, and as different from them both; “because it is referred to” (elsewhere); “because it is suitable here” also.

Here ends the first quarter of the first chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā-texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Brahman cannot be denoted here by the words ‘vital-breath’ and the rest. Why? “On account of the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital-breath.” First, the characteristic marks of the individual soul are stated in the passages: ‘Let none desire to enquire after speech, but let him desire to know the speaker’ (Kauṣ. 3.8), “I delivered the Arunmukhas, the

¹ Ś, R, Bh, B.

² R, ŚK, Bh, B.

³ Ś, R, Bh, B.

ascetics, to the wolves''' (Kauṣ. 3.1) and so on; and the characteristic marks of the chief vital-breath are stated in the passage: 'Now, verily, the vital-breath alone is the intelligent soul that taking hold of this body makes it stand up' (Kauṣ. 3.1). Hence it is not possible that Brahman is referred to here,—

(We, reply:) "No." Why? "On account of the threefoldness of meditation, on account of being referred (elsewhere), on account of (its) suitability here." That is, the designation of Brahman by such and such terms (viz. Indra and the vital-breath) is for the sake of teaching the threefoldness of meditation, just as elsewhere three kinds of meditation on Brahman are referred to. There (viz. in the Taittirīya-upaniṣad) Brahman is recommended to be meditated on in His own nature in the passages: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1), 'Brahman is bliss' (Tait. 3.6); and to be meditated on as the inner soul of the sentient and the non-sentient, as well as the soul of all in the passages: 'Having created that, he entered into that very thing. Having entered it, He became real and that, defined and undefined, based and non-based, knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6). In the same manner "on account of its suitability", i.e. on account of the suitability of such a threefoldness, "here", i.e. in the Prataṛdanavidyā as well, there is no divergence among the texts, the whole group of texts referring to one and the same Brahman. This should be understood here: If a text be ascertained from the introduction and the rest to be referring to Brahman, then if there be marks of anything else therein, those, too, should be referred to Brahman, who is the inner controller of that thing, who possesses it as His power, and who is the object to be meditated on. Hence, it is established that the object indicated by the words 'Indra', 'vital-breath' and the rest is the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled 'Indra and the vital-breath' (11).

Here ends the first section of the first chapter in the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śāriraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the reverend Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the reverend Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. Reading same. He gives two alternative explanations of the second part of the sūtra, viz. the reply to the objection, thus:—

(1) 'If it be objected . . . , (then, we reply:)—On account of the threefoldness of meditation, (i.e. your interpretation would involve the assumption of devout meditation of three kinds, viz. on the individual soul, on the chief vital-breath and on Brahman, but one and the same section cannot teach three different kinds of things). (Moreover, the word "vital-breath" must denote Brahman here,) on account of (that meaning) being accepted (elsewhere), on account of connection here (i.e. in the passage itself characteristic marks of Brahman are mentioned). (Hence the conclusion is that Brahman is the topic of the whole chapter.)' This interpretation is different from Nimbārka's interpretation.

Or, 'If it be objected . . . , (then, we reply:) (the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital-breath are not out of place in a chapter which deals with Brahman) on account of the threefoldness of meditation (i.e. because this chapter aims simply at advocating thereby the three ways of meditating on Brahman, viz. under the aspect of the prāṇa, under the aspect of prajñā, and in itself, according as Brahman is viewed either with reference to the two limiting adjuncts, or in itself); because (in other passages also we find that meditation on Brahman is) made dependant (on Brahman being qualified by limiting adjuncts—cf. Chānd. 3.14.2); because (the hypothesis that Brahman is meditated on under three aspects) is perfectly consistent here (i.e. in the prāṇa chapter¹). This interpretation too does not tally with Nimbārka's interpretation, for Nimbārka does not hold that the sentient and the non-sentient—under the aspects of which Brahman is meditated on—are limiting adjuncts of Brahman.

Rāmānuja

Reading and interpretation same. According to Rāmānuja, the three kinds of meditation are:— (1) Meditation on Brahman in His own nature as the cause of the world, (2) meditation on Brahman as

¹ Ś.B. 1.1.31, pp. 255 ff.

having the totality of the enjoying souls as His body (i.e. as the inner soul of the sentient), and (3) meditation on Brahman as having the objects and means of enjoyment for His body (i.e. as the inner soul of the non-sentient).¹

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. Reading different—viz. omits the portion: 'Āsritatvād iha tad-yogāt'. Two alternative interpretations given, the first (the author's own view) exactly like Śaṅkara's first explanation; the second (the view of others: 'apare tu', etc.) like Nimbārka's explanation.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading and interpretation same. He points out, exactly after Rāmānuja, that the three kinds of meditations on the Lord are—svarūpeṇa, bhokṭṛ-śarīreṇa and bhogya-rūpeṇa.³

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in Baladeva. His interpretation is like Śaṅkara's first interpretation.⁴

Résumé

The first quarter of the first chapter contains:—

- (1) 32 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
- (2) 31 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
- (3) 32 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
- (4) 31 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
- (5) 32 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
- (6) 31 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva omit sūtra 9 in Nimbārka's commentary.

¹ Śrī. B. 1.1.32, p. 224, vol. 1.:—'*Nikhīla-kāraṇa-bhūtasya Brahmanah svarūpeṇānusandhānam, bhokṭṛ-varga-śarīrakatvānusandhānam, bhogya-bhogopakarāṇa-śarīrakatvānusandhānañ ceti trividham anusandhānam upadeṣṭum ity-arthah*'

² Bh. B. 1.1.31, pp. 35-36.

³ ŚK. B. 1.1.32, pp. 291-92, Part 3.

⁴ G.B. 1.1.31.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'Celebrity everywhere'. (Sūtras 1-8)

SŪTRA 1

“(THAT WHICH CONSISTS OF MIND IS BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING OF WHAT IS CELEBRATED EVERYWHERE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Beginning: 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one meditate on him thus' (Chānd. 3.14.1¹), Scripture continues: 'Consisting of mind, having the vital breath for his body'. (Chānd. 3.14.2²). Here, the object which is to be meditated on as consisting of mind is to be understood as the Highest self, the cause of all, and not as the individual soul. Why? Because the highest self alone, celebrated in all the Vedāntas, is taught in the above passages, viz. 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, in the first section, the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to the holy Lord Vāsudeva has been shown,—He who is the object of enquiry, the greatest Being, the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, having Scripture for His sole proof, omniscient, without an equal or a superior and the one mass of infinite auspicious qualities. Now, in the following two sections, the reverend teacher of the Veda is showing that those texts,—some of which indistinctly indicate the individual soul and the rest, and some of which distinctly do so,—all refer to Him alone.

The Chandogas record the following: 'All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him, and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one meditate (on him) thus. Now, a person consists of

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, B.

determination. According to what his determination is in this world, so does he become on departing hence. Let him form a determination. He who consists of mind, has the vital-breath for his body, is of the form of light' (Chānd. 3.14.1-2¹) and so on. Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the individual soul² should be understood as the object to be meditated on, possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest, or the Highest self. What is reasonable here?

(*Prima facie* view.)

If it be suggested: The individual soul. Why? Because the individual soul is well-known to have the mind and the vital-breath as its instruments; because Scripture declares that Lord Brahman, the Supreme Being, has no connection with mind and the vital-breath, in the passage: 'Without the vital-breath, without mind, pure' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2); and, finally, because having the heart for its abode as well as being atomic, stated in the passage: 'This is the soul³ within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn' (Chānd. 3.14.3), are possible in the case of the limited individual soul alone. If it be objected: of the six proofs, viz. scriptural statement, mark, text, topic, place and name, each succeeding one is weaker than the preceding one. Of these, scriptural statement means an independent statement, and mark means the power of words (to indicate some meaning). Now, here, the scriptural statement, viz.: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), is of a greater force than the mark of the individual soul, viz. consisting of mind and the rest, it being mentioned first, (the rule being that of these six, each preceding one is of a greater force than each succeeding one). Hence, Brahman alone, mentioned above, is to be construed here as the object to be meditated on,—(we reply:) no, because as that text fulfils its purpose simply by teaching, as a means to the attainment of tranquillity, that everything has Brahman for its soul, thus: 'Tranquil, let one meditate', so it is not concerned with laying down any injunction regarding the meditation on Brahman (here ends the original *Prima facie* view) . . .

¹ This passage occurs also in Śat. Br. 10.6.3. It forms a part of the famous *Sāṇḍilya-vidyā*, or the Doctrine of *Sāṇḍilya*. For a further account see footnote (5), p. 1078 f.

² '*Kṣetrajña*', means 'Knower of the field', or the body, i.e. the soul, the conscious principle in the corporeal frame.

³ Correct quotation: '*Eṣa ma ātmā* . . . ' Vide Chānd. 3.14.3, p. 158.

(Correct conclusion.)

We reply:—The highest soul alone, possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest, is the object to be meditated on. Why? “Because” the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, “celebrated everywhere”, i.e. in all the Vedāntas, “is taught” as the cause of all, as the soul of all, here in the text: ‘All this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1). Or, else, “because” the attributes of ‘consisting of mind’ and the rest, “celebrated” in all the Vedāntas as belonging to the Supreme Brahman, thus: ‘Consisting of mind, leader of the vital-breath and the body (Muṇḍ. 2.2.7), ‘This ether that is within the heart,—therein is the person, consisting of mind (Tait. 1.6), and so on, “are taught”. Of these, ‘consisting of mind’ means ‘capable of being apprehended by a purified mind’; ‘having the vital-breath for the body’ means ‘being the support and the ruler of even the vital-breath’; ‘without the vital-breath’ means ‘abiding independently of the vital-breath’; and ‘without mind’ means ‘having knowledge not dependent on the mind’.

Or, else, the text: ‘All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from him, disappearing into him, and breathing in him;—tranquil, let one meditate (on him) thus’ (Chānd. 3.14.1) enjoins meditation, thus: ‘Let one meditate on Brahman, the soul of all, in a tranquil spirit’. The text: ‘Let him form a determination’ (Chānd. 3.14.1) is a repetition (of the same injunction), with a view to proving that the attributes of ‘consisting of mind’ and the rest belong to the very same Being, mentioned above, (viz. Brahman). Let one meditate on Brahman, the soul of all and possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest,—this is the sense of the text. Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether Brahman, indicated as the soul of all, is the individual soul, or the Highest self. What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: The individual soul. Why? Because, it alone can possibly assume the forms of all kinds of beings, Brahmā and so on, due to karmas, based on beginningless nescience; while it is never possible for the Supreme Brahman to assume identity with all sorts of low or vile forms, since He is endowed with (the attributes of) omniscience, omnipotence, freedom from sins, freed on by nature from all faults and so on. The word ‘Brahman’ too, applies to the individual soul alone, it being endowed with great qualities (like knowledge and the like). And the origin and the rest of the world being due to karmas, it is reasonable to indicate the individual soul as their cause,—

We reply: "Because of the teaching of what is celebrated everywhere", i.e. the meaning of the word 'Brahman,' who is designated as the soul of all and as the cause of the origin and the rest of all, is the Highest Self alone. For this very reason, "everywhere", i.e. in the Vedāntas, he is "taught" to be "celebrated" as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world—because of this; and also because it is impossible that the origin and the rest of the world can be due to the individual soul, since in the passages—"He desired: 'May I be many, may I procreate' . . . He created all this" (Tait. 2.6) and so on, the Supreme Lord alone is celebrated to be the cause of the world. This is stated in the 'Law of salvation'¹. Beginning: "Whence has arisen this entire world, consisting of the immovable and the movable, and to whom does it go during universal dissolution? Tell me that, O grandfather! By whom has this world, together with the oceans, the sky, mountains, cloud, lands, fire and air, been made?" (Mahā. 12.6765-66²); having stated: 'The scripture which was related by Bhṛgu to Bhāradvāja, who asked' (Mahā. 12.6769C³); having stated the origin of all beings thus: 'Of him who is called Nārāyaṇa, who is unchangeable, the imperishable soul, who is unmanifest, unknowable, higher than prakṛti;⁴ and having stated: 'Then, a lustrous, celestial lotus was created by the self-born. From that lotus arose Brahmā, the Lord, consisting of the Veda' (Mahā. 12.6779 C-89A⁵),—the text designates Lord Kṛṣṇa, Nārāyaṇa, Brahman, as the cause of all sentient beings and non-sentient objects, thus: 'For he is difficult to be known, undoubtedly inconceivable in nature even by the perfected souls. He, verily, is Lord Viṣṇu, celebrated to be infinite, abiding as the inter controller of all beings, difficult to be known by those who have not obtained the self,—who is the creator of this principle of egoism for the production of all beings, from whom arose the universe, about whom I have been asked by you here' (Mahā. 12.6784-86A⁶). Hence, the Highest Self

¹ *Mokṣa-dharma* is the name of a section of the 12th book of the *Mahā-bhārata*, from *Adhyāya* 174 to the end.

² P. 604, lines 3-4, vol. 3.

³ *Op. cit.*, line 7.

⁴ This is not traceable in any of the three editions, Asiatic Society, *Vaṅga-vāṣī* and Bombay.

⁵ P. 604, lines 17-18 (vol. 3). This verse is not found in the Bombay edition.

⁶ P. 604, lines 22-24.

alone is denoted by the word 'Brahman' here, and not the individual soul.¹

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Reading same. He gives two alternative interpretations, which tally with the last two explanations of Śrīnivāsa.²

SŪTRA 2

"AND BECAUSE OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ATTRIBUTES INTENDED TO BE STATED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the attributes, viz. 'consisting of mind,' 'having true resolves' and the rest, "intended to be stated" in the text: 'Consisting of mind, having the vital-breath for the body, of the form of light, having true resolves' (Chānd. 3.14.2³) and so on, are 'appropriate' on the part of Brahman alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the attributes of 'having true resolves' and the rest, 'intended to be stated' as the peculiar attributes of Brahman in the passage: 'Consisting of mind, having the breath for the body, of the form of light, having true resolves, having the ether as the soul, having all desires, having all odours,⁴ . . . having all tastes, pervading all this, unspeaking, indifferent' (Chānd. 3.14.2) and so on, are "appropriate" on the part of Brahman alone,—so Brahman alone is understood in the above text. The adjective 'pervading all this' means that He has accepted 'all this'—i.e. the sentient and the non-sentient objects, ending with 'taste', —as His own; 'unspeaking' means that He abides in silence because of His unsurpassed graveness; 'indifferent' means that 'He has no concern'.

¹ Śrīnivāsa gives altogether three explanations of this Sūtra, the first of which tallies with the explanation of Nimbārka.

² Śrī. B. 1.2.1. Pp. 231 *et seq.* Part 1.

³ R, B.

⁴ The original text reads 'sarva-karma' after this.

SŪTRA 3

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF INAPPROPRIATENESS, NOT THE EMBODIED (SOUL)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

He who is possessed of the attributes of consisting of mind and the rest is the Supreme Being alone, and not the individual soul, because (the attributes like) 'consisting of mind', 'having true resolves' and so on, are "inappropriate" on its part.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman alone is to be understood as consisting of mind, for the purpose of meditation, and not "the embodied", i.e. the individual soul, possessing a body. Why? Because the attributes of 'having true resolves' and the like are "inappropriate" on the part of the individual soul. Moreover, the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest too, are inappropriate on the part of the individual soul. Thus, the text says: 'Let him form a determination' (Chānd. 3.14.1). Of what kind is he? 'Consisting of mind', again, 'having the vital-breath for his body'. These adjectives are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul, because no such implication is involved here, nor any purpose. But all these are appropriate on the part of the Highest self. Thus, when it is said: Let the worshipper, whether he desires for salvation, or for any particular fruit, 'form a determination', i.e. perform meditation or action, in a 'calm' spirit, the question arises: In reference to whom is he to perform meditation or action? and in reply, the Highest Person, the soul of all, and indicated above in the passage: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), is pointed out as the object to be meditated on. And, this text: 'Consisting of mind, having the vital-breath for the body' (Chānd. 3.14.2) and so on refers to Brahman. Hence the attributes of 'consisting of mind' and the rest are not appropriate on the part of the individual soul.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different. According to Śrīkaṇṭha, a new adhikaraṇa begins with this sūtra (sūtras 3-8), concerned with

the question whether a passage in the Mahā-nārāyaṇa-upaniṣad (Māhānār. 11.3) refers to Nārāyaṇa or to Śiva. Thus:—‘(The passage refers to Śiva, and not (to) the embodied (i.e. Nārāyaṇa), because (the attributes of being the Lord of the universe and the rest) are not appropriate (on the part of Nārāyaṇa)’.¹

SŪTRA 4

“AND BECAUSE OF THE DESIGNATION OF OBJECT AND AGENT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this reason too, the object qualified by the adjectives ‘consisting of mind’ and the rest is not the embodied soul, “because of the designation of object and agent” in the text: ‘On departing hence, I shall reach him’ (Chānd. 3.14.4²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, that which consists of mind and has breath for its body is not to be understood as the embodied soul. Why? “Because of the designation” of the embodied soul as the “agent”, i.e. as the worshipper, and “because of the designation” of the Highest Self as the ‘object’, i.e. as the object to be meditated on and obtained, in the passage: ‘On departing hence, I shall reach him’ (Chānd. 3.14.4). That is, ‘I’, or one desiring for salvation, ‘shall reach’, i.e. shall obtain, ‘him’, i.e. Brahman, mentioned before as possessed of the attributes of ‘consisting of mind’ and the rest, ‘hence’, i.e. after the fall of the body, after the destruction of the works which have begun to bear fruits. A worshipper who is endowed with such a right insight attains Brahman.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz.: ‘(The supreme soul, viz. Śiva, the object to be meditated on, is other than Nārāyaṇa), because of the designation of the object and the agent, (i.e. because

¹ ŚK. B. 1.1.3, pp. 318 *et seq.*, Part 4.

² Ś, R, Bh, B.

Śiva is designated to be the object to be worshipped, Nārāyaṇa, the worshipper)¹.

SŪTRA 5

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WORDS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which possesses the attributes of ‘consisting of mind’ and the like is the Highest Self, different from the embodied soul, because in the text: ‘This soul of mine within the heart’ (Chānd. 3.14.3, 4²) the individual soul and the Highest Self are denoted by different words, viz. the genitive and the nominative respectively.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, that which possesses the attributes of consisting of mind and so on, is the highest self, different from the embodied soul. Why? “On account of the difference of words”, i.e. because of another scriptural passage of kindred subject-matter, viz. ‘Like a grain of rice, or a barley-corn, or a grain of millet, or the kernel of a grain of millet, such is the Golden Person within the self’ (Śat. Br. 10.6.3.2), there is “difference of words”, viz. the locative ‘within the self’ denotes the embodied self, while the nominative ‘the Golden Person’ denotes the Highest self.³

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. (‘Brahman, viz. Śiva, is other than and superior to Nārāyaṇa) on account of a particular word (or scriptural passage) (to that effect’).⁴

¹ ŚK. B. 1.2.4, pp. 322–324, Part 4.

² R, B.

³ Note that *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa* refer to two different passages here.

⁴ ŚK. B. 1.2.5. (Pp. 324–25, Part 4.)

SŪTRA 6

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And on account of the Smṛti” text:—‘The Lord abides, O Arjuna! in the heart-region of all beings’ (Gītā 18.61¹), there is a difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“He who sees me everywhere, and sees everything in me, of him I will never lose hold, and he shall never lose hold of me” (Gītā 6.30), “He who, established in unity, worships me as abiding within all beings, that ascetic abides in me, under whatever circumstances he may live” (Gītā 6.31), “There is nothing higher than me, O Dharmāñjaya! All this is strung on me, like gems on a string” (Gītā 7.7), “And I abide within the heart of all, and from me memory, knowledge and their absence” (Gītā 15.15), “The Lord abides, O Arjuna! in the heart-region of all, causing all beings to revolve by His mysterious power, as if mounted on a machine” (Gītā 18.61), “Because I excel the perishable and am superior even to the imperishable, I am celebrated in the world, and in the Veda as the Highest Person” (Gītā 15.18). The following scriptural texts too are referred to by the term “and” (in the sūtra):² ‘The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the Lord and the non-Lord’ (Śvet. 1.9), ‘The Lord of matter and souls, the ruler of the attributes’ (Śvet. 6.16), ‘The eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious’ (Śvet. 6.13; Kaṭha 5.13) and so on. From such Smṛti and scriptural texts, it is to be known that there is a difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Thus, in this section, the difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul is indicated by the reverend author of the aphorisms in four aphorisms;³ and this view is most reasonable, since it is established by both Smṛti and Scripture. The Highest Self is ever-free, omniscient, independent, all-pervading

¹ Ś, R, Bh, B.

² Note the different interpretations of the word ‘Ca’ in the sūtra, as given by *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa*. According to the former, it simply means ‘also’, while according to the latter, ‘on account of scriptural texts’.

³ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.3–6.

without an equal or a superior, the soul of all and the controller of all. The individual soul, on the other hand, though of the nature of eternal knowledge, has, as is well-known, its attribute of knowledge enveloped by the beginningless māyā, is subject to bondage and release, possessed of little knowledge, a part of Brahman, but through its aversion to the Lord, revolves through many births owing to the works done by itself. Non-difference also, established by the scriptural texts like: 'He is the self, thou art that' (Chānd. 6.9.4, 6.10.3, etc.), 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), 'This soul is Brahman' (Brh. 4.4.5) and so on, is most reasonable. Thus, the reverend author of the aphorisms will speak about the nature of difference and non-difference, as held by himself, under the aphorism: 'A part, on account of the designation of variety' (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) and so on. We shall speak of it in detail in the same place.¹

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and interpretation same. But in conclusion, he adds his own view, viz. that this difference between the individual soul and Brahman is not real, but due to limiting adjuncts only.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading same, interpretation different, viz. 'On account of Smṛti' (viz. Gītā 11.9) Nārāyaṇa is the worshipper—i.e. different from Śiva.³

SŪTRA 7

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS OCCUPYING A SMALL ABODE, AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THAT, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE OBJECT OF MEDITATION), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS TO BE CONCEIVED THUS, AS IN THE CASE OF THE ETHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of its having a small abode, as mentioned in the text: 'This soul of mine within the heart' (Chānd.

² Ś.B. 1.2.7, p. 265.

¹ Vide V.K. 2.3.42.

³ Ś.K. B. 1.2.7, pp. 325-26, Part 4.

3.14.3); also on account of the designation of its smallness in the text : 'Smaller than a grain of rice, or' (Chānd. 3.14.3; Śat. Br. 10.6.3.2¹), (the object of meditation) here is not Brahman,—

(We reply:) "Not so", because Brahman is to be meditated on in that way. Minuteness on the part of a great thing, however, fits in, as in the case of a window and the ether.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected:—Brahman cannot be understood here as the object of meditation. Why? "On account of its occupying a small abode and on account of the designation of that." That is, that which has a small abode, i.e. place, viz. the individual soul which is like the tip of the spoke of a wheel, is 'arbhakaukas', the state of that is 'arbhakaukastvam', on account of that,²—the resulting meaning being: 'on account of the characteristic mark of the individual soul'. That is to say, occupying a limited place, viz. the heart, is the attribute of the individual soul only, and not the attribute of Brahman. Moreover, "on account of the designation" of smallness by that very term (viz. 'small'), in the passage: 'Smaller than a grain of rice, or a barley-corn' (Chānd. 3.14.3; Śat. Br. 10.6.3.2), the individual soul alone is to be understood here, and not Brahman,—

(We reply:) "No." Why? It is "because (Brahman) is to be conceived thus",—i.e. "Because (Brahman) is to be conceived", or to be meditated on, "thus", i.e. as abiding within the heart, small in size,—that the Highest Self is designated in that way. And, hereby His omnipresence is not contradicted. For, He is designated to be minute with the object of designating a particular kind of meditation on Him as very subtle. Nor, again, does He become small in size (i.e. small like the heart) hereby, since the text: 'Greater than the earth, greater than the sky' (Chānd. 3.14.3) speaks of the greatness of the Lord. An analogous case is the following: Just as the ether, though all-pervasive, is spoken of as occupying a small place and as small in reference to the eye of a needle, so is Brahman, the topic of discussion,—this is the sense.

¹ P. 806, line 18.

² This explains the compound 'arbhakaukastvāt'.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading and interpretation same. He points out that just as the Lord of the entire universe may be appropriately said to be the Lord of Ayodhyā, so the Supreme Soul, abiding everywhere, may very well be denoted as abiding within the heart.¹

Rāmānuja

Reading same, interpretation of the word 'vyomavaś ca' different, viz:—'(The Lord is described to be) like the ether as well (i.e. all-pervading as well, in that very passage, viz. Chānd. 3.14.3²)'. Hence the Lord is not really minute by nature, but is simply designated to be so for the purpose of meditation.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading and literal interpretation same, though this topic is different, as noted above.³

Baladeva

Reading same, interpretation of the word 'vyomavaś ca' different, viz: '(The Lord though atomic as abiding within the heart of men, is yet all-pervading) like the ether (as declared by the same passage, viz. Chānd. 3.14.3⁴)'. And this is possible because the Lord is possessed of inconceivable powers.

SŪTRA 8

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IF BRAHMAN WERE TO DWELL WITHIN THE HEART, THEN) THERE FOLLOWS EXPERIENCE (OF PLEASURES AND PAINS), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that owing to His connection with all hearts, "there will follow experience" of pleasure and pain on the part of

¹ Ś.B. 1.2.7, p. 266.

³ Ś.K. B. 1.2.7, p. 327, Part 1.

⁴ G.B. 1.2.7, p. 114, Chap. 1. Note the difference from *Rāmānuja*.

² Śrī. B. 1.2.7, p. 237, vol. 1.

Brahman, as on the part of the individual soul,—(we reply:) no such objection can be raised, because there is an absolute difference between the individual soul and Brahman, as the soul is an enjoyer of the fruits of the works done by itself, while Brahman is ever-free from sins.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Owing to its connection with a single heart, there results experience of pleasures and pains on the part of the individual soul. Owing to His connection with all hearts simultaneously, there certainly results experience of all pleasures and pains everywhere on the part of the all-pervading Highest Self. If this be so, then the Highest Self, as the enjoyer of pleasures and pains, will inevitably become subject to all sorts of faults, as the individual soul itself is. Hence even the Supreme Being will be subject to karmas,—

(We reply:) “No.” “On account of difference (vaiśeṣyāt)”. The word “vaiśeṣyāt” is formed by adding the suffix ‘śyañ’ to the word ‘viśeṣa’ in an identical sense, (viz. difference) or to indicate excessive difference. That the individual soul is an enjoyer of the fruits of works performed by itself and the Supreme Soul is just the opposite is established in Scripture, in accordance with the Smṛti-passage: ‘Of these, He who is the Supreme Self is said to be eternal and free from the properties of matter.¹ He is not affected even by the fruit, as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water. The active self, on the other hand, is another, who is liable to release and bondage’ (Mahā. 12.13754-13755²), and the declaration of the Lord Himself: ‘Works do not affect me; I have no desire for fruits of works’ (Gītā 4.14). Thus, on account of an absolute difference between these two, it follows that the individual soul alone experiences pleasures and pains, and not the Supreme Soul. Hence it is established that that which consists of mind and has the breath for its body, is none but the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled ‘Celebrity everywhere’ (1).

¹ One line omitted, viz. ‘*Sa hi Nārāyaṇa jñeyah sarvātmā puruṣo hi saḥ*’.

² P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Reading and literal interpretation same. Here, too, he is forced to add his usual explanation that the difference between the individual soul and Brahman is not real, but only phenomenal.¹

Rāmānuja

Interpretation of the word 'vaiśeṣyāt' different. According to Nimbārka, 'vaiśeṣyāt' means 'on account of the difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman'; while according to Rāmānuja, it means 'on account of the difference of the cause of enjoyment'²; i.e. it is not abiding within the body which is the cause of undergoing pleasure and pain, but being subject to karmas, which is never possible in the case of the Lord.³

Bhāskara

Reading and interpretation same. The example cited is appropriate—Simply because the Lord abides within the heart, it does not follow that He shares its experiences, for there is no rule that co-existence and the consequent inter-relation imply the sharing of the same attributes. The ether, e.g. though in connection with a burning place, does not burn itself.⁴

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading and literal interpretation same, though the topic is different, as noted above.⁵

¹ Ś.B. 1.2.8, p. 268.

² 'Hetu-vaiśeṣyāt.'

³ Śrī. B. 1.2.8, p. 238, vol. 1.

⁴ Bh. B. 1.2.8, p. 40.

⁵ ŚK. B. 1.2.8, pp. 327 *et seq.*, Part 4.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The eater'.
(Sūtras 9-10)

SŪTRA 9

"THE EATER (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE COMPREHENSION
(OR TAKING, I.E. DEVOURING) OF THE MOVABLE AND THE IM-
MOVABLE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: 'He to whom both the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya are the food and death the condiment, who thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha 2.25¹), the eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, "on account of the comprehension (or taking, i.e. devouring)"² of the food which has death for its condiment, i.e. of the Universe, consisting of the movable and the immovable, implied by the terms 'Brāhmaṇa' and 'Kṣatriya'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the preceding section, after having shown that the text: 'All this, verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on refers to Brahman, the author has shown also the absence of any experience of pleasure and pain due to karma on the part of Brahman. Now, by showing that the text: 'He, of whom the Brāhmaṇa' (Kaṭha 2.25) and so on refers to Him, he removes the suspicion that, as before, He cannot be an eater of the movable and the immovable.³

In the Kaṭha-vallī it is recorded: 'He, to whom both the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya are the food and death the condiment, who thus knows where He is?' (Kaṭha 2.25). Here by the word 'food' edible objects are understood, and by the words 'of whom', indicating connection, an eater is understood. A doubt arises, viz. whether the eater here is fire, or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul, since here all the three have been referred to before. What is reasonable

¹ ŚK. B. 1.2.8, pp. 327 *et seq.*, Part 4.

² It is not clear what *Nimbārka* means exactly by the term 'grahaṇa' here. It may mean appropriately both 'understanding' and 'taking or devouring'. Thus, *Brahman* is the eater, because the movable and the immovable are understood as the food here; or because, the movable and the immovable are devoured as the food here.

The same remarks apply to *Srinivāsa*'s interpretation.

³ I.e. it may be thought that since Brahman is not an enjoyer, as shown above, He cannot be an eater too.

here? If it be suggested: First, let fire be the eater here, because it is well-known to have the power of burning the Brāhmaṇa and the Kṣatriya; and because the scriptural text:—‘Fire is the eater of food’ (Brh. 1.4.6) declares so. Or, let the individual soul be the eater, because it is well-known to be an enjoyer; because the scriptural text: ‘Of the two, the one tastes sweet berry’ (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1) declares so; and, finally, because in the preceding section, (viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.8) it alone has been established to be an enjoyer. In accordance with the negative text: ‘Without eating’ (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1), as well as on the ground of the negation of experience in the preceding section (viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.8), the Highest Self cannot be understood as the eater here,—

We reply: Here the eater can possibly be the Highest Self alone. Whence is this known? “On account of the comprehension (or taking, i.e. devouring¹) of the movable and the immovable,” i.e. because here the movable and the immovable are understood to be the food. If it be objected that the words ‘movable’ and ‘immovable’ are not found here,—(we reply:) It may be so, (yet that does not falsify our view), because by the terms ‘Brāhmaṇa’ and ‘Kṣatriya’, the movable and the immovable are understood metaphorically; and because there being a natural connection between death and the movable and the immovable, that food which has death for its condiment, viz. the movable and the immovable, is understood here. Hence the eater is the Highest Self, the destroyer of the Universe,—this is the resulting meaning, for neither fire, nor the individual soul, can possibly be the eater of the entire world. The text: ‘Without eating’ (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1) denies any experience of the fruits of works on the part of the Lord.

SŪTRA 10

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The eater is the Lord, the Highest Person, because He alone is mentioned as the topic of discussion in the text ‘The great, the all-pervading’ (Kaṭha 2.22²).

¹ See footnote (2), previous page.

² R, ŚK.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As the Highest Self is mentioned as the topic of discussion in the texts: 'Knowing the great, all-pervasive self' (Kāṭha 2.22), 'By him is (He) attainable, whom alone he chooses' (Kāṭha 2.23; Muṇḍ. 3.2.23), and as a peculiar mark of the Lord, viz. unintelligibleness, is mentioned in the passage: 'Who thus knows where He is?' (Kāṭha 2.25), it is established that the eater is the Highest Self alone.

Here ends the section entitled 'The eater' (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The cave'.
(Sūtras 11-12)

SŪTRA 11

"THE SOULS ENTERED INTO THE CAVE (ARE THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE SUPREME SOUL), BECAUSE THAT IS SEEN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: 'There are two, drinking of righteousness in the world of good deeds, entered into the cave' (Kāṭha 3.1¹), the two souls, entered into the cave, should be known to be two sentient beings, viz. the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. Why? "Because that is seen", i.e. because it is found that this section designates the entering of these two alone,—of the Supreme Soul in the passage: 'Him, who is difficult to see, who has entered into the hidden, who is hidden in the cave' (Kāṭha 2.12²); and of the individual soul in the passage: 'She, who arises with the vital-breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who, entering into the cave, abides therein, who was manifested through the elements' (Kāṭha 4.7³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that the Supreme Soul, the topic of discussion and the object to be meditated on, is the eater of the movable and the immovable, and that He is difficult to be known, as declared by the text: 'Who thus knows' (Kāṭha 2.25). Now, by

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ R, B.

teaching the following attributes of the Lord—viz. ‘being easily attainable’; ‘being easily knowable’ and the rest—which result from His close association (with the individual soul¹),—to one who desires for salvation, who desires to attain His nature, who desires to know Him, and who is submerged in the pit of mundane existence consisting of the movable and the immovable, the author is showing that the text: ‘Righteousness’ (Kāṭha 3.1) and so on refers to the Lord.

Immediately after the above-quoted text, we find the following in the Kāṭha-valli: ‘There are two, drinking of righteousness in the world of good deeds, entered into the cave, in the highest upper region. Those who know Brahman speak of them as “light” and “shade”, as well as those who maintain the five sacred fires,² and those too who thrice kindle the Naciketas fire’³ (Kāṭha 3.1). Here a doubt arises as to whether here buddhi and the individual soul are designated as entered into the cave, or the individual soul and the Supreme Soul? What is reasonable here? If it be suggested: Buddhi and the individual soul,—because in accordance with the statement: ‘Entered into the cave’ (Kāṭha 3.1), entering into a cave is impossible on the part of the Supreme Soul who is all-pervasive; because it is impossible for the Supreme Being who has all His desires fulfilled to be the enjoyer of the fruits of works, as stated in the passage: ‘Drinking of righteousness’ (Kāṭha 3.1); because any connection with the ‘world of good deeds’,—i.e. with the world where one enjoys the fruits of the works done by one’s self, viz. the body generated by works,—is impossible on His part; and, finally, because a question is found, seeking to know the individual soul as different from buddhi, viz. “‘There is this doubt when a man is dead: some saying, ‘He is’, others, ‘He is not’. This I should know, as taught by you”’ (Kāṭha 1.20⁴). Hence, these two alone (viz. buddhi and individual soul) are established by this text,—

¹ I.e. the Lord abides with the individual soul in the same place, viz. the heart, and as such is easily knowable and attainable by it.

² Viz. *Anvāhārya-pacana* or *Dakṣiṇa*, *Gārhapatya*, *Āhavanīya*, *Sabhya*, and *Āvasathya*. M.W., p. 577, Col. 3.

³ Vide M.W., p. 458, Col. 2.

⁴ The sense is: *Naciketa* wants to know here what happens to the soul after death, i.e. he wants to know the self as distinct from the body, buddhi and so on. Hence, in reply, *Yama* must speak of the individual soul and buddhi, and as such the passage in question must deal with these two alone.

We reply: The souls entered into the cave, viz. the heart, are two sentient beings alone. If it be objected: The entering of the individual soul stands to reason, since it is atomic; but entering into a cave is not appropriate on the part of the Supreme Soul who is all-pervasive, and hence the above objection remains in force,—(we reply:) No. “Because that is seen.” That is, because in this very Upaniṣad, the text: ‘The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, abides within the soul, the Lord of the past and the future’ (Kaṭha 4.12) enjoins the Supreme Soul to be looked upon as abiding within the caves (i.e. hearts) of His sincere devotees in accordance with their wishes, though He Himself is all-pervading; because this is found in the texts: ‘Hidden in the cave, dwelling in the abyss’ (Kaṭha 2.12), ‘He who knows him, hidden in the cave’ (Tait. 2.1.1); and, lastly, because in the text: ‘She, who arises with the vital-breath, who is Aditi, who is made of the deities, who, entering into the cave abides therein, who was manifested through the elements’ (Kaṭha 4.7), the individual soul is designated as entering into the cave. Moreover, in the text: ‘Drinking of righteousness’ (Kaṭha 3.1), one being ascertained to be a sentient being as the enjoyer of the fruits of works, the other too must be understood to be a sentient being alone, because we find that in ordinary life whenever a number is mentioned, beings of the same class are meant. When, e.g. it is said ‘Look out for a second for this cow’, people look out for a cow only, and not for a horse or an ass. This is established in the Mahā-bhāṣya.

To the objection, viz. that a question is found which seeks to know the individual soul as different from buddhi,—(we reply:) the reply to this question is something else, and not this text. It cannot be said also that there is anything inconsistent in the ‘drinking of righteousness’ (Kaṭha 3.1), since the statement: ‘Drinking of righteousness’ (Kaṭha 3.1) is justifiable, just like the statement: ‘Men with umbrellas are going’;¹ since it is possible to say that while the individual soul drinks, the other (viz. the Lord) causes it to drink,

¹ That is, referring to a crowd of hurrying people, we often say: ‘Men with umbrellas are going’, though really only some of them are carrying umbrellas, and not all. Similarly, here too, when it is said: ‘The two drinking’, etc. what is really meant is that only one (viz. the individual soul) is drinking, and not the other (viz. *Brahman*).

and is as such the causative agent;¹ and since it is well-known everywhere that the Supreme Lord first experiences the fruits of the works which are performed by one who is whole-heartedly devoted to Him, and are entrusted to Him. Hereby, it is explained also how the Supreme Being can abide in a body generated by works. The sense is that just as 'shade' can be removed by 'light' and not 'light' by 'shade', so the 'light' and the 'shade' (in the above text) are none but Brahman and the individual soul, the independent and the dependent.

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the phrase 'tad-darśanāt' different, viz.: 'Because it is seen (that numerals denote beings of the same nature)'.²

SŪTRA 12

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIFICATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul and the Supreme Being alone are understood here as entered into the cave, because in this section those two alone are specified as the object to be worshipped and the worshipper, as the object to be known and the knower, and so on, in the texts: 'By knowing the knower of what is born from Brahman,³ the deity to be worshipped, by revering (him), he goes to everlasting peace' (Kāṭha 1.17⁴), 'The bridge for sacrificers' (Kāṭha 3.2⁵) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The individual soul and the Supreme Soul are to be understood as entered within the cave "also because of the specification" of those two alone. The sense is that in this treatise (viz. the Kāṭha-upaniṣad), the individual soul and the Supreme Soul alone are specified as that which approaches and the goal approached, as the thinker

¹ That is, *Brahman* is not really an agent or drinker here, but only instigates the other to drink. He is said to be drinking in this sense alone.

² Ś.B. 1.2.12, p. 272, Bh.B. 1.2.12, p. 41.

³ Correct quotation: '*Brahmajā-jñā*'. Vide C.S.S. ed., p. 8. '*Brahmajā-jñā*' may be interpreted also as '*Brahmajāś cāsau jñāśceti*'.

⁴ R.

⁵ Op. cit.

and the object thought, in the passages: 'Know the soul to be the charioteer, and the body the chariot' (Kāṭha 3.3), 'He reaches the end of the road, that supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kāṭha 3.9), 'Him, who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into the hidden, who is hidden in a cave, who dwells in the abyss, ancient,—by thinking him God, through the study of the Yoga of what relates to the self, the wise man discards joy and sorrow' (Kāṭha 2.12) and so on. Hence, it is established that the individual soul and the Supreme Soul alone are to be understood here as entered into the cave, and not buddhi and the individual soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'The cave' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'What is within'. (Sūtras 13-18)

SŪTRA 13

"THAT WHICH IS WITHIN (THE EYE IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF FITTING IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the passage: 'That person who is seen within the eye' (Chānd. 4.15.1¹), the Person "within" the eye is the Highest Person alone, and not any one else. Why? Because the attributes of 'being the self', 'being fearless', 'being the uniter of all lovely things', and so on,—mentioned in the passages: "'He is the self", said he, "This is the immortal, the fearless, this is Brahman"' (Chānd. 4.15.1²), 'They call it the "uniter of lovely things"' (Chand. 4.15.2),—"fit in" in the case of the Highest Person alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing that the text: 'That Person who is seen within the eye' (Chānd. 4.15.1) and so on refers to Brahman, the author removes the doubt, viz:—In the previous passage (viz. Kāṭha 3.1), the individual soul and the Supreme Soul may be understood, since the dual number is found used. But here, since the singular number

² Ś, R, Bh.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

is used, who (viz. the individual soul *or* the Supreme Soul) is to be understood?

We read under the Upakośala-vidyā¹ in the Chāndogya:—"That Person who is seen within the eye, he is the soul", said he, "This is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman. Hence, even if they pour clarified butter or water on it, it goes away to both sides" (Chānd. 4.15.1) and so on. Here, a doubt arises as to whether the person, taught as abiding within the eye, is the reflected self (i.e. the image of a person reflected on the eye of another), or the individual soul, or the presiding deity of the sense-organ (viz. the eye), or the Supreme Soul. The *prima facie* view is as follows: In accordance with the statement 'is seen', he may be the reflected self, because the reflected self alone is well-known to be perceivable, while the individual soul and the rest are not perceivable. If it be said that here 'seeing' means scriptural insight (and not actual, physical perceiving),—then the individual soul may be that which is 'within' the eye, since it, as the perceiver of colour and the rest, is in proximity to the eye.¹ Or, the presiding deity of the eye is denoted by the word 'person' in accordance with the scriptural passage: 'Through his rays he is stationed herein' (Brh. 5.5.2), and because the all-pervasive Being cannot possibly abide within the eye.

With regard to it, we reply: "That which is within", i.e. the being who is within the eye, is the Supreme Soul alone. Why? "On account of fitting in", i.e. because the attributes of 'being the self', 'fearlessness', and so on, "fit in" in the case of the Supreme Soul alone. Although 'being the Self' and the rest are not incompatible with the real nature of the individual soul, yet when the term 'Brahman' (in the text) can be understood in its primary sense, it is not proper to take it as implying some other sense. Moreover, 'fearlessness', too, is not appropriate in the case of any one, other than Brahman, as known also from the text: 'Through fear of Him the wind blows, through fear of Him the sun rises, through fear of Him fire and Indra, and death as fifth, speed along' (Tait. 2.8.1); and further because the attributes of 'being the uniter of all lovely things' and the

¹ I.e. it is the soul which really perceives colour, etc. and not the eye itself, but the soul perceives them through the eye, and is as such in close proximity to the eye. Hence, as the soul is situated very near to the eye, it is called the person within the eye.

rest, mentioned in the sacred text: 'They call this "the uniter of all lovely things"' ¹, because all lovely things come together to him' (Chānd. 4.15.2), 'He is also "the leader to all blessing"' ² because he leads to all blessings' (Chānd. 4.15.3), 'He also is "the leader to light"' ³, because he shines in all the worlds' (Chānd. 4.15.4), "fit in" in the case of the Supreme Soul alone. 'Saṃyadvāma' implies one from whom the 'vāmas', i.e. the fruits of karmas 'come together', i.e. one who is the cause of the rise of all fruits of karmas. This very thing is stated in the above text thus:—'Because', i.e. since, 'the lovely things' 'come together', i.e. arise from 'this', i.e. the Person within the eye, the cause. In the text 'He is also the 'vāmanī', the 'vāmanī' implies one who 'leads', i.e. causes people, to attain the 'vāmas' or auspicious objects. This very thing is stated in the passage: 'Because he leads to all blessings'. In the text 'He also is the bhāmanī', the 'bhāmanī' implies one who leads to the 'bhāmas', i.e. one who manifests all objects. This very thing is stated in the text: 'Because he shines in all the worlds',—this is the meaning of the text.

SŪTRA 14

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF PLACE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the designation of the place" of the Supreme Soul, in the text: 'He who abiding within the sun' (Bṛh. 3.7.18⁴), the Person within the sun is none but He.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. How can an all-pervading being be designated as occupying a small locality, the reverend author of the aphorisms replies here:

The Person within the eye can be the Supreme Soul alone. Why? "On account of the designation of place", i.e. because of the designation of the abode of the Lord, the Highest Person alone, the cause of all causes, the inner soul of all, and the object to be meditated by all; because one who occupies one part cannot properly dwell in another.

¹ Saṃyadvāma.

³ Bhāmanī.

² Vāmanī.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

If it be objected: How can an all-pervading being abide in a small locality,—(we reply:) No inconsistency whatsoever is involved here. Just as fire, though all-pervading, becomes visible in clouds and the rest in the form of lightning and so on through its own greatness, so the Lord, though all-pervading, becomes visible in the eye and the rest through His own special powers, for the sake of fulfilling the desire of His devotees. The words “and so on” mean:—On account of the designation of the form of the Supreme Soul, suitable to Him, and fit for abiding in a place,¹ celebrated in the following passages:—‘Now, this Golden Person who is seen within the sun, has a golden beard, golden hair’ (Chānd. 1.6.6), ‘He sees the Person, lying in the city, who is higher than the highest aggregate of souls’ (Prašna 5.5). ‘The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, smokeless like light’ (Kaṭha 4.13) and so on; i.e. on account of the designation of the form of the Lord by the expression ‘The Person who is seen’² (Chānd. 4.15.1). By the term “and” His power of manifesting Himself in forms, as desired, in the eye, in the heart and the like, is indicated.

SŪTRA 15

“ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF THE MENTION ONLY OF WHAT IS CHARACTERIZED BY PLEASURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is within the eye is the Supreme Being alone, “on account also of the mention of what is characterized by pleasure” in the passage: ‘Pleasure is Brahman, the ether is Brahman’ (Chānd. 4.10.4³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The Person within the eye is the Highest Person alone, the cause of the world, and not any one else. Why? “On account also of the mention of what is characterized by pleasure.” That is, in the

¹ I.e. unless the Lord has a form, He cannot abide anywhere. Hence, the body of the Lord enables Him to abide in the eye and so on.

² I.e. that Person within the sun has a form is evident from the word ‘seen’, for a bodiless being cannot be seen.

³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

introductory text: 'The vital-breath, is Brahman, pleasure is Brahman, the ether is Brahman' (Chānd. 4.10.4), pleasure that is Brahman, i.e. Brahman characterized by pleasure, is mentioned, and that alone is referred to here.

SŪTRA 16

"ALSO FOR THAT VERY REASON, THAT IS BRAHMAN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"That", i.e. pleasure, is "Brahman", i.e. Brahman alone is characterized by pleasure. Why? On account also of the text, establishing their mutual specification¹, viz. 'What, verily, is pleasure, that is the ether; what is the ether, that is pleasure' (Chānd. 4.10.5²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The word 'pleasure' conventionally denotes worldly pleasure, so how can it be said that Brahman is characterized by pleasure?—the reverend teacher of the Veda replies here:

"That is Brahman." This means that in that introductory text, Brahman alone, characterized by pleasure, is mentioned and not worldly pleasure. Why? "Also for that very reason," i.e. on account also of the text intimating their mutual specification, viz. 'What, verily, is pleasure that is the ether; what is the ether, that is pleasure' (Chānd. 4.10.5), for worldly pleasure cannot consistently refer to an all-pervading substance—denoted by the term 'ether'—as non-different from itself.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, etc.

This Sūtra is omitted by Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva.

Rāmānuja

Reading different, viz. 'Ata-eva ca sa Brahma'. Interpretation too different, viz. 'For that very reason (i.e. because the ether is characterized by pleasure), that (viz. the ether) is Brahman'.³

¹ I.e. *ka* (pleasure) qualifies *kha* (ether) and *vice versa*.

² R, ŚK.

³ Śrī. B. 1.2.6, pp. 252-253, Part 1.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. 'Ata-eva sa Brahma'. Interpretation too different, viz. exactly like Rāmānuja's.¹

SŪTRA 17

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF THE PATH OF ONE WHO HAS HEARD THE UPANIṢAD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The path", called 'the path of gods', "of one who has heard the Upaniṣad" is celebrated in another scriptural text, viz. 'Now those who seek the soul by austerity, chastity, faith and knowledge, win the sun by the northern path. That, verily, is the abode of the vital-breaths, that is immortal, that is fearless, that is the highest goal. From that they do not return' (Praśna 1.10²). "On account also of the mention" of that very "path" here in the text: 'They pass over to light' (Chānd. 4.15.5³), the Person within the eye is none but the Highest Person.⁴

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the person within the eye is the Supreme Soul,—so says the reverend author of the aphorisms.

That through which bondage is broken is Upaniṣad, the knowledge of the Supreme Soul; or that which leads one to attain the Supreme Soul is Upaniṣad, the knowledge of the Supreme Soul. The treatise relating to that is also Upaniṣad. "Śrutopanīṣatka" is one by whom the Upaniṣad has been directly heard from a teacher; he is a knower of Brahman, the Mysterious. "The path" which, as celebrated in another Scripture and in the Smṛtis, belongs to him, i.e. is his way to attaining Brahman who is established in the Upaniṣads,—that very path is mentioned here too as belonging to one who knows the person within the eye. For this reason too, i.e. "on account

¹ ŚK. B. 1.2.16, p. 360, Part 4.

² Ś, R, Bh.

³ Ś, R, Bh, B.
⁴ That is, the worshipper of the person within the eye follows the same path followed by the worshipper of Brahman. This proves that the person within the eye is Brahman.

of the mention of the path of one who has heard the Upaniṣad", the person within the sun is the Supreme Self,—this is the sense.

Thus, the path, which is said to be followed by a knower,—so that he may attain Brahman,—in another scriptural text, viz. 'Now, those who seek the soul by austerity, chastity, faith and knowledge, win the sun by the northern path. That, verily, is the abode of the vital-breaths, that is immortal, that is fearless, that is the highest goal. From that they do not return' (Praśna 1.10), as well as in the Smṛti passage, viz. 'Fire, light, day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northern progress,—through these do the knowers of Brahman go to Brahman on departing' (Gītā 8.24),—that very path is said to belong to one who knows the person within the eye, in the following passage: 'Now, whether they perform obsequies in the case of such a person, or not, (the dead) pass over to light, from light to the day, from the day to the waxing fortnight, from the waxing fortnight to the six months during which the sun moves northwards, from the months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, from the moon to lightning. Then there is a non-human Person. He leads them to Brahman. This is the path of the gods, the path to Brahman. Those who go by it do not return to this human whirlpool,—they return not' (Chāṇḍ. 4.15.5-6). Hence, the person within the sun is none but the Supreme Soul.

The meaning of the text (viz. Praśna 1.10) is as follows:— 'Now', i.e. after the fall of the body, they 'win', i.e. attain the sun, 'by the northern path', i.e. through the path beginning with light and so on. Then, through the moon and the rest, in the order to be designated hereafter,¹ they attain the nature of Brahman. By doing what? Through the three kinds of 'austerity', mentioned by the Lord,² or else through the 'austerity' which is the special duty of a Vānaprastha³ and a Saṃnyāsin,⁴ both being primarily given to austerity;

¹ See below, p. 119. Vide also V.K. 4.3.5.

² Vide Gītā 17.14-16, where three kinds of austerity (*tapas*) are spoken of, viz. *Sāra*, *Vān-maya* and *Mānasa*. These, again, may be of three kinds, viz. *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. Vide 17.16-22.

³ A Brahmin in the third stage of life, who has passed through the stages of a student and house-holder and has abandoned his life and family for an ascetic life in the forest.

⁴ A Brahmin in the fourth stage of life, a religious mendicant, who has given up all earthly concerns.

‘through faith’, i.e. through vidyā, which is a mental disposition given to the worship of the feet of the teacher, i.e. through meditation, arising from the hearing and the thinking of the Vedānta, and mentioned in the text: ‘The self should be meditated on’ (Bṛh. 2.4.5: 4.5.6),—one should, seeking the self, meditate on it,—this is the grammatical construction. By the phrase: ‘through chastity’, the text shows the particular stage of life which is congenial to the hearing, the thinking and the rest of the Vedānta. By chastity and the like, not only the duties, incumbent on special stages of life, are to be understood. That those who are destitute of any devotion for Brahman, but merely belong to one or other of the stages of life and are devoted to the duties, incumbent thereon, return once more and attain the world, is declared by the reverend Parāśara in a passage, which begins: ‘The Prājāpatya is for the Brāhmaṇas’ and ends: ‘The Brāhma is declared in Smṛti to be for the Saṃnyāsins’. That those who, among these, are devoted to the Supreme Brahman, attain His world, is mentioned in the passage: ‘Those ascetics who are devoted to Brahman alone, who ever meditate on Brahman, to them belong that supreme place, which, verily, the wise see’. Hence, the Vāna-prastha and the rest should be understood as implying devotion to the Supreme Brahman, (and not as mere duties incumbent on different stages of life). By ‘chastity’ is meant here the religious duties pursued by the Naiṣṭhikas¹ who lead a life of chastity and are absolutely free from all desires for enjoyment, here or hereafter. The sense is that the search for Brahman should properly be made through such a permanent vow² of ‘chastity’.

The sacred duty called ‘chastity’ is stated by the all-knowing ‘Law of Salvation’³ under the section called ‘Vārṣṇeya-adhyātma’, thus: ‘This unbroken chastity which is the form of Brahman is higher than all religious practices. By it, (people) reach the highest goal’ (Mahā. 12.7770⁴). Under the section treating of instruction,

¹ A *Naiṣṭhika* is a perpetual religious student, who observes the vow of chastity. M.W., p. 570, Col. 1.

² I.e. ‘*Brahma-cārya*’ (=chastity) in the ordinary sense of the term means *temporary* chastity, which a student has to observe so long as he has not entered the stage of a house-holder. But here the term means *permanent* chastity which a *Naiṣṭhika*, e.g. practises.

³ *Mokṣa-dharma*.

⁴ P. 640, line 40, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed.

it is said: 'Listen, O Father Yudhiṣṭhira, to the merits of chastity. He who leads a life of chastity from birth to death, and practises the "Great Vow", there is nothing, know, O King, that is unattainable by him. Many millions of Vṛṣis dwell in the world of Brahman, those who are truthful, ever self-controlled, leading a life of chastity. Chastity is a supreme duty, honoured in all stages of life, and if resorted to, chastity burns, O King, all sins', and so on. In accordance with the scriptural text, viz.: 'Desiring which people practice chastity, that word I tell you in brief' (Kāṭha 2.15), as well as in accordance with the statement by the Lord, viz.: "'Desiring which people practise chastity, that word I will tell you in brief'" (Gītā 8.11), chastity alone is the chief means to the supreme region. The repetition of the means, to be mentioned hereafter in the aphorism: 'Repetition, more than once, because of teaching' (Br. Sū. 4.1.1), may also be resorted to by a Naiṣṭhika.

The text 'This verily' (last portion of Praśna 1.10) and so on indicates Brahman, who is to be attained through the path which begins with light, and to be enquired into.

(The meaning of the text—Chānd. 4.15.5-6—is as follows:) 'Now', i.e. when he is dead, whether people perform proper funeral ceremonies or do not perform them, in either case, the wise, unobstructed in their progress, and wishing to attain the nature of the Lord, attain the presiding deity of light, through that the day; after that, they successively attain, the presiding deities of fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the year, the wind or the world of gods, the sun, the moon, lightning the worlds of the king of water (i.e. Varuṇa) and Indra, then the world of Prajāpati. After that, breaking through the sphere of prakṛti, they attain the Virajā, the best of rivers and forming the boundary of the supreme place. After having crossed that river and having entered the world of Viṣṇu,—called 'supreme void', 'supreme place', 'world of Brahman' and so on, having the stated marks,¹ and unapproachable by those who are averse to the Lord,—they roam about, attaining the nature of Brahman,—this is the resulting meaning. This we shall expound in details in the fourth chapter.² 'This is the path of Gods', because it is characterized by having Gods as the conductors. It is the 'path to Brahman', because it is the way to Brahman, the object

¹ Vide V.K. 1.1.1.

² Vide V.K. 4.3.5.

to be enquired into and the object to be attained. 'Those who go by it' 'do not return', i.e. do not enter any more, through the influence of karmas, into 'this human whirlpool', i.e. the material world, figuratively implied by the creation of mankind, and subject to recurrence (which is indicated by the term 'whirlpool'), —as declared by the Lord Himself in the passage: "The worlds, beginning from the world of Brahma, come and go, O Arjuna. But, on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no rebirth" (Gītā 8.16). The difference of the world of Brahman from the sphere of matter is stated in the Mokṣa-dharma under the dialogue between Jaigīṣa and Vyāsita in the passage which begins: "A man of what nature, of what conduct, of what learning, of what valour does attain the place of Brahman which is higher than prakṛti, and eternal"? and ends "He attains the place of Brahman which is higher than prakṛti, and eternal" (Mahā. 12.9968-9969¹).

SŪTRA 18

"ON ACCOUNT OF NON-ABIDING, AS WELL AS ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, NOT THE OTHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is within the eye cannot be any one "other" than the Highest Self. Why? Because any one other than Him does not regularly abide therein; and because immortality and the rest are not possible on its part.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The other", i.e. the reflected self, or the individual soul, or the presiding deity of the eye, in short, any one other than the Supreme Soul,—is not the Person within the eye. Why? "On account of non-abiding", i.e. because any one other than the Supreme Soul, does not regularly abide in the eye, since the presence of the reflected soul in the eye depends on the nearness of another person to the eye, (and hence when the person moves away, there is no reflection any longer); since the individual soul is connected with all the sense-organs (and cannot, therefore, abide within the eye only); and since the

¹ P. 716, lines 22-23, vol. 3. For full quotation see under V.K. 1.3.13.

presiding deity is declared to abide in the eye through the rays, (and hence does not himself abide within the eyes¹); and finally, because immortality, fearlessness, 'being the uniter of lovely things' and the rest are not possible on the part of any one other than Him. Hence, it is established that the Highest Soul alone is to be worshipped as the person within the eye.

Here ends the section entitled 'That which is within' (4).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. he takes this sūtra as forming an *adhikaraṇa* by itself, concerned with the question whether the Person, of the size of a thumb merely, (Mahānār. 16.3) is the Lord or someone else. Thus: '(The person, of the size of a thumb, is the Lord), because of the instability (i.e. unsuitableness), as well as because of the impossibility (of the attributes of "having the entire world as the body", "being the devourer of the entire world", and so on, on the part of any one else)'.²

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled 'The inner controller'. (Sūtras 19-21)

SŪTRA 19

"THE INNER CONTROLLER IN THE PRESIDING DEITIES AND THE REST, AND IN THE WORLDS AND THE REST (IS THE HIGHEST SELF); ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF HIS QUALITIES."³

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The inner controller,—mentioned repeatedly in all the versions in reference to the presiding deities of the earth and the rest, in the passage which begins: 'He who, abiding within the earth', and

¹ Vide Śrī. B. 1.1.18, p. 354, Part 1.

² ŚK. B. 1.1.18, pp. 364-66, Part 4.

³ Cf. the different readings:—K.S.S. ed. and Brindaban ed. read '*adhi-devādi*'. C.S.S. ed. reads '*adhidaivādhi*'.

continues: 'He is your soul, the inner controller' (Bṛh. 3.7.3¹),— is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the designation of His qualities" here, viz. 'being the controller of all' and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author points out that just as the text about the Person within the eye refers to Brahman, so the text about the inner controller, too, refers to Brahman, and to none else.

The inner controller, i.e. the controller who abides within; who is repeatedly mentioned in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, under the section treating of the inner controller, in all the versions in reference to the presiding deities of the earth, the sky, the ether and the rest, in the passage which beginning: 'Who controls from within this world and the other world and all beings' (Bṛh. 3.7.1), continues: 'He who, dwelling within the earth, is other than the earth, whom the earth does not know, of whom the earth is the body, who controls the earth within—He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal ²' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), and so on; and who is taught, after that,—in the text which begins: 'He who abiding in all the worlds' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.17 ³) and ends: 'He who abiding within the soul' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30 ⁴),—by a section, which enjoins him with in reference to the worlds, the Vedas, the sacrifices and the soul ⁵,—is such an inner controller, a deity, or an individual soul, or the Highest Self, the one topic of all the Vedas? What is reasonable here? He may be a presiding deity, or an individual soul, because these two abide everywhere.

With regard to this, we reply: The inner controller mentioned in all the versions in reference to the presiding deities of the earth, fire, sky, ether, air, sun and the rest, can be the Highest Self alone.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² This is repeated at the end of each verse from Bṛh. 3.7.3–3.7.23.

³ P. 1074, line 5.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, line 18.

⁵ The *Kāṇva* branch designates a being abiding within the earth and the rest (vide Bṛh. 3.7.3–23). The *Mādhyandina* branch, after designating a being abiding within the earth and so on (vide Śat. Br. 14.6.7.7–16), reads three additional texts, viz. 'He who dwells in all the worlds', 'He who dwells in all the Vedas' and 'He who dwells in all the sacrifices,' and in place of 'He who dwells in intelligence' (Bṛh. 3.7.22) a text 'He who dwells in the soul' (Vide Śat. Br. 14.6.7.17–30). Note that *Nimbārka* makes no reference to this *Mādhyandina* addition in his commentary, although it is clearly indicated in the *sūtra* by the word 'lokādiṣu'.

Wherefore? "On account of the designation of His qualities", i.e. on account of the designation here of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, viz. 'being the governor of all worlds, Vedas, sacrifices, beings, vital-breaths, soul and the rest', 'being the inner controller of all', 'being immortal' and so on. Hence a deity cannot be understood, because a deity, too, is but an individual soul and the stated qualities are not appropriate on his part, and because in that case, the statement that the inner controller is unknowable by the earth-god, viz. 'Whom the earth does not know' (Brh. 3.7.3), becomes inconsistent. The individual soul, too, is not the inner controller, for the stated qualities are not appropriate on its part as well; and because in the passage: 'He is your soul, the inner controller' (Brh. 3.7.3, etc.), it is declared to be different from the inner controller by the use of the genitive case (= 'your'), designating difference.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 18 in Śaṅkara-bhāṣya. Reading different, viz. 'Antaryāmyadhidaivādiṣu . . . '1, i.e. omits 'lokādiṣu'.

Rāmānuja

Reading like the Chowkhamba edition.² Interpretation different, viz. exactly like Śrīnivāsa's. Nimbārka reads 'lokādiṣu' in the sūtra, like Rāmānuja, but gives no meaning of the word 'lokādiṣu'.

Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 18 in his commentary. Reading like the Chowkhamba edition.³

Baladeva

This is sūtra 18 in his commentary. Reading different, viz. like Śaṅkara's.⁴

1 Ś.B. 1.2.18, p. 282.

2 Śrī. B. 1.2.19, p. 257, vol. 1.

3 Bh. B. 1.2.18, p. 43. ŚK. B. 1.2.19, p. 368, Part 4.

4 G.B. 1.2.18 (p. 128, Chap. 1).

SŪTRA 20

“AND (THE INNER CONTROLLER IS) NOT THAT WHICH IS DESIGNATED IN THE ŚMṚTI, ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF QUALITIES NOT BELONGING TO IT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And, *pradhāna* is not denoted by the term “inner controller”, “on account of the mention” of the qualities of a sentient being, viz. ‘being the controller of all’, ‘being the seer of all’ and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Although *pradhāna* has already been set aside under the aphorism: ‘Because (he) sees, not, it is non-scriptural’ (Br. Sū. 1.1.5), yet it is being set aside once more apprehending the possibility of the attributes of invisibility the rest (belonging to the inner controller alone) on its part.¹

“That which is designated in the *Smṛti*”, i.e. *pradhāna* established by the *Śāṃkhya Smṛti*, is not denoted by the term “inner controller”. Why? “On account of the mention of qualities not belonging to it”,—“the qualities not belonging to it” mean the qualities which belong to a sentient being,—“on account of the mention”, i.e. declaration, of such qualities, in the concluding text: ‘He is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unknown knower’ (Bṛh. 3.7.23). On account of the designation of the qualities of a sentient being, viz. ‘being the soul of all’, ‘being the governor of all’ and so on, *pradhāna* cannot be accepted here.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. add ‘*śārīraśca*’, and extends the same argument to the case of the individual soul as well.²

¹ That is, *pradhāna* is invisible, and the inner controller too is said to be invisible, etc. (Bṛh. 3.7.23). Hence it might be thought that *pradhāna* is the inner controller. This is being refuted here.

² Śrī. B. 1.2.20, p. 259, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.2.20, p. 372, Part 4.

SŪTRA 21

“AND THE EMBODIED ONE (IS NOT THE INNER CONTROLLER),
BECAUSE BOTH ALSO DEPICT IT AS DIFFERENT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And” the individual soul is not the inner controller, because “both” the Kaṇvas, ‘as well as’ the Mādhyandinas depict “it” “as different” from the inner controller, respectively in the passages: ‘He who abiding in intelligence’ (Brh. 3.7.22¹), ‘He who abiding in the soul’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7.30²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection: Let then the individual soul, and not pradhāna, be denoted by the term “inner controller”, since the qualities of being a seer and the rest are appropriate on the soul’s part—the author replies here:

The word ‘not’ is to be supplied here from the preceding aphorism. And the “embodied one”, i.e. the soul which has entered into a body, its abode for enjoying the fruits of its own actions, is not denoted by the term “inner controller”, on account of the mention of qualities not belonging to it, viz. ‘being the soul of all’, ‘being the governor of all’, ‘being the seer of all’ and so on; ‘for both’ the Kaṇvas, ‘as well as’ the Mādhyandinas “depict” ‘this’, i.e. the embodied one, “as different” from the inner controller, since the embodied self is an abode like the earth and the rest, and is an object to be governed.³ The Kaṇvas read: ‘He who abiding within intelligence’ (Brh. 3.7.22), the Mādhyandinas read: ‘Whom the soul does not know, of whom the soul is the body, who controls the soul from within—He is your soul, the inner controller, immortal’ (Śat. Br. 14.5.7.30). There being the denial of any other seer in the passage: ‘There is no seer other than Him’ (Brh. 3.7.23), the seer of everything is the Highest Person alone, the sense being that none other than the Lord is the seer of everything. The individual soul, known from the text: ‘The person alone is a seer, a hearer’, is the seer of only a few things in

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK. B.

² P. 1074, line 18. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK. B.

³ I.e. the individual soul is the abode, while the inner controller is one who abides therein, just as He abides within the earth and the rest. Again, the individual soul is the object governed, the inner controller, the governor. Hence the two are different.

contrast to Brahman, (the seer of everything),—such is the distinction (between Brahman, and the soul, though both are seers). Here too, the difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman is established by Scripture and aphorism. This difference should not be understood in the sense the logicians understand it to exist between the individual soul and the Lord, (i.e. as absolute difference), but (it implies that the individual soul) is a part of Brahman who is One alone, as mentioned in the text: 'Brahman,¹ one, without a second' (Chānd. 6.2.1), without an equal or a superior, the governor, possessed of infinite powers and an ocean of auspicious qualities. Although here in the introductory chapter, the individual soul, possessed of the stated marks, is said to be different from the Lord, because of its own peculiar qualities, mentioned in the Veda, viz. 'being an object to be controlled' and so on,—yet just as an attribute is different from its substratum (yet non-different from it), so it is non-different from its own controller, as it is incapable of having an independent existence or activity, and as it does not contradict the attributes, such as, 'being one', 'being without a second' and so on, belonging to the Whole of which it is a part.² Thus, the qualities of 'being subject to bondage and release', 'having little knowledge' and the rest, pertain to the part, (viz. the individual soul); while the qualities of 'being ever-free', 'being omniscient', 'being unenveloped (by nescience)', 'being the object to be approached by the freed' and the rest, are peculiar to Brahman. Hence, no fault of an intermixture of qualities arises here. Similarly, 'materiality', 'mutability' and the like are the peculiar qualities of the non-sentient, a power of Brahman; while 'omnipotence', 'omniscience' and the rest, are peculiar to Brahman, the possessor of the power. Although prakṛti is different from Brahman as a power, yet it is non-different from Brahman, as a power has no separate activity, etc. Thus, a relation of difference-non-difference between the three realities is the view of the followers of the Upaniṣads (i.e. Vedāntins).

Here ends the section entitled 'The inner controller' (5).

¹ The word '*Brahman*' not included in the original text.

² I.e. if the individual soul were different from *Brahman*, then it would have been a second principle besides *Brahman* and would have thereby contradicted His Oneness. But as it does not do so, it must be non-different from Him.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. omits 'śārīraśca' in the beginning, interpretation same.¹

Thus, according to Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva:—

'Na ca smārtam atad-dharmābhilāpāt.' (One sūtra.)

'Śārīraścobhaye'pi hi bhedenainam adhiyate.' (One sūtra.)

According to Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha:—

'Na ca smārtam atad-dharmābhilāpāt śārīraś ca.' (One sūtra.)

'Ubhaye'pi hi bhedenainam adhiyate.' (One sūtra.)

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'Invisibility'. (Sūtras 22-24)

SŪTRA 22

"THAT WHICH POSSESSES THE QUALITIES OF INVISIBILITY AND SO ON (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF (HIS) QUALITIES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That which is mentioned by the Ātharvaṇikas in the text: 'Invisible' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6²) and so on, as 'possessed of the qualities of invisibility and the rest', is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the mention" of His "qualities" in the passage 'He who is omniscient' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9³), etc.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the preceding section, pradhāna was set aside on the ground of qualities like 'being a seer' and the like which belong to a sentient being only. Now, by showing that the text: 'Now, the higher is that whereby that Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), and so on refers to Brahman, the author is disposing of the objection, viz. Let pradhāna

¹ Śrī. B. 1.2.22, p. 260, Part I.

ŚK. B. 1.2.22, p. 374, Part 1.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ *Op. cit.*

be understood here (in the above text), owing to the absence of that (i.e. owing to the fact that the above text contains no reference to the qualities of a sentient being).

In the Ātharvāṇa, it is said: 'There are two knowledges to be known' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.4). Among these, the knowledge of works, viz. the Ṛg-veda and the rest, is the lower.¹ With a view to teaching the higher, viz. the knowledge of Brahman, in contrast to it, it is said: 'Now, the higher is that whereby the Imperishable is apprehended, that which is invisible, incapable of being grasped, without family, without caste, without eye, without ear, it is without hands and feet, eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, excessively subtle, it is unchangeable, which the wise perceive as the source of beings' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5-6), 'Without the vital-breath, without mind, pure, higher than the high Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.12) and so on. Here a doubt arises as to whether here the Imperishable, the source of beings and possessed of the qualities of invisibility and the rest, is pradhāna, or the individual soul, or the Highest Self. The *prima facie* view is as follows:—As invisibility and such other qualities are possible on the part of pradhāna and the individual soul; as pradhāna is established to be the source of beings; and as the individual soul too, the cause of the body and the rest through its own works, can be so,—let one of these two be the Imperishable.

With regard to this, we reply: The Imperishable, the source of beings and possessed of the qualities of invisibility and the rest, is the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of the mention of qualities", i.e. because in the passage: 'He who is all-knowing, omniscient, whose penance consists of knowledge, from Him alone Brahman, name and form, and food arise' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9), the permanent attributes of the Highest Self, viz. omniscience, etc. are stated, with a view to laying down the attributes of the Imperishable, the source of beings.

If it be objected: This view is not reasonable. Having referred to the Imperishable in the passage: 'The Imperishable is apprehended' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), then again having designated the Imperishable as a limit in the passage: 'Higher than the high Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), the text next goes on to designate the meaning of the word 'higher' as the Highest Self, in the passage: 'He who is all-knowing' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9). If here the Highest Self be understood by the word

¹ Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.5.

‘Imperishable’ in the first passage, then how can the text: ‘Higher than the Imperishable, the Light’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) be possible, it being impossible for one to be higher than one’s own self, and there being no reality higher than Brahman, the Imperishable, the cause of the world and the topic of discussion, as evident from the declaration by the Lord Himself, viz. “‘There is nothing else, higher than me, O Dhanañjaya’!” (Gītā 7.7), as well as from the scriptural text: ‘There is nothing higher than the Person’ (Kāṭha 3.11)? Hence, let either pradhāna or the individual soul be the meaning of the word ‘Imperishable’, mentioned first, (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5); and let the Highest Self, higher than that high Imperishable, be omniscient,—

(We reply:) Not so, because the word ‘Imperishable’, mentioned for the second time, (Muṇḍ. 2.1.5) does not refer to the Highest Self. Thus, from the knowledge, called ‘higher’,—mentioned in the passage: ‘The higher is that whereby that Imperishable is apprehended’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5),—it is gathered that the Imperishable is the Highest Brahman alone, since no other knowledge, except that of Brahman, can be high. Thus, having begun with the Highest Self, denoted by the word ‘Imperishable’ and celebrated in the texts: ‘He teaches in truth that knowledge of Brahman whereby one knows the Imperishable, the Person, the True’ (Muṇḍ. 1.2.13), ‘As the hairs and the body-hairs arise from a living person, so from the Imperishable arises this Universe’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7), ‘As from a well-lit fire thousands of sparks of a similar form emit forth, so do, my dear, manifold existences from the Imperishable’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.1) and so on, and with the Imperishable, possessed of the attributes of invisibility and the rest, in the passage: ‘Now, the higher is that whereby that Imperishable is known’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5), Scripture, with a view to demonstrating His qualities and nature, designates Him once more as ‘higher’ than the ‘Imperishable’, i.e. than the individual soul which is His own part; as well as than the ‘high’, i.e. pradhāna which His own power,—i.e. designates Him as their source and controller. Or, else, the ‘Imperishable’ is that which pervades the mass of its own modifications; ‘higher’ than that imperishable is pradhāna which is superior to its own modifications; and ‘higher’ than this pradhāna is the Highest Self. Or, else, the Supreme Person is ‘higher’ than the Person within the aggregate (or Hiranyagarbha) who is higher than the Imperishable, viz. pradhāna,—this is the sense.

SŪTRA 23

“ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF ATTRIBUTES AND DIFFERENCE, NOT THE TWO OTHERS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna and the individual soul are not denoted by the words ‘Imperishable, the source of beings’, “on account of the designation of attributes and difference”. The designation of attributes is: ‘All-pervading’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6¹); and the designation of difference is: ‘Higher than the high Imperishable’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“The two others”, i.e. pradhāna and the soul, are not indicated as the Imperishable, the source of beings, but the Highest Self alone. Why? “Also on account of the designation of attributes and difference.” That is, the attribute: ‘All-pervading’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6) in the text concerned excludes pradhāna and the individual soul from being the Imperishable, the source of beings,—on account of that; in the text: ‘Higher than the high Imperishable’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2), the difference of the Imperishable, the source of beings, from these two is designated,—on account of that as well.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They interpret this sūtra in the same way. The word ‘viśeṣaṇa’ interpreted differently, viz. ‘Because this section distinguishes the Imperishable from pradhāna and the individual soul, since it aims at proving that through the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all’.³

¹ Not quoted by others.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

³ Śrī. B. 1.2.23, p. 364, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.2.23, p. 383, Part 4.

SŪTRA 24

“ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE MENTION OF (HIS) FORM.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Also on account of the mention of the form” of the Highest Self in the passage: ‘Fire is his head’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.4¹) and so on, not the other two.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The very same Being who is this Imperishable, the source of beings, the Cause of all causes and has the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, abides also as the inner controller of the sentient and the non-sentient, the powers, and as His effects; and should be meditated on by one who desires salvation and is free from the faults of envy and malice,—with a view to showing this, the author here states that the universe is the form of the Lord.

The Imperishable, the source of beings, is the Highest Self alone, and not the other two. Why? “On account of the mention of (His) form.” In the passage: ‘Fire is his head, his eyes, the sun and the moon, the regions his ears, his utterances the Vedas, wind his breath, his heart the Universe, from his feet the earth (arises), truly, he is the Inner Soul of all beings’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.4), the entire expanse of the universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is designated as the form of the Highest Self alone, the inner Controller of all. If pradhāna and the individual soul be understood here, the designation of such a form is not possible. For this reason also, it is established that the Imperishable, who is the source of beings, is the Highest Person.

Here ends the section entitled ‘Invisibility’ (6).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

After this sūtra he reads a sūtra ‘prakaraṇāt’, not found in other commentaries.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'Vaiśvānara'. (Sūtras 25-33)

SŪTRA 25

"Vaiśvānara (IS THE LORD), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DISTINCTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF THE COMMON TERM."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

'Vaiśvānara' is the Highest Self alone, because that the word 'Vaiśvānara', though a common term, denoting (both) fire and Brahman, is to be understood as implying Brahman here, follows from the fact that we know its "distinctive attributes" through the designation of its parts, such as the heaven as its head and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out that the Lord is to be meditated on as the Soul of the movable and the immovable. Now, by pointing out that the Lord is to be meditated on, in the very same manner, as Vaiśvānara also, the author shows that the text: "Who is our soul? What is Brahman?" (Chānd. 5.11.1) refers to the Lord.

In the Chāndogya, the following passage is found, beginning: "Who is our soul? What is Brahman?" (Chānd. 5.11.1), "You know now that Vaiśvānara Self, tell us about Him alone" (Chānd. 5.11.6), and continuing: 'But he who meditates on the Vaiśvānara Self as of the measure of a span only, and as of an unlimited dimension, —he eats food in all the worlds, in all beings, in all selves. Verily, of this Vaiśvānara Self, the head, indeed, is the brightly shining (heaven), the eye the multiform (sun), the breath that which moves in various paths (i.e. the wind), the body the extended (space), the bladder, indeed, wealth (i.e. water), the feet the earth indeed, the breast, indeed, the sacrificial altar, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Anvahāryapacana fire, the mouth the Āhavanīya fire' (Chānd. 5.18.1-2). A doubt arises as to whether here Vaiśvānara is the gastric fire, or the elemental fire, or the presiding deity of fire, or the Highest Self. The *prima facie* view is as follows: The word 'Vaiśvānara' is a common term. Why? Because it is applied to the gastric fire, as in the passage: 'This is the Vaiśvānara fire which is within this person, by means of which

this food that is eaten is digested. Its noise is that which one hears on covering the ears. When one is on the point of departing one does not hear this sound' (Brh. 5.9.1); because it is applied also to the elemental fire, as in the passage: 'For the whole world, the gods made Agni Vaiśvānara a sign of the day' (Rg. V. 10.88.12¹); because it is applied to the fire-god too, as in the passage: 'May we be in the favour of Vaiśvānara, for verily, he is the king of the worlds, bliss, lustrous' (Rg. V. 1.98.1²); and because it is applied to the Highest Self, as in the passages: 'He threw it in the self, indeed, in the heart, in Agni Vaiśvānara' (Tait. Br. 3.1.8.7³). 'This Vaiśvānara arises as having all forms, as the vital-breath, as fire' (Praśna 1.7).

With regard to it, we reply: Vaiśvānara is the Highest Person alone. Why? "On account of the distinctive attributes of the common word", i.e. because there are distinctive attributes for taking the common term 'Vaiśvānara',—applied, equally, to the gastric fire, the elemental fire, the fire-god and the Highest Self,—as denoting specifically the Highest Self alone. The sense is that the distinctive attributes by reason of which the Highest Person alone may be taken as the primary meaning of the word 'Vaiśvānara', are present here, as we know them from the text: 'Of this Vaiśvānara Self, the head indeed is the brightly shining (heaven)' (Chānd. 5.18.2) and so on. Hence, the word 'Vaiśvānara', though commonly applicable to all (the four), here denotes the Highest Self (alone), on account of such distinctive attributes. The gastric fire and the rest cannot possibly have limbs, like the heaven, and the rest down to the earth,—since they are not the soul of all, and since in this section, the common term is qualified by the special attributes of the Lord, such as, 'being the soul of all' and the rest, mentioned in the introductory text: "Who is our soul? What is Brahman"? (Chānd. 5.11.1).

¹ P. 347, lines 7-8.

² P. 81, lines 3-4.

³ P. 265, lines 3-4, (vol. 3). Correct quotation: '*Tad . . . hr̥daye agnau vaiśvānare prāsyat*'.

SŪTRA 26

“THAT WHICH IS STATED BY SMṚTI MUST BE AN INDICATION, THUS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The form, stated in Smṛti as well, in the passage: ‘Of whom, fire is the mouth, the heaven the head’ (Mahā. 12.1656.6¹), “must” be a decisive factor in proving that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The word “thus” implies the reason. For this reason, too, Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self alone,—because “that which is stated by Smṛti must be an indication” of the fact that the word ‘Vaiśvānara’ denotes the Highest Self. The phrase “That which is stated by Smṛti” means that the form, characterized by having the heaven for the head and the rest, denoted by the scriptural text: ‘The head, indeed, is the brightly shining (heaven)’ (Chānd. 5.18.2) and so on, is mentioned also by a Smṛti which follows Scripture. That very thing must be “an indication”, i.e. a decisive factor here,—this is the sense. The Smṛti-passages are the following: ‘Of whom fire is the mouth, the heaven the head, the sky the navel, the earth the feet, the sun the eye, the regions the ear,—obeisance to Him, the Soul of the world’ (Mahā. 12.1656b–1657a²), ‘Of whom the heaven is the head, the wise declare, the sky, verily, the navel, the sun and the moon the eyes, the regions the ear, the earth the feet,—He is the inconceivable Soul, the maker of all beings’. For this very reason, it has been said: ‘Scripture and Smṛti are celebrated to be the two eyes of the wise. Deprived of one, one is said to be “one-eyed”; deprived of both “blind”’.

Or, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra:) the phrase: “That which is stated by Smṛti” means as follows: (The form) which is recognized in the following manner thus: What is celebrated in another scriptural text, viz. ‘Fire is his head, the eyes the sun and the moon’ (Mund. 2.1.4), and so on, as well as in the stated Smṛti-passages as the form of the Highest Self, that alone, is stated here (in Chānd. 5.18.2),—that form must be an indication, i.e. a sign, that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self.

2 P. 424, lines 2-3, vol. 3

1 Ś. R.

SŪTRA 27

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (Vaiśvānara IS THE GASTRIC FIRE) ON ACCOUNT OF WORD AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF ABIDING WITHIN, NOT (THE HIGHEST SELF), (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING THE VISION (OF THE LORD) THUS, ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, AND (BECAUSE) THEY READ HIM ALSO AS A PERSON.”¹

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that since the word ‘Vaiśvānara’ conventionally denotes the gastric fire, since there is the designation of a triad of fires, since it is mentioned as the abode of the offering to the vital-breaths, and since it is declared by Scripture to be abiding within, Vaiśvānara is not the Highest Self, but the gastric fire,—

(We reply:) “No”, “as” the Supreme Lord is “taught to be viewed” “thus”, i.e. in the gastric fire; “for” if the Supreme Lord be not understood here, then having the heaven as the head and the rest ‘is not possible’; and it is declared by Scripture to be a person,—so Vaiśvānara is none but the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The Highest Self cannot be denoted by the word ‘Vaiśvānara’ here, but the gastric fire. Why? “On account of words and the rest,” i.e. the reasons which begin with ‘word’ are ‘reasons beginning with word’,²—‘on account of those’.³ Those reasons are as follows: First, the ‘word’ here is ‘Vaiśvānara’, and that conventionally denotes the gastric fire, and when a literal meaning is possible, it is improper to suppose any other meaning. Secondly, there is the word ‘fire’, i.e. there is a co-ordination between Vaiśvānara and the word ‘fire’ in the Vājasaneyaka-text, viz. ‘This is the Vaiśvānara fire’ (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11⁴). Thirdly, a triad of fires is designated in the text; ‘The heart is the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Ānvāhārya’ (Chānd. 5.18.2) and so on. Fourthly, Vaiśvānara is declared by Scripture to be the support of the offering to the

¹ The C.S.S. ed. omits ‘*iti cen na*’, p. 11.

² *Śabdādayaḥ*.

³ This explains the compound ‘*śabdādibhyaḥ*’.

⁴ P. 805, line 17.

vital-breaths in the passage: 'Therefore, the first food which one may come across should be offered' (Chānd. 5.19.1). And, finally, Vaiśvānara abides "within", which, more particularly, is a characteristic mark of the gastric fire,—the Vājasaneyins declare that Vaiśvānara abides within in the passage: 'For he who knows this Vaiśvānara fire to be like a man, abiding within a man' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11). On account of such reasons like "words and the rest", and "on account of abiding within", the Highest Self cannot be understood,—

(We reply:) "No", "on account of teaching the vision (of the Lord) thus", i.e. since such an object (viz. the gastric fire) is taught to be meditated on under the aspect of the Lord, i.e. since the Supreme Lord is enjoined to be meditated on as qualified by the gastric fire, i.e. since the above-mentioned Supreme Soul, who is Vaiśvānara (or the universal soul) being the soul of all, is taught to be in the gastric fire and the rest as their soul. If it be objected: In that case, let gastric fire itself be Vaiśvānara primarily,—we reply: no, "because that is impossible", i.e. because having the heaven as the head and the rest is impossible on the part of the gastric fire. This means, it is possible on the part of the Highest Self alone, who is the soul of all, and not on the part of any one else. "And also", the Vājasaneyins "read" "him", i.e. Vaiśvānara, "as a person" in the passage: 'That Vaiśvānara fire is the person' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11). It is possible for the Highest Self to be a Person, He being the soul of all, but this is not possible if the mere gastric fire be understood here. The word "and"¹ denotes that this is universally known, i.e. that the Highest Self is a Person is well-known from scriptural texts like: 'The Person, verily, is all this' (Śvet. 3.15), 'There is nothing higher than the Person' (Kāṭha 3.11) and so on.

SŪTRA 28

"FOR THAT VERY REASON, NOT THE DEITY, NOR THE ELEMENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of those "very" reasons stated above, "the deity and the element" are "not" to be understood by the word 'Vaiśvānara'.

¹ 'Ca' in the sūtra.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“For that very reason”, i.e. on account of the very reasons stated above, the presiding “deity” of fire is not to be understood the word ‘Vaiśvānara’; and the “element”, i.e. the elemental fire, also is not to be understood.

SŪTRA 29

“(THERE IS) NO CONTRADICTION, EVEN (IF THE WORD “VAISVĀNARA” DENOTES THE LORD) DIRECTLY, JAIMINI (THINKS SO).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Lord Vaiśvānara is ‘all and man’, i.e. the soul of all,—to be meditated on “directly” as such;—this, the teacher “Jaimini” thinks, involves “no contradiction”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the word ‘Vaiśvānara’ has been proved to be referring to Brahman, first on the ground of the reasons like ‘distinctive attributes of a common term’ (Br. Sū. 1.2.25) and the rest. Again, there being a doubt,—viz. on account of words and the rest, as well as on account of abiding within, it refers to the gastric fire,—it has been once more proved, for the sake of removing incompatibility, to be referring to Brahman alone, qualified by the gastric fire, on the ground of the reasons like: ‘because of teaching the vision (of the Lord) thus’ (Br. Sū. 1.2.27) and so on. Now, by showing that the word ‘Vaiśvānara’ denotes Brahman etymologically too, so that He may be directly worshipped as such, the author shows that another teacher too (viz. Jaimini) confirms his own view.

The teacher “Jaimini” thinks that as the word ‘Vaiśvānara’, even without being viewed as denoting the Lord, only so far as He is qualified by the gastric fire, refers directly to the Highest Self, intending to designate as it does His special qualities,—so Vaiśvānara is to be meditated on “directly” as the Highest Self indeed. This view involves “no contradiction”.¹

¹ I.e. it has been said in the previous *sūtra* that *Vaiśvānara* stands for the Lord only so far as the Lord is qualified by the gastric fire. But now it is said that *Vaiśvānara* stands for the Lord directly, without any qualification.

Etymologically, 'Vaiśvānara' implies 'he who is all and man', He being the Universal Soul; or 'one who is the man, i.e. the maker of all', He being the Universal Cause; or 'one by whom all men are to be controlled', He being the Universal Controller. The long vowel (i.e. 'ā' in the word 'Vaiśvānara') follows from the rule 'when "nara" follows "viśva", the "a" in the latter is lengthened to designate a name' (Pāṇ. 6.3.129, SD. K. 1048¹). The taddhita-suffix (by which the word 'Vaiśvānara' is derived from the word 'Vaiśvanara') is added without changing the meaning, as in the case of 'rākṣasa' (derived from 'rakṣas'), 'vāyasa' (derived from 'vayas') and so on.²

The co-ordination of the words 'Agni' and 'Vaiśvānara', too, is appropriate. 'Agni' is 'one who goes, i.e. goes to or manifests himself in the heart-lotus',—the 'na' (in the root 'aṅg') is elided in accordance with the rule: 'And, the "na" of "aṅga" is elided'³ (Uṇādi-sūtra 490)⁴—; or 'one who causes one to go, i.e. causes the first birth of the Universe.

SŪTRA 30

"ON ACCOUNT OF MANIFESTATION, ĀŚMARATHYA (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With a view to favouring His worshippers who are devoted to Him alone and to none else, the Highest Self though infinite, manifests Himself in accordance with the respective capacities of His devotees. As such, He can fittingly be regarded as of the size of merely a span,—this is so "on account of manifestation", so the sage "Āśmarathya" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(The author) explains, in accordance with the approbation of Āśmarathya, the text about that which is of the size of merely a span.

In the text: 'But who meditates on the Vaiśvānara Self as of the measure of a span only and as of an unlimited dimension' (Chāṇd.

¹ P. 654, vol. 1.

² Vide Pāṇ. 4.1.104, SD. K. 1106, p. 682, vol. 1, and Pāṇ. 5.4.38, SD. K. 2106, p. 936, vol. 1.

³ And 'ni' is added, as mentioned in the sūtra 488. Thus, aṅg = ag + ni = agni.

⁴ SD. K., p. 634, vol. 2.

5.18.1), it is perfectly justifiable to hold that even one whose 'measure' or limit, has disappeared 'on all sides' or entirely¹, i.e. even the Highest Person, who is unlimited, can be of the measure of a span merely, i.e. of the extent measured by the thumb and the forefinger. How? "On account of manifestation." That is, with a view to favouring those who are devoted to none else except to Him, the Lord manifests Himself in the heart-lotus in a form, which is eternal, blissful and non-material, which is of the size of a span and is the fulfiller of the desire of His own devotees, just as He manifested Himself in the limited space of a pillar as a man-lion.² This is the view of the teacher Āśmarathya.

Or, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra), with a view to favouring the dull-witted devotees (i.e. who can grasp gross objects only), the Lord squeezes Himself, as it were, into gross regions only; though all-pervading, He limits Himself in accordance with their respective intelligence and manifests Himself in those respective places. Thus, "on account of manifestation", He can, very well, be of the measure of merely a span,—so thinks "Āśmarathya",—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation of the word 'abhivyakteḥ' different, viz. 'on account of definiteness', i.e. the texts speaks of the Lord of a definite extent with a view to rendering the thought of the meditating devotee more definite.³

SŪTRA 31

"ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE, BĀDARI (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The imagination of a body from head to foot is "on account of remembrance", i.e. for the purpose of recollection (or meditation),—so thinks the teacher "Bādari".

¹ *Abhitaḥ vigataḥ mānaḥ* = *abhivimānaḥ*.

² The reference is to the killing of *Hiraṇyakaśipu* by the Lord in the form of a man-lion. Vide Mahā. 3.15835, etc.

³ Śrī. B. 1.2.30, p. 274, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.2.30, p. 392. Part 1.

Vedānta-kaustubha

On the enquiry: What purpose is served by such a manifestation of a Being,—who is of the size of merely a span,—in the heart-lotus of the sharp-witted (i.e. those who are capable of grasping subtle things)? On the enquiry: What purpose is served by such worship of a Being,—who is limited as having limbs like head and the rest in the heaven and so on,—on the part of the dull-witted (i.e. those who are capable of grasping gross things)?—it is said here:

The manifestation, in the heart-lotus, of the Highest Self as of the size of merely a span; similarly the imagination of His body, from head to foot, in the regions of the heaven and the rest, are “on account of remembrance”, i.e. serve the purpose of recollection, or meditation in that way, for attaining the Supreme Lord. This is the view of the teacher “Bādari”.

SŪTRA 32

“ON ACCOUNT OF IDENTIFICATION, SO JAIMINI THINKS, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The imagination of their¹ breast and the rest as the sacrificial altar and so on is for the purpose of effecting “an identification” of Agni-hotra with the offering to the vital-breaths, which is a subsidiary element of the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, practised by a worshipper of Vaiśvānara,—“so” the teacher “Jaimini” thinks. That very thing the scriptural text: ‘Now, he who offers the Agni-hotra, knowing this thus’ (Chānd. 5.24.2²), ‘shows’.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be asked: If the Highest Self, having thus the three worlds as His body, be denoted by the term ‘Vaiśvānara’, then, what is the purpose of imagining the breast and the rest of the worshipper as the sacrificial altar and so on thus: ‘The breast is the sacrificial altar, the hairs the sacrificial grass, the heart the Gārhapatya fire, the mind the Anvāhāryapacana fire’ (Chānd. 5.18.2)?—the author replies here:

¹ I.e. of those who meditate on *Vaiśvānara*.

² Ś, R, SK.

The imagining of the worshippers as the sacrificial altar and the rest is for the purpose of effecting an "identification" of Agni-hotra with the offering to the vital-breath, which is a subsidiary element of the Vaiśvānara-vidyā, practised by the worshippers of Vaiśvānara,—"so" the teacher "Jaimini" thinks. "For thus", i.e. this very identification of the offering to the vital-breath and the Agni-hotra, "Scripture shows" in the following passage: 'Now, he who offers the Agni-hotra knowing this thus, his offering is made to all the worlds, to all beings, to all selves' (Chānd. 5.24.2).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

The interpretation of the word 'sāmpatteḥ' different, viz. 'on account of mysterious power or lordliness'. Hence the sūtra: '(The Lord is said to be of the measure of a span) on account of (His) mysterious power, so Jaimini (thinks), for thus Scripture shows (viz. that the Lord is possessed of such powers)'.¹

SŪTRA 33

"AND THEY RECORD THIS IN THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And they record" "this", i.e. Vaiśvānara having the heaven as his head and so on, as a Person in the body of the worshipper.

Here ends the second quarter of the first chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts and composed by the Reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And moreover, the Vājins "record" "this", i.e. the Lord Vaiśvānara, "in that", i.e. in the body of the worshipper, in the passage: 'He who knows this Vaiśvānara fire as a man, abiding within man' (Śat. Br. 10.6.1.11). That is to say, these too, viz. his being a person,

¹ G.B. 1.2.32, p. 142, Chap. 1.

as well as his abiding within, are indicative of the fact that Vaiśvānara is Brahman. The sense is that if the gastric fire be understood here, then the circumstance of abiding within a person will, of course, be possible, but not that of being like a person. Hence, it is established that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled 'Vaiśvānara' (7).

Here ends the second quarter of the first chapter in the commentary,
the holy Vedānta-kaustubha.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. 'And they (viz. the Ātharvaṇikas) record this (viz. the existence of such mysterious powers) in that (viz. in the Lord)'.¹

Résumé

The second quarter of the first chapter contains:—

- (1) 33 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka ;
- (2) 32 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara ;
- (3) 33 sūtras and 6 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja ;
- (4) 32 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara ;
- (5) 33 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha ;
- (6) 33 sūtras and 7 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara and Baladeva omit the sūtra 16 in Nimbārka's commentary. Nimbārka omits the sūtra 24 in Bhāskara's commentary.

¹ G.B. 1.2.33, p. 143, Chap. 1.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'The heaven, the earth, and so on'. (Sūtras 1-7)

SŪTRA 1

"THE SUPPORT OF THE HEAVEN, THE EARTH AND THE REST (IS BRAHMAN ALONE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE TERM 'OWN'."

Vedānta-pārijāta saurabha

"The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest", stated in the passage: 'In whom the heaven' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5¹) and so on, is Brahman, "on account of the term 'own'", i.e. on account of the word 'soul' and the rest which are denotative of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing that to be the support of the three worlds, too, is possible on the part of the Lord alone who has the heaven for His head and so on and is the soul of the three worlds.

In the Muṇḍaka, we read: 'He in whom the heaven, the earth and the sky are woven, and the mind together with all the vital-breaths,—Him alone know as the one soul; give up other worlds. He is the bridge to immortality' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5). Here a doubt arises—viz. whether that which is indicated as the support of the heaven and the rest by the locative 'in whom' is pradhāna or the individual soul, or the Supreme Soul, the cause of the birth and the rest of the world. What is suggested here to begin with? The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let pradhāna be the support. As it is found that an effect arises from and dissolves into its own cause, it is reasonable to hold that it has its own cause as its support. (This is so), also on account of the scriptural mention of 'bridge'. To be a bridge means to be limited; but Brahman is not limited as declared

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

by, the text: 'Infinite, boundless' (Brh. 2.4.12). The term 'self' too may be applied to pradhāna thus:—

Pradhāna is the self, because of being the benefactor of the soul. Whoever is the benefactor of some one else is his self; just as (when it is said:) 'Verily, Bhadrāsena is my self'. Or, else, let the individual soul be the support, as there is the mention of the word 'soul' in the text,—the word 'soul' denotes the individual soul primarily, since it is a sentient being;—as the soul is mentioned in Scripture as the support of sense-organs like mind and the rest; as the soul is said to be connected with the vein, as well as to be born, in the passage: 'Where the veins have congregated together like the spokes in the nave of a wheel, he moves about within, becoming manifold' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.6); and, finally, to be the support of the entire universe, the object to be enjoyed, fits in on the soul's part, it being an enjoyer.

We reply: "The support of the heaven, and the earth and the rest" is none but the Supreme Brahman. That is, 'dyau' and 'bhu' (make) 'dyubhuvau', that which begins with 'dyu-bhuvau' is 'dyu-bhuvāu ādi', i.e. all the things beginning with the heaven, and ending with the vital-breath,—their support is the Highest Self. Why? "On account of the term 'own'", i.e. on account of the term 'soul', denotative of itself, viz. of the Supreme Soul, the topic of discussion, and characterized by an adjective as stated in the passage: 'Him alone know as the *one soul*; give up other worlds' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5),—here, from the adjective 'one' which denotes the Lord, the soul of all, it is known that the 'soul' is the Supreme Soul;—also on account of the word 'bridge', mentioned in the passage: 'The bridge to immortality' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5); i.e. the 'bridge' or the support meaning the cause of attaining 'immortality' or salvation. In another scriptural text, viz. 'By knowing him thus, one becomes immortal on earth' (Tait. Ār. 3.12¹), He alone is celebrated to be the cause of the attainment of immortality. Connection with the artery, too, is possible on the part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'But surrounded by the veins he hangs like a sheath' (Mahābhār. 11.9). In accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'Not born, he is born in many ways' (Vj. S. 31.169²; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1³), 'Though unborn, the unchangeable soul' (Gītā 4.6), it is also possible for Him to be born in many

1 P. 199.

2 P. 857, line 17.

3 P. 201.

ways. Finally, to be the support of the instruments of the individual soul, too, is possible on the part of the Supreme Soul who is the support of all. The following aphorisms¹, secondary in nature, are but amplifications of this primary aphorism.

SŪTRA 2

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF BRAHMAN) THE OBJECT TO BE APPROACHED BY THE FREED.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest is Brahman alone. Why? “On account of the designation” of such a support alone as “the object to be approached by the freed”, in the passage: ‘When the seer sees the golden-coloured Creator, the Lord, the Person, the source of Brahmā, then the knower, having discarded merit and demerit, stainless, attains the highest identity’ (Muṇḍ. 3.1.13²) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest is none but Brahman. Why? “On account of the designation (of Brahman) as the object to be approached by the freed.” That which is to be approached, i.e. obtained, by those who are freed from the fetter of mundane existence is “the object to be approached by the freed”, on account of the “designation”, i.e. indication, of that³. The sense is: The reality that is admitted to be the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest, to be one, to be the bridge to immortality, and is celebrated elsewhere also as the object to be approached by the freed,—that very same reality, the one topic of all the Vedas and without an equal or a superior, is designated as the object to be obtained by the freed, in the passages: ‘The knot of the heart is undone, all doubts are cut off, and his works perish, when he, who is high and low, is seen’ (Muṇḍ. 2.2.8), ‘Just as the flowing rivers disappear into the ocean discarding name and form, so the knower, freed from name and form, goes to the Person, who is Higher than

² R, ŚK, B.

¹ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.3.2-7.

³ This explains the compound ‘*muktopasrpya-vyapadeśāt*’.

the high' (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8). The phrase 'high and low' means: One to whom the high, i.e. Brahmā, Śiva, and the rest, are inferior. The phrase: 'higher than the high' means: the Person who is higher than the high, i.e. the individual soul or prakṛti.¹

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading slightly different, viz. adds a 'ca' in the end.²

SŪTRA 3

"NOT THE INFERENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF TEXTS TO THAT EFFECT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, which is arrived at through inference, is not that support, on account of the absence of texts denoting it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest cannot be "the inference". The non-sentient cause which is without any connection with Brahman, viz. pradhāna, inferred by the Sāṃkhyas on the ground of non-sentient effects, like the elements and the rest³, is said to be "the inference", and that is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? "On account of the absence of texts to that effect." That is, the "text to that effect" is 'tac-chabda', "absence of text to that effect" is 'atac-chabda', on account of that⁴, or on account of the absence, here, of texts denoting the

¹ Note that *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa* understand the word 'Vyapadeśāt' as referring to different passages.

² Śrī. B. 1.2.3, p. 283, Part 1. ŚK. B. 1.3.2, p. 401, Part 4.

³ First, we infer that every effect must have a cause, that cause another cause and so on, and finally there must be an uncaused first cause. Secondly, we infer that this uncaused first cause must be non-sentient, since the effects which we perceive are non-sentient, and the effect and its cause must be similar in nature. It is in this way that the *Sāṃkhyas* arrive at non-sentient first cause or *pradhāna*.

⁴ This explains the compound 'atac-chabdāt'.

inferrible *pradhāna*. On the contrary, there are texts denoting a sentient being, such as, 'He who is omniscient' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9.; 2.2.7) and so on.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra.¹

SŪTRA 4

"AND THE BEARER OF THE VITAL-BREATH."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The bearer of the vital-breath" also is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? On account of the very same absence of texts to that effect.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The words: 'not, on account of the absence of texts to that effect' are to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. "The bearer of the vital-breath", i.e. the individual soul, too, is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest, on account of the absence of texts to that effect;—that means: although the term 'soul' is equally applicable to the individual soul and the Supreme Soul, yet just as in this section there are texts like 'Him alone know as one.—He is the bridge to immortality' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5), 'He who is omniscient' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7) and so on, establishing the peculiar qualities of the Supreme Soul, so there are no texts here, establishing the peculiar qualities of the individual soul;—also because it is impossible for the individual soul, which is atomic by nature, to be the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. This aphorism is taken separately, because of its association with the following aphorisms.²

¹ Śrī. B. 1.3.3, p. 283, Part 1.

ŚK. B. 1.3.3, p. 403, Part 4.

² That is, it would not have been necessary to introduce a special sūtra for the individual soul,—which like *pradhāna* is precluded in the preceding sūtra,—if it were not for the reasons given in the following three sūtras, which apply only to the individual soul, and not to *pradhāna*.

COMPARISON

All others omit the 'ca' in the end.¹

SŪTRA 5

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, "on account of the designation of difference" also between the knower and the object to be known, the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest is not the bearer of the vital-breath, (or the individual soul).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The bearer of the vital-breath is not to be understood as the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? "On account of the designation of difference", i.e. because the difference between the two, viz. between the individual soul—which is possessed of little knowledge and is subject to bondage and release through the Lord's māyā consisting of the three guṇas—and the Omniscient Lord, as the knower and the object to be known, is designated by the holy Scripture itself in the passage: 'Him alone know as one' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.5). The purpose of this repeated declarations of difference is to point out that with a view to attaining His nature, one should practise meditation on Him, based on a true knowledge about Him.

SŪTRA 6

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Supreme Self being the topic, the individual soul is not to be understood as the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest.

¹ Ś.B. 1.3.5, p. 310. Srī. B. 1.3.4, p. 283, Part 1.
Bh. B. 1.3.5, p. 52. ŚK. B. 1.3.4, p. 404, Part 4.
B.B. 1.3.5.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is not that the individual soul constitutes the topic so that it may be understood here. None but the Supreme Soul is the topic here, as evident from the introductory passage: “‘What, my reverend Sir, being known, all this comes to be known’?” (Muṇḍ. 1.1.3),—all things do not become known when the individual soul is known, since all things have not the individual soul as their soul—and as established by the fact that in the passage: ‘Now, the higher is that whereby that Imperishable is apprehended’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.5) and so on, the Supreme Soul alone is referred to.

SŪTRA 7

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF ABIDING AND EATING.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the abiding” of the Highest Self as a non-eater, as well as ‘on account of the eating’ of the individual soul, as laid down in the text: ‘Two birds’ (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; cf. also Śvet. 4.6¹), the individual soul is not the support of the heaven and the earth.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is once more explaining statements regarding the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

The individual soul is not the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest. Why? “On account of abiding and eating”, “sthiti” and “odana” (make) “sthityodane”—on account of that². “On account of the abiding” of one bird in the tree, i.e. the body, without eating the fruit of work and shining, and “on account of the eating” of the fruit of work by the other as subject to karmas,—as laid down in the text which refers to the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest, viz. ‘Of these two, one tastes the sweet berry, the other looks on without eating’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.3),—the difference between the individual soul and Supreme Soul is known. Hence, it is established

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² This explains the compound ‘sthityodanābhyām’.

that the independent and omniscient Supreme Soul alone is the bridge to immortality; and as the soul of all, He is also the support of the heaven, the earth and the rest.

Here ends the section entitled 'The heaven, the earth and the rest' (1).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Reading and interpretation same, but points out at the end in his usual manner that the distinction between the individual soul and Brahman is no more real than that between the ether within a pot and the universal ether and so on.¹

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The plenty'.
(Sūtras 8-9)

SŪTRA 8

"THE PLENTY (IS THE LORD), BECAUSE OF THE TEACHING (OF IT) AS ABOVE SERENITY (VIZ. THE VITAL-BREATH)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Plenty, taught by the highest teacher, the venerable Sanat-kumāra, to our preceptor, the reverend Nārada, in the passage: 'But the Plenty alone should be enquired after' (Chānd. 7.22.1²), is not the vital-breath, but the Highest Person. Why? "Because of the teaching" of the Plenty as "above" the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing that the text: 'But the Plenty alone should be enquired after' (Chānd. 7.22.1) and so on, refers to Brahman.

¹ Ś.B. 1.3.7, p. 31.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

The following is recorded by the Chandogas: “It has been heard by me from men like you that one who knows the soul crosses over sorrow. I am such a sorrowing one, reverend sir! Cause me, sir, to cross over the sorrow” (Chānd. 7.1.3), thus asked by Nārada, his preceptor, the reverend Sanatkumāra, the teacher of the doctrine of salvation, taught: ‘The name is Brahman’ (Chānd. 7.1.5). Again, asked thus: “Is there, sir, more than name?” (Chānd. 7.1.5), he taught: “Speech, verily, is more than name” (Chānd. 7.2.1). In this way, fifteen objects, beginning with name and ending with the vital-breath, were taught.¹ After having taught the vital-breath, he, without being asked any further question, taught the following: “But he, verily, speaks superiorly who speaks superiorly through truth” (Chānd. 7.16.1), “But the Plenty alone should be enquired after”. “I enquire, sir, after the Plenty.” “Where one does not see another, does not hear another, does not know another, that is the Plenty. But where one sees another, hears another, knows another, that is the small” (Chānd. 7.23.1–24.1). Here the term ‘plenty’ (bhūman) denotes ‘muchness’. It is derived in the following manner: The suffix ‘imanic’ is added to the word ‘bahu’ (much) in the sense of ‘the nature thereof’², in accordance with the rule: ‘The (suffix) “imanic” is optionally added to the words “prthu” and the rest’ (Pāṇ. 5.1.122; SD. K. 1784³) (in order to indicate the sense ‘the nature thereof’.—Pāṇ. 5.1.119; SD. K. 1781). Then the root (viz. bahu) and the suffix (viz. imanic) undergo a change in accordance with the rule: ‘After “bahu”, the first letters of “iman” and “iyas” affixes are elided, and “bahu” is replaced by the word “bhū”’ (Pāṇ. 6.4.154, 158; SD. K. 2017⁴). Here ‘muchness’ means ‘immensity’ (i.e. quantitative greatness), and not numerosity (i.e. numerical greatness), because just as the term ‘bahu’ denotes number, as in the examples: ‘In expressing numerosity the plural case affix is used’ (Pāṇ. 1.4.21; SD. K. 187⁵), ‘Many, purified by the penance of knowledge’ (Gītā. 4.10), ‘After many births’ (Gītā. 7.19) and so on, so it is seen to be applied in the sense of ‘immensity’ also, in contrast to smallness, as in the example: ‘He who renders service, be it great or small, to one who has heard Scripture’. Here, too, the term ‘plenty’ being used

² *Tasya bhāvaḥ.*

¹ Vide Chānd. 7.1 *et seq.*

³ P. 894, vol. 1. Correct quotation translated: ‘Prthvādibhya imanic vā’.

⁴ P. 908, vol. 1. That is, *bahu + imanic = bhū + man = bhūman*.

⁵ P. 114, vol. 1.

in contrast to smallness in the passage: 'There is no pleasure in the small' (Chānd. 7.23.1), its meaning is nothing but 'immensity'. Thus, there is no pleasure in the small, but the Plenty alone is pleasure. Hence: 'The Plenty alone is to be enquired into' (Chānd. 7.23.1). That is, the Plenty, or the Supreme Soul alone, who is of the form of pleasure characterized by unsurpassed greatness, should be enquired after by one desiring salvation and wishing to attain pleasure characterized by unsurpassed greatness. When the reverend Sanatkumāra said this, the reverend Nārada said: "'I enquire, sir, after the Plenty'" (Chānd. 7.23.1). That is, 'Sir', meaning, O reverend teacher! I desire to know the Plenty alone in particular. Therefore, Sanatkumāra told him the characteristic marks of the Plenty by means of a positive (indicating what it is) and a negative (indicating what it is not) proposition, thus 'where' (Chānd. 7.24.1) and so on,—this is the sense of the text.

Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the Plenty is the vital-breath or the Supreme Soul. The vital-breath, holds the *prima facie* view, because in the previous passage: 'The vital-breath is more than hope' (Chānd. 7.15.1), the vital-breath alone is indicated, and because after the teaching about the vital-breath, there are no further question and answer (as there were in the previous cases), viz: "'Is there, sir, more than name"?' (Chānd. 7.1.5), "'Speech, verily, is more than name'" (Chānd. 7.2.1). By the term 'vital-breath', the individual soul, endowed with the vital-breath, is to be understood, and not merely a kind of air,—because, from the passage: 'The vital-breath is the father, the vital-breath the mother' (Chānd. 7.15.1), the vital-breath is known to be a sentient being; and because in the introductory text, viz: 'One who knows the soul crosses over sorrow' (Chānd. 7.1.3), as well as in the concluding text: 'To the soul alone belongs all this'¹ (Chānd. 7.25.2), the term 'soul' is found employed. The passage: 'Where one does not see another' (Chānd. 7.24.1) and so on, too, fittingly applies to the individual soul, because all its activities like seeing and the rest cease during its state of deep sleep; and further, because all its practical activities like external perceptions and the rest cease when its own real nature, different from the body, the sense-organs, buddhi and the rest, is known. Hereby, it should be known that texts like: 'Verily, the Plenty is pleasure' (Chānd. 7.23.1),

¹ Correct quotation: 'Ātmaivedam sarvam'. Vide Chānd. 7.25.2, p. 402.

'Verily, the vital-breath is immortal' (Brh. 1.6.3) and so on, are all to be explained as referring to the individual soul, possessing the vital-breath.

With regard to it, we reply: The Plenty is the Supreme Soul alone and not the individual soul, possessing the vital-breath. Why? "Because of the teaching (of it) as above serenity." "Serenity" means one in whom there is complete serenity, i.e. the individual soul, celebrated in the Scriptural text: 'This serenity, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form' (Chānd. 8.3.4) and so on. (The above phrase means: because of the teaching of it as) "above" that which is denoted by the term: "vital-breath". In the text: 'But he speaks superiorly, who speaks through truth' (Chānd. 7.26.1) from the term 'but', the difference between the subsequent teaching about the Plenty and the prior one about the vital-breath is known. The sense is that since the teaching about the Plenty is different from the teaching about the vital-breath, the meaning of the word "plenty" is different from the meaning of the term "vital-breath".

(An alternative explanation of the sūtra.) Or, else, (the phrase means:) because of the teaching of the worshipper of truth as higher than the worshipper of the vital-breath, in the passage: 'But he, verily, speaks superiorly' (Chānd. 7.16.1); i.e. owing to a difference between the worshippers, there is a difference between the objects to be worshipped as well. The sense is this: If it be objected: In accordance with your statement, viz. that the Plenty is that alone, which is denoted by the term truth, demarcated as higher than the individual soul,—just as each of the fifteen objects, beginning with name and ending with speech, is taught as successively higher by the reverend Sanatkumāra, asked by the reverend Nārada,—how do you know that truth is taught as something higher,—(we reply:) Having stated that a knower of the vital-breath is a superior speaker in the passage: 'Verily, by seeing this, by thinking this, by knowing this, one becomes a superior speaker' (Chānd. 7.15.4), and having distinguished the worshipper of truth from the worshipper of the vital-breath by the term 'but' in the passage: 'But he, verily, speaks superiorly, who speaks superiorly through truth' (Chānd. 7.16.1), Scripture teaches truth, the cause of being a superior speaker in this case (Chānd. 7.16.1), as higher than the vital-breath, the cause of being a superior speaker in the previous case (Chānd. 7.15.4).

The instrumental case 'through truth' (satyena) follows the rule: 'The third case-ending is added to a word denoting a mark or an attribute which indicates the existence of a particular state or condition' (Pāṇ. 2.3.21; SD. K. 566¹). The clause 'who speaks', etc. means: who speaks superiorly through truth which figuratively implies the Supreme Brahman, the object to be worshipped. The word 'truth' is well known to be denoting Brahman, as in the passages: 'Verily, the name of this Brahman is truth' (Chānd. 8.3.4), 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1) and so on. 'Being a superior speaker' means being the speaker of the supremacy of one's own object of worship, and this amounts to declaring the unsurpassedness of the Deity to be worshipped. The suffix 'śatr' in 'by seeing this' and the rest follows the rule: 'The present participle is used to denote the manner or the cause of an action' (Pāṇ. 3.2.126; SD. K. 3103²). That is, the direct vision of the Deity to be worshipped is the cause of being a superior speaker. The sense is that it becomes possible for one to be such a superior speaker only through the grace of the Deity worshipped by him, and apprehended through direct vision. Moreover, the very permission to speak the truth, giving up being a superior speaker through merely the vital-breath, asked for in the passage: "May I, sir, speak superiorly through truth" (Chānd. 7.16.1), indicates the termination of the section of the vital-breath. Here, the term 'soul', too, can have a consistent meaning only if the Supreme Soul be understood, since to be the cause of all, mentioned in the passage: 'To the self alone all this belongs' (Chānd. 7.26.1³), is impossible on the part of any one else. His Holiness will speak of this in subsequent aphorisms.⁴

COMPARISON

Baladeva

He gives two alternative explanations of the sūtra the last of which agrees with the explanation given by Nimbārka. The first explanation is: 'The Plenty (is Brahman), because it is immense joy, and because it is taught as the highest'.⁵

¹ P. 423, vol. 2.

³ For correct quotation see footnote 1, p. 152.

⁴ Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.4-35.

² P. 558, vol. 2.

⁵ G.B. 1.3.8.

SŪTRA 9

“ AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE ATTRIBUTES.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“ And ” because attributes like ‘being of the form of unsurpassed pleasure’, ‘being immortal’, ‘being established on one’s own greatness’ and the rest are “ appropriate ” on the part of the Highest Self alone, the Plenty is none but the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The attributes, mentioned in the section of the Plenty, which are not possible on the part of any one else, being “ appropriate ” in reference to the Highest Self alone, it is known that the Plenty is the Highest Self. Thus, the passage: ‘Where one does not see another’ (Chānd. 7.24.1), means: ‘where’ one, immersed in pleasure characterized by unsurpassed greatness, ‘does not see’, i.e. notice, ‘another’, i.e. petty worldly pleasure, the contrary of the pleasure which is characterized by greatness,—just as one who has drunk the nectar, does not notice any other drink. Moreover, ‘where’ one, plunged in pleasure, ‘does not see’ any sorrow, the contrary of pleasure, i.e. comes to be endowed with every pleasure and delivered from every sorrow. The term ‘where’ means ‘by being attached to whom’. Such attributes of ‘being the giver of unsurpassed pleasure’, ‘being the remover of all sorrow’ and the rest are appropriate on the part of the Highest Self alone, and not on that of the individual soul, denoted by the term ‘vital-breath’. Further, as the attributes of ‘being immortal by nature’, ‘being established on one’s own greatness’, ‘being the creator of all’ and the rest,—mentioned in the passages: “ ‘ That which is the Plenty is, verily, the immortal ’—‘ Sir, On what is it established ? ’ ‘ On its own greatness ’ ” (Chānd. 7.24.1), “ ‘ He alone is below ’ ” (Chānd. 7.25.1), ‘ From the soul the vital-breath ’ (Chānd. 7.26.1) and so on,—are appropriate on the part of the Highest Self alone, so it is established that the Plenty is none but the Highest Self.

Here ends the section entitled ‘The Plenty’ (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The imperishable'. (Sūtras 10-12)

SŪTRA 10

"THE IMPERISHABLE (IS BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF SUPPORTING THE END OF THE ETHER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Imperishable is Brahman. Why? "Because of its supporting" the ether, indicated as the support of the effects in past, present and future.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing that the Brhadāranyaka passage: 'He said: "That, verily, is the Imperishable"' (Brh. 3.8.8) and so on, refers to Brahman.

In the Brhadāranyaka we read: "In whom is the ether woven, warp and woof?" He said: "That, verily, O Gārgī, the Brāhmaṇas call the Imperishable, non-gross, non-atomic, non-short, non-long, non-red, non-lubricous, without shadow"" (Brh. 3.8.8) and so on. A doubt arises, viz. whether here pradhāna is understood by the term 'Imperishable', or the individual soul, or the Supreme Brahman. What is suggested, to begin with? The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let pradhāna be denoted by the term 'Imperishable' because, to be the supporter of its own effects, fits in on its part; and because non-grossness and the rest, too, fit in on its part, it being admitted to be without form. Or, let the individual soul be implied by the term 'Imperishable', since it is possible for it to be the supporter of all non-sentient objects, the objects of its own enjoyment.

With regard to it, we reply: The Imperishable is the Supreme Brahman. Why? "On account of supporting (all things) ending with the ether", i.e. on account of supporting that which ends with the ether, viz. the group of effects beginning with the earth, or the group of effects, beginning with the earth and ending with the ether. To the query: "That, O Yājñavalkya, which is above the heaven, that which is beneath the earth, that which is between these heaven and the earth, that which is past, present and future¹, in whom is all that woven,

¹ Omits 'ācakṣata', vide Brh. 3.8.6, p. 168.

warp and woof?" (Brh. 3.8.6), the answer being given: "In the ether alone all that is inter-woven, warp and woof" (Brh. 3.8.7), Gārgī asked again: "In whom, verily, is the ether interwoven, warp and woof?" (Brh. 3.8.7). Then, the answer given was that the support of (all things), beginning with the earth and ending with the ether, is the Imperishable, in the passage: 'He said: "That, verily, is the Imperishable"' (Brh. 3.8.8) and so on. Thus, on account of supporting the group of effects, beginning with the earth and ending with the ether, known from the above question and answer, the Imperishable is none but Brahman.

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra;) "The end", i.e. the limit or the cause, of the "ether", meaning the atmospheric ether¹, is the non-manifest *pradhāna*,—"on account of supporting it". That is, the Imperishable,—mentioned as the support of that which is indicated as the support of all objects in past, present and future, in the passage beginning: 'That which is above' (Brh. 3.7.7); which is denoted by the term 'ether'; and which has the names 'non-manifest', 'subtle', '*pradhāna*' and the rest,—is not *pradhāna*, but Brahman alone.²

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the term 'ambarānta' different, viz. '(all things) ending with the ether'³. Śaṅkara uses the term 'Brahman' here⁴, although evidently from his point of view Brahman cannot be such a support, but Īśvara.

¹ I.e. the ether, in the ordinary sense, as distinguished from the ether which denotes *pradhāna*.

² Note that the first explanation given by *Śrīnivāsa* tallies with the explanations of *Śaṅkara* and *Bhāskara*, the second with those of *Rāmānuja* and *Nimbārka* and others.

³ Ś.B. 1.3.10, p. 318. Bh. B. 1.3.10, p. 55. See *Śrīnivāsa* above.

⁴ P. 319, 'Na ca ayam ambarānta-dhṛtiḥ Brahmano'nyatra sambhavati', etc.

SŪTRA 11

“AND THIS (SUPPORTING) (BELONGS TO THE LORD), ON ACCOUNT OF COMMAND.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And this” supporting belongs to the Highest Person alone. Why? Because (the Imperishable, the supporter) is mentioned by Scripture to be a commander, in the passage: ‘Verily, at the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand held apart’ (Bṛh. 3.8.9¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. : Very well, let pradhāna be not denoted by the term ‘Imperishable’. But, as, to be such a support fits in on the part of the individual soul, the enjoyer of material objects; as, possessing the attributes of non-grossness and the rest too fits in on its part; and, as, finally, if the individual soul be understood, then an etymological meaning (of the term ‘Imperishable’) is possible, viz. : ‘The Imperishable is that which does not perish, i.e. the individual soul,—let the individual soul alone be implied by the term ‘Imperishable’,—the author replies here:—

The supporting of the body and the rest alone,—the abode where the individual soul experiences the fruits of its own works,—is possible by the individual soul. “And this” supporting is the work of the Highest Self alone, and not of any one else. Why? “On account of command”, i.e. because of the mention of command in the passage: ‘Verily, at the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand held apart’ (Bṛh. 3.8.9) and so on. ‘Prakṛṣṭa’, i.e. unrestricted, ‘śāsana’ is ‘praśāsana’, i.e. unrestricted commanding.²

SŪTRA 12

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER NATURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Here, by the term ‘Imperishable’ neither pradhāna or the individual soul can be understood. The Supreme Being alone is the meaning

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² This explains the word ‘praśāsanāt’ in the sūtra.

of the term 'Imperishable'. Why? "On account of the exclusion of another nature", in the passage: 'Verily, that Imperishable, Gārgī, is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the unknown knower' (Bṛh. 3.8.11¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the Highest Self alone is denoted by the term 'Imperishable'. Why? "On account of the exclusion of other nature", i.e. the "nature" "of another", viz. of pradhāna or the individual soul; or the "nature" "of another two" (make) "another nature",² "on account of the exclusion" of that.³ The concluding passage, viz. "Verily, that Imperishable, Gārgī, is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the unknown knower. None but it is a seer, . . .⁴, none but it is a thinker, none but it is a knower. Verily in this Imperishable, Gārgī, the ether is interwoven, warp and woof" (Bṛh. 3.8.11), excludes a nature other than Brahman. Thus, pradhāna is excluded on the ground of the attributes of a sentient being, viz. being a seer and the rest; and the individual soul is excluded on the ground of the teaching that the Being who is unseen by all is the seer of all, and so on. Hence, it is established that by the term 'Imperishable' the Highest Self alone is understood.

Here ends the section entitled 'The imperishable' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'One sees'.
(Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF HIS QUALITIES), HE IS THE OBJECT WHICH ONE SEES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The object which one sees, mentioned in the passage: 'He sees the Person, lying in the city' (Praśna 5.5⁵), is not Brahmā, residing

² *Anyā-bhāva*.

¹ Ś, B, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ This explains the compound '*anyā-bhāva-vyāvṛtteḥ*'.

⁴ Omitted portion: 'None else other than it is a hearer'. Vide Bṛh. 3.8.11,

⁵ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

in the Brahma-world and included within the Brahmāṇḍa.¹ But the Highest Self alone, the topic of discussion, the Lord of His own special and non-material Brahma-world, is "the object which one sees". Why? "On account of the designation" of His qualities in the passage: 'That which is tranquil, ageless, fearless' (Prašna 5.7²) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been said that prakṛti and the individual soul are not understood by the word 'Imperishable' which denotes Brahman. Now it is being pointed out,—by means of this aphorism, as well as by the text dealing with that topic,—that prakṛti (or the material sphere) is rejectible, while the world of the Highest Self is acceptable; and that the individual soul is the worshipper, one who is approaching (a goal), while the Highest Self is the object to be worshipped and the goal to be resorted to.

We find the following text in the Praśna-upaniṣad of the Ātharvaṇas, introducing the topic of discussion thus: 'Verily, that, O Satyakāma, which is the syllable "om", is the higher and the lower Brahman. Hence a knower, through this very support, reaches one of these two' (Prašna 5.2), and continuing: "Again, he who meditates on the Highest Person with this very syllable 'om' of three elements comes to the light in the sun. As a snake is freed from its skin, so, verily, he is freed from sins. He is led by the Sāman verse to the world of Brahman. He sees the Person, lying in the city, and higher than the highest mass of souls" (Prašna 5.5). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether "the object which one sees",—i.e. the Reality which one sees, in accordance with the declaration, viz. that through the meditation on Him, the worshipper of the three elements, freed from all sins, having come to the sun, and having been led by the Sāman verses to the world of Brahman, sees that very Person, lying in the City,—is the four-faced Brahmā, the presiding deity of all souls, and indicated before as the 'lower Brahman'; or whether the object which one sees is the Highest Person, denoted by the term 'Supreme Brahman', the cause of the whole world and the topic of Scripture. The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let the four-faced Brahmā be the

¹ For the nature and constituent of a Brahmāṇḍa, vide V.R.M., pp. 32 *et seq.*

² R, ŚK, B.

object which one sees. As¹ it has been stated before that the worshipper of the praṇava (= om) of one element and the worshipper of the praṇava of two elements respectively attain the world of man and the world of the ether as fruits, so the world of Hiranyagarbha,—who represents the individual souls in their collective aspect,—higher than the other, should be understood as designated as the fruit belonging to the worshipper (of the praṇava) of three elements. The object of the perception of a person, who has come to that world, is he (the four-faced) alone, the ruler of that world. It is quite appropriate to hold that the person, residing in that world and representing the individual souls in their collective aspect, is superior to those discrete souls which are embodied beings, yet are superior to the body, the sense-organs, etc. Hence the object which one sees is the four-faced Brahmā.

On this suggestion, we reply: The Highest Self alone, the topic of discussion and the cause of the world, is the object which one sees. Why? “On account of designation”, i.e. on account of the designation of the qualities of the Highest Self, such as, ‘being the object to be attained by the wise’, ‘being tranquil’, ‘being ageless’, ‘being immortal’, ‘being fearless’ and the rest, mentioned in the passage: ‘Through this very syllable “om” as the support, a knower reaches that which is tranquil, ageless, immortal, fearless, the supreme, the supreme goal’² (Prašna 5.7). ‘A mass of souls’ implies one who has connection with the body and the rest, generated by karmas; and that (viz. connection with the body, etc.) is declared by Scripture to be pertaining to the four-faced Brahmā too, in the passage: ‘He who first creates Brahmā’ (Śvet. 6.18). Nor is the world of the four-faced Brahmā higher than the ether, it being included among the heaven and the rest. The world, mentioned in the passage: ‘He sees the Person, lying within the city’ (Prašna 5.5), is not the world of Brahmā,—otherwise called the ‘world of truth’ and an abode for the enjoyment of the fruits of works, but is the world of Brahman,—who is the topic of discussion and the object which one sees,—to be approached by the freed, it being indicated as the sleeping-place of the Person, higher than even the ‘mass of souls’ which itself is higher than all worlds.

¹ Here the *śatṛ-suffix* implies reason, in accordance with Pān. 3.2.126, SD. K. 3103.

² ‘*Parāyaṇam*’ not included under the original text.

This very world of the Supreme Brahman is declared as the object to be attained by the wise by another Upaniṣad of the same Ātharvaṇas, beginning: “The place which all the Vedas record, that which all the austerities declare, wishing what people practise chastity, that place I tell you in brief” (Kāṭha 2.15), and continuing: ‘That is the best support, that is the supreme support. By knowing that support, one rejoices in the world of Brahman’ (Kāṭha 2.17). That very Upaniṣad declares the unattainableness of this (world of Brahman) by the non-knower, and its attainableness by the knower; as well as its difference from mundane existence in the passages: ‘But he who has not understanding, who is inattentive, and ever impure, does not reach that place, and goes to transmigratory existence. But he who has understanding, who is attentive and ever pure, reaches that place, whence he is not born again. A man, however, who has understanding as his charioteer, the mind as the rein, reaches the end of the journey, that highest place of Viṣṇu’ (Kāṭha 3.7-9). In the Śānti-parva, it is said in the beginning of the Hārita-gītā: ‘Yudhiṣṭhira said: “A man of what nature, of what conduct, of what knowledge, of what resort, attains the place of Brahman, that is higher than prakṛti and eternal?” Bhīṣma said: “He who is engaged in the religious duties in connection with salvation, who is abstemious, who has conquered the senses, attains the supreme place that is higher than prakṛti and eternal”’ (Mahā. 12.9968-9969).¹ From such question and answer by the wisest men, the superiority of the world of Brahman—the object of enquiry—to prakṛti, its attainableness only through the religious duties in connection with salvation, and its eternity, are established. Hence, it is established that the object which one sees is Brahman, lying in the city, and higher than prakṛti, in its effected and in its causal conditions.

Here ends the section entitled ‘One sees’ (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different, viz. according to him, the question is whether the higher or the lower Brahman is meant here, and not

¹ P. 716, lines 22-23, vol. 3.

whether Brahman or Brahmā, the four-faced. The conclusion, of course, is that the higher Brahman is meant.¹

Adhikāraṇa 5: The section entitled 'The small'.
(Sūtras 14-23)

SŪTRA 14

"THE SMALL (ETHER) IS BRAHMAN, ON ACCOUNT OF WHAT FOLLOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The "small" ether, mentioned in the passage: 'In this city of Brahman is a small lotus, a chamber; small is the ether within it' (Chānd. 8.1.1²), can be the Highest Self alone. Why? "On account of what follows", i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, which are designated subsequently in the passage: 'As large is this ether, so large is that ether within the space. In it both the heaven and the earth are contained. This soul is free from sins, ageless' (Chānd. 8.1.3³) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, on the ground of the text: 'He sees the Person lying in the city' (Praśna 5.5), 'lying within the city', as well as 'being the object which one sees', fit in on the part of the Highest Self as possessing a manifest auspicious form. In the very same manner, smallness, too, fits in on His part as residing in the abode, viz. the heart-lotus. With this in his mind, the reverend author of the aphorisms says now:

We find the following text in the Chāndogya immediately after the doctrine of the Plenty⁴: 'Now what is within this city of Brahman is a small-lotus, a chamber; small is the ether within it. What is within that should be searched for; that, verily, should be enquired into' (Chānd. 8.1.1). The meaning of the text, according to us, is as follows: 'what is' within 'this city of Brahman',—i.e. within the body which is the abode where the individual soul, a part of Brahman, enjoys the fruit of its karmas and which is the place where it realizes

¹ S.B., 1.3.13, p. 321: 'Kim asmin vākye param Brahma abhidhyātavyam upadiśyata ahasvit aparam iti'.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ Op. cit.

⁴ V.K., 1.3.8.

Brahman,—is a “small”, i.e. a tiny ‘lotus’, viz. the heart, well-known from Scripture; that very thing is a chamber as it were. In that same chamber, there is a “small”, i.e. a tiny, or one who has manifested himself in a subtle form in accordance with the wish of his own devotees who are devoted to none else, ‘ether’, i.e. one who is pervasive by nature. In that heart-lotus, the small Brahman who is denoted by the term ‘ether’ ‘should be searched for’, i.e. should be discriminated as different from the enquirer, as well as from the body; and ‘should be enquired into’, i.e. should be meditated on repeatedly through the ‘hearing’ of the Vedānta.

Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the term ‘small ether’ the elemental ether is to be understood, or the Highest Self. If it be suggested: The elemental ether, because the term ‘ether’ is well-known to denote the elemental ether, and because the term ‘small’ too, as implying a subtle object, may be applied to it. It cannot be said that in the text: ‘As large is this ether, so large is the ether within the heart’ (Chānd. 8.1.3), one and the same thing (viz. the ether) cannot reasonably be both the object compared and the object (upameya and upamāna) with which it is,—because it can appropriately be so on the ground of the distinction of the external and the internal.¹ Or, let the embodied soul, like the point of a spoke only, be the small ether, because it, too, is known from the passage: ‘Now this serenity (i.e. serene being) having arisen from this body’ (Chānd. 8.3.4). Being atomic by nature, it can be fittingly termed ‘small’; and, being undefiled by the body, the sense-organs and the rest, it can be fittingly compared to the ether²—

We reply: “The small”, i.e. the small ether, is none but the Highest Self. Why? “On account of what follows”, i.e. on account of the reasons contained in the concluding text, i.e. on account of the peculiar qualities of the Highest Self, viz. ‘being comparable to the ether’, ‘being the support of all worlds, beginning with the earth’, ‘being the soul’, ‘being free from sins’—and the rest. Thus, in the passage: ‘As large is this ether, so large is that ether within the

¹ That is, as the external ether it is the *upamāna*, as the internal ether the *upameya*. Hence no contradiction is involved.

² That is, as the ether remains aloof from the impurities of the world, though connected with it, so the soul remains aloof from the impurities of the body and the rest, though connected with them. Hence the latter may be compared with the former.

heart' (Chānd. 8.1.3) the small ether, i.e. the Supreme Being alone, is compared to the well-known ether, since when two different things can be reasonably held to be the object with which the thing is compared and the object compared, it is unreasonable to suppose one and the same thing to be both (viz. upamāna and upameya). 'Being the supporter of all effects' too, mentioned in the passage: 'In it both the heaven and the earth are contained' (Chānd. 8.1.3), fits in on the part of the Highest Self alone. The attributes like 'being the soul', 'being free from sins' and the rest, mentioned in the passage: 'This soul is free from sins, ageless, deathless, sorrowless, without hunger, without thirst, possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves' (Chānd. 8.1.5), fit in only if the Highest Self be understood. Moreover, after having designated the non-permanency of the fruits of works and their incapacity of knowing Him in the passage: 'As here the world won by work perishes, so hereafter the world won by merit perishes' (Chānd. 8.1.6), Scripture concludes: 'Now, those who depart, having known the soul here and those true desires, come to have free movement in all the worlds' (Chānd. 8.1.6). That is, those worshippers who 'depart' to the other world, 'having known', i.e. having realized 'the soul', i.e. the Supreme Lord called 'the small', and 'those', i.e. His qualities, come to have free movement in all the worlds. Accordingly, the small ether is the Highest Self, since then alone free movement is explicable on the part of those who know the nature and qualities of the 'small one'.

SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT OF GOING AND OF WORD, FOR THUS IT IS SEEN,
THERE IS A MARK AS WELL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The "going" is mentioned in the text: 'All beings are going day by day' (Chānd. 8.3.2¹), and the "word" is 'The world of Brahman' (Chānd. 8.3.2²),—on account of these two, the 'small one' is ascertained to be the Supreme Being. The daily going is "seen thus" in another scriptural text too, viz.: "'Then, my dear, he comes to be

² *Op. cit.*

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

united with the Existent''' (Chānd. 6.8.1¹). If the karmadhāraya compound be understood,² then Brahman alone is 'the mark', i.e. the primary meaning of the word ('Brahma-loka') "as well".

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, says the author, the small ether is the Highest Self.

The subsequent reasons are being amplified now. In the text about the small-ether, viz.: 'Just as those who do not know the place move again and again over a hidden treasure of gold, but do not find it, so these beings are going day by day to that world of Brahman but do not find it, for they are carried away by untruth' (Chānd. 8.3.2), the phrase: 'are going day by day' states the "going"; and the "word" is: 'this world of Brahman', (Brahma-loka)—on account of these two, it is known that the small ether is the Highest Self. The sense is that because of the going of the individual souls, indicated by the term 'beings', to Brahman daily during deep sleep when all the sense-organs are dissolved; and because of the word 'world of Brahman', the small ether is ascertained to be none but the Highest Self, as the individual soul is one who approaches (and hence cannot be the goal approached), and as going is not appropriate on the part of the elemental ether. "For thus it is seen", i.e. the going of all beings to the Highest Self alone day by day during the state of deep sleep, as well as their return therefrom, are found, in the very same manner, in other passages too, viz.: "So exactly, my dear, all these beings, being united with the Existent, do not know; we have become united with the Existent"' (Chānd. 6.9.2), "Having come back from the Existent, they do not know: We have come back from the Existent"' (Chānd. 6.10.1). In the very same manner, the term 'world of Brahman', too, is found applied to the Highest Self, as in the passage: "This is the world of Brahman, O king," said he' (Bṛh. 4.3.32). The phrase 'that' (Chānd. 8.3.2) indicates the going of all beings there (viz. to Brahman). That is, the term 'world of Brahma' (Brahma-loka),—stated to be in apposition with the word 'that' which denotes the 'small one', and explained as a karmadhāraya compound thus: 'the world which is Brahman',—is "a mark", i.e. a convincing proof, that the small ether is the Highest Brahman.

¹ *Op. cit.*

² See below V.K.

SŪTRA 16

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF SUPPORTING (THE LORD IS THE SMALL ETHER), BECAUSE THIS GREATNESS IS OBSERVED IN HIM (FROM ANOTHER SCRIPTURAL PASSAGE).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The holding apart, mentioned in the passage: ‘He is the bridge, a liminary support of these worlds’ (Chānd. 8.4.1¹), fits in if the small ether be the Highest Self, because “this greatness is observed” “in him”, i.e. in the Highest Self alone who is called ‘a support’² on the authority of another scriptural passage, viz.: ‘At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand, held apart’ (Bṛh. 3.8.9³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the following reason, viz.: “On account of supporting”, by the word ‘small ether’, the Highest Self alone is to be understood here. Compare: ‘Now, he who is the soul is the bridge, a liminary support for keeping these worlds apart’ (Chānd. 8.4.1). The sense is: (The soul is) ‘a bridge’,—or, the cause of the non-intermixture,—and a ‘liminary support’,—or that which separates,—‘for keeping apart’—i.e. for preventing the intermixture or splitting asunder ‘of these worlds’, or of the worlds separated from one another as relating to the soul (i.e. internal), and as relating to the gods (i.e. external). The sense is that as “this greatness”, viz. supporting, “is observed” in the Highest Self in another scriptural passage, so here, too, the small ether, the liminary support of all the worlds, is known to be the Highest Self. The other scriptural passage is to the effect: ‘At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgī, the sun and the moon stand held apart’ (Bṛh. 3.8.9). Similarly, there is a passage: ‘He is the Lord of all, he is the Lord of the worlds, he is the bridge, the liminary support for keeping these worlds apart’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22⁴).

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² C.S.S. ed. slightly different, p. 14, viz.: ‘*Asya ca mahimno dhṛtyā-khyasya* . . .’

³ Ś, R, Bh.

⁴ Correct quotation: ‘*Eṣa sarveśvara eṣa bhūtādhipatir eṣa bhūta-pālaḥ eṣa setuḥ* . . .’. Vide Bṛh. 4.4.22, p. 246.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha. Resulting meaning same, although the meaning of words different, viz.: 'asya' means 'of the Lord' and 'asmin' means in the small ether. Hence the sūtra: 'Because supporting, which is a greatness of him (viz. the Lord), is observed in it (viz. in the small ether)' ¹

SŪTRA 17

"AND BECAUSE IT IS WELL-KNOWN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And because the word 'ether' is well-known to be denoting the Highest Self as well,—as in the passages: 'The ether, verily, is the revealer of name and form' (Chānd. 8.14.1 ²), 'All these beings, forsooth, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1 ³),—the small ether is none but the Highest Self.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Again, the small ether should be understood to be none but the Highest Self. Why? Because the word 'ether' is well-known to be denoting the Highest Self as well. Where? In the passages: 'The ether, verily, is the revealer of name and form' (Chānd. 8.14.1), 'All these beings, forsooth, arise from the ether alone' (Chānd. 1.9.1).

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz.: 'Because (the Lord) is celebrated (in other Upaniṣads, viz. Mahopaniṣad, Kaivalya-upaniṣad and the rest), to be an object to be worshipped as abiding in the small lotus, (the small ether is the Lord)' ⁴.

¹ Śrī. B. 1.3.15, pp. 308-9, Part 1.

ŚK. B. 1.3.15, pp. 437-8, Part 5; B.B. 1.3.16.

² Ś.

⁴ ŚK., 1.3.16, p. 438, Part 5.

³ Ś, R, Bh.

SŪTRA 18

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF A REFERENCE TO THE OTHER, (VIZ. THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), HE (IS THE SMALL ETHER), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF IMPOSSIBILITY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that “on account of a reference” to the individual soul as well in the middle of the text about the ‘small one’, viz. in the passage: ‘This serene being having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form. This is the soul, said he’ (Chānd. 8.3.4¹), let the individual soul be the ‘small one’,—

(We reply:) ‘no’, “because of the impossibility” of the qualities of freedom from sins and the rest,² on the part of the individual soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected that “on account of a reference” to the individual soul by the term ‘serene being’ in the middle of the text about the small ether, viz. in the passage: ‘This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form. This is the soul, said he. This is immortal, fearless’ (Chānd. 8.3.4), let “him” alone be the small ether,—

(We reply:) ‘No’. Why? “Because of impossibility”, i.e. because the above-mentioned qualities of freedom from sins and the rest are impossible on the part of the individual soul.

SŪTRA 19

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT FROM WHAT IS SUBSEQUENT, (THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL MAY BE MEANT HERE), (WE REPLY:) BUT (THAT SUBSEQUENT PASSAGE REFERS TO THE SOUL SO FAR ONLY) IT HAS ITS REAL NATURE MANIFEST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that “from what is subsequent”, i.e. from Prajāpati’s statement referring to the individual soul, the eight-fold

² Vide Chānd. 8.1.5.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

qualities of freedom from sins and the rest are known to belong to the individual soul as well, hence let it alone be the small ether,—

We reply: The Highest Self, endowed with the above-mentioned qualities and having His real nature ever manifest, is the 'small one'; but not the individual soul, having its real nature manifest,¹ (not always, but only during release).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Here the word 'small' is to be supplied from the main aphorism,² and the words 'he, no' from the preceding one.³ If it be objected: This is impossible. "From what is subsequent" to the doctrine of the 'small', i.e. from the statement of Prajāpati, the individual soul should be known as endowed with the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest. Hence, here too let it alone be the 'small one', endowed with the qualities of freedom from sins and the rest,—

(We reply:) "No". There, viz. in the passage: 'Having attained the form of Highest light, it is completed in its own form' (Chānd. 8.3.4), the individual soul which has its real nature manifest, is intended to be designated. The word "but" (in the sūtra) clearly indicates the great difference between that which has its real nature manifest and the 'small one' the real nature of which is ever unveiled and which is ever beyond the conventional distinctions of bondage and release. Thus the statement of Prajāpati (Chānd. 8.7.1) teaches the individual soul as possessing the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest,—the soul which has its real attributes concealed by the states of waking and the rest, rooted on karmas, meritorious or non-meritorious, and existent from all eternity; and which has its real nature manifest through the attainment of the Highest Self, caused by meditation on Him. But the text about the 'small one' (Chānd. 8.1.5) teaches the Highest Self as possessing the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest,—the Self who has His nature and attributes ever manifest, and who is denoted by the term 'small ether'.³

¹ The contrast is between the *nityāvirbhūta-svarūpa Paramātman* and the *āvirbhūta-svarūpa jīvātman*. See V.K. below.

² Viz. Br. Sū. 1.3.14.

³ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.3.18.

³ That is, the Highest Self is *always* possessed of the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, while the individual soul is *not always* possessed of them, but only when its real nature comes to be manifested. Hence the 'small one', which is *always* possessed of these attributes cannot be the individual soul.

The meaning of the scriptural text (Chānd. 8.3.4) is as follows: Just as the eye,—enveloped in deep darkness and hence unable to perform its own special function of making known objects like clothes, ornaments and the rest,—having attained the ever-unenveloped sun, is completed in its own form and able to perform its own special function of manifesting its own objects,—so the individual soul, ‘having attained’, i.e. having completely attained, near itself, the ‘highest’, i.e. the Being different from the sentient individual soul and the non-sentient, ‘light’, i.e. the real nature of the Whole the revealer of all, is ‘completed’ in its real nature as knowledge, different from the body, the sense-organs and the rest and endowed with its own bliss,—as such it is said to have its real nature manifest (āvirbhūta-svarūpa). The word ‘āvirbhūta-svarūpa’ is to be explained as ‘one whose real nature has become manifest’. Moreover, as ‘being a bridge’, ‘being the limitary support of all worlds’, and ‘being the controller of the sentient and the non-sentient’ are not possible even on the part of the individual soul which has its real nature manifest, so the small other can never be supposed to be the individual soul. In the doctrine of the ‘small’ (Chānd. 8.1.5), the attributes of freedom from sins and the rest, which are special to one who has this real nature *ever* manifest, are mentioned; while in the doctrine taught by Prajāpati (Chānd. 8.7.1), only those that are special to that which has its nature manifest (and not *ever* manifest). Hence, the reason ‘because of impossibility’ (mentioned in Br. Sū. 1.3.18) remains in force.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different, viz.: ‘If it be said . . . , (then we reply) No, but (the passage in question refers to the soul only so far) as its real nature has become manifest (i.e. so far it has become Brahman).¹ Thus, according to Śaṅkara, the statement of Prajāpati (Chānd. 8.7.1) does not really refer to the individual soul, but to Brahman. According to Nimbārka, however, as we have seen, it refers to the freed soul, which too is different from Brahman.

¹ Ś.B. 1.3.19, pp. 333 *et seq.*

Bhāskara

He, too, points out that the statement of Prajāpati does not refer to the individual soul *as such*, but to the soul which has become the Supreme Soul in nature.¹

SŪTRA 20

“AND THE REFERENCE HAS A DIFFERENT PURPOSE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“The reference” to the individual soul is for showing that the Supreme Soul is the cause of the manifestation of the real nature of the individual soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: If the small ether be the Supreme Soul having His real nature ever-manifest, then the reference to the individual soul in the text about the ‘small one’, viz. in the passage: ‘Now, this serene being, having arisen from this body’ (Chānd. 8.3.4), must have a purport,—the author replies here:

The word “and” (in the sūtra) implies possibility. Just as on attaining the sun, the eye, overpowered so long by darkness, is completed in its real form, so on attaining the highest light, i.e. the small ether, the individual soul, having so long its real nature and qualities like freedom from sins and the rest hidden by the beginningless māyā, is completed in its own special form. Thus, the reference to the individual soul in the statement of Prajāpati is simply for showing that the small ether is the cause of the manifestation of the real form of the individual soul, and not for proving that the small ether is the individual soul itself.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz.: ‘And the reference (to the individual soul) has a different purpose (viz. the determining of the nature of Brahman)’². According to Nimbārka, however, as we have seen,

¹ Bh. B. 1.3.19, p. 58.

² Ś.B. 1.3.20, p. 339; Bh. B. 1.3.20, p. 58.

the purpose is to show that Brahman is the cause of the manifestation of the real nature of the soul.

SŪTRA 21

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL DECLARATION OF WHAT IS SMALL (THE LORD IS NOT THE SMALL ETHER), (WE REPLY:)-THAT HAS BEEN SAID.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“If it be objected that on account of the scriptural declaration of what is small”, the all-pervasive Being cannot be understood here,— (we reply:) the answer to this has already been given.¹

Vedānta-kaustubha

“If it be objected that on account of the scriptural declaration of what is small” in the passage: ‘Small is the ether within it’ (Chānd. 8.1.1), let the individual soul alone, which is atomic in size, be the ‘small one’,—

(We reply:) The answer to this has been given under the aphorism: ‘Because (Brahman) is to be conceived thus, as in the case of the ether’ (Br. Sū. 1.2.7).

SŪTRA 22

“AND BECAUSE OF THE IMITATION OF THAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And because of the imitation” “of that”, i.e. of that which has its real nature ever manifest, in accordance with the passage: ‘He alone shining, everything shines’ (Kāṭha 5.15; Muṇḍ. 2.2.10; Śvet. 6.14²), the individual soul, the imitator, cannot be the ‘small one’, having its real nature ever-manifest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author says that for this reason, too, the individual soul is not the small ether.

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 1.2.7.

² Ś, Bh.

Because of the imitation "of that", i.e. of the small ether having the eight-fold attributes ever manifest, by that which has its attributes of freedom from sins and the rest manifest (and not *ever* manifest) the 'small one' is none but the Highest Self. Just as in the Muṇḍaka, declaring the imitation of the Lord by all in the passage: 'He alone shining, everything shines' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.10); and declaring further that everything is to be manifested by the Lord in the passage: 'Through his light all this shines' (Muṇḍ. 2.2.10), all things which are imitators and objects to be manifested cannot be the object which is imitated and the object which manifests,—so the individual soul, mentioned by Prajāpati, and an imitator, cannot be Brahman, denoted by the term 'small', and object to be imitated.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. according to them, the sūtras 22-23 form a new adhikaraṇa, designating that the passage Muṇḍaka 2.2.10 refers not to a luminous substance, but to the Supreme Soul.¹ But according to Nimbārka, they form parts of the preceding adhikaraṇa, setting forth additional arguments as to why the 'small ether' is none but the Supreme Soul.

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

According to all, the word 'anukṛteḥ' means 'because of similarity'. That is, the individual soul is not the 'small one' or Brahman, because it is only similar to Him.²

SŪTRA 23

"MOREOVER (THIS IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI."³

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Also Smṛti declares: 'They have come to attain equality of attributes with me' (Gītā 14.2⁴).

¹ Ś.B. 1.3.22, pp. 340 ff.; Bh. B. 1.3.22, pp. 58 *et seq.*

² Śrī. B. 1.3.21, p. 313, Part 1, 'Tad-anukāras tat-sāmyam'.

ŚK. B. 1.3.21, pp. 444-5, Part 5; G.B. 1.3.22.

³ C.S.S. ed., p. 15, reads 'Apī smaryate'.

⁴ R. B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Smṛti declares the equality of the individual soul, freed from all bondage, with the Supreme Soul, in the passage: 'They have come to attain equality of attributes with me' (Gītā 14.2). Hence, it is established that the small ether is none but the Supreme Soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'The small' (5).

COMPARISON**Śaṃkara and Bhāskara**

Reading different, viz. 'Api ca smaryyate'. Interpretation different, viz.—'Further, Smṛti (viz. Gītā 15.12, etc.) declares (the Soul to be the cause of the manifestation of all)'.¹

Rāmānuja and Baladeva

Reading: 'Api smaryyate'.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading: 'Api ca smaryyate', i.e. 'Moreover Smṛti declares (that the Lord is to be meditated on as abiding in the heart-lotus³)'.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'What is measured'. (Sūtras 24-25)

SŪTRA 24

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEXT ONLY, WHAT IS MEASURED (IS THE LORD)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"What is measured", i.e. what is of the size of a thumb, is none but the Highest Person, "on account of the text": 'The Lord of past and future' (Kāṭha 4.13⁴).

¹ Ś, B. 1.3.23, p. 343; Bh. B. 1.3.23, p. 59.

² Śrī. B. 1.3.23, p. 313, Part 1; G.B. 1.3.23.

³ ŚK. B. 1.3.23, p. 445, Part 5.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been established that Brahman is to be meditated on as the 'small one'. Now, the author points out that Brahman is to be meditated on as of the size of merely a thumb.

In the Kāṭha-vallī, we read: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, dwells in the midst of the soul' (Kāṭha 4.12); again: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, smokeless like light' (Kāṭha 4.13); again: 'The Person, of the size of merely a thumb, the inner soul, is ever seated in the heart of beings' (Kāṭha 6.17). Here, a doubt arises as to whether the Person of the size of merely a thumb is the individual soul or the Highest Person. The *prima facie* view is as follows: The Person of the size of merely a thumb is the individual soul in accordance with the Śvetāśvatara-text, viz.: 'The lord of the vital-breaths, who is of the size of merely a thumb and of a form like the sun, moves about through his own works' (Śvet. 5.7d-8a); as well as in accordance with the Smṛti passage, viz.: 'Then Yama drew forth, by force, from the body of Satyavāna, the person, of the size of merely a thumb, tied to the noose and brought under his control' (Mahā. 3.16763¹).

With regard to this, we reply: "What is measured", i.e. the Person of the size of merely a thumb, mentioned in the Kāṭha-vallī, is none but the Supreme Soul. Why? "On account of the text", i.e. on account of the text: 'The lord of past and future' (Kāṭha 4.13). The sense is this: Although 'being of the size of merely a thumb', mentioned in the above Scripture and Smṛti texts, is here perceived to be a characteristic mark of the individual soul, yet that mark is set aside,²—this is the sense.

If it be objected: It being impossible for the individual soul, which is by nature atomic in size, to be of the size of a thumb, and there being the mark: 'tied to the noose', the individual soul can be of the size of merely a thumb only if its subtle body be meant.³ But it

¹ P. 806, line 5, vol. 1.

² That is, although in the above scriptural and Smṛti texts, the individual soul has been designated as of the size of a *thumb*, yet in other numerous passages, it is designated as of the size of an *atom* merely. Hence, the above description is set aside.

³ That is, since the individual soul cannot be of the size of a *thumb*, being declared to be *atomic* in size, the designation of it as of the size of a thumb merely means that its subtle body is so, and not that it itself is so.

is impossible for Brahman, the topic of discussion, to be of the size of merely a thumb, even though repeatedly taught by Scripture,—

(We reply :) No, it being possible for Brahman to be so, in accordance with the wish of His devotees, and on account of His connection with place (viz. the heart). With regard to this point, a preceding aphorism (viz. Br. Sū. 1.2.7) may be consulted. Moreover, on account also of a text referring to the Person of the size of merely a thumb, viz. : ‘Let one draw him forth from his own body with firmness, as a pith from a reed. Let one know him’ (Kaṭha 6.17), the Supreme Soul alone is of the size of merely a thumb. Thus, the meaning of the text is as follows: The individual soul, entitled to know Brahman, the agent, endowed with a right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul,—implied by the phrase: ‘from his own body’,—‘should draw forth’, i.e. should lift up or put outside,—through intense prayer again,—‘him’, i.e. the Person of the size of a thumb, the object and known first through meditation to be within the heart, ‘from his own body’, i.e. from the body known as his own, ‘as the pith from a reed’; then ‘he should know him with firmness’. If this be so, the Person of the size of merely a thumb, the object to be worshipped, must be other than the worshipper himself.

SŪTRA 25

“BUT (THE LORD IS SAID TO BE OF THE SIZE OF MERELY A THUMB) IN REFERENCE TO THE HEART (OF MEN), BECAUSE MEN (ALONE) ARE ENTITLED (TO SCRIPTURE).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Lord can very well be of the size of merely a thumb, “in reference to the heart” of the worshippers. To the objection, viz. The size of the heart in animals being not fixed, how can Brahman be of the size of a thumb in reference to the heart?—the author replies: “Because men (alone) are entitled (to Scripture)”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is justifying the contention that Brahman can be of the size of merely a thumb.

Even an all-pervasive Being can be of the size of merely a thumb, "with reference to the heart", i.e. with reference to the heart, or the heart-lotus which is of the size of merely a thumb, of His own devotees, devoted to Him alone and to none else. The sense is that this designation is indeed proper like the designation of the Lord as 'one who makes three strides' (Trivikrama), in reference to the three worlds.¹

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the word "hṛdyapekṣayā"):

As from the word "heart" ("hṛd") alone the size of that which is within it (viz. the Lord) is known, the words "in reference to" ("apekṣayā") are to be understood as: 'in reference to the worshippers', i.e. in accordance with their wish.²

To the objection, viz. As the size of the heart differs in accordance with the difference of living creatures, the text about (the Person of the size of merely) a thumb cannot be explained in reference to the heart,—we reply: "Because men (alone) are entitled" to Scripture. This is the meaning:³ 'That to which men are entitled' (make 'manuṣyādhikāra'), 'the state of that' (make 'manuṣyādhikāratva'), on account of that (make 'manuṣyādhikāratvāt'). The meaning of the scriptural text concerning (the Person of the size of merely) a thumb is explicable in reference to the heart of men. Although Scripture is of a universal application,⁴ yet as men alone can be worshippers and seekers, they alone are entitled to it. Hence, no contradiction arises here even if the hearts of elephants and lice be not of the size of merely a thumb, as they are not entitled to works enjoined in Scripture and Smṛti, as established in the sixth chapter, determining the conditions of being entitled to sacrifices and so on.⁵ Thus, it is

¹ 'Trivikrama' is an epithet of Viṣṇu, who paced the three worlds in three steps in His Vāmana or Dwarf incarnation. The sense is, that just as the all-pervading Lord is said to have three strides only, so He may be said to be of the size of a thumb only.

² I.e. the Lord manifests Himself as of the size of a thumb to please his devotees.

³ The compound 'manuṣyādhikāratvāt' is to be explained as follows.

⁴ That is, scriptural mandates are to be followed by all.

⁵ Vide Pū. Mī. Sū. 6.1.4-5, pp. 504-7, Part 1.

established that the Supreme Soul alone is the Person of the size of merely a thumb.

Here ends the section entitled 'What is measured' ¹ (3).

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'The deity'.
(Sūtras 26-30)

SŪTRA 26

"EVEN THOSE WHO ARE ABOVE THEM (I.E. MEN) (ARE ENTITLED TO THE WORSHIP OF BRAHMAN), (SO) BĀDARĀYAṆA (HOLDS), BECAUSE OF POSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The gods and the rest also, who are above men, are entitled to such a worship of Brahman,—so thinks the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa."

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said in the last section that the text about the Person of the size of merely a thumb is explicable in reference to the heart of men, as men are entitled to Scripture. Now, incidentally, the question as to whether or not gods too are entitled to the worship of Brahman is being considered.

In the Bṛhadāranyaka, we read: 'Whoever among the gods was awakened to this, he alone became that; likewise among the sages' (Brh. 1.4.10). (The sense is:) Whoever among the gods, and similarly among the sages 'was awakened', i.e. directly perceived Brahman, 'he alone' attained the nature of Brahman. Here, on the doubt, viz. whether or not the gods are entitled to the worship of Brahman, which is a means to attaining His nature, if the suggestion be: As men are entitled to Scripture; and as Indra and the rest are incapable of practising meditation,—seeing that they, whose bodies consist of sacred texts, are not possessed of physical bodies,²—the worship of Brahman is not possible on the part of the gods,—we reply: Such a worship of Brahman is possible on the part of gods as well, who are "above" men,—so the reverend "Bādarāyaṇa" thinks. Why?

¹ The section entitled 'What is measured' is resumed in sūtra 1.3.40.

² That is, in order that one might carry on meditation, one must have a physical body, which a god lacks. Hence a god cannot practise meditation.

“On account of possibility,” i.e. because the worship and the like of Brahman, leading to salvation which is characterized by the attainment of Brahman and is preceded by the cessation of all retributive experience due to their own works, is possible on their part as well. Thus, although they have supermundane and celestial enjoyment, yet since such an enjoyment is subject to the faults of non-permanency, surpassability and the rest, its cessation, one day or other, is possible; hence, a desire for salvation, too, is possible on their part, by reason of their learning the unsurpassability, supreme blissfulness and permanency of the attainment of the nature of Brahman; and finally through this desire for salvation, a worship of Brahman, too, is possible on their part¹ there being proofs establishing their right to the worship of Brahman, viz. the texts: ‘For one hundred and one years, forsooth Indra dwelt with Prajāpati, practising chastity’ (Chānd. 8.11.3), ‘Verily, Bhṛgu, the son of Varuṇa, approached his father Varuṇa, (with the request) “Sir, teach me Brahman”’ (Tait. 3.1.1) and so on. Similarly, corporality, too, is possible on their part in accordance with text about the evolution of name and form,² as well as in accordance with sacred formulæ, explanatory and glorificatory passages and tradition.³ Thus it is declared by Scripture: ‘When about to say “vaśat”, he should meditate on that deity for whom the offering is taken’ (Ait. Br. 11.8.4). Here, no meaning of the text being possible unless the god referred to, be possessed of a body,⁵ the god must be understood to have a body. In tradition too, the sun, the moon, Vasu and the rest are well-known to have bodies. The sons of Kuntī were born from gods like Dharma and the rest, possessed of bodies.⁶

¹ That is, just as in the case of a man, the non-permanency of the earthly enjoyment leads him to seek for salvation, which yields a permanent fruit, and that, again, leads him to worship the Lord as a means thereto, so exactly the non-permanency of the heavenly enjoyment leads a god to seek for salvation, which leads him to worship the Lord.

² Vide Chānd. 6.3.2-4.

³ *Ānandāśrama* ed., p. 305.

These are *mantra* and *artha-vāda*.

³ *Mantras, artha-vāda and itihāsa*.

⁵ Because, we cannot meditate on the deity, unless he possesses a body. To meditate is to meditate on a certain definite form. Cf. Śrī. B. 1.3.25. ‘*Na hi nirviśeṣa-devatā dhiyam adhirohati*.’

⁶ Kuntī, the wife of Pāṇḍu, had, with his approval, three sons, Yūdhiṣṭhira, Bhīma and Arjuna, by the three deities, Dharma, Vāyu and Indra respectively. Vide Mahā. 1.4760 *et seq.* (chap. 123), pp. 174 *et seq.*, vol. 1.

In the Purāṇas, too, there is a multitude of legends of various kinds about them, possessing bodies. The verses from those chapters are not quoted here for fear of increasing the bulk of the book.

SŪTRA 27

“ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IF THE GODS BE POSSESSED OF BODIES) A CONTRADICTION WITH REGARD TO WORKS (WILL RESULT), (WE REPLY :) NO, BECAUSE OF THE OBSERVATION OF THE ASSUMPTION OF MANY (BODIES BY THE GODS, ETC.). ”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: Since the worship of Brahman is not possible without a body, their corporality must surely be admitted. But if that be so, it will give rise to a “ contradiction with regard to works ”,— (We reply :) “ no ” such objection can arise. Why? “ Because of the observation of the assumption ” simultaneously of many bodies even by one and the same deity.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Although the corporality of the gods, as of us, is an inevitable conclusion, as the activities in connection with the repeated practice of ‘hearing’, ‘thinking’ and ‘meditating’ are possible only on the part of one who is endowed with a body, sense-organs and mind, and as in that way alone it is possible for them to be the benefactors of sacrifices, through their actual presence, like sacrificing priests and the rest,¹—yet if they be possessed of bodies, there will be “ a contradiction with regard to works ”, viz. sacrifices and the rest, since the simultaneous presence of one body (i.e. of one god) in many sacrifices is impossible,²—

(We reply :) “ No ”. Why? “ Because of the observation of many worships.”³ “ Many ”, i.e. of various forms, “ worship ”, “ on account

¹ That is, if gods be possessed of bodies, then they may themselves be present at sacrifices, like the priests, and conduce to their proper performance, etc.

² That is, one and the same god is simultaneously invoked in many sacrifices, but evidently, he cannot be simultaneously present in many places.

³ The compound ‘*aneka-pratipatter darśanāt*’ is explained as follows.

of the observation of that". Thus, just as one and the same teacher is found to be saluted simultaneously by many saluting disciples, just as one and the same sun is found to be worshipped simultaneously by many worshipping men, so there is no inconsistency in supposing that different sacrificers offer their own objects to one and the same corporal deity who abides in his own place. Hence no harm is done to sacrifices.

Or else, there may be another construction of the phrase "aneka-pratipatter darśanāt". If it be objected that there will be "a contradiction with regard to works" in the stated way,—(we reply:) "No". Why? "On account of the assumption of many", i.e. on account of the assumption of many forms, or on account of the attainment of many bodies, by one and the same person who is perfected by Yoga. Why? "Because of the observation" of it in Scripture. Thus, in the Mokṣa-dharma,¹ a question being put forth concerning the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga thus: "'Reverend father, it behoves you to tell me in particular about the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga. Everything, O knower of sacred duties, is known to you, O best among the Kurus"! (Mahā. 12.11037²), the text, having set forth an eulogy of the Sāṃkhya and the Yoga, goes on: "'Those who are endowed with the power of the Yoga and are self-controlled and majestic, enter, O Pārtha, through Yoga into Prajāpatis, sages, gods and the great elements. Neither Yama, nor the angry Antaka,³ nor the supremely mighty Mr̥tyu lords it, O king, over the Yoga of unmeasured might. A yogin, O mightiest of the Bhāratas, can, by reason of attaining strength,⁴ create many bodies for himself, and move about the world by them all. By some he may attain (i.e. enjoy) objects, by others, he may practise a severe penance, and he may again contract them, as the sun does the multitude of its rays' (Mahā. 12.11060-64⁵).

¹ Name of a section of the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata*, from chap. 174 to the end.

² P. 754, line 27, vol. 3.

³ Name of *Yama*, the god of Death.

⁴ Here the *śatṛ*-suffix implies reason.

⁵ P. 755, lines 20-23, vol. 3.

SŪTRA 28

“ IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (A CONTRADICTION WILL RESULT) WITH REGARD TO WORD, (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN (OF EVERYTHING) FROM IT, ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND INFERENCE (I.E. SMṚTI).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that if the corporality of the gods be admitted, a contradiction will result with regard to the Vedic words denoting them, as these words will become meaningless prior to the origin of the objects (viz. the gods) denoted by them and subsequent to their destruction,—

(We reply:) No such contradiction results, “on account of the origin” of the objects (viz. the gods and the rest) “from it”, i.e. from the words alone, denoting eternal prototypes or forms, and serving as reminders to the thought of Prajāpati, in accordance with the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: ‘He evolved name and form by means of the Veda’ (Tait. Br. 2.6.2.3 ¹), ‘A celestial word, without beginning and end, eternal, and composed of the Vedas was omitted by the self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities’ (Mahā. 12.8534 ²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Here, the word ‘contradiction’ is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. If it be objected: Very well, there may not be any contradiction with regard to works if the gods be possessed of bodies, still there may be contradiction “with regard to the words” denoting gods and the rest, i.e. with regard to the Vedic forms. That is, on account of the non-eternity of the bodies of the gods,—they being due to karmas—as well as on account of the eternity of the Vedic texts, the eternal relation between a word and its meaning will be

¹ P. 275, line 9, vol. 2. Reading ‘ . . . rūpe . . . ’.
R, ŚK.

² P. 666, line 22, vol. 3.

Ś, R, Bh.

Reading: ‘*Anādi-nidhanā vidyā* . . .’ *Vaṅgavāsī* ed. reads: ‘*Anādi-nidhanā vidyā* . . . *Ādau deva-mayī vidyā* . . .’ P. 1635, vol. 2.

Śaṅkara, *Rāmānuja* and *Bhāskara* too read ‘*Anādi-nidhanā nityā* . . .’ like *Nimbārka*.

impossible, and hence a contradiction will result between the object which is limited in time and the word which is true for all times. If it be said that owing to the force of the word, the object too is eternal,—then a contradiction will result with regard to the texts which prove its non-eternity: if it be said that for the sake of the object, the word is non-eternal,—then there will arise a contradiction with regard to the texts which prove its eternity.—

(We reply:) “No”. There is no contradiction with regard to the word as well. Why? “On account of the origin from it”, i.e. on account of the origin, or the rise, of the gods and the rest from this, i.e. from the Vedic words, denoting the eternal prototypes of gods, etc. and serving as a reminder to the thought of the creator regarding the forms of gods, etc. to be created at the time of each particular creation. Thus, when a certain great personality, who has accumulated a mass of merit and desires to become Prajāpati, comes to attain lordship through the grace of the Lord, he is called ‘Prajāpati’. At the time of creation when individuals like the former gods and the rest are no more, Prajāpati, having learnt the Veda in a manner to be designated hereafter,¹ and having apprehended, like a man arisen from sleep,² the particular prototypes of the gods and the rest by means of the lamp-like Veda, i.e. from the Vedic words alone which denote those particular prototypes, creates the later gods, etc. in accordance with those prototypes. Hence there is no room for the alleged contradiction.

If it be objected: What proof is there that Prajāpati creates objects after having known their particular forms from the Vedic words?—we reply: “On account of perception and inference”. “Perception” means Scripture, since it is independent of any other proof. “Inference” means Smṛti, since it demonstrates the meaning of Scripture,—on account of these two, i.e. on account of Scripture and Smṛti. First, the scriptural passage is the following; viz.: ‘Prajāpati evolved name³ and form the existent and the non-existent, by means of the Veda’ (Tait. Br. 2.6.2.3), likewise: ‘He uttered “bhūr”, he

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 1.3.30.

² That is, when a man arises from sleep at night he can see nothing until he lights a lamp. Similarly, at the beginning of creation, the creator knows particular objects from the lamp-like light of the Veda, i.e. knows the forms of those objects and creates them anew accordingly.

³ The text omits ‘nāma’.

created the earth' (Tait. 2.2.4.2¹), 'He uttered "bhuva"', he created the ether' (Tait. Br. 2.2.4.2-3²) and so on. The Smṛti passage is contained in the Mokṣadharmā³, and beginning: 'The sages read the Vedas day and night by penance' (Mahā. 12.8533b⁴), continues: 'A celestial word, without beginning and end, eternal and composed of the Vedas, was emitted by the self-born in the beginning, whence proceeded all activities.⁵ The Lord created the names of the sages and the creations which are in the Vedas, as well as the various forms of beings and the procedure of acts, from the Vedic words alone in the beginning. At the end of the night, the Unborn One bestowed the names of sages and the creations which are in the Vedas to others. The things that are celebrated in the world, namely, difference of names, austerity, work and sacrifice'.⁶

Similarly, there are other passages, viz. 'In the beginning the Supreme Lord created the names and forms of beings, as well as the procedures of actions, from the Vedic word alone'⁷ (V.P. 1.5.62), 'In the beginning, he created the names and actions of all as separate, as well as the different established orders,⁸ from the Vedic word alone' (Manu. 1.21⁹) and so on.¹⁰

¹ P. 195, lines 7-8, vol. 2.

³ See footnote 1, p. 182.

⁵ For correct quotation, see footnote 2, p. 183.

⁶ P. 666, lines 23-26, vol. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, lines 9-10.

⁴ P. 663, line 22, vol. 3.

Reading: 'Nama rūpañ ca bhūtānāṃ karmāṇāṃ ca pravartayan
śārvaryy-ante sujātānām'
Vāṅgavāsī ed. reads: ' pravartanam sujātānām'.

P. 1635, vol. 2.

⁷ P. 50

Variant readings: 'Devādīnāṃ cakāra sah'.

⁸ Cf. Kulluka-bhaṭṭa's Commentary on the Manu-Smṛti (p. 10): 'Pṛthak-saṁsthāś ca iti. Laukikīś ca vyavasthāḥ, kulālasya ghaṭa-nirmāṇam, kuvindasya paṭa-nirmāṇam ityādika-vibhāgena nirmītavān.'

⁹ P. 9.

¹⁰ The sum and substance of the argument is as follows: The *prima facie* view is that if the gods be possessed of bodies, then, since these bodies, are non-eternal, the gods must be so. But the Vedic words which denote the gods are eternal. Hence there cannot be any eternal connection between the non-eternal gods and the eternal Vedic words, i.e. these Vedic words cannot denote gods and the rest, and must be meaningless.

The answer to this objection is as follows: The individual gods are indeed non-eternal, but this does not prove that the eternal Vedic words are meaningless, for what they denote is not the *individual* (*vyakti*) which is non-eternal, but the

SŪTRA 29

“FOR THIS VERY REASON, THE ETERNITY (OF THE VEDAS FOLLOWS).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The creation by Prajāpati is preceded by the (Vedic) word. “For this” reason the “eternity” of the Veda is established.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having apprehended the objection, viz.: In spite of the eternity of the Veda,—it not being mentioned as something created,—the Vedic words, denoting the forms of gods and the rest, are concerned with non-eternal objects; and having removed the consequent false notion regarding the non-eternity of these as well,¹ the author is confirming, incidentally, the eternity of the Veda.

“The eternity” of the word, i.e. of the Veda, follows “for this very reason”, i.e. also because of its priority to the creation by Prajāpati. Words like ‘Vaiśvāmītra’, ‘Kāṭhaka’ and so on etymologically mean simply what has been uttered by them. Thus ‘what has been said by Viśvāmītra is Vaiśvāmītra’, ‘what has been said by Kāṭha is Kāṭhaka’, and so on. At the end of the universal dissolution, Prajāpati, having conceived the forms, powers and the rest of Viśvāmītra and others from the Vedic words ‘Viśvāmītra’, etc. mentioned in texts like: ‘He chooses the maker of sacred formula’, ‘This is a hymn of Viśvāmītra’ (Tait. Saṃ. 5.2.3²) and so on; and having created them as endowed with those particular forms and those particular powers, appoints them to the task of revealing those particular sacred formulæ (mantras).

Thus given the powers by him, they too, having practised suitable penances, read the sacred formulæ,—which form portions of the Veda, which are eternally existent, and which were revealed by Viśvāmītra and others of former ages,—perfect in their sounds and accents without having read them or learnt them from the recitation of a teacher.

type (ākṛti) which is eternal. It is in accordance with these eternal types, denoted by the eternal Vedic words, that the non-eternal individuals are created anew at the beginning of each creation.

¹ That is, since the Vedic words denote non-eternal objects, it might be thought that these words themselves are non-eternal.

² P. 24, lines 21-22, vol. 2.

As such, though they are makers of the sacred formulæ, the eternity of the Veda is perfectly justifiable.¹

SŪTRA 30

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF HAVING THE SAME NAME AND FORM, (THERE IS) NO CONTRADICTION EVEN WITH REGARD TO THE RECURRENCE (OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION (I.E. SCRIPTURE) AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Thus, there is “no contradiction even with regard to the recurrence”, or the creation and destruction of the material world. Why? Because the objects which are to be created in the beginning of each age have the same names and forms as those in the past ages, “on account of perception” (i.e. scriptural text), viz. ‘The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before’ (R̥g. V. 10.190.3²), and ‘on account of Smṛti’, viz. ‘Just as the various signs of the seasons are seen to be the very same in their regular recurrence, so are the beings in the successive ages’ (V.P. 1.5.64³).

¹ That is, the Vedic *mantras* are said to be composed by different sages like *Viśvāmītra* and so on; and hence it may be thought that these sages being non-eternal, the *mantras* composed by them must also be so, i.e. the *Veda* must be non-eternal. But the fact is that the sages are not really the *composers* of the *mantras*, which are really eternal; but when they are said to be the composers of those *mantras*, it is simply meant that they utter, i.e. *reveal* the eternally existent *mantra* in different ages. Thus, e.g. *Viśvāmītra* in one particular age utters a *mantra* which is then said to be *Vaiśvāmītra*. Then, in course of time, *Viśvāmītra* perishes, but the *mantra* remains intact; and in the next age, a new *Viśvāmītra* is deputed to utter and reveal the very same *mantra* and so on. Thus, the *mantra* itself remains unchanged from all eternity, only its revealers change from age to age. Hence the Vedic *mantras* are really eternal and so is the *Veda*.

² Pp. 143-4.

Ś, Bh. ŚK, B.

³ P. 50.

Ś, Bh. Cf. a very similar passage in Mahā. 12.8550, p. 667, lines 9-10, vol. 3, which is the same as the above passage, only reads ‘*Tathā Brahmarādiṣu*’ in place of ‘*Tathā bhāvā yugādiṣu*’.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: The view that Prajāpati, having known the particular forms of object by means of the Veda,—in accordance with the maxim of a person arisen from sleep,—¹ creates them as he did before, fits in the case of the periodical dissolution.² But since in the case of the total dissolution ³ there is destruction of everything, how can the priority of the Veda to creation be possible? How can also its eternity be possible? How can again the world be preceded by it? The author replies here:

The word “and” (in the sūtra) is meant for removing the doubt. The word “even” implies possibility. That is to say, there is no contradiction whatsoever “even with regard to the recurrence” consisting in a continuous stream of creation and dissolution of the material world, i.e. with regard to the first creation at the end a great dissolution. Why? “On account of having the same name and form.” Thus, during the total dissolution, the Lord Vāsudeva, the one mass of a multitude of attributes which are special to Him, eternal, infinite and natural, and possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, having drawn in all the effects, consisting in His own powers (śakti) of the sentient and the non-sentient, as a tortoise draws in its limbs; and having placed them in Himself in a successive order, opposed to that of creation, abides in silence, like a boy who has gathered up his toys. At that time, the Vedas, the objects denoted by them, as well as the forms of the latter, exist in Him, all blended together with Him. Thus, the entire Universe always exists in its cause, viz. Vāsudeva or Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers. There is no such thing as absolute destruction, in accordance with the scriptural text: “The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second” (Chānd. 6.2.1). That is, ‘My child!’ ‘this’, i.e. the Universe, ‘was existent alone’, i.e. was non-different from its cause, ‘in the beginning’,

¹ See footnote 2, p. 184.

² *Naimittika-pralaya*.

³ *Prākṛta-pralaya*.

Naimittika pralaya means the dissolution of the three worlds when one day of the *Kāryya-brahman* or *Hiraṇyagarbha* comes to an end; while *prākṛta pralaya* means the dissolution of all objects together with the *Kāryya-brahman* himself. Vide Ved. Pari., 7th chap. for the four kinds of *pralayas*: *nitya*, *naimittika*, *prākṛta* and *ātyantika*.

i.e. prior to creation; and that, viz. the cause, denoted by the term 'existent', is 'one only, without a second'. He is without an equal or a superior, indicated respectively by the words 'only' and 'without a second'; and He is to be known also as manifold by nature indeed, since He is the substratum of the sentient and the non-sentient which are His powers. Dissolution means the existence of the effect in the cause in a subtle form; while creation means simply the manifestation of such an effect. At the end of dissolution, the omniscient and all-knowing Lord, having wished first "May I be many" (Chând. 6.2.3; Tait. 2.6.1); having then separated the mass of enjoying souls and the objects of enjoyment, so long merged in Him as His subtle powers; having created all objects from the mahat down to the four-faced Brahmā as He did before; having manifested the eternally existent Vedas; having taught them mentally to Brahmā; and having deputed him to the creation of the Universe, consisting of gods, men and the rest, as it was before, Himself exists as his (Brahmā's) inner soul, as declared by the text: 'Having created it, he entered into that very thing' (Tait. 2.6.1). Brahmā too, who has attained lordship through His grace, having apprehended their forms from the Vedic words, creates gods and the rest. As such, there is no contradiction even with regard to the recurrence,—this is the sense. Just in this consists the non-human origin of the Veda, it having an eternally existent form like the Supreme Brahman. And its eternity means that one, having remembered a particular order of succession, through the impressions generated in his mind by his prior recitations of the Veda in a fixed order, should recite the Veda in that very order.¹

If it be asked: Whence is this known: We reply: "From perception and from Smṛti". "Perception" means that which destroys the darkness of the heart, i.e. Scripture, viz. 'He who first creates Brahmā and he who, forsooth, delivers the Vedas to him, to that Deity, who is the light of self-knowledge, I, desirous of release, take shelter', (Śvet. 6.18); similarly: 'The creator fashioned, as he did before, the sun and the moon, the heaven, the earth and the ether, and then the sky' (Rg. V. 10.190.3). There is a Smṛti passage as well, viz. 'Then

¹ That is, the *Veda* is said to be *apauruṣeya* or of non-human origin, and *nitya* or eternal. Now, the first means that the *Veda* is eternally existent, and is simply revealed, and not created, at the time of each new creation. The second means that it is recited in exactly the same order of succession in different ages all throughout.

a lotus sprang forth from the navel of the sleeping Deity. In that lotus, O holy one, Brahmā was born, fully versed in the Vedas and their parts. He was told by Him "Create beings, O highly learned one!" 'Just as the various signs of the seasons are seen to be the very same in their regular recurrence, so are the beings in the successive stages' (V.P. 1.5.64), 'Whatever were the names of the sages and (their) knowledge of the Vedas, the same the Unborn One gives to them when they are born at the end of the night. Similarly, the past individual gods are equal to the present gods in names and forms', and so on. Hence, since the gods too may be seekers, there is nothing contradictory in their being entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Therefore it is established that the gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled 'The deity' (7).

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The honey and the rest'. (Sūtras 31-33)

OPPONENT'S VIEW (Sūtras 31-32)

SŪTRA 31

"ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, (THE SUN AND THE REST HAVE) NO RIGHT TO THE (MEDITATIONS ON) THE HONEY AND THE REST, (SO) JAIMINI (THINKS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It being impossible that the object worshipped can be the worshipper himself, the sun and the rest are not entitled to the meditations on the honey, etc.—so "Jaimini" thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been said that the gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Now, the question is being considered whether or not they are entitled to meditations on the honey and the rest.

The meditation on the honey is mentioned in the Chāndogya: 'This sun, verily, is the honey of the gods' (Chānd. 3.1.1) and so on. By the phrase "and so on" (in the sūtra) other meditations in which the gods are the objects worshipped are to be understood. Here a

doubt arises, viz. Whether or not the gods are entitled to the meditations on the honey and the rest. What is reasonable here? Gods like the sun, Vasu and others have "no right" to the meditation on the "honey and the rest",—so the teacher "Jaimini" thinks. Why? "On account of impossibility," i.e. because it is impossible that the sun and the rest which are accepted as the objects to be worshipped in those meditations, can be themselves worshippers.

OPPONENT'S VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 32

"AND BECAUSE OF (THEIR) BEING (WORSHIPPERS) WITH REGARD TO THE LIGHT (I.E. BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And because of (their) being" worshippers "with regard to" Brahman, they are not entitled to the honey-meditation and the rest,—this is the *prima facie* view.

Vedānta-kaustubha

But it is not to be thought that this being the case the gods are without a Lord, because then they, being all of a mutually equal status, will come to be annihilated through vying with one another, and also because the text: 'Through fear the sun arises' (Tait. 2.8.1) will come to be contradicted. The fact is that they are the worshippers of the Highest Self and are themselves worshipped by others. So, the opponent points out here: The gods and the rest, who are the objects to be worshipped in the honey-meditation and the like, being worshippers "with regard to the light", i.e. of the Supreme Brahman, are not to be taken as the worshippers in the honey-meditation, etc.—this is the sense; as declared by the passage: 'That the gods worship as the Light of lights, as life, as immortal' (Brh. 4.4.16).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation of the word 'jyotiṣi' different. The sūtra means, according to them: And because (the words 'sun', 'moon', and the

rest) refer to the Light. That is, the sun and the rest are not sentient deities, possessed of bodies, but are mere non-sentient spheres of light; and what is non-sentient cannot be, evidently, entitled to any meditation.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 33)

SŪTRA 33

“BUT BĀDARĀYAṆA (MAINTAINS) THE EXISTENCE (OF RIGHT ON THE PART OF THE GODS), FOR THERE IS (POSSIBLE LONGING FOR BRAHMAN ON THEIR PART).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, the author states the correct conclusion. “Bādarāyaṇa” maintains “the existence” of right on the part of the sun, Vasu and the rest, to the honey-meditation and the like as well, “because” a longing for Brahman “is” possible on their parts, consequent on the attainment by them of their respective offices in a future age as well, through the worship of Brahman, their Inner Controller.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus set forth the view of Jaimini, his Holiness, wishing to refute it, is stating his own view.

The word “but” precludes the *prima facie* view. The reverend “Bādarāyaṇa” maintains “the existence”, i.e. the existence of right on the part of the sun, Vasu and others, to the honey-meditation and the like as well, “because” a longing for Brahman is possible on the part of even the sun and Vasu and the rest in the present age, consequent on their attainment of sun-hood, Vasu-hood and the rest in a future age as well, through the worship of Brahman, their Inner Controller. Thus, here the worship of Brahman being enjoined both in His effected and causal states, the words ‘sun’ and the rest, imply Brahman, their Inner Controller; and hence it is possible for the very same Vasu and others to be the objects to be worshipped and attained; since the concluding text: ‘He who knows this Brahma-Upaniṣad’ (Chānd. 3.11.3) proves that the words ‘sun’ and the rest, imply

¹ Ś.B. 1.3.32, pp. 336-67; Bh. B. 1.3.32, p. 66.

Brahman. Thus, Brahman alone being the object to be worshipped even in the honey-meditation and the like, the text: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights, as life, as immortality' (Bṛh. 4.4.6) is perfectly consistent. It cannot be said also that as the fruit of the honey-meditation is the attainment of Vasu-hood and the rest, and as Vasu and the rest have already attained that, they cannot be seekers, or wish for these again,—because in ordinary experience, a desire for wealth in a future life is found on the part of those who are rich in the present life. Hence, it is established that the gods are entitled to the honey-meditation and the like.¹

Here ends the section entitled 'The honey and the rest' (8).

¹ The *Madhu-vidyā*, or the representation of the sun as the honey extracted from all the *Vedas*, as taught first to *Prajāpati* by *Brahmā*, then to *Manu* by *Prajāpati*, and then to his descendants by *Manu*, and to *Uddālaka Āruṇi* by his father (Vide Chānd. 3.11.4) is given in Chānd. 3.1.3.11. It begins: 'Verily, the sun is the honey of the gods. Its cross-beam is the heaven. The ether is the honey-comb. The rays are the sons (i.e. the sons of bees)' (Chānd. 3.1.1), and goes on to represent the eastern rays of the sun, its red form, as extracted from the *R̥g-veda*; the southern rays of the sun, its white form, from the *Yajur-veda*; the western rays of the sun, its dark form, from the *Sāma-veda*; the northern rays of the sun, its exceedingly dark form, from the *Atharva-veda*; and the upwards rays of the sun, its centre, from the *Upaniṣads* (Chānd. 3.1–3.5). After that the different forms of the sun are designated as the objects of enjoyment for *Vasus*, *Rudras*, *Ādityas*, *Maruts* and *Sādhyas* who respectively enter into and arise from those forms (Chānd. 3.6–3.10). Finally, in the concluding section the sun is represented as standing in the middle, without rising or setting, and as neither rising nor setting for one knows this *Brahma-upaniṣad* (= secret of *Brahman*) (Chānd. 3.11).

(1) Here the opponent's view is that *Vasus* and the rest are enjoined here as the objects of worship (Chānd. 3.6–3.10) and hence they themselves cannot be the worshippers.

The answer to this objection is that the *Madhu-vidyā* has two sections. The first section (viz. Chānd. 3.6–3.10) designates *Brahman* in His effected state, i.e. as appearing in the forms of *Vasus* and the rest. The second section (viz. Chānd. 3.11) designates *Brahman* in His causal state, i.e. as abiding in the sun as its Inner Self. And the concluding designation of the *Madhu-vidyā* as a '*Brahma-upaniṣad*', proves that the meditations on the *Vasus* and the rest too are really meditations on Brahman as abiding within them. Hence Brahman is really the object to be meditated throughout in the *Madhu-vidyā*, and as such *Vasus* and the rest can be worshippers here, i.e. can practise the *Madhu-vidyā*.

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different, viz. 'Bādarāyaṇa (maintains) the existence (of right on the part of the gods), for (although the gods have no right to the Madhu-vidyā and the rest, in which they themselves are implicated, yet there is (their right to the pure knowledge of Brahman)').¹ Thus, Śaṅkara does not admit that the gods are entitled to the Madhu-vidyā as Nimbārka does. The view of the latter as we have seen, is that the gods are entitled not only to the knowledge of Brahman in general, but also to those vidyās in which they themselves are implicated.

Bhāskara

Interpretation of 'asti hi' different, viz. ' . . . for there is (scriptural evidence that the gods are entitled to the Madhu-vidyā and the rest)'.²

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled 'The exclusion of the Śūdras'. (Sūtras 34-41)

SŪTRA 34

"HIS GRIEF (Arose) ON ACCOUNT OF HEARING ITS DISRESPECT, ON ACCOUNT OF HASTENING AT THAT TIME, FOR THIS IS WHAT IS INDICATED (BY THE TERM "ŚŪDRA")."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be supposed, on the ground³ that in the Chāndogya the term 'Śūdra' is applied by a preceptor to one desirous of salvation,

(2) The opponent resumes: Even if Brahman and none else, be the object of meditation here, yet Vasus cannot be held to be practising the Madhu-vidyā, since the fruit of Madhu-vidyā is the attainment of Vasu-hood, etc. and why should those who are already Vasus, etc. strive to be so again.

The answer is that they may be Vasus and so on in the present age, but at the same time be desirous of holding the same position in a future age also, and of finally attaining Brahman. It is this desire of attaining Vasu-hood, etc. first and then Brahman which leads them to practise the Madhu-vidyā.

¹ 'Yady-api madhv-ādi-vidyāsu devatādi-vya-miśrāsu asamhavo' dhikā-rasya, tathāpi asti hi śuddhāyām Brahmanavidyāyām sambhavaḥ'.

Ś.B. 1.3.33, p. 367.

² Bh. B. 1.3.33, p. 66.

³ Here the śatṛ-suffix implies reason.

that a Śūdra¹ is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. Because of "his",² i.e. of Jānaśruti's, desire for salvation, on hearing the disrespectful words used by the swan; and because of his hastening towards, for that reason, to the preceptor at that very moment,— "it is indicated" that his grief had arisen and that was what was meant by the address 'Śūdra'.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the following question is being considered: Just as it has been said that the gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, as the term 'God' is mentioned in the text: 'Then, whosoever among the gods is awakened' (Bṛh. 1.4.10), so whether or not a Śūdra too is entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, seeing that in the Chāndogya, the word 'śūdra' is mentioned in reference to Jānaśruti who desired for salvation.

If it be suggested: The word 'śūdra' being mentioned in the Chāndogya under the Saṁvarga-vidyā in the passages: "'Oh! the necklace and the carriage be yours, O Śūdra, together with the cows"' (Chānd. 4.2.3), "'You have brought these, O Śūdra"'! (Chānd. 4.2.3); a Śūdra too must be entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, it being possible for him also to be a seeker³. And, he may gain the knowledge of the nature, etc. of Brahman through the hearing of tradition and the rest, in accordance with the statement of the ancient ones: 'He should make the four castes hear, beginning with the Brāhmaṇa' (Mahā. 12.12360a⁴), and, the statement of Hari-Vaṁśa: 'One who is Śūdra by birth should attain a good end through hearing', which lays down an injunction with regard to the hearing of Brahman by him also. The prohibition contained in the passage: 'Hence, a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṁ. 7.1.1⁵), is concerned simply with his disqualification with regard to acts like sacrifices to be performed by means of fire, but is not a cause of his

¹ The fourth and the lowest caste.

² Here the genitive case implies an agent (*kartr*) in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.3.65, SD. K. 623.

³ That is, just as it has been shown that gods are entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, since they desire (arthins) for salvation, so the Śūdras too desire for salvation and are as such entitled to the same knowledge.

⁴ P. 81, line 4, vol. 3.

⁵ P. 241, line 21, vol. 2.

disqualification for knowledge, as knowledge is mental, and as Vidura¹ and the rest, as well as women like Sulabhā² and so on are found to possess the knowledge of Brahman,—

We reply: A Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman for the following reasons: First, he lacks the requisite fitness, not having the knowledge of the nature of Brahman and the method of worshipping Him. Secondly, although the worship of Brahman may be accomplished mentally, yet the knowledge of the nature, etc. of Brahman is generated by the study of the Veda, preceded by the investiture with the holy thread. Finally, a Śūdra being excluded from investiture, is not fit for knowing Brahman and as such his seeking is of no great value. As the injunctions regarding work hold good in the case of the first three classes, the prohibition holds good equally with regard to knowledge as with regard to work. Also, as in accordance with the statement: 'The Veda is to be confirmed by tradition and Purāṇa' (Mahā. 1.260³), tradition and Purāṇa, too, confirm the knowledge established by the Veda, a Śūdra cannot attain knowledge from that too. The injunction about the 'hearing', on the other hand, simply means that such a 'hearing' has the effect of destroying a Śūdra's sins and securing prosperity for him, here or hereafter; and not that he is entitled to meditation or knowledge. The possession of knowledge by Vidura and the rest should be known to be due to the non-destruction of the knowledge which they attained in another birth, and their such low births should be known to be due to their works which had begun to bear fruits. Hence a Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

On the other hand, the term 'Śūdra', mentioned in Scripture, is to be explained thus: This the reverend author of the aphorisms states in the words: "grief", and so on. "For" implies the reason, and "his", means Jānaśruti Pauṭrāyaṇas. That is, on hearing the disrespectful words used by the swan for his want of knowledge of Brahman, thus: "O, who is that man of whom you speak, as if he were Raikva, with the cart"? (Chānd. 4.1.3), Jānaśruti at once

¹ Vidura was the younger brother of Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Pāṇḍu. He was the son of Vyāsa and a slave-girl, who was dressed as one of the widows of Vicitra-vṛyya, and mistaken by Vyāsa as such. Vide Mahā. 1.4301, etc.

² Sulabhā was female mendicant who entered into a highly learned discourse with Janaka. Vide Mahā. 12.11854 et seq. (Chap. 321).

³ P. 10, line 11, vol. I.

hastened to Raikva, the man with the cart and a knower of Brahman. From this, it is "indicated" that his "grief" had arisen. Hence, the address 'Śūdra' was applied by the sage to a non-Śūdra, with a view to intimating his own omniscience, thinking: 'This Jānaśruti has come to learn the knowledge of Brahman from me, tempting me with the offering of riches. He does not know me, that I have performed all my duties and am omniscient'. Thus, (the whole story goes:), Jānaśruti Pautrāyaṇa was a royal saint, versed in religious duties. Certain divine sages, pleased with his multitude of qualities, and intending that having heard their conversation, and having thereupon approached Raikva, the knower of Brahman, Jānaśruti, too, would become a knower of Brahman, assumed the forms of swans and began to fly in a circle over the king who was lying on the roof of his palace in summer. Then, the swan which was following said with surprise to the one which was leading: 'O Bhallākṣa, Bhallākṣa, do you not see the light of the king Jānaśruti which has pervaded the region of the heaven? That light will burn you, so do not cross it'. On hearing these words of the one following it, the leading swan replied: "O, who is that man of him you speak as if he were Raikva, with the cart"? (Chānd. 4.1.3), i.e. you speak of this Jānaśruti as if he were Raikva with the cart, meaning, the reverend Raikva who has a 'yugva' or a cart and is a knower of Brahman. By the adjective 'with a cart', Raikva's mark was indicated, in order that he might be easily found out and approached. Then, on hearing the disrespectful words used by the swan, Jānaśruti too, ascertained, in the morning, the whereabouts of Raikva through his man, and repaired to the sage Raikva, taking with him six hundred cows, a necklace and a chariot yoked with horses; and having approached him, said: 'O Raikva! Take all these cows and the rest, and teach me, O reverend sir'. Raikva replied: "O, the necklace" (Chānd. 4.2.3) and so on, i.e. 'O Śūdra, the heap of wealth, like the chariot and the rest, together with the cows be yours'. And he addressed him as 'O Śūdra' more than once (viz. again in Chānd. 4.2.5). A 'Śūdra' is one who grieves (śocati), and the word is formed in accordance with the rule:

'When the root "śuc" is followed by the suffix "ra", the "ca" is replaced by "da"' (SD. K. Uṇādi-sūtra 176¹), and the vowel 'u' is lengthened (in accordance with the uṇādi-sūtra 175²). Hence "his",

1 P. 599, vol. 2.

2 Thus, śuc + ra = śūd + ra = śūdra.

i.e. Jānaśruti's grief alone "was indicated" by Raikva, with a view to pointing out Jānaśruti's fitness for receiving instruction, and not his connection with any caste,—this is the sense.¹

SŪTRA 35

"(JĀNAŚRUTI WAS NOT A ŚŪDRA) ALSO BECAUSE WE KNOW OF (HIS) KṢATRIYAHOOD FROM THE INDICATION, (VIZ. THE FACT OF HIS BEING MENTIONED) LATER ON WITH CAITRARATHA."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Because we know of the Kṣatriyahood" of Jānaśruti "from the indication" viz. that 'later on' he was mentioned together with Caitraratha Abhipratārin, Kṣatriya, in the passage: 'Now, when Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākṣaseni were being served food, a religious student begged of them' (Chānd. 4.3.5²), Jānaśruti was not a Śūdra.

Vedānta-kaustubha

From this reason also, the author, points out, the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti is known.

His grief alone has arisen; hence he was called a 'Śūdra' by the sage; this being so, the Śūdrahood of Jānaśruti was not due to this caste. Why? "Because we know of (his) Kṣatriyahood"; i.e. also because we know of his Kṣatriyahood from the fact that in the introductory passage, viz. 'A plentiful giver, one preparing many food' (Chānd. 4.1.1), he is known to be a lord of gifts and a giver of much well-cooked food, from the fact of his sending the door-keeper, known from the passage: 'He said to the door-keeper' (Chānd. 4.1.5) and from the fact of his giving golden ornaments, chariot and daughter to Raikva. Having, thus, stated the marks contained in the introductory text and proving the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti, the author goes on to show the mark, contained in the concluding text of the samvarga-vidyā, according to the maxim of the 'crow's eye',³—the term "and"

¹ Vide Chānd. 4.1–4.2.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

³ The maxim of the 'crow's eye' means as follows: Crows are supposed to have only one eye, which as occasion requires, moves from the cavity on one side into that of another. The maxim is used of a word which appears only once

(in the sūtra) referring to both—, in the words: “And from the indication, (viz. the fact of his being mentioned) later on with Caitraratha”; i.e. “from the indication”, viz. that Jānaśruti was mentioned together with Caitraratha who is ascertained to be a Kṣatriya from the fact of his association with a well-known priest of Kṣatriyas. Thus, in the concluding text, viz.: ‘Now, when Śaunaka Kāpeya and Abhipratārin Kākṣaseni were being served food by a cook,¹ a religious student begged of them’ (Chānd. 4.3.5), Caitraratha, named Abhipratārin is mentioned. This is the sense: On the enquiry: ‘who were the two that were being served’ ‘by the cook’, i.e. by one who superintends over the oven?—the text says: Śaunaka’s descendant, the priest of the Kapi clan, and Kākṣasena’s descendant, named Abhipratārin, the king. When these two sat down to eat, they were asked for alms.

If it be asked: Whence do you know that Abhipratārin was a Caitraratha? (a descendant of Citraratha),—we reply: He was so, because of his connection with Kāpeya, (i.e. descendant of Kapi), the priest of Citraratha. From the text: ‘The Kāpeyas made Citraratha perform sacrifice by this’ (Tāṇḍ. Br. 20.12.5²), it is well-known that the Kāpeyas were the priests of Citraratha. The term ‘by this’ means ‘by the Dvi-rātra’.

If it be objected: Very well, let Abhipratārin be Caitraratha because of his connection with a priest of Citra; but what proof is there of his Kṣatriyahood?—(we reply): The text: ‘From him was born a king of Kṣatriyas, named Citraratha’, is the proof. The words ‘from him’ mean ‘from Citraratha’.

A Kṣatriya being referred to in the end, Jānaśruti, mentioned in the beginning, too, must be a Kṣatriya, since in one and the same vidyā there is the mention, as a rule, of persons of the same class,—this is the meaning of the aphorism. Moreover, the Kṣatriyahood of Abhipratārin being ascertained in the end on the ground of his

in a sentence, but which applies to two portions of it, or to two persons or things, fulfilling a double purpose. The maxim may be said to approximate to the English one of ‘killing two birds with one stone’. Vide L.N., Part I, pp. 12-13. Likewise, here the phrase: ‘*Kṣatriyatvāvagateḥ*’ fulfils a double purpose, meaning both ‘on account of knowing the Kṣatriyahood of Caitraratha Abhipratārin’, and ‘on account of knowing the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti’. See p. 200, n. 1.

¹ The word ‘*sūdena*’ not found in the original text. Vide Chānd. 4.3.5, p. 189.

² P. 561, vol. 2.

association with Kāpeya, a Brāhmaṇa, the Kṣatriyahood of Jānaśruti, too, is ascertained in the beginning on the ground of his association with Raikva,—this is the sense.¹

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Reading different, viz. They break it into two different sūtras: 'Kṣatriyatvā gates ca' (sūtra 34), and 'uttaratra-liṅgāt' (sūtra 35²).

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. 'Kṣatriyatvā-gates ca'³
instead of 'Kṣatriyatva-avagates ca'

SŪTRA 36

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE REFERENCE TO PURIFICATORY RITES, AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF THEIR ABSENCE (IN THE CASE OF A ŚŪDRA), (A ŚŪDRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the reference to the purificatory rites" of investiture with the holy thread in the section concerned with knowledge,

¹ Thus, altogether three reasons are advanced—why *Jānaśruti* is to be taken as a *Kṣatriya* :—

(a) In the beginning, *Jānaśruti* is said to be practising charity, feeding people on a large scale, which proves him to be a *Kṣatriya*.

(b) In the end, *Abhipratārin* is mentioned, and *Abhipratārin* being a *Kṣatriya*, *Jānaśruti* must be so, since persons of the class are entitled to the same *Vidyā*.

(c) *Abhipratārin*, mentioned in the end, is said to be a *Kṣatriya*, because of his connection with a *Brāhmaṇa* (viz. *Kāpeya*), and hence *Jānaśruti*, mentioned in the beginning must be so, because of his connection with a *Brāhmaṇa* (viz. *Raikva*).

² Śrī. B. 1.3.34-35, pp. 337-338, Part 1, Madras ed. Some editions read

'*Kṣatriyatva-avagatesca*'. Vide Bombay ed., p. 326.

The Benares of V.D., reads '*Kṣatriyatva-gates ca*' (p. 60); but the Brindavan ed. of V.S., reads '*Kṣatriyatva-avagates ca*' (p. 46).

Śk. 1.3.34-35, pp. 438, 480, Part 5.

³ Bh. B. 1.3.34, p. 67.

thus: 'He invested him, forsooth, with the holy thread' (Śat. Br. 11.5.3.13¹) and so on; "and on account of the declaration of their absence" thus: 'A Śūdra, belongs to the fourth caste and is once-born (G.D.S. 10.50²), 'And he is not fit for a purificatory rite' (Manu 10.126³),—a Śūdra is not entitled to knowledge.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous aphorism, the disqualification of a Śūdra for the knowledge of Brahman has been established on the ground of reason. Now, his disqualification is being proved on the ground of Scripture, etc. as well.

A Śūdra is not entitled to knowledge. Why? "On account of the reference to purificatory rites," i.e. on account of the reference to the purificatory rites of investiture with the holy thread in sections concerned with knowledge, thus 'He invested him, forsooth, with the holy thread' (Śat. Br. 11.5.3.13). But, then, is it to be supposed that a Śūdra, too, is entitled to investiture? To this it is replied: "On account of the declaration of their absence", i.e. on account of the depiction of the absence, in the case of a Śūdra, of purificatory rites like investiture with the holy thread and the rest, in the passages: 'In a Śūdra there is no sin and he is not fit for a purificatory rite' (Manu. 10.126). 'A Śūdra belongs to the fourth caste and is once-born' (G.D.S. 10.50) and so on. The investiture with the holy thread is designated in the case of others in the passage: 'Let one invest a Brāhmaṇa with the holy thread at the age of eight, a Kṣatriya at eleven, and a Vaiśya at twelve' (Āś. G.S. 17.1.3-4⁴).

Hence, the reference to investiture with the holy thread fits in in the sections concerned with knowledge.

¹ P. 861, line 19.

Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ P. 419.

Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

² P. 14, line 8.

Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

⁴ P. 72.

SŪTRA 37

“AND BECAUSE OF (GAUTAMA’S) PROCEEDING (TO INITIATE JĀBĀLA) ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. HIS ŚŪDRAHOOD), (A ŚŪDRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, “because of” Gautama’s “proceeding” to invest Jābāla with the holy thread and to teach him, only “on the ascertainment of the absence” of his Śūdrahood,—here, too, a Śūdra is not indeed entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, says the author, a Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman.

Fatherless Jābāla, desirous of salvation, and about to approach a preceptor, asked his mother with a view to learning his lineage. ‘Of what lineage am I?’ She too, unaware of his lineage, replied: ‘I do not know’. Jābāla too, having approached Gautama, said: ‘Reverend Sir! I wish to stay in your place as a student of sacred knowledge’. Then, being asked by him: ‘Of what lineage are you?’ Jābāla said: ‘Sir, I do not know of what lineage I am,’ and so on. Thus, when Jābāla had spoken the truth, and when, thereby, the absence of Jābāla’s Śūdrahood had been ascertained thus: “‘A non-Brāhmaṇa cannot speak thus”’ (Chānd. 4.4.5¹), then only Gautama proceeded to invest Jābāla with the holy thread and teach him with the words: “‘Fetch the fuel, my child. I shall invest you with the holy thread. You have not deviated from truth”’ (Chānd. 4.4.5²). Hence, a Śūdra is not entitled to knowledge.

¹ Correct quotation: ‘ *vivaktum arhati*’. Vide Chānd. 4.4.5, p. 196.

² Vide Chānd. 4.4 for the whole story.

SŪTRA 38

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE PROHIBITION OF HEARING, STUDYING, AND (LEARNING) THE MEANING (OF THE VEDA), (A ŚŪDRA IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

A Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman, “on account of the prohibition of the hearing” and so on of the Veda on his part, in the text: ‘One should not study (the Veda) in the vicinity of a Śūdra’ (V.Sm. 18.9¹) and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, a Śūdra is not entitled to the knowledge of Brahman. For what reason? “On account of the prohibition of hearing” and the rest on the part of a Śūdra, in the passage ‘A cemetery, endowed with feet, is, verily, a Śūdra.’² Hence one should not study (the Veda) in the vicinity of a Śūdra’ (V.Sm. 18.9), ‘Hence a Śūdra is a beast,³ not fit for sacrifices’ and on so. The sense (of the first passage) is: A ‘cemetery’ that is ‘endowed with feet’, i.e. capable of moving, ‘is a Śūdra’, in whose presence one should not even study the Vedas. The sense is that the hearing of the Veda, the study of it, the performance of the religious duties mentioned therein, are prohibited, all the more, to a Śūdra.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They treat this sūtra and the next as one sūtra.⁴

¹ P. 216, line 20. Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² Reading slightly differs, viz. ‘Eka vai lac-chmaśānam . . .’ (p. 216).

³ ‘Bahu-paśuḥ paśu sadṛśa iti arthaḥ.’ Śrī. B. 1.3.38, p. 339, Part I.

⁴ Ś.B. 1.3.38, p. 376; Bh. B. 1.3.38, p. 68; G.B. 1.3.38.

SŪTRA 39

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF SMṚTI.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And on account of the Smṛti”, viz. ‘One should not teach him sacred duties’ (Manu 4.806¹; V.Sm. 18.12²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

“And on account of the Smṛti”, viz. ‘One should not teach him sacred duties, nor sacred vows’ (Manu 4.806; V.Sm. 18.12), ‘One should not impart knowledge to a śūdra’ (Manu 4.80a; V.Sm. 18.12) and so on.

Here ends the section entitled ‘The exclusion of Śūdras’ (9).

Adhikaraṇa 6 resumed: The section entitled ‘What is measured’ resumed. (Sūtras 40-41)

SŪTRA 40

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE SHAKING.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

What is measured, is to be known as the Supreme Person, He being the shaker of the entire universe, and because the words ‘great’ and the rest are found used.

Vedānta-kaustubha

After having completed the incidental discussion about qualification (adhikāra) in connection with the discussion about the Person, measured as the size of merely a thumb, begun in the aphorism ‘On account of the text only, what is measured (is the Lord)’ (Br. Sū. 1.3.24), the author is finishing the original discussion.

¹ P. 146.

² P. 217, line 1.

R.

The words 'what is measured' are to be supplied. In the Kāṭha-vallī, we find the following in the section of the Person, of the size of merely a thumb: 'Whatever there is, the whole world, emanated (from the vital-breath), trembles in the vital-breath alone, the great fear, a thunderbolt about to be hurled. Those who know that become immortal' (Kāṭha 6.2). Here, what is measured as of the size of a thumb and is denoted by the term 'vital-breath' is none but the Supreme Being. Why? For the following reasons: First, "on account of the shaking", i.e. the Lord alone is the cause of the shaking of the entire universe, emanated from Himself. Secondly, the term 'great', which is a synonym for Brahman, has been used. Thirdly, the term 'fear' proves that the vital-breath is Brahman, for He alone is the cause of the fear of all, as declared by the text: 'Through fear of him the fire burns, through fear the sun shines, through fear Indra, Wind and Death, the fifth, speed on' (Kāṭha 6.3); and finally, the Lord alone is the cause of the immortality of one who possesses knowledge of Him.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. they take this sūtra as forming a new adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the term 'prāṇa' in Kāṭha-upaniṣad (6.2) denotes Brahman or not. But according to Nimbārka, this sūtra does not begin a new adhikaraṇa, but only resumes adhikaraṇa 6.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. he also begins a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with the question whether the term 'vajra' in Kāṭha-upaniṣad (6.2) denotes Brahman or not.

SŪTRA 41

"BECAUSE OF PERCEIVING LIGHT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because in the text: 'Through his light' (Kāṭha 5.15¹), 'light' is mentioned, the measured Person is the Supreme Being.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the very same Kaṭha-vallī, in the section of the Person measured as of the size of a thumb, it is declared, prior to the text about the vital-breath, (viz. Kaṭha 6.2): 'The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor do these lightnings shine, much less this fire. He shining, everything else shines after him. All this shines through his light' (Kaṭha 6.2). "Because" in this text, light, belonging exclusively to the Supreme Soul who is denoted by the term 'light'. "is seen" (i.e. declared), it is established that what is of the size of merely a thumb is none but the Supreme Soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'What is measured' (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. they take this sūtra as forming a new adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the term 'light' in the Chāndogyaopaniṣad (8.12.6) denotes Brahman or not.¹

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. '(The word "vajra" in the Kaṭhopyaniṣad must mean the Lord), because it is seen (that in a preceding passage He is called) light'.²

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled 'Something different'. (Sūtras 42-44)

SŪTRA 42

"THE ETHER (IS BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF IT) AS SOMETHING DIFFERENT, AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the passage: 'The ether, verily, is the producer of name and form' (Chānd. 8.14.1³), the object denoted by the term 'ether' is the

¹ S.B. 1.3.40, pp. 380 *et seq.*; Bh. B. 1.3.40, p. 69; SK. B. 1.3.41, pp. 498 *et seq.* Part 5.

² G.B. 1.3.40.

³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Highest Person. Why? "On account of the designation" of the Supreme Soul "as something different" from even the freed souls,—He being the producer of all objects possessing names and forms implied by the term 'name and form',—as well as on account of the designation of Brahmanhood, immortality and the rest on its part.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, by means of the aphorism: 'On account of the text only, what is measured (is the Lord)' (Br. Sū. 1.3.24), the text regarding the Person of the size of merely a thumb has been shown to be referring to Brahman, and this has been confirmed once more immediately after the end of the incidental sections. Now, with a view to designating the non-attachment and the omnipresence of the Supreme Self, it is being shown that the text about the ether, too, refers to Him.

In the Chāndogya, we read: 'The ether, verily, is the producer of name and form. That within which they are is Brahman, that is immortal, that is the soul' (Chānd. 8.14.1). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the term 'ether' the elemental ether is to be understood here, or the soul freed from the bondage of mundane existence, or the Supreme Soul. If it be said that the elemental ether is to be understood, since the term 'ether' is well-known to denote that alone,—(we reply:) no, on account of the term 'soul'. What then should be understood? If it be suggested: the freed soul, Why? For the following reasons: First, the freed soul alone has been mentioned previously as the topic of discussion, in the passage: 'Shaking off (evils) as a horse shakes off his hairs' (Chānd. 8.13.1),—the phrase: 'That within which they are' means: That soul, freed from mundane existence, from which 'they', i.e. name and form 'are different' (antara), i.e. outside. Further, the discarding of the well-known name and form is possible on the part of the soul in its state of release, as declared by the passage: 'Just as the flowing rivers, discarding name and form' (Muṇḍ. 3.2.8). And, finally, the term 'ether', too, is appropriate with regard to the freed soul, it being possessed of fully manifest knowledge. The phrase: 'That is Brahman, that is *immortal*' denotes the state of salvation.

(Author's conclusion.)

We reply: The meaning of the term 'ether' here can fittingly be the Supreme Soul alone. Why? "On account of the designation

(of it) as something different", i.e. on account of the designation of the object denoted by the term 'ether',—which is untouched by name and form, as evident from the phrase: 'That within which they are'; and is the producer of name and form, as evident from the phrase: 'The producer of name and form',—as different from the object which is devoid of the power of being a producer, since during its state of bondage, the soul, partaking of name and form as subject to karmas, is not itself capable of producing, i.e. revealing, name and form;—to do so being all the more impossible on its part during its state of release. That the activities in connection with (the creation and the rest) of the Universe, are impossible on its part, will be expressly stated later on.¹ On the other hand, that the Supreme Soul, an adept in the creation of the entire Universe, is such a producer, is well-established by Scripture itself, thus: "Having entered with this living soul, let me evolve name and form" (Chānd. 6.3.2), 'From him arose—² this name, form and food' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9) 'The Wise One, who abides conceiving all forms, giving names, and declaring (them)' (Tait. Ār. 3.12.7³). The 'ether' is Brahman also on account of the designation, in the text, of the exclusive qualities of the Lord, such as, being eternally manifest, greatness, immortality and the rest, implied by the term "and so on" (in the sūtra). Nor has the freed soul been mentioned before as the topic of discussion, the Supreme Soul alone being the topic, as evident from the passage: 'I attain the world of Brahman' (Chānd. 8.13.1), and the term 'ether', too, being well-known to denote the Supreme Soul alone, it being all-pervasive and non-attached.

SŪTRA 43

"(AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF BRAHMAN) AS DIFFERENT (FROM THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) IN DEEP SLEEP AND DEPARTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the designation of the omniscient "as different" from the non-knower "in deep sleep and departing".

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 4.4.17.

² Correct quotation: 'Tasmād etat Brahma . . . '. Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.9, p. 10.

³ P. 199.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Since it is found from a consideration of the meaning of the text 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.¹) that there cannot possibly be anything different from Brahman, how can it be said: "On account of the designation (of Brahman) as something different and so on"? (Br. Sū. 1.3.42)—

(We reply): True. In spite of there being non-difference between the individual soul, which is a part of Brahman, and Brahman, owing to the fact that the individual soul has no existence, activity and the rest apart from Brahman,—its difference from Him, too, is inevitable, possessing as it does its own peculiar qualities,—so says the reverend author of the aphorisms.

The words "on account of the designation" are to be supplied. (The individual soul and Brahman are different from each other,) on account of the designation of the Supreme Soul, the omniscient, as "different" from the individual soul, the non-knower, "in deep sleep", in the passage: 'Embraced by the Intelligent Soul, he does not know anything external, nor anything internal' (Brh. 4.3.21), and "in departure", in the passage: 'Mounted by the Intelligent Soul, it goes groaning' (Brh. 4.3.35). 'Mounted' means superintended, 'groaning' means making frightful sounds, or sounds of hiccough. It is not possible that the non-knowing soul, sleeping or departing, can at the same time, becoming intelligent, embrace or mount itself, or that another individual soul can do so, omniscience being impossible on the latter's part as well.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. according to them, this adhikaraṇa is concerned with the question whether the Bṛhadāraṇyaka text 4.3.7 refers to the Supreme Soul, or not.²

¹ Also occurs in Chānd. 6.9.4, 6.10.3, 6.11.3, 6.12.3, 6.13.3, 6.14.3, 6.15.3, 6.16.3.

² Ś.B. 1.3.42, pp. 382; Bh. B. 1.3.42, p. 70.

SŪTRA 44

“ON ACCOUNT OF WORDS LIKE ‘LORD’ AND THE REST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the designation of the Supreme Soul as different from the individual soul by the texts: ‘The Lord of all’ (Brh. 4.4.22, 5.6.1¹), ‘The ruler of all’ (Brh. 4.4.22²), it is established that He alone is the ether.

Here ends the third section of the first chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-texts composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author dwells on the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

There is indeed a difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. Why? “On account of words like ‘lord’ and the rest”, i.e. on account of texts like: ‘The Lord of all’ (Brh. 4.4.22, 5.6.1), ‘The controller of all’ (Brh. 4.4.22), ‘The ruler of all’ (Brh. 4.4.22), ‘He rules all this’ (Brh. 5.6.1), ‘He is the Lord of all’ (Brh. 4.4.22) and so on.

Though already shown above, we shall speak of this difference-non-difference in detail later on.³ Hence, it is established that on account of the designation of the Lord as something different and so on, the meaning of the term ‘ether’ is none but the Supreme Lord.

Here ends the section entitled ‘Something different’ (10).
Here ends the third section of the first chapter in the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² *Op. cit.*

³ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.4.9, 1.4.20, 1.4.21, 2.1.13, 2.1.21, etc.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. the same topic continued.¹

Résumé

The third section of the first chapter contains:

- (1) 44 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka.
- (2) 43 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara.
- (3) 44 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja.
- (4) 43 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara.
- (5) 44 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha.
- (6) 43 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva read the sūtras 38 and 39 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha read the sūtras 2 and 3 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra, while breaking the sūtra 35 in the same as two different sūtras.

¹ Ś.B. 1.3.43, p. 385; Bh. B. 1.3.43, p. 70.

FIRST CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'What is derived from inference'. (Sūtras 1-7)

SŪTRA 1

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT WHAT IS DERIVED FROM INFERENCE (VIZ. PRADHĀNA), TOO, (IS MENTIONED IN THE TEXTS) OF SOME (BRANCHES), (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS PUT DOWN IN THE SIMILE OF THE BODY, AND (THE TEXT) SHOWS (THIS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in a text of the Kāṭha-branch, viz. 'Higher than the great (mahat) is the unmanifest (avyakta), higher than the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣa)' (Kāṭha 3.11¹), "What is derived from inference"², i.e. pradhāna, "too", is found mentioned,³—

(We reply :) "No", because in accordance with the text: 'Know the soul to be the lord of the chariot and the body to be the chariot' (Kāṭha 3.3⁴), the body, which is put down in the simile of the chariot, is understood by the term 'unmanifest'. "And" having demonstrated the mode of subduing the sense-organs, the text "shows", in the concluding portion⁵, that what had been previously contrived through the simile⁶ (viz. the body), is understood here, thus: 'A wise man should restrain speech in the mind, that he should restrain in the intelligent soul, the intelligent soul in the great (mahat), that he should restrain in the tranquil soul' (Kāṭha 3.13⁷).

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² For, why pradhāna is called 'ānumānika', see footnote 1, p. 42.

³ Cf. Br. Sū. 1.1.5, which contends that pradhāna is 'aśabda' or not mentioned in Scripture.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

⁵ C.S.S. ed. reads 'vākya-śeṣaḥ' (p. 19).

⁶ 'Rūpaka-parikalpitaṃ grahaṇam' is evidently a misprint. All other editions read 'rūpaka-parikalpita-grahaṇam', meaning 'rūpaka-parikalpitasya grahaṇam'. Vide e.g. C.S.S. ed. (p. 19).

⁷ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In this manner, it has been shown above, under three sections, that the scriptural texts all refer to Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, an ocean of natural, infinite and inconceivable auspicious qualities, untouched by any material qualities and the cause of the world. Now again, in the fourth section, by showing¹ that those texts too which apparently seem to establish pradhāna—which is demonstrated by the doctrine of Kapila and is independent of Brahman,—all refer really to Brahman, and by establishing² that pradhāna is acceptable only as dependent on Brahman,—the reverend author of the aphorisms is removing the false belief, viz. that certain words like ‘Unmanifest’ and the rest, which denote pradhāna, being mentioned in Scripture, pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, is neither non-scriptural, nor derived from inference merely.

In the Kāṭha-vallī, we find the following: ‘Higher than the great (mahat) is the unmanifest (avyakta), higher than the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣa)’ (Kāṭha 3.11). Here, a doubt arises, viz. whether the object denoted by the word ‘unmanifest’ is pradhāna, whether the object denoted by the word ‘unmanifest’ is pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, or the body. The *prima facie* view is as follows: Let it be pradhāna, because here we recognize the very same order, beginning with the great (mahat) and ending with the Person (puruṣa), which is well-known in the Kapila-smṛti. If it be objected: The concordance of the entire Veda with regard to Brahman, the cause of the world, has been established duly; hence it is not possible to establish its connection with anything else, (the reply is:) Very well, let then pradhāna, “derived from inference”, (mentioned in the texts) “of some” schools, be the cause of the world. So here in the school of the Kāṭhikas pradhāna is understood by the term ‘unmanifest’. (Here ends the original *prima facie* view.)

(Author’s conclusion:) “No”. Wherefore? “Because of understanding what is put down in the simile of the body”, i.e. because by the term ‘unmanifest’ in this text, the body, mentioned in the preceding text and put down as a simile, is to be understood. A simile means the imagination of one object as another on the ground of a certain similarity. Thus, compare the passages: ‘Know the soul to be the lord of the chariot, the body to be the chariot; know intellect

¹ Here the *sūtr*-suffix implies reason.

² See footnote 1, above.

to be the charioteer, and the mind to be the reins. The sense-organs, they say, are the horses, the objects of the senses their roads; the self, connected with the sense-organs and the mind, is the enjoyer, so the wise say. He who is devoid of understanding and ever inattentive, his sense-organs are uncontrollable, like the wicked horses of a charioteer. But he who is possessed of intelligence and ever attentive, his sense-organs are controllable, like the good horses of a charioteer. He, however, who is devoid of understanding, is inattentive and ever impure, does not attain that place, and attains mundane existence. But he who is possessed of understanding, is attentive and ever pure, attains that place whence he is not born again. A man, however, who has understanding as his charioteer and the mind as his reins, attains the end of the road, that supreme place of Viṣṇu' (Kāṭha 3.3; 3.9). In these passages, a man—who is desirous of the place of Viṣṇu, the end of the road of transmigratory existence, and who being the enjoyer is the principal agent—is first metaphorically represented as the lord of a chariot; his body,—which is subordinate to him as the abode of his enjoyment,—as the chariot; and the sense-organs, intellect and the rest, as the charioteer and the rest, as far as possible,—which shows that just as it is possible for a potter to be the creator of pots, etc. only when he is connected with the wheel, the stick and the rest, so the attributes of the soul, viz. 'being an agent', 'being an enjoyer' and the rest, are found to belong to it, only when it is connected with the body, the sense-organs, etc. and not when it is devoid of attributes, since it is impossible for it then to be the realizing agent,—one who is approaching a goal. After that, the qualities of a sentient being, like: 'being an agent', 'being a realizing agent who is approaching towards a goal' and so on, implied by its quality of 'being an enjoyer' are stated. Immediately after, the liability of a non-knower, whose sense-organs are unrestrained, to transmigratory existence, and the fitness of a knower, whose sense-organs are restrained, for the place of Viṣṇu are designated; and then the place of Viṣṇu is pointed out as the object to be reached. Immediately after this, Scripture goes on to declare those objects which have superiority to others, in so far as these latter are to be controlled, in the passage: 'Higher than the sense-organs are the objects of senses, higher than the objects is the mind, higher than the mind is intellect, higher than intellect is the great soul. Higher than the great (mahat) is the unmanifest (avyakta), higher than the unmanifest is the Person (puruṣa), nothing is higher

than the Person, He is the goal, the highest course' (Kāṭha 3.10; 3.11). Here, the objects, designated before as the lord of the chariot and the rest, are mentioned irrespective of the simile¹ for the sake of making the intended meaning clear². And the soul and the rest, metaphorically represented as the lord of the chariot and so on, are here referred to by those very terms ('soul' and so on) respectively; and the body, metaphorically represented as the chariot, being left over, is denoted by the term 'unmanifest'³. Thus, the objects of senses, metaphorically represented as the roads, are 'higher than', i.e. superior to, the sense-organs, metaphorically represented as the horses, in so far as these latter are to be controlled, since when in proximity to objects of senses, the sense-organs of even a self-controlled man are found to incline to them once more. Higher than those even is the mind, metaphorically represented as the reins, since the proximity to objects of sense too is of little avail if the mind be not inclined to them. Higher than that even is intellect, metaphorically represented as the charioteer, since the mind, too, is of little avail in the absence of apprehension. Higher than that even is the soul, metaphorically represented as the lord of the chariot, because of its superiority as an agent. Since all these depend upon its will, it alone is specified as the 'great'. Higher than that even is the body, metaphorically represented as the chariot, since all the activities of the individual soul in connection with all the means to salvation depend on the body. Higher than that even is the Person, the soul of all and the end of the road of transmigratory existence, since everything else, mentioned previously, are under His control. When He is won by

¹ A *krama* is a kind of simile in which the comparisons exhibited correspond to each other in regular succession. M.W., p. 319, Col. 2.

² That is, in order that the intended meaning may be clearly conveyed to the reader, the metaphorical way of representation, resorted to above, is given up here, and the actual objects, the sense-organs and the rest, are directly and plainly stated.

³ The argument is as follows: In Kāṭha 3.3-3.9 the soul, the body and the rest, are successively compared to the lord of a chariot, a chariot and so on; while in Kāṭha 3.10-3.11 the same objects, viz. the soul and so on, are mentioned once more, not metaphorically, but directly and plainly. Now in these latter verses, the soul, etc. are denoted by those very words, only there is no actual mention of the body. Hence, when everything else fits in, the body, the only remaining one on this side, must be denoted by the term 'unmanifest', the only remaining one on that side.

means of meditation, as directed, all the ends of a man are accomplished, as declared by the passage: 'Whatever verily, be the means resorted to for the sake of the four ends of a man, a man, who has taken refuge in Nārāyaṇa, attains them without it'. Hence, here the mahat, an effect of pradhāna, is not understood by the term 'great'; nor pradhāna, its cause, by the term 'unmanifest'; nor puruṣa, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, the twenty-fifth principle in contrast to the twenty-four material ones, by the term 'Person'. The entire Veda is in concordance with regard to this very Person, the object which one should desire to enquire into, and an ocean of infinite, auspicious attributes, there being nothing higher than Him, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'There is nothing higher than the Person' (Kaṭha 3.11), the Smṛti passage: 'There is nothing else higher than me, O Dhanañjaya' (Gītā 7.7). The Person alone is the object to be attained, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'That is the goal, that is the highest course' (Kaṭha 3.11), as well as with the declaration by the interpreter of the texts (viz. Nimbārka): 'There is no other goal except the lotus-feet of Kṛṣṇa' (D.Ś. 8a).

Having shown that the Supreme Person is difficult to be attained by one who is not self-controlled, while easy to be attained by one who is self-controlled, and having shown the mode of subduing the sense-organs, the text "shows", in the concluding portion, that what had appeared previously in the simile is understood here, (and not the Sāṃkhya pradhāna), thus: 'This soul, hidden in all beings, is not manifest, but is perceived by subtle seers through highest, subtle intellect. A wise man should restrain speech in the mind, that he should restrain in the intelligent soul, the intelligent soul in the great, that he should restrain in the tranquil soul' (Kaṭha 3.12-3.13). (The text means:) 'This', i.e. Vāsudeva,—omniscient, to be approached by the freed souls, and without an equal or a superior, as stated in the text: 'There is nothing higher than the Person, that is the goal, that is the highest course' (Kaṭha 3.11),—though present in all beings, 'is not manifest', i.e. is not perceived by all, since they are not entitled to perceive Him. For this very reason, He is 'hidden',—the compound (viz. 'gūrḍho' tmā) is in accordance with Vedic use,—as declared by the Lord Himself: "'I am not manifest to all"' (Gītā 7.25). If one is entitled to perceive the Lord, then alone He comes to be perceived; hence it is said 'is perceived' and so on. All the sense-organs, implied by the term 'speech', should be restrained in the

mind,—the long vowel (ī in ‘manasī’) is in accordance with Vedic use ; the mind in the intelligent soul, i.e. in intellect, since ‘being intelligent’ and ‘being the soul’ are possible on the part of intellect, owing to its connection with the individual soul; intelligence in the great soul, i.e. in the individual soul; and that in the tranquil, i.e. in Brahman, the Universal Cause. The sense is that if in the previous case (viz. Kaṭha 3.11), because of understanding¹ the principle ‘mahat’ by the term ‘great’, we understand its cause,—viz. pradhāna which is derived from inference,—by the term ‘unmanifest’ on the ground of its immediate proximity to it, then, here, too, that may be understood by the term ‘great’, and hence (the injunction:) ‘One should restrain the great in the tranquil’ should lead to undesired conclusions². Hence the concluding text, too, shows that what had previously appeared in the simile of the body is understood here.

SŪTRA 2

“BUT THE SUBTLE (BODY IS DENOTED BY THE TERM ‘UNMANIFEST’) BECAUSE OF ITS FITNESS (TO BE DENOTED SO).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said that the word “unmanifest” denotes something subtle,—(we reply: it may denote the body too,) since the body too, the meaning (of the term “unmanifest”), is a grosser state of something subtle indeed.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Although the subtle body is fit to be denoted by the term “unmanifest” since in the simile of the chariot the parts of the subtle body (viz. the sense-organs, the mind, etc.)³ are understood as the parts of the chariot (viz. the horses, the reins, etc.), yet it cannot be said to be the chariot, On the contrary, it is the gross body which has been put down as the chariot. But how can it be understood by the term “unmanifest”, it being something manifest?

¹ Here the *śatp*-suffix implies reason.

² That is, in that case the *mahat* would be dependent on *Brahman*, a conclusion which is contrary to the *Sāṃkhya* view itself.

³ The constituents of the subtle body are the five *tan-mātras*, the ten sense-organs, the mind, and the vital-breath. Vide V.R.M.P. 30.

We reply: The word “but” implies emphasis. The body is the gross effect, *pradhāna* is the subtle cause, and that alone is to be understood; so the term “unmanifest” may very well refer to it. Why? “Because of its fitness”, i.e. because of the fitness of the subtle *pradhāna* to assume the form of the effect, or because of the fitness of the effect to assume the form of the cause. Just as in the text: ‘All this verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), the universe, though different from Brahman as His effect, having been emanated from Him, is yet declared to be non-different from Him, so is this body, which is non-different from *pradhāna*.

Or else, (an alternative explanation;) because of the fitness of that word “unmanifest”, denoting the cause, to denote the effect too¹, as in the example: ‘Mix the soma with cows’ (Ṛg. V. 9.46.4²).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

Interpretation of ‘*tad arhatvāt*’ different, viz. because the unmanifest matter alone, when it has assumed the form of the effect (viz. body), is fit to undertake activities, promoting the end of men, like a chariot.³

SŪTRA 3

“(PRADHĀNA) HAS A MEANING ON ACCOUNT OF (ITS) DEPENDENCE ON HIM.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, taught in the Upaniṣads, “has a meaning on account of its dependence” on the Supreme Cause; while that admitted by others is meaningless, such is the distinction (between our *pradhāna* and that of others, viz. of the Sāṃkhyas).

¹ The argument is that the cause and the effect being non-different, a term denoting the one, can very well denote the other. Hence the term ‘unmanifest’, denoting *pradhāna*, the cause, can denote the body, its effect as well.

² P. 203, line 16. That is, the *Soma* is to be mixed, not with the cow, the cause, but with the milk, its effect. Here a word, denoting the cause, really stands for the effect.

³ Śrī. B. 1.4.2, p. 357, Chap. 1.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. In that case, be happy by falling in with the Sāṃkhyas, since you admit the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna,—the author replies here:

In ordinary experience, a non-sentient object, having no connection with a sentient principle, can have no meaning, incapable as it is of giving rise to an effect. Never does a lump of clay assume the form of a pot by itself. Similarly, pradhāna, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, having no connection with a sentient principle and itself non-sentient, is not able to give rise to effects; hence, it is simply meaningless. Pradhāna, taught in the Upaniṣads, on the other hand, “has a meaning”. That has a meaning which serves the ‘meaning’, or the purpose, of giving rise to all effects, beginning with the mahat and ending with a tuft of grass. Why? “On account of (its) dependence on Him”.¹ That which is dependent on Him, i.e. on Brahman or Lord Vāsudeva, sentient and the Supreme Cause, is ‘tad-adhīna’, viz. pradhāna, the state of being that (tad-adhīnatva), on account of that (tad-adhīnatvāt).

But the dependence of pradhāna on Brahman is not like the dependence of atoms on Īśvara, as held by the logicians, but is due to the relation between a power and the possessor of the power,² as established by the scriptural text like: ‘The own power of the Deity, hidden by his own qualities’ (Śvet. 1.3) and so on. The scriptural texts, establishing pradhāna as taught in the Upaniṣads, have been quoted above.³

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

He gives two alternative explanations of the sūtra, the first of which tallies with the explanation given by Nimbārka. The second is as follows: ‘But (the subtle causal body is designated as) subtle (in reference to the gross body), because of the fitness (of the word “unmanifest” to denote it)’ (Sūtra 2). (‘Bondage and release) have meaning as dependent on it (viz. the subtle body)’ (Sūtra 3).⁴

¹ The compound ‘tad-adhīnatvāt’ is to be explained as follows.

² That is, not an external and accidental relation, but an internal and essential one.

³ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1.

⁴ Bh. B. 1.4.3, p. 73.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. 'The soul, the body and the rest) have a meaning as dependent on Him (viz. the Lord)'.¹

SŪTRA 4

"ALSO BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF ANY STATEMENT OF (ITS) BEING AN OBJECT TO BE KNOWN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The word 'unmanifest' does not denote pradhāna of the Tāntrikas (i.e. the Sāṃkhyas), "also because of the absence of any statement of its being an object to be known".

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also pradhāna is not denoted by the term 'unmanifest' here. Why? "Because of the absence of any statement of its being an object to be known." The Sāṃkhyas, incoherently prattling that salvation arises from a right discrimination between prakṛti (= matter) and puruṣa (= soul), say that with a view to the attainment of salvation, prakṛti, too, should be known by one desiring for salvation. But pradhāna is not mentioned by the Kāṭhas as an object to be known, there being the mention of the word 'unmanifest' simply.

SŪTRA 5

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (SCRIPTURE) SPEAKS (OF PRADHĀNA AS AN OBJECT TO BE KNOWN), (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR THE INTELLIGENT SOUL (IS THE OBJECT TO BE KNOWN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that the text: 'By discerning him, who is without beginning, without end, higher than the great (mahat) eternal, one is delivered from the jaws of death' (Kāṭha 3.15²), "speaks" of pradhāna as an object to be known,—

¹ ŚK. B. 1.1.3., p. 514, Part 6.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

(We reply :) ‘No’. “The intelligent soul”, i.e. the Supreme Soul, is here indicated as the object to be known, He being the “topic”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: The following text “speaks” of pradhāna as an object to be known, viz.: ‘What is without sound, without touch, without form, unchangeable, likewise without taste, constant, and without odour, without beginning, without end, higher than the great (mahat), eternal, by discerning that, one is delivered from the jaws of death’ (Kaṭha 3.15). It means that ‘by discerning’, i.e. by knowing, pradhāna,—the cause of and higher than ‘the great’, i.e. than the principle mahat, the second principle called buddhi, and an effect of pradhāna,—one is delivered from the jaws of death, i.e. from the jaws of mundane existence.

(We reply :) “No”, “for the intelligent soul” alone is indicated here as the object to be discerned. Why? “On account of the topic”, i.e. because the Supreme Soul is the topic here, as evident from the texts: ‘That supreme place of Viṣṇu’ (Kaṭha 3.9), ‘Nothing is higher than the Person’ (Kaṭha 3.11), ‘The soul, hidden in all beings, is not manifest’ (Kaṭha 3.12) and so on. And by the phrase: ‘Higher than the great (mahat)’, the superiority of the Supreme Soul to the individual soul,—mentioned previously in the passage: ‘Higher than buddhi is the great soul’ (Kaṭha 3.10),—is denoted.

SŪTRA 6

“AND THUS THERE ARE STATEMENT AS WELL AS QUESTION ABOUT THREE ALONE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That in this Upaniṣad, “there are statement as well as question about three”,—viz. the means, the end, and the realizing agent,—is known from a consideration of the meaning of the prior and later texts. Here, there is no room for determining a principle which is derived from inference (viz. pradhāna).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Here pradhāna cannot be understood by the term 'unmanifest', since here in the Kaṭha-valli, "there is statement about three alone",—viz. the Supreme Soul, the worship of Him, and the worshipper,—as the objects to be designated; "as well as question" about them as the objects to be known, but not about pradhāna and the rest, established by the Sāṃkhya-tāntra. Thus, when three boons were promised to Naciketas by Death with the words: "Since you have passed three days in my house without eating, O Brāhmaṇa, a guest to be saluted, salute to you, O Brāhmaṇa, may it be well with me; therefore choose three boons for each (night)" (Kaṭha 1.9), the former asked for the propitiation of his father as the first boon thus: "May Gautama be tranquil-minded, well-disposed, with anger appeased towards me, O Death! May he cheerfully greet me, when dismissed by you,—this I choose as the first boon among the three" (Kaṭha 1.10). Then, being granted the propitiation of his father with the words: "Aud-dālaka Āruṇi, dismissed by me¹, will be cheerful as before, he will sleep happily at nights, with his anger appeased" (Kaṭha 1.11) and so on, he asked for the knowledge of fire, called Naciketas, and a means to salvation, thus: "You know, O Death, the heavenly fire; tell it to me, who has faith. Those who live in the heaven-world partake of immortality—this I ask as the second boon" (Kaṭha 1.13). The construction of the above text is as follows: 'O Death!' 'You know', i.e. remember and know, the 'heavenly fire', i.e. the fire which leads to salvation. So 'tell that to me', desirous as I am of salvation. I choose as the second boon that knowledge of the fire, whereby 'those who live in the heaven-world', i.e. those to whom belong the heaven-world, viz. the world to be approached by the freed souls through the path beginning with light as stated in the fourth chapter², or the Vedāntins, 'partake of', i.e. attain, 'immortality' or salvation. Here the word 'heaven' applies to salvation equally, this being well-known from other texts as well, such as, 'The world of heaven is a golden sheath, covered with light', 'The knowers of Brahman go to Brahman, to the world of heaven' (Bṛh. 4.4.8³)

¹ That is, commanded by me. Vide Ś.B. on Kaṭha: 'Matprasṛṣṭaḥ mayā anujñātaḥ saṁ'.

² Vide Br. Sū. 4.3.1 et seq.

³ Correct quotation: 'Tena dhīrāḥ apiyanti brahma-vidaḥ svargaṁ lokam'. Vide Bṛh. 4.4.8, p. 237.

and so on. Then, having obtained the knowledge of the fire, taught thus: "I tell it to you, learn it from me, knowing the heavenly fire, O Nāciketas! The attainment of the infinite world, and the support" (Kāṭha 1.14) and so on, he,—by means of a question regarding the real nature of salvation, characterized by the attainment of the Supreme Soul, the highest end of men,—asked, as the third boon, about the real nature of the object to be attained, the real nature of the attainer and the real nature of meditation, the means, thus: "When a man is dead there is this doubt, some saying that he is, others that he is not. This may I know, taught by you, this is the third among the boons" (Kāṭha 1.20). Thus, when the real nature of salvation was asked thus, the reply given by Yama, preceded by an examination of Naciketa's fitness for that teaching, was as follows: "Him, who is difficult to be seen, who is hidden, who has entered within, who is hidden in the cave and who dwells in the abyss, by knowing Him as God through the knowledge of the Yoga relating to the soul, a wise man discards joy and sorrow" (Kāṭha 2.12).

Having been thus taught, in a general manner, Naciketas with a view to understanding clearly the real nature of the object to be attained, indicated by the word 'God', the real nature of the means, viz. knowledge, demonstrated by the phrase 'by knowing', and the real nature of the attainer, demonstrated by the words 'wise man', once more asked about meditation, different from means like merit and demerit, thus: "Different from the right, different from the non-right" (Kāṭha 2.14); about the object to be approached, not limited by time, thus "Different from what has been done and what has not been done, different from what has been and what will be" (Kāṭha 2.14); and also about the attainer, as this latter question is a question about the attainer, the sentient being as well, the latter, too, being eternal and included among the objects to be attained.¹

Or else, this text is concerned with a question about the object to be approached. Like the co-ordination of the two words 'different', mentioned in the text "Different from the right, different from non-right" (Kāṭha 2.14), there is also a co-ordination between the two words 'different', mentioned subsequently, and so in this question

¹ That is, the last portion of Kāṭha 2.14 is a question about both *Brahman*, the object to be attained, and the individual soul, the attainer, since the latter, too, is eternal and an object to be attained like the former.

about the object to be approached, the approaching agent and of the means too have been included; and hence really no less than three questions were asked.¹

Then, having praised the *praṇava* by way of demonstrating Brahman; having depicted the real nature of the attainer, denoted by the *praṇava*, and the real nature of the means, denoting the *praṇava*; and having taught the *praṇava* once more, Yama taught the real nature of the attainer, in the passage: “A wise man is neither born, nor dies. He has not arisen from anything, has not become anything. Unborn, eternal, constant is this ancient one, who is not killed when the body is killed” (Kaṭha 2.25); the real nature of the object to be attained, in the passage beginning: “Smaller than the small, greater than the great is the soul placed in the cave (i.e. heart) of this creature. Him one who is free from active will sees, freed from sorrow, through the grace of the Creator, (and) the glory of the soul” (Kaṭha 2.20), and ending: “Who knows thus?” (Kaṭha 2.25); and meditation that is of the form of devotion, in the middle in the passage: “This soul is not attainable by the study of the Veda” (Kaṭha 2.23) and so on. Then, having stated that the Supreme Soul is easily attainable

¹ The entire passage is:

‘*Anyatra dharmād anyatra adharmād anyatra asmāt kṛtākṛtāt.*
Anyatra bhūtād bhavyāc ca yat tat paśyasi tad vada’ (Kaṭha 2.14).

The author is here trying to show that this is not a question about a single thing, but about three different things, viz. *Brahman*, the individual soul, and the means to salvation.

He offers two explanations:

(a) The portion: ‘Different from the right and different from the non-right’ refers to the means, viz. knowledge, different from ordinary merit and demerit. And, the portion: ‘Different from what has been done and what has not been done, different from what has been and what will be’ refers equally to *Brahman* and the individual soul, to both of whom, who are eternal, the above description fittingly applies. Hence the above question means: Tell me about (1) the means, (2) the individual soul and (3) *Brahman*.

(b) The whole text is really a question about *Brahman*, but includes questions about the *other two* as well. Thus, the portion ‘different from the right . . .’, means ‘who is different from the means’; and the portion ‘different from what has been done . . .’ means, ‘who is different from the individual soul’. Hence the above question means: Tell me about (1) *Brahman*, who is different from (2) the means and (3) the individual soul. As such it is really a question about the last two as well.

by the individual soul,—since the Person worshipped and the worshipper have entered into the same cave (Kaṭha 3.1¹),—and the mode of worship, as well as the attainment of the place of Viṣṇu by the worshipper, in the passage which begins: “Know the soul to be a lord of chariot” (Kaṭha 3.3), and ends: “This the wise declare” (Kaṭha 3.14), he concluded with the words: “Invisible” (Kaṭha 3.15) and so on. Hence, this Upaniṣad contains a statement about the three alone as the objects to be known, as well as a question about them; there is no reference to pradhāna, established by the Tantra, (viz. the Sāṃkhyas).

SŪTRA 7

“AND AS IN THE CASE OF THE GREAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as, although the word ‘great’ (mahat) has been applied by the Sāṃkhyas to the second principle called ‘buddhi’, yet it is found applied elsewhere as well in Vedic texts like, ‘I know this great Person’ (Vj. S. 18.12²; Śvet. 3.8),—so the word ‘unmanifest’ (avyakta) may refer to the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as the word ‘great’, mentioned in the Veda, is applied to the individual soul and to Brahman,—as in the passages: ‘Higher than intellect is the great soul’ (Kaṭha 3.10), ‘The soul which is great and all-pervading’ (Kaṭha 2.22 ; 4.4) and so on,—and not to the second principle, called buddhi, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, and cannot be applied elsewhere even by a hundred Sāṃkhyas, so it is established that the word ‘unmanifest’ as well, being mentioned in the Veda, does not apply to pradhāna, but denotes the body.

Here ends the section entitled ‘What is derived from inference’ (1).

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 1.2.11-12.

² P. 857, line 10.

Ś, Bh.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled 'The cup'.
(Sūtras 8-10)

SŪTRA 8

"(THE WORD 'UNBORN' DOES NOT DENOTE THE SĀṂKHYA PRAKṚTI)
ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SPECIFICATION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE CUP."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the *prima facie* view, viz. Let prakṛti, mentioned in the sacred text: 'One unborn female (ajā)' (Śvet. 4.5¹), be the one established in (the Sāṃkhya) Smṛti, the author indicates the right conclusion. The unborn one, mentioned in the sacred text, must have Brahman for its soul², because there is no specification guaranteeing the *prima facie* view³, as in the case of the cup, mentioned in the sacred text: 'There is a cup with its mouth below' (Bṛh. 2.2.3⁴).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been shown that in the Kāṭha-vallī pradhāna, which is not mentioned in the Veda, is not denoted by the term 'unmanifest', as it, through denoting the cause, viz. pradhāna which is mentioned in the Veda, denotes its effect, viz. the body. It has also been shown that as pradhāna has Brahman for its soul, the text, thereby, refers to Brahman. In a like manner, it is being shown now that the text about the unborn one, too, refers to Brahman alone.

In the Mantropaniṣad of the Śvetāśvataras, we find the following: 'By an unborn female (ajā),⁵ red, black and white, bringing forth manifold offspring of a like nature, there lies an unborn male (aja)⁶; enjoying. Another unborn male (aja) leaves her who has been enjoyed' (Śvet. 4.5). A doubt arises, viz. whether in this sacred text prakṛti, established by the Sāṃkhya-smṛti, is recognized by the term 'unborn one' (ajā), or whether the meaning of the sacred text

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² I.e. be dependent on *Brahman*.

³ I.e. There is nothing here to guarantee us in selecting *pradhāna* of the opponents as the unborn one.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

⁵ 'Ajā' means a she-goat, too, cf. Ś.B. 1.4.10, p. 404.

⁶ 'Aja' means a he-goat also.

is prakṛti, having Brahman for its soul. On the *prima facie* view, viz. The 'unborn one', etymologically derived as 'one who is not born'; self-supporting; independently bringing forth, by nature, offspring of a like nature; consisting in the three guṇas; the cause of the distinction between bondage and release; and admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, should be understood to be mentioned by the sacred text as well.

We reply: The 'unborn one', which has Brahman for its soul, is mentioned by the sacred text. Why? "On account of non-specification", i.e. because there is no special circumstance for understanding pradhāna which is derived from inference. Our (i.e. Upaniṣadic) (prakṛti), too, is unborn. Since a scriptural text is authoritative only in reference to its own explicit meaning, i.e. only in reference to what it actually states, a self-supporting one is not recognized here, because the word 'self-supporting' is found nowhere, and also because it is impossible for a non-sentient object to have an independent existence. An example illustrating the absence of any specification, such as: 'This is so', with regard to a common term, is given in the words: "As in the case of a cup". In the text: 'There is a cup with its mouth below, and bottom above' (Brh. 2.2.3), the word 'cup' (camasa) conveys only the idea of an implement used in eating, in accordance with the etymology: (A 'camasa' is that) whereby one drinks (camyate anena); and so no accurate specific determination, that a cup (camasa) is such, is possible, on account of non-specification, —(the marks of) having the mouth below and the rest being possible elsewhere too.¹ Similarly, in the sacred text under discussion also, there can be no specifying out that this prakṛti, simply because it is unborn, is the one established by the Sāṃkhya-smṛti.

¹ I.e. in the above text about the 'ajā', there are no special marks which justify us in selecting out the *Sāṃkhya prakṛti* here out of other possible meanings of the term 'ajā', just as in the text about the 'camasa', there are no special marks for fixing what exactly a camasa denotes here, until we are told specifically in the complementary passage that it denotes the head.

SŪTRA 9

“BUT (THE UNBORN ONE IS) THAT WHICH HAS LIGHT (I.E. BRAHMAN) FOR ITS BEGINNING (I.E. CAUSE), FOR THUS SOME READ.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that in the sacred text about the cup (camasa), it is known from the complementary text: ‘It is the head’ (Bṛh. 2.2.3) that the cup is the head; now what is the convincing reason for understanding a particular meaning in the sacred text about the unborn one?—

We reply: That of which “light”, i.e. Brahman, is the “beginning”, i.e. cause, is here denoted by the sacred text about the unborn one, for “thus” alone “some read”, viz. ‘From him arose Brahma, name, form and food’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as from the complementary passage: ‘This is the head, for there is a cup with its mouth below’ (Bṛh. 2.2.3), it is known that nothing but the head is the cup, so there is no ground here for specifying out the unborn one, established by the Sāṃkhyas. On the contrary, that unborn one which has Brahman for its soul is to be understood in the sacred text about the unborn one (Śvet. 4.5), on the ground of prior and later texts,—so holds the author.

The term “but” implies certainty. Prakṛti, “which has light for its beginning”, is to be understood definitely in the sacred text about the unborn one. The compound: “which has light for its beginning” means: That of which the ‘beginning’, i.e. the instituting cause, is ‘light’, i.e. Brahman, celebrated in scriptural texts like: ‘That the gods worship as the light of lights’ (Bṛh. 4.4.16), ‘Now the light which shines higher than this heaven’ (Chānd. 3.13.7) and so on,—i.e. it should be understood to be that which has Brahman for its soul. In the Veda, the peculiar nature, qualities and the rest of Brahman alone being specially determined, no other topic has been dealt with; and hence, that alone which has Brahman for its cause is to be understood. The sense is: Beginning: ‘The speakers of Brahman say: “what is the cause”?’ (Śvet. 1.1) and so on, and rejecting the views of those who take time to be the first cause, of the Bauddhas, the Mīmāṃsakas, the Jains and the logicians, suggested in the passage:

‘Time, nature, destiny, accident’ (Śvet. 1.2), the text goes on: ‘Those, following meditation and concentration, saw God’s self-power, hidden by His own qualities’ (Śvet. 1.3). On account of this introductory text, in the sacred text about the unborn one (Śvet. 4.5), that unborn one alone which has been established by the Veda and which a power of Brahman,—the cause of the Universe and denoted by words like ‘light’ and the rest,—is to be understood, since subsequently also in the passages: ‘From this, the Māyin creates this universe, and in it the other is bound up with Māyā’ (Śvet. 4.9), ‘But let one know prakṛti to be Māyā, and the Great Lord to be the Māyin’ (Śvet. 4.10), ‘The One, who rules over every source’ (Śvet. 4.11) and so on, that alone which has Brahman for its soul is established. For that very reason, it is declared in the same Upaniṣad that although this, as a power, is different from the possessor of powers, yet it is non-different from Brahman, because of having no existence and activity apart from the possessor of powers, thus: ‘On knowing the enjoyer, the object enjoyed and the Mover, all has been said, this is the three-fold Brahman’ (Śvet. 1.12). Here, the enjoyer is the individual soul, denoted by the term ‘higher prakṛti’; the object enjoyed is the non-sentient in its causal and effected states, denoted by the term ‘lower prakṛti’; and the Mover is the Highest Person, possessing the two prakṛtis, and denoted by the term ‘Brahman’. Thus, the phrase: ‘All is this Brahman’ establishes the non-difference of Brahman and the two prakṛtis, the objects to be controlled,—since the existence and activity of the latter two depend on their Controller,—in spite of there being a difference of nature between them and the Lord.

With a view to confirming that unborn one which is mentioned in the Veda, by that very Veda, the author establishes this once more in the words: “For thus some read”; that means, because thus some schools, i.e. the Ātharvaṇikas, “read” in the Muṇḍakopaniṣad that this unborn one has Brahman for its soul: ‘From him arose Brahmā, name, form and food’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9); and because it is declared by the Lord Himself, in the passage: “My womb is the great Brahman. In it I place the germ” (Gītā 14.3). In the Taittirīyaka, too, having introduced Brahman in the passage: ‘Smaller than the small’ (Mahānār. 6.3¹), having, then, designated the origin of the entire universe,

1 This verse occurs also in Kāṭha 2.20 and Śvet. 3.20.

implied by the vital-breath, in the passage: 'Seven vital breaths arise from him' (Mahānār. 8.4), the text goes on to read after that: 'By an unborn female, red, white and black, bringing forth manifold offspring of a like nature, lies an unborn male, enjoying. Another unborn male discards her, who has been enjoyed' (Mahānār. 9.2). And since this sacred text is to be taken as referring to prakṛti, which has Brahman for its soul, and since here, too, the same must inevitably be the case, that prakṛti alone which has Brahman for its soul is the object to be established by the sacred text about the unborn one.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

The interpretation of 'jyotir-upakramā' different, viz. '(The unborn one is) the beginning (i.e. the material cause) of light (i.e. of the four kinds of material objects, consisting in light, i.e. fire, water, and so on)'.¹

SŪTRA 10

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF THE FASHIONING (OF THE UNIVERSE), THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE HONEY (-MEDITATION)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

No contradiction is involved in taking one and the same substratum of qualities as unborn and having, at the same time, Brahman for its material cause. On account of the teaching of the creation of the universe from Brahman, the cause of the world and possessing subtle powers, both fit in, "as in the case of the honey-meditation".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. How can an unborn one be something generated, the author replies:

The word "and" is for disposing of the objection. There is no contradiction in taking an unborn one as something generated. Why? "On account of the teaching of fashioning." The word "fashioning"

¹ Ś.B. 1.4.9, p. 402.

means making or creation, on account of the teaching of that ¹, i.e. on account of the teaching of the creation of the universe from Brahman, possessing subtle powers, in the passage: 'From this, the Māyin creates this universe' (Śvet. 4.9). The unmanifest prakṛti, subtle in form and a power of Brahman, is said to be unborn because of being non-different from Brahman as His power. That very same prakṛti, emanated from the possessor of powers or Brahman and abiding in the form of effects, is said to have Brahman for its beginning or cause, and hence there is no contradiction. Here the author states a parallel case in the words: "As in the case of the honey-meditation". In the honey-meditation,² which begins: 'Verily, this sun is the honey of the gods' (Chānd. 3.1.1), in the concluding text: 'Then, having risen up from thence, it will neither rise nor set, it will remain alone in the middle' (Chānd. 3.11.1), the very same thing, which in its causal state abides in a subtle form and is not, as such, designable as honey, is, in its effected state, imagined to be the honey, enjoyable by gods like Vasu and the rest, and to be possessed of rising and setting, without giving rise to any contradiction. Similarly, the very same eternally existent prakṛti is designated by the sacred text in its causal form in relation to the bondage and release of the eternally existent individual soul. Here, the individual soul, indicated by the term: 'unborn one' (aja),—eternal by nature, carried away by the current of beginningless karmas, and hence devoid of a true knowledge of the real nature of itself or of the Supreme Being,—having identified itself through nescience with the bodies, such as of men, gods and the rest which are the evolutes of prakṛti, lies by, enjoying sounds and the rest, the parts of prakṛti; such a one, devoid of the bliss of Brahman, is said to be 'bound'. But one, who having attained by chance the grace of the Lord through humbleness and the like, and having attained the bliss of Brahman by means of the repetition of the means,—'hearing' (śravaṇa) and the rest of the Vedānta,—learnt from a holy spiritual preceptor, discards prakṛti, is said to be 'freed'. If in accordance with the etymology: 'An unborn one (ajā) is one that is not born', it is said that the unborn one is not prakṛti, eternally existent and having Brahman for its soul, then the conventional distinction between the bondage and release of the created souls cannot

¹ This explains the compound: 'kalpanopadeśāt'.

² Vide V.K. 1.3.31-33. See footnote 1, p. 193.

be explained by the non-sentient pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman. Hence it is established that the unborn one, mentioned in the sacred text, has Brahman for its soul.

Here ends the section entitled 'The cup' (2).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different: viz. 'On account of the teaching of an imagination (i.e. a metaphor); there is no contradiction'. That is, the word 'ajā' here does not stand for one who is literally unborn, but simply metaphorically represents prakṛti, the source of all things, as a she-goat, just as the sun, though not really honey, is metaphorically represented as such in the Chāndogya.¹

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled 'The collection of number'. (Sūtras 11-13)

SŪTRA 11

"NOT ON ACCOUNT OF THE COLLECTION OF NUMBER EVEN, ON ACCOUNT OF DIVERSITY, AND ON ACCOUNT OF EXCESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Even on account of the collection of number" in the text 'In whom the five people and the ether are based' (Bṛh. 4.4.17; Śat. Br. 14.7.2.19²), it is not to be said that the twenty-five principles, beginning with pradhāna, are based on Scripture, so what dispute can there be regarding the knowability of one pradhāna from Scripture?³ Why? "On account of diversity," i.e. because the objects which are based on Brahman, established in Scripture and denoted by the

¹ Ś.B. 1.1.10, pp. 404-5. Bh. B. 1.1.10, p. 75. Cf. Rāmānuja's criticism of this interpretation.

² P. 1090, line 3. Ś. R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ That is, all the twenty-five principles of the Sāṅkhyas can be known from Scripture, not to speak of pradhāna alone.

term 'in whom', are different from the objects established in the Tantra (i.e. the Sāṃkhya-smṛti), since the former are found to have Brahman for their soul; "and on account of the excess" of Brāhman, the support, and likewise of the ether.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the previous aphorism, it has been shown that the text about the unborn one, not referable to pradhāna, as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas on the ground of texts like: 'The self-power of the Deity' (Śvet. 1.3), refers to Brahman on the ground that it refers to His power, viz. pradhāna, as admitted by the Vedāntins. In the very same manner, by showing that ¹ the text about the 'five five-people' refers to the vital-breath and the rest, based on Brahman, on the ground of the pronoun ('in whom') and so on, leading to the nullification of the number admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, (viz. twenty-five), the reverend author of the aphorisms is confirming his contention that pradhāna has never been mentioned in Scripture.

In the sixth chapter ² of the Brhadāranyaka, immediately after the introduction: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights, as life, as immortality' (Brh. 4.4.16; Śat. Br. 14.7.2.20 ³), we read the following: 'In whom the five five-people and the ether are based, him alone I, the knower, the immortal, know as the soul, the immortal Brahman' (Brh. 4.4.17; Śat. Br. 14.7.2.19). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether by the phrase; 'five five-people', meaning five groups of five, the twenty-five principles, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, are denoted, or the vital-breath and the rest, five in number and called 'five-people' (pañca-jana). The *prima facie* view is as follows: We get here the twenty-five principles, mentioned in Scripture and determined more specially in the Sāṃkhya-smṛti. In the Śaṣṭi-saṃhitā ⁴, we read the following,—beginning: 'Being struck ⁵ by the three kinds of sorrow, (one undertakes) an enquiry into the cause of their removal' (Sām. Kā. 1), and continuing: 'The primal cause prakṛti is not an effect; the seven objects beginning with the mahat are causes as well as

¹ Here the *sat*-suffix implies reason.

³ P. 1090, line 5.

² Ought to be fourth chapter.

⁴ That is a Sāṃkhya treatise or a saṃhitā or treatise dealing with the sixty ideas peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas.

⁵ Correct quotation: 'abhihātāt' which is translated here. Vide Sām. Kā. 1, p. 1.

effects; sixteen objects are effects (only); puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect' (Sām. Kā. 3¹).

With regard to it, we reply: "Not even on account of the collection of number"; The word "even" implies possibility.² In spite of the fact that the number twenty-five is found in this text, prakṛti and the rest have not Scripture as their authority. Why? "On account of diversity", i.e. because the twenty-five principles, mentioned in Smṛti, cannot be arranged in five groups of five each, they being of various kinds. There can be numeration or grouping of objects only with reference to a class, a common quality and so on, e.g. when we say: 'A group of five cows', 'a group of five learned men'. But here we find no common cause for grouping five objects under each pentad. In such cases as: 'seven are causes as well as effects', 'sixteen are effects (only)' and so on, on the other hand, there do exist causes for such groupings.³

Or, else (an alternative explanation of the word 'nānābhāvāt'), 'on account of the absence of plurality'. That is, all the objects mentioned in the Vedānta having Brahman for their soul, there is no absolute plurality, in accordance with the statement: 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.4; 6.10.3-6.16.3), and also in accordance with the teaching contained here, viz. 'In whom the five five-people and the ether are based' (Bṛh. 4.4.17). The sense is that if the twenty-five principles, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, be accepted here, then, they not having Brahman for their soul, plurality will result, contradicting Scripture.

Or, rather, the principles, admitted by our opponents and independent of Brahman, being distinct from those that are based on Brahman, in accordance with the text: 'In whom the five five-people' (Bṛh. 4.4.17), "and on account of excess", there is not even the number twenty-five here. On the contrary, "on account of the excess", i.e. surplus, viz. the Supreme Soul, the support of all, indicated

¹ P. 4.

² I.e. *even if* it be possible to understand here the number intended by the Sāṃkhyas, still then the Sāṃkhya view cannot be said to be referred to here. It will be shown later that it is not really even possible to understand here the number twenty-five intended by the Sāṃkhyas.

³ I.e. A group consists of a certain number of *similar* objects. But here it is impossible to divide the twenty-five Sāṃkhya principles into five groups, each containing five *similar* principles. Hence it cannot be said that 'five five-people' means $5 \times 5 = 25$ principles of the Sāṃkhyas.

by the pronoun 'in whom', and the ether, twenty-five principles are not denoted.

The meaning of the text is as follows: 'The gods worship that', viz. Brahman. What is that? 'That which is the light of lights', i.e. of sun and the rest; 'life', i.e. the cause of the longevity of its own devotees; 'immortal', i.e. the object to be attained during the state of release, this is the sense of the introductory text (Brh. 4.4.16, etc.). 'In whom', i.e. in Brahman, 'the five five-people are based'. The compound 'five-people' (pañca-jana) is to be explained in accordance with the rule: 'Words indicating a quarter or a number are compounded (with words in the same case¹) to designate a name (and the compound is a tat-puruṣa)' (Pāṇ. 2.1.50; SD. K. 727²). The word 'five-people' is here understood as a name, since the meaning of the component parts (i.e. the number five) is not intended to be designated. Just as by the expression 'seven sages' each of the seven sages is denoted, so by the word 'five-people' as well. On the enquiry: How many five-people are there? the adjective 'five' is added.³ As Yājñavalkya says: 'In whom the ether is based that alone is Brahman, the support of all and immortal. He who knows the Highest Self, to be approached by the freed, the soul, the cause of all existence and activity, becomes immortal, so I think. He who does not know Him does not become free'.

SŪTRA 12

“(THE ‘FIVE-PEOPLE’ ARE) THE VITAL-BREATH AND THE REST,
ON ACCOUNT OF THE COMPLEMENTARY PASSAGE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the complementary passage”, viz. ‘Those who know the breath of breath, the eye of eye, the ear of ear, the food of

¹ In accordance with the previous Pāṇ.-sūtra 2.1.49.

² P. 509, vol. 1.

³ I.e. the expression 'five-people' denotes the name of a certain class of beings, and the expression 'five five-people' denotes that there are *five* classes of such beings, just as the expression 'seven sages' denotes a certain class of sages, (i.e. stars) and the expression 'seven seven-sages' denotes that there are seven classes of such beings. What these classes of beings called 'five-people' are is indicated in the next sūtra.

food, the mind of mind' (Śat. Br. 14.7.2.21¹), these "five-people" (pañca-jana) are to be known as the vital-breath and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the question: Who, then, are the five-people, the author replies here.

"On account of the complementary passage", viz. 'Those who know the breath of breath, the eye of eye, the ear of ear, the mind of mind' (Śat. Br. 14.7.2.21), the vital-breath and the rest, five in number, having Brahman as their soul, and denoted by the term "five-people", are meant by the sacred text.

SŪTRA 13

"(THE NUMBER FIVE IS TO BE COMPLETED) BY LIGHT, FOOD BEING NON-PRESENT (I.E. NOT MENTIONED) (IN THE TEXT) OF SOME."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Food being non-present (i.e. non-mentioned)", on the other hand, in the complementary passage of the Kāṇvas², the number five is to be completed "by light", mentioned in the beginning.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. Let the vital-breath and the rest, five in number, be the 'five-people' on the ground of the complementary passage, subsequent to the sacred text about the 'five-people' in the Mādhyandina branch. In the Kāṇva branch, too, there is a text about the 'five-people'. There the word 'food' is not found in the complementary passage. Hence, how can the number five be completed here?—the author replies here.

It has been said that the Mādhyandinas complete the number five by means of food. But "there being the absence or non-mention of food" in the reading "of some", i.e. of the Kāṇvas, the number five is completed "by light", mentioned in the introductory passage: 'That the gods worship as the light of lights' (Brh. 4.4.16),—this

¹ P. 1090, lines 5-6. Ś. R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² Viz. Brh. 4.4.18, which omits 'annasya annam'.

is the sense. Hence, it is established that pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman, is not an object to be known from Scripture.

Here ends the section entitled 'The collection of number' (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled 'Being the cause'. (Sūtras 14-15)

SŪTRA 14

"AND (THE LORD ALONE IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD) AS THE CAUSE WITH REGARD TO THE ETHER AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF (BRAHMAN) AS DESIGNATED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Omniscient and omnipotent Brahman alone is to be understood everywhere in the texts about the creation of the ether and the rest, because the very same Brahman, "as designated" in the characterizing aphorism¹ and the following, is demonstrated "as the cause" of the ether and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection may be raised here: That view, too, which rejecting pradhāna, established by Smṛti, as the cause of the world, takes the universe to have Brahman as its sole cause, is, indeed, a doubtful one, since in the Vedānta texts, demonstrating the cause, creation is stated to be due to manifold causes. Thus, in a certain text: "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 6.2.1), creation is said to be due to the existent; in a certain other text: 'From this soul the ether has arisen' (Tait. 2.1), to be due to the soul alone; again in another text, on the other hand: 'The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning, from that, forsooth, the existent arose' (Tait. 2.7), likewise in the text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning, it was existent' (Chānd. 3.19.1), to be due to the non-existent; in another text: "What is its final goal?" "The ether" said he' (Chānd. 1.9.1), to be due to the ether; in a certain other text again: "All these beings, verily, enter into the vital-breath"

¹ Viz. Br. Sū. 1.1.2, etc.

(Chānd. 1.11.5), to be due to the vital-breath; and in some passages in the Brhadāraṇyaka: 'The soul alone was this in the beginning' (Brh. 1.4.17), 'Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning' (Brh. 1.4.10), to be due to the soul and to Brahman. Such being our knowledge of the cause of the universe, it is not possible to ascertain definitely that Brahman alone is the cause of the universe. But it is possible to ascertain definitely that pradhāna, independent of Brahman, is the cause of the universe. Thus, in the text: 'Verily, at that time this was unmanifest (avyākṛta), it became manifest simply by name and form' (Brh. 1.4.7), by the word 'unmanifest' pradhāna, independent of a sentient principle, is declared to be the cause of the universe. The meaning of the text is that 'this', i.e. the manifest world, was 'at that time', i.e. prior to creation, 'unmanifest' and 'it', viz. pradhāna, 'became manifest by name and form'. The mass of texts demonstrating the cause of the universe should be taken to be referring to pradhāna alone.

With a view to disposing of the above view, his Holiness is showing that the mass of texts designating the cause of the universe all refer to Brahman.

The word "and" is for disposing of the objection. The word "as" implies the kind. It is possible to ascertain definitely that the Highest Person alone, omnipotent, endowed with the attributes of omniscience and the rest and the Lord of all, is the Cause of the Universe. How? "On account of the declaration" of the very same Brahman, "designated" in the characterizing aphorism and the rest, "as the cause" of effects like the ether and the rest. Thus, Brahman alone, mentioned previously in the passage: 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and infinite' (Tait. 2.1), is designated as the cause in the passage: 'From him, verily' (Tait. 2.1) and so on. Likewise, Brahman alone, indicated by the passages, "'The existent alone, my dear'" (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'He thought: "May I be many"' (Chānd. 6.2.3), is designated in the passage: 'He created light' (Chānd. 6.2.3). The same is to be understood with regard to other Upaniṣad texts too.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

General import same, literal interpretation different, viz. '(Although there may be a conflict among the Vedānta texts) with regard

to (the order of the things created, like) the ether and the rest, (there is no conflict among them with regard to the creator,) because as (Brahman) is designated as the cause (in one Vedānta) so (He) is mentioned (in other Vedāntas too)¹.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but continues the same topic. Hence the sūtra: 'And just as on account of the declaration (i.e. understanding) (of Brahman) as the cause (in all the Vedānta texts) with regard to (all the effects like) the ether and the rest, (as well as in all other general texts), (pradhāna of the Sāṃkhya is not understood, so the Sāṃkhya principles are not understood here)'. That is, just as we interpret the vague and general text 'verily, at that time, it was unmanifest' (Bṛh. 1.4.7) in the light of the specific text: 'The soul alone was this in the beginning' (Bṛh. 1.4.1), and understand thereby the first text as denoting Brahman and not the Sāṃkhya unmanifest or pradhāna, so exactly, here we should interpret the vague and general text about the 'five five-people' (Bṛh. 4.4.17, etc.) in the light of the specific passage about the vital-breath and the rest (Bṛh. 4.4.18, etc.), and understand, thereby, the 'five five-people' as the vital-breath and the rest, and not as the Sāṃkhya principles.²

SŪTRA 15

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE DRAWING IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the drawing in" of Brahman. That is, the very same Brahman, mentioned previously in the passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6³), is referred to in the passage: 'The non-existent, verily' (Tait. 2.7⁴) too. Similarly the very same Brahman, mentioned previously in the passage: 'The sun is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.19.1⁵), is also referred to in the passage: 'The non-existent alone was this' (Chānd. 3.19.1⁶). Hence, Brahman alone, who is ever existent, is denoted

¹ Ś.B. 1.4.14, p. 414.

³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

⁵ Not quoted by others.

² ŚK. B. 1.1.14, p. 530, Part 6.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

⁶ Ś, R, Bh, B.

by the word 'non-existent', since there being no distinction of names and forms prior to creation, He has then no existence in so far as connected with these names and forms. In the same manner, what is denoted by the term 'unmanifest' in the passage: 'Verily, at that time, this was unmanifest, it became manifest simply by name and form' (Brh. 1.4.7¹), is referred to in the subsequent passage as well: 'He is entered here as far as the finger-nail tips' (Brh. 1.4.7²) and so on. It is also impossible for the non-sentient pradhāna to be a controller by entering within. Hence, the unmanifest, its controller, is said to be Brahman. The sense is that in the texts, demonstrating the cause of the universe, Brahman alone, established by the defining aphorism and the rest, is to be understood,—there is not even the slightest possibility of pradhāna being so understood.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of the drawing in" of Brahman. That is, the very same Brahman, omniscient, and creating the universe subsequent to His resolution to be many, as mentioned previously in the passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6), is also referred to in the passage: 'The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning, from that the existent arose' (Tait. 2.7). Here, Brahman as possessed of subtle powers in His causal state is denoted by the term 'non-existent',—which is but a synonym for the word 'subtle',—in contrast to Brahman as possessed of manifested powers in His effected state, fit to be denoted by the term 'existent',—which is but a synonym for the word 'gross'. In the very same manner indeed, it should be known that Brahman, mentioned previously in the passage: 'The sun is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.19.1), is referred to in the passage too: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning, it was existent' (Chānd. 3.19.1). In the very same manner, in the text about the unmanifest as well, it is the inner controller of the unmanifest that is denoted by the word 'unmānifest', as here the pronoun 'he' refers to Brahman, denoted by the term 'unmanifest', in the passage: 'He is entered here as far as the finger-nail tips. When seeing, the eye; when hearing, the ear; when thinking, the mind. Let one worship (Him) as the soul' (Brh. 1.4.7). In spite of there being a separate agent of manifestation, the expression 'It became manifest (vyākriyata)' should be understood as denoting

¹ Ś, R, Bh, B.

² Ś, R, ŚK, B.

an 'object-agent' (i.e. the reflexive passive form). Or else, the present indicative should be understood simply in the passive¹. Hence, everywhere the cause is one and the same indeed. The objections with regard to the cause are refuted in this section. We shall dispose of the objections with regard to the effects, on the other hand, in the third quarter of the second chapter, under the aphorisms: 'Not the ether, because of being non-scriptural' (Br. Sū. 2.3.1) and the following. Hence, it is established everywhere that the cause of the universe is Brahman alone, a sentient Being and possessed of omniscience and the rest.

Here ends the section entitled 'Being the cause' (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

The general purport (of the sūtras 14-15) same, but while Nimbārka connects this adhikaraṇa more directly with the topic of the preceding part of the pāda, viz. with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view², Śaṅkara and Bhāskara do not do so, but take it to be concerned with the general question of the concordance of all texts with regard to Brahman.³

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different. The same topic continued: 'On account of the drawing in'. That is, just as the very same Brahman, mentioned in the prior passage: 'He wished' (Tait. 2.6) is understood in the subsequent passage too: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Tait. 2.7), because the two passages involve each other, so exactly, the 'five five-people', mentioned in the prior passage (Brh. 4.4.17, etc.) are understood as the vital-breath and the rest,

¹ I.e. as having reference to a necessarily implied agent, as in the expression: 'The village is being approached'. Vide Ś.B. 1.4.15, p. 417.

² This is evident from the concluding sentence of his explanation of the sūtra 15: "Na pradhāna-śaṅkā-gandho' pīti bhāvaḥ". V.P.S. 1.4.15, p. 131, K.S.S.

³ This is evident from the beginning of the adhikaraṇa: 'Tatra idam aparam āśaṅkate: Na janmā-di-karaṇatvaṃ Brahmano, Brahma-viśayaṃ vā gati-sāmānyaṃ vedānta-vākyānāṃ pratipattum śākyam', etc. Vide Ś.B. 1.1.14, pp. 412-13; Bh. B. 1.1.14, pp. 76-77.

mentioned in the subsequent passage (Bṛh. 4.4.18, etc.), because the two passages involve each other.¹

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled 'Denoting the world'. (Sūtras 16-18)

SŪTRA 16

"BECAUSE OF DENOTING THE WORLD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not to be supposed that in the text: "He verily, O Bālāki, who is the maker of these persons, of whom this is the work" (Kauṣ. 3.9²), the object to be known is the person, mentioned in the Tantra (viz. in the Sāṃkhya doctrine) and the enjoyer of the fruits of merit and demerit. None but the Supreme Soul is here indicated as the object to be known. Why? Because Brahman is the topic, as known from the text: "Let me declare Brahman to you" (Kauṣ. 4.1³); because the word 'work', meaning 'something that is done', denotes the world which is an effect; because by the pronoun 'this' the world, established by the evidence of perception and the rest, is suggested; and, lastly, because the person, mentioned in the Tantra, is not the topic here.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The Sāṃkhyas hold that prakṛti is the agent and puruṣa the enjoyer. The impossibility of prakṛti to be the cause has been shown in various ways. Now, although it has been shown in the section regarding Pratardana⁴ that the Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa texts refer to Brahman, yet by showing that the text "Of whom this is the work" (Kauṣ. 4.19), too, refers to Brahman, the author is now disposing of the objection, viz.: the person (puruṣa), admitted by the Sāṃkhyas, is accepted by the Vedānta, on the ground of its being an enjoyer; and prakṛti, superintended by it, is the cause of the world.

We read of a dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru in the Kauṣītaki-brāhmaṇa. There, a sage, called Bālāki Gārgya having

¹ Śk. B. 1.1.14, pp. 532-33, Part 6.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

⁴ Vide 'Indra-prāñādhikaraṇa', sūtras 1.1.29-32.

³ Ś, R, Bh, B.

promised the king Ajātaśatru: “Let me declare Brahman to you” (Kauṣ. 4.1), having then designated various persons as Brahman, thus “He who is the person within the sun” (Kauṣ. 4.3), “The person within the moon” (Kauṣ. 4.4) and so on¹, became silent. Then, Ajātaśatru, who knew Brahman², having condemned him with the words: “In vain, did you tell me”³ (Kauṣ. 4.19), said: “He who, verily, O Bālāki, is the maker of these persons, and⁴ of whom this is the work, he, verily, is to be known” (Kauṣ. 4.19). Here a doubt arises, viz. whether puruṣa, established in the Sāṃkhya-tantra, the superintendent of prakṛti and the enjoyer, is taught here as the object to be known, or the Supreme Soul. The *prima facie* view is as follows: It was puruṣa, unconnected with prakṛti, as established in the Tantra, that was indicated, by the royal sage, as the object to be known, because of the mention of a connection with works in the phrase: “and of whom this is the work” (Kauṣ. 4.19); because works, consisting in merit and demerit, are possible on the part of the individual soul alone, entitled to works; because a connection with work is not admitted on the part of the Supreme Soul; and, because the origin of the world is due to the works of the respective enjoyers. Moreover, here in accordance with the text: ‘They two went to a sleeping person’ (Kauṣ. 4.19), it was the enjoying soul alone which was demonstrated by Ajātaśatru to Bālāki. Likewise, in the passage: ‘Just as a merchant enjoys with his own people, and as his own people enjoy him, so exactly this intelligent self enjoys with these selves, so exactly these selves enjoy it’ (Kauṣ. 4.20), the characteristic mark of the enjoying soul alone is found. The meaning of the text is as follows: ‘Just as a merchant’, i.e. a lord who is the chief, enjoys ‘with his own people’, i.e. with implements like servants and the rest; and ‘his own people’, i.e. the servants and the rest, ‘enjoy’ the merchant, i.e. depend on him for food and clothing, ‘so

¹ The sage wanted to teach the king about the person within the sun, that within the moon, that within the lightning, that within the cloud and so on, altogether about sixteen persons, but in each case, the king begged to be spared of the teaching, as he was already acquainted with the person in question. Finally, the king himself taught the sage about Brahman. Vide Kauṣ. 4.

² The word ‘*Brahmajña*’ is not really included in the text.

³ Correct quotation: ‘*Mṛṣā vai khalu mā saṃvādayiṣṭhā*’, in which case it would mean ‘in vain, verily, did you make me talk’. Vide Kauṣ. 4.19, p. 138.

⁴ Correct quotation ‘*vā*’ and not ‘*ca*’.

exactly this intelligent self 'enjoys with these', i.e. with the persons within the sun and the rest. And it cannot be said that since the word 'work', mentioned in the concluding text: "Of whom this is the work" (Kauṣ. 4.19) denotes action, the vital-breath, possessing the activity of motion as his substratum, mentioned in the concluding text: 'In this vital-breath alone, he becomes one' (Kauṣ. 4.20), is to be understood; but puruṣa, established in the Tantra and the enjoyer of the fruits of works, is not to be accepted here as the object to be known,—for the term 'vital-breath' refers to the bearer of the vital-breath or the individual soul, such a construction, viz. 'in this vital-breath', meaning 'in puruṣa, the bearer of the vital-breath', being possible. If, in accordance with the explanation 'In the vital-breath which is present in this, i.e. in the soul', the two locatives (viz. 'in this' and 'in the vital-breath') are to refer to different objects¹, then although the word 'vital-breath' will refer to the chief vital-breath, yet as it is naturally an implement of the individual soul, none but the individual soul is the object to be established here. And hence the meaning is: 'He who is the maker', i.e. the cause, 'of these persons', i.e. of the persons dwelling in the orb of the sun and the rest, and implements of the enjoyment of the individual soul, 'and of whom this is the work', i.e. merit and demerit, the cause of its being the cause², is to be known as unconnected with prakṛti. And hence Brahman, introduced as the object to be depicted in the text: "Let me declare Brahman to you" (Kauṣ. 4.1), is none but puruṣa, there being no proof of any God other than it. As the qualities of perceiving and the rest, belonging to the cause, are possible on its part, possessing as it does the quality of consciousness, prakṛti alone, superintended by the puruṣa, the enjoyer, is the cause of the world. (Here ends the *prima facie* view.)

(Author's conclusion.)

With regard to it, we reply: Here, the Highest Person alone, the maker of the persons, is the object to be known. Why? For the following reasons: First, the term 'work' denotes the world; and the

¹ I.e. standing in a *vyadhikaraṇa* relation and not in a *samānādhikaraṇa* relation, or in a relation of a noun and an adjective referring to the same locus, as the first explanation takes them to be.

² I.e. the works (*karmas*) of the soul lead to the creation of the world the sun and the rest.

creatorship of the world is not possible on the part of any one other than the Supreme Soul. A 'work' is what is done, i.e. the world, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient. Secondly, the creatorship of the world is not possible on the part of the sentient individual soul which has entered into the world as an enjoyer, and which is never admitted to be a creator. Thirdly, the creatorship of the world is impossible also on the part of prakṛti, superintended by the individual soul of little knowledge and little power. In ordinary life, what little is done by non-sentient objects, like chariots and the rest superintended by sentient beings, is due to the sentient beings alone. And, there being no purpose in rejecting the primary agent, the primary agent is none but the Supreme Being, celebrated in a mass of scriptural texts. The world, known through perception and the rest, is referred to by the pronoun 'this'. Work consisting in merit and demerit simply is not denoted by the term 'work' here. Since the sixteen persons, indicated as Brahman by Bālāki who had promised: "Let me declare Brahman to you" (Kauṣ. 4.1), were not really Brahman, Ajātaśatru, having condemned him who could not tell him about Brahman, thus: "In vain, verily, did you tell me ¹" (Kauṣ. 4.19), taught the Supreme Soul,—not known by the sage, and the maker of the persons indicated by him,—as the object to be known, with the words: "He who, verily, O Bālāki" (Kauṣ. 4.19). Otherwise, the persons connected with works, i.e. merit or demerit, being already known to Bālāki, the teaching of them as the objects to be known would be meaningless. Hence, the word 'work' simply denotes that the universe consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient is an effect; and does not denote mere merit and demerit, or mere action. This being so, the word 'this', too, has a purpose, since, referring as it does to the entire world, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient and known through the evidence of perception and the rest, it serves to preclude the supposition of its being due to a mere person. Thus, the meaning of the text: "He who, verily, O Bālāki, is the maker of these persons" (Kauṣ. 4.19) is as follows: O Bālāki, he who is the maker of the persons within the sun and the rest, designated by you as Brahman, and who is not the maker of the persons only, but of whom this entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, is an effect,—that Supreme Soul, the soul of

1 For correct quotation see footnote 3, p. 243.

all, the Lord of all, is the object to be known. Here, although the persons, being included within the world, are proved to have the Supreme Soul as their cause, their separate mention is to be known for the purpose of rejecting their Brahman-hood, claimed by Bālāki.¹

SŪTRA 17

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC MARK OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL AND THE CHIEF VITAL-BREATH, (THE LORD IS NOT DENOTED HERE), (WE REPLY:) THAT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of the characteristic mark of the individual soul, contained in the passage: ‘This intelligent self enjoys with these selves’ (Kauṣ. 4.20²); as well as on account of the characteristic mark of the chief vital-breath, contained in the passage: ‘Now, in this vital-breath alone he becomes one’ (Kauṣ. 3.3; 4.20³), one of these two is to be understood, and not Brahman,—

(We reply:) “that has been explained” in the section treating of Pratardana⁴. The sense is that the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the rest have been explained there as referring to Brahman, and should be known to be so here as well.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: On account of the characteristic mark of an individual soul, contained in the passage: ‘Just as a merchant enjoys with his own people, and as his own people enjoy him, so exactly this intelligent self enjoys with these selves, so exactly do these selves enjoy it’ (Kauṣ. 4.20); as well as on account of the characteristic mark of the chief vital-breath, contained in the passages: ‘Then in

¹ I.e. in the text: ‘He who is the creator of these persons, of whom this is the work’, the phrase ‘of whom this is the work’ implies that the entire universe—including the sun and the rest—is the effect of *Brahman*. In spite of this the persons within the sun and the rest are mentioned separately once more as the effects of *Brahman*, because the king wants to point out particularly that they are not *Brahman*, as previously alleged.

² Ś, R, ŚK.

³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK.

⁴ Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.29–32.

this vital-breath alone he becomes one' (Kauṣ. 3.3; 4.20), one of these two is to be understood, and not the Supreme Soul,—

(We reply:) "that has been explained" in the sub-section, beginning with the aphorism: 'The vital-breath, on account of intelligibility in that way' (Br. Sū. 1.1.29). There, the text being ascertained to have Brahman for its object on the ground of the beginning and the end, the marks of the individual soul and the rest, too, have been described as referring to Him alone. In the very same manner, here, too, in the beginning, in the passage: "Let me declare Brahman to you" (Kauṣ. 4.1), Brahman is mentioned as the object. In the middle, too, in the text: "Of whom this is the work" (Kauṣ. 4.19), Brahman is mentioned as the agent of the 'work' or the entire universe. The end as well refers to none but Brahman, since the text: 'He who knows thus, having overcome all evils, attains supremacy, independent rule and lordship among all beings' (Kauṣ. 4.20), declares that excellent results pertain to His worshippers. Thus, this text being ascertained to be referring to Brahman, the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the rest, too, are to be taken as referring to Him. And, it is not to be said that there is any repetition here (of what has already been said under Br. Sū. 1.1.29-32), since that section about Pratardana does not determine the meaning of the text: 'Of whom this is the work' (Kauṣ. 4.19), which the present section does.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. he reads this sūtra and the next one as one sūtra.¹

SŪTRA 18

"BUT JAİMİNĪ (THINKS THAT THE MENTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL) HAS A DIFFERENT PURPOSE, ON ACCOUNT OF QUESTION AND EXPLANATION, AND THUS SOME (READ)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Jaīmīni thinks that the mention of the individual soul in this section has the purpose of suggesting Brahman, other than the

¹ Bh. B. 1.1.17, p. 78.

individual soul; on account of the question: “Where, O Bālāki, did this person lie? What did he become? Whence did he come back?” (Kauṣ. 4.19¹); and on account of the reply: “When the sleeping person sees no dreams whatsoever, then in this vital-breath alone he becomes one” (Kauṣ. 4.19²). The Vājasaneyins, too, thus record the Supreme Soul as other than the individual soul. There too, there are question and answer. The question is: “What did he then become? Whence did he return?” (Bṛh. 2.1.16³), and the answer is: “That which is this ether within the heart, in that he lies” (Bṛh. 2.1.17⁴).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: since in the text: ‘In this vital-breath alone he becomes one’ (Kauṣ. 4.19), entering by the individual soul is mentioned, and since the term ‘vital-breath’ is applied to Brahman, who alone is fit to be the substratum of the individual soul’s entering, let the characteristic marks of the vital-breath refer to Brahman. But it seems very difficult to take the characteristic marks of the individual soul as referring to Brahman, since here in the passage: ‘They two went to a sleeping person’ (Kauṣ. 4.19), the exclusive mark of an individual soul is found,—the author replies here.

The teacher Jaimini thinks that the mention of the individual soul in this section “has a different purpose”, viz. the purpose of demonstrating that the Supreme Soul,—possessed of the qualities of being a support and the rest,—is different from the individual soul, possessed of the qualities of ‘being the object to be supported’, etc. Why? “On account of question and explanation.” Thus, Ajātaśatru, a knower of Brahman, approached a sleeping person with Bālāki, desirous of enquiring into Brahman; and called that person thus: “O Soma, the king” (Kauṣ. 4.19). But when the sleeper did not hear him, Ajātaśatru thereby demonstrated the fact that enjoyer is different from the vital-breath and the rest which are not enjoyers. After that, when the sentient soul, different from those non-sentient, was awakened by the push of the stick, Ajātaśatru himself asked the following questions with a view to demonstrating Brahman once more as different from the sentient and the non-sentient:

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² *Op. cit.*

⁴ *Op. cit.*

“Where, O Bālāki, did this person lie? What, verily, did he become? Whence did he return?” (Kauṣ. 4.19). As Bālāki was unable to answer the question, Ajātaśatru himself replied: “When the sleeping person sees no dream whatsoever, then in this vital-breath alone he becomes one; . . . when he wakes up, . . . then from this soul all the vital-breaths proceed, each towards its place, from the vital-breaths the gods, from the gods the worlds” (Kauṣ. 4.20). On account of such question and answer the Supreme Soul, different from the individual soul, is to be understood here. The sense is this: During the period of deep sleep, the soul, having drawn forth the whole group sense-organs, and having entered into the Supreme Soul,—denoted by the term ‘vital-breath’ which stands in apposition with the pronoun ‘this’ in the text: ‘In this vital-breath’ (Kauṣ. 4.19),—becomes self-abiding and tranquil. Then, when time comes, it goes out from that very vital-breath for undergoing retributive experiences. This Supreme Soul, celebrated to be the substratum of deep sleep¹ and the rest, and different from the individual soul, is the object to be known,—such is the view of Jaimini as well. The mention of Jaimini is for the purpose of clearly indicating that the meaning stated above by us is highly commendable.

“And thus some”, i.e. the Vājasaneyins designate the Supreme Soul as different from the individual soul, consisting of intelligence. There, too, a dialogue between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru has been introduced, containing a question and an answer. The question is: “He who consists of intelligence, what did he become then? Whence did he come?” (Bṛh. 2.1.16); and the answer is: “That which is the ether within the heart, in that he lies” (Bṛh. 2.1.17²). That the ether is the Supreme Soul has been established under the section, concerned with the text: ‘Small is the ether within that’ (Chānd. 8.1.1³). This difference between the individual soul and the Lord has been demonstrated before by the author of the aphorisms in many aphorisms like: ‘And on account of the designation of difference’ (Br. Sū. 1.1.18⁴), etc. Incidentally it is confirmed here too as being

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 3.2.7.

² The *Bālāki Ajātaśatru-saṃvāda* in Bṛh. 2.1 is exactly similar to that in Kauṣ. 4, only the latter makes no mention of the ether.

³ Vide *Dahara-adhikaraṇa*, Br. Sū. 1.3.14–24.

⁴ Vide also Br. Sū. 1.1.22, 1.2.4, 1.2.21, 1.2.23, 1.3.5, etc. (The numbering is Nimbārka’s.)

held by Jaimini as well, with the words: "But Jaimini (thinks that the mention of the individual soul has a different purpose". With a view to showing that it is confirmed all the more strongly as being based on the Veda, it is said: "On account of question and explanation", and for suggesting that it is celebrated in all the Upaniṣads, it is said "and thus some". The non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman, too, has been mentioned before,¹ and we shall speak of it carefully later on.² Hence, none but the Supreme Soul is taught as the object to be known. It is established that He alone is the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, and not puruṣa, established in the Tantra, or pradhāna, superintended by it.

Here ends the section entitled 'Denoting the world' (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

General import same, only while Nimbārka, as before, connects this adhikaraṇa more directly with the topic of the preceding part of the pāda, viz. refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara do not do so, but take it to be concerned with the general question of the concordance of all texts with regard to Brahman.³

Śrīkaṇṭha

General import same, but he too does not take this adhikaraṇa as concerned with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but with the question of the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.⁴ Hence according to him, the problem here is whether the

¹ Vide V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11, 1.1.7, p. 25, 1.2.6, p. 52, etc. (Page references are to the K.S.S. ed.)

² Vide e.g. V.K. 1.4.20, p. 139, 1.4.21, p. 140, 2.1.16, p. 151, etc. (K.S.S. ed.)

³ This is evident from the fact that while according to Nimbārka the question is whether in Kauṣ. 4.19 the object to be known is the Sāṃkhya puruṣa or the Supreme Soul (vide V.P.S. 1.3.16), according to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, the question is whether in the same text the object to be known is the vital-breath or the Supreme Soul. Vide Ś.B. 1.4.16, p. 418; Bh. B. 1.4.16, p. 78.

⁴ *Punar api jīvāt paramēśvarasya anya-bhāvam upapādayati.* ŚK. B. 1.4.16, Intro., p. 535, Part 6.

object to be known in Kauṣītaki text (4.19) is the individual soul or the Supreme Soul, and so on.¹

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled 'The connection of texts'. (Sūtras 19-22)

SŪTRA 19

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION OF TEXTS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the text: "O! the self, verily, should be seen" (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6²), the Supreme Soul should be understood as the object to be seen, "on account of the connection" of the text with Him alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, by showing once more the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman, the author is disposing of puruṣa, admitted by the Sāṃkhyas.

We find the following text in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka under the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa, beginning: 'He said: "O, not for the love of the husband, verily, is a husband dear, but for the love of the soul is a husband dear"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), and continuing: "O, the self, verily, should be seen, should be heard, should be meditated on"' (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6). Here the doubt is, viz. whether the soul, the twenty-fifth principle of the Sāṃkhyas, is taught as the object to be seen, or the Highest Person, Lord Vāsudeva? What is reasonable here? The *prima facie* objector thinks: The soul, the twenty-fifth principle established by the Tantra, is taught as the object to be seen and so on, as it is possible for it alone to be the object of the acts of perception and the rest; as it is impossible for Brahman, admitted by the defendant, to be properly an object of an act, He being unlimited by so muchness; as the connection of the Self with the dearness of husband, wife, son and the rest, mentioned in the beginning, is possible on the part of only puruṣa, mentioned by the Tantra; as in the middle, too, in the text: "This great Being, infinite and endless, is but a

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 536 *et seq.*

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

mass of intelligence. Having risen from those elements, one vanishes into them alone. After death, there is no consciousness” (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13), puruṣa is laid down as subject to transmigratory existence as connected with origin and destruction—puruṣa, which is mentioned in the Tantra, the very one, which dwells within the body as indicated by the word ‘this’, which is indicated by the word ‘great being’ with a view to making its distinction from the material beings clear, which is indicated by the word ‘infinite’ with a view to making its illimitableness in time clear, which is endless, i.e. innumerable, and which is a mass of intelligence; and as, finally, towards the end as well, the text: “O, whereby one should know the knower” (Bṛh. 2.4.14; 4.5.15), declares it to be a knower.

With regard to it, we point out the right conclusion: None but the Highest Person is here taught as the object to be seen and so on. Why? Because the text has connection with the Supreme Soul alone, i.e. because from a consideration of the beginning and the end, the connection of the group of texts, intending to convey the same meaning, as referring to the Supreme Soul is known. Thus, when from Yājñavalkya’s statement, viz.: “Of immortality, however, there is no hope through wealth” (Bṛh. 2.4.2; 4.5.3). Maitreyī came to know definitely that work, to be accomplished by means of wealth, is not a means to salvation,—as well-known from other scriptural texts too, viz.: ‘Frail indeed are these boats of sacrifices’ (Muṇḍ. 1.2.7), ‘What is not made is not gained through what is made’ (Muṇḍ. 1.2.12) and so on,—she, desiring for salvation, asked about the means to salvation, thus: “What shall I do with that whereby I may not be immortal? Whatever, Sir, you know, tell me that” (Bṛh. 2.4.3; 4.5.4). Thus asked, Yājñavalkya taught the Supreme Soul alone, the soul of all, as the object of the acts of seeing and the rest, thus: “O, the self, verily, should be seen” (Bṛh. 2.4.3; 4.5.4), salvation being possible through the meditation on Him alone. The knowledge of all, too, is possible through the knowledge of Him. In the end, too, the attribute of ‘being the self of all’, mentioned in the passage: “All this is the soul” (Bṛh. 2.4.6; 4.5.7), is a characteristic mark of the Supreme Soul alone.

SŪTRA 20

“(THE BEGINNING WITH THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) A MARK OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, ĀŚMARATHYA (THINKS SO).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

To the question: Why, then, is there the beginning with the individual soul? we reply: the fact that the Supreme Soul is designated by a word denoting the individual soul,—the latter being non-different from the former as His effect,—is a convincing proof “of the establishment of the initial proposition”, viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. So “Āśmarathya” thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The individual soul alone is apprehended as connected with the dearness of husband and the rest in the beginning, in the passage: “O, not for the love of the husband, verily, is a husband dear, but for the love of the soul is a husband dear” (Brh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on; as well as connected with origin and destruction in the middle, in the passage: “Having arisen from these beings, one vanishes into them alone. After death there is no consciousness” (Brh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13),—

(We reply:) True. Still, by the term “individual soul” the Supreme Soul is to be understood here. No such objection can be raised in view of the fact that He, being the cause of all, can be denoted by all words. The author is showing this with the approval of another teacher.

In accordance with the text: ‘From whom, verily, all these elements arise’ (Tait. 3.1), the individual soul, too, entered into the elements, is reckoned among the effects, and Brahman is the cause. These two being the effect and the cause, there is, undoubtedly, a primary difference between them. Thus the texts designating duality are correct. Since the effect is non-different from the cause, being born from it and so on, non-difference between the two, too, is equally a fact. Thus, the texts designating non-duality, too, are correct. In this way, both the kinds of texts being authoritative in their own senses, there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Hence, it is possible for words denoting the effects to denote the causes as well, just as in the

case of the pot and the clay, standing in the relation of effect and cause, the word 'pot' refers to the clay as well. This being so, the initial proposition too, viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all, is established,—such is the view of Āśmarathya. The meaning of the words of the aphorism is as follows: This, really, is "a mark" or a convincing proof "of the establishment of the initial proposition", viz. that through the knowledge of one, there is the knowledge of all. What mark? Listen! The individual soul being non-different from the Supreme Soul as His effect, by the word "individual soul" the Supreme Soul is designated,—so the teacher Āśmarathya thinks.

SŪTRA 21

"ON ACCOUNT OF SUCH A CONDITION OF ONE WHO IS ABOUT TO DEPART, AUḍULOMI (THINKS SO)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the union of the individual soul, about to depart from the body, with Brahman, Brahman is denoted by a word denoting the individual soul,—so Auḍulomi thinks.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"On account of such a condition," i.e. on account of the union of the individual soul with the Supreme Soul,—of the soul which "is about to depart" from the aggregation of the body and the sense-organs, in accordance with the text: 'As the flowing rivers disappear into the sea, leaving names and forms, so a knower, freed from name and form, attains the celestial Person, higher than the high' (Chānd. 8.3.4); which is endowed with the hearing, the thinking, the meditation and the direct vision of Brahman; and which is well-known to be unborn from the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'A wise man is neither born, nor dies' (Kāṭha 2.18), 'This is unborn, eternal, constant' (Gītā 2.20), i.e. on account of its attaining the state of Brahman, the Supreme Soul is denoted by a term denoting the individual soul,—so thinks the teacher Auḍulomi. On this view, there is a difference between the individual soul and Brahman during the soul's state of bondage, and non-difference during its state of

release. In this manner, there are both difference and non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman. Thus, the meaning of the text is difference and non-difference,—such is the view of the teacher Auḍulomi. Such difference and non-difference are admitted by the reverend Auḍulomi for the benefit of the dull-witted. But really even during the state of bondage, the individual soul, which is atomic in size and possesses little knowledge, though different from Brahman who is all-pervasive, non-deviating in nature and omniscient, is yet non-different from Him, since it has no separate existence and activity,—just as a leaf is non-different from the tree, the ray from the lamp, the attribute from its substratum and the sense-organs from the vital-breath. Likewise, though in release it is non-different from Him, it having no separate existence and activity, at the same time, it is undoubtedly different from Him, in accordance with the text: ‘It is completed in its own form alone’¹ (Chānd. 8.3.4). Otherwise, the imperishableness of the respective natures of both must come to be jeopardized. The view of Āśmarathya, too, should be known to be the same.

COMPARISON

The commentators give different meanings of the word ‘*evam bhāvāt*’. According to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara it means ‘on account of attaining identity with the Supreme Soul’;² according to Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha, ‘on account of attaining the state of the Supreme Soul’;³ and according to Baladeva, ‘on account of becoming dear to all, etc.’⁴

SŪTRA 22

“ON ACCOUNT OF ABIDING, SO KĀŚAKṚTSNA.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the abiding” of the Supreme Lord,—celebrated in the passage: ‘Entered within, the ruler of men’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2⁵)

¹ ‘*Eva*’ is not included in the original text. Vide Chānd. 8.3.4, p. 421.

² ‘*Paramātmaikyopapatteḥ*.’ Ś.B. 1.4.21, p. 425; Bh. B. 1.4.21, p. 81.

³ ‘*Paramātma-bhāvāt*.’ Śrī. B. 1.4.21, p. 394, Part 1, Madras ed. Śk. B. 1.4.21, p. 549, Part 6.

⁴ G.B. 1.4.21

⁵ P. 181. R.

and so on,—in the individual soul as the controller, in the beginning and in what follows, by a term denoting the object to be controlled the controller is understood—so thinks Kāśakṛtsna.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“On account of the abiding” of the Supreme Soul in the individual soul,—an object to be controlled by Him,—as its soul, in accordance with the texts: ‘He who abiding in the soul is other than the soul, whom the soul does not know, of whom the soul is the body, who rules the soul within, he is your soul, the inner controller, immortal’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30¹), ‘Entered within, the ruler of men, the soul of all’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.2), by a term denoting the individual soul, the Supreme Soul is denoted,—so thinks the teacher Kāśakṛtsna, a knower of the object controlled, as well as of the controller.

Thus, by means of the views of the three sages, the nature of difference and non-difference has been incidentally shown by his Holiness. And with a view to removing the contradiction among the scriptural texts by his own theory, he will clearly prove the natural relation of difference-non-difference between the individual soul and Brahman in the aphorisms: ‘A part, on account of the designation of variety’ (Br. Sū. 2.3.42) and so on.

Here, the word ‘soul’ in the beginning refers to the Supreme Soul alone. The worship of that very Supreme Soul is designated as a means to salvation in the passage: “‘O, the soul, verily’” (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6) and so on. The text: ‘Having arisen from these beings, one vanishes into them alone’ (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13), indicates transmigratory existence pertaining to one who is averse to the Supreme Soul; and the text: ‘There is no consciousness after death’ (Bṛh. 2.4.12; 4.5.13) indicates salvation pertaining to His worshipper. Hence, it is established that the texts of the Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa all agree in referring to Brahman, different and non-different from the sentient and the non-sentient, the cause of all, to be approached by the freed and the controller of all.

Here ends the section entitled ‘The connection of texts’ (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Here too, as before, the general import is the same, but while Nimbārka¹ takes this *adhikaraṇa* to be connected more directly with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha do not. Further, Śaṃkara and Bhāskara interpret the word 'avasthiteḥ' differently. To them, it means 'because of (Brahman's) abiding as the individual soul' (*vijñātmā-bhāvena*)².

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled 'The material cause'. (Sūtras 23-27)

SŪTRA 23

“(BRAHMAN IS) THE MATERIAL CAUSE, AND (THE EFFICIENT CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT WITH REGARD TO THE INITIAL PROPOSITION AND THE ILLUSTRATION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“The material cause,” as well as the efficient cause,—indicated by the particle “and” (in the sūtra),—is none but the Supreme Soul, because then alone the initial proposition: “Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?” (Chānd. 6.1.3³), as well as the illustration: “Just as, my dear, through a lump of clay, all objects made of clay may be known” (Chānd. 6.1.4⁴) are explicable.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having thus refuted the atheistic school of the Sāṃkhyas, now the author, by refuting the theistic school of the Sāṃkhyas, is confirming the view, mentioned above, that the Lord is the non-different material and efficient cause of the world.

It may be objected that, properly, this section ought to have been inserted immediately after the aphorism: 'From whom (arise)

¹ Vide V.K. 1.4.11, p. 137, Kāśī ed.

² Ś.B. 1.4.21, p. 426; Bh. B. 1.4.21, p. 81.

³ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

the origin and the rest of this' (Br. Sū. 1.1.2), demonstrating the characteristic marks of Brahman, establishing the nature of the cause of the world. (To this we reply): No. One sees its appropriateness here indeed. Thus, on the enquiry: viz. Of what mark is Brahman? with regard to the injunction, viz. 'An enquiry into Brahman should be undertaken',—the mark of Brahman was stated in the aphorism 'From whom (arise) the origin and the rest of this' (Br. Sū. 1.1.2). There it was certainly established, on the ground of scriptural and Smṛti texts, that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause. After that, there being no enquiry as to whether He is *only* the material cause, or only the efficient cause, the topic was not further amplified. But there those who take everything to be the transformation of prakṛti (and take Brahman to be the efficient cause *only*) are being refuted separately.

Thus, some theistic Sāṃkhyas hold: In the world of ordinary experience, sentient beings like potters and the rest are found to be the efficient cause alone, and not the material cause. In the passages: 'He thought' (Brh. 1.2.5; Ait. 1.1), 'He thought' (Praśna 6.3), creation is said to be preceded by thinking. Hence let the Supreme Lord, the thinker, be, somehow or other, only the efficient cause of the world; but the material cause of mahat and the rest is nothing but pradhāna, superintended by Him, just as clay is the material cause of pots and the like, in accordance with the text: 'He thinks of her who is the mother of all changes, non-knowing, having eight forms, and eternal. Ruled by him she manifests herself; again incited and superintended by him alone¹ she gives birth to the world for the benefit of the soul. She is a cow, without beginning and end, the progenitress, the source of all beings' (Cūl. 3b-5a²).

With regard to it, we reply: Brahman alone is 'prakṛti', i.e. the material cause of the world, as well as its efficient cause, indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). Why? "On account of the absence of conflict with regard to the initial proposition and illustration," i.e. on account of the non-contradiction or consistency of

¹ Incorrect, ought to be 'adhyāsītā, which is translated here.

² Reading different, viz.:

'Vikāra-jananīm māyām aṣṭa-rūpāṃ dhruvām
Dhyāyate adhyāsītā tena tanyate preritā punaḥ.
Stūyate puruṣārthan ca tenaivādhiṣṭhitā purā
Gaur anādati sā tu janitṛī bhūta-bhāvinī'. Vide Cūl. 3-5, p. 230.

the initial proposition and the illustration. The initial proposition, to begin with, is as follows: “Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known?” (Chānd. 6.1.3). The meaning of this text is as follows: O son Svetaketu! Did you ask for that ‘instruction’, i.e. that instructor, viz. the Supreme Soul, ‘whereby’, i.e. through hearing of whom from the preceptor, even what is unheard becomes heard, what is unthought becomes thought, what is unknown becomes known? It is known from this initial proposition that the Supreme Soul is the material cause, since the hearing and the rest of the effects is justifiable only through the hearing and the rest of the material cause. The illustration given is as follows: “Just as, my dear, through a lump of clay, all objects made of clay may be known” (Chānd. 6.1.4) and so on. It is known from this illustration that the Supreme Soul is the material cause of the object illustrated as well (viz. clay). A potter has not been cited in the illustration; and through a potter being known, a pot cannot be known. But a lump of clay being known, all objects made of clay, like pots and the rest, may, indeed, be known.

To the contention, viz. that in the world of ordinary experience sentient beings like potters and the rest are found to be efficient causes merely,—we reply: We do not arrive at the cause of the world by means of inference and the rest, and so, for us, there is no need for the illustration of a potter. But discarding all evidences contrary to the Veda, we follow what is mentioned by Scripture and the preceptor¹. Moreover, in the world of ordinary experience, too, we see that a sentient person is the material cause of the effects like hairs, body-hairs and the rest; that a spider is the material cause of the web, and so on. We read in Scripture, too: ‘Just as hairs and body-hairs (arise) from a person, just as a spider creates and takes’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7²). If it be objected that in the above cases, the material causes containing elements, suitable for giving rise to the effects,—(we reply:) in the subject of our discussion, too, there is God’s self-power, called prakṛti.

¹ Vide V.K. 1.1.3.

² Correct quotation:

‘Yathā ūṣa-nābhīḥ sṛjate grhṇate ca
Yathā pṛthivyām oṣadhayaḥ sambhavanti.
Yathā sataḥ puruṣāt keśa-lomāni’, etc. Vide Muṇḍ. 1.1.7, p. 9.

SŪTRA 24

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF REFLECTION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the teaching of reflection” in the text: ‘He perceived (i.e. thought): “May I be many”’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), the fact that Brahman is the creator (i.e. the efficient cause) and the material cause is established.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“On account of the teaching of reflection,” i.e. on account of the teaching of resolution, in the passage: ‘He wished’ (Tait. 2.6), as well as on account of the teaching of resolution in the passage “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6 ; Chānd. 6.2.3), the Supreme Soul alone can appropriately be the creator (or the efficient cause) and the material cause respectively).

COMPARISON

All others read ‘ca’ in the end.¹

SŪTRA 25

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION OF BOTH IN THE SACRED TEXT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account of the direct mention of Brahman as the efficient and material cause in the sacred text: ‘Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth. O wise men, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the worlds’² (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6-7³), Brahman alone is of the two-fold forms.

¹ The reading in the C.S.S. ed. of V.P.S., however, adds ‘ca’ at the end, p. 23. But the Brindaban ed. (vol. I) omits the ‘ca’, p. 354.

² Last line of the quotation incorrect. For the correct quotation see below V.K. The C.S.S. ed. gives the correct quotation, p. 23, which is translated here.

³ P. 360, lines 5-7, vol. 2.
R, Bh, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The particle “and” implies affirmation. Brahman is, indeed, both the material and the efficient cause. Why? “On account of the direct mention of both in the sacred text.” Thus, to the question, viz. ‘What was the wood, what was the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth? O wise men, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the worlds’ (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6¹; Ṛg.V. 10.81.4²), the answer: ‘Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth. O wise men, I tell you through the mind, it stood on Brahman supporting the worlds’ (Tait. Br. 2.8.9.6-7), directly records ‘both’, i.e. the fact that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

This is Sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. ‘On account of the direct mention of both (viz. origin and dissolution) by the sacred text’. That is, in Chāndogya 1.9.1 it is said that all beings arise from and disappear into the ether. Now, here the term ‘ether’ stands for Brahman (as shown in Br. Sū. 1.1.22). Hence the above passage means that all things arise from and disappear into Brahman. But things disappear into their material cause from which they have arisen. Hence the above passage proves that Brahman is the material cause of everything.³

SŪTRA 26

“ON ACCOUNT OF CREATING HIMSELF, ON ACCOUNT OF TRANSFORMATION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause of the world. Why? “On account of creating Himself,” as known from the passage: ‘That itself created itself’ (Tait. 2.7⁴). If it be objected: Now can the Creator be Himself the object of creation?—(We reply:) ‘On

¹ P. 360, lines 2-5, vol. 2.

³ Bh. B. 1.4.24, p. 85.

² P. 336, lines 8-10.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

account of transformation'. The omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, having transformed Himself into the form of the world by the projection of His power, becomes transformed, indeed, through His own nature, undeveloped, and possessing powers like creatorship, etc.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause. Why? "On account of creating himself." That is, in the text: 'That itself created itself' (Tait. 2.7), He Himself is indicated as the creator of Himself, the object of creation,—the word 'kṛti' means creation,—on account of this. If it be objected: How can the fact that the Creator Himself is the object of His own creation be reconcilable?—the author replies: "On account of transformation". The omniscient and omnipotent Supreme Soul, non-deviating in nature, transforms Himself into the form of the world through the projection of His own powers, consisting in His own self and superintended by Him; on account of such a transformation everything is faultless. His powers are infinite and natural, as established by the following scriptural and Smṛti texts, viz. 'His supreme power is declared to be of various kinds indeed, and natural is the operation of his knowledge and power' (Śvet. 6.8). 'The ancient Person is possessed of a variety of powers, and the powers of others cannot be like them', 'Hundreds of positive powers, like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3.2¹). He projects them in the beginning of creation. The best among the sacred texts of the Śvetāśvataras proves His non-dependence on another at the beginning of creation, as well as His being without an equal or a superior, thus: 'His action and organ do not exist, His equal or superior is not seen' (Śvet. 6.8). And the following scriptural and Smṛti texts are evidences with regard to His transformation or the projection of powers: 'Just as a spider creates and takes' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7), 'Having entered into pradhāna (i.e. matter) and puruṣa (i.e. soul) through His own wish, Hari stirred up the mutable (viz. matter) and the immutable (viz. soul) when the time of creation arrived' (V.P. 1.2.29²), 'Just as a tortoise, having stretched forth its limbs, draws them in again, so the

¹ P. 22.

² P. 16.

soul of beings swallows up again the created beings' (Mahā. 12. 7072b-7073a¹).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They break the sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. 'Ātmakṛteḥ' and 'Pariṇāmāt'.²

SŪTRA 27

"AND BECAUSE (BRAHMAN) IS CELEBRATED TO BE THE SOURCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And in the texts: 'The source of beings which the wise see' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6³), 'The creator, the Lord, the person, the source of Brahmā' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3⁴), Brahman "is celebrated" by the word "source". Hence, Brahman alone is the material cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Because" in the texts: 'The source of beings which the wise see' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), 'The creator, the Lord, the person, the source of Brahmā' (Muṇḍ. 3.1.3), 'This is the source of all' (Māṇḍ. 6), Brahman "is celebrated" by the word "source", denoting the material cause,—the material cause is none but Brahman,—this is the sense. Hence, the doctrine of the Sāṃkhyas is not to be accepted, being opposed as it is to the Veda. It is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa alone, the sole topic of all the Vedas, different and non-different from the universe, the Highest Person, the Lord, and the Lord of all, is to be meditated on by one desirous of salvation as the non-different material and efficient cause of the universe.

Here ends the section entitled 'The material cause' (7).

¹ P. 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: 'Harate' instead of 'grasate'.
Vaṅgavāsī ed. too reads 'harate', p. 1571.

² Śrī. B. p. 404, Part 1; Śk. B., pp. 564-65, Part 6.

³ Ś, R, Bh, B.

⁴ *Op. cit.*

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Śrīkaṇṭha

As before they do not take this adhikaraṇa to be directly connected with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, as Nimbārka does.¹

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled 'The explanation of all'. (Sūtra 28)

SŪTRA 28

"HEREBY ALL IS EXPLAINED, EXPLAINED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Hereby", i.e. by the totality of the sections, 'all' the Vedāntas 'are explained' as referring to Brahman, "explained".

Here ends the fourth quarter of the first chapter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms is showing the concordance of all the Vedāntas with regard to Brahman by means of extended and analogical application.² "Hereby", i.e. through the above mode of concordance, "all" Vedāntas, mentioned or non-mentioned, should be known to be "explained" as referring to Brahman. It should be known that the Vedas also are in concordance with regard to Brahman alone, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'The word which all the Vedas record' (Kaṭha 2.15); and in accordance with the Smṛti text: "'I alone am to be known through all the Vedas'" (Gītā 15.15). The repetition shows the end of the chapter. Hence it is established that Lord Kṛṣṇa, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, the sole topic of all the Vedas, and

¹ Vide V.K. 1.4.23, p. 142 and 1.4.27, p. 145. K.S.S. ed.

² *Atideśa*. For the explanation of '*atideśa*' see V.K. 2.1.3.

denoted by the terms 'Brahman', 'Nārāyaṇa' and the rest, is to be worshipped by one, desirous of salvation, through hearing, thinking, meditating and so on.

Here ends the section entitled 'The explanation of all' (8).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the first chapter of the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the holy lotus-feet of Nimbārka, the founder and teacher of the sect of the venerable Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. they connect this adhikaraṇa more directly with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, which Nimbārka does not. Thus, the meaning of the sūtra according to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara is: 'Hereby' (i.e. by the mode of refuting the Sāṃkhya view), all (i.e. other doctrine like Atomism and the rest) are explained (as negated), explained'.¹

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. 'Hereby (viz. by the method indicated above) all (the words like pradhāna, Śiva and the rest) are explained (as denoting Brahman alone), explained'.²

Thus, we find that Nimbārka, Rāmānuja and Baladeva direct the entire pāda, except the last adhikaraṇa, to the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, but surprisingly enough make no reference to the Sāṃkhya view in the last adhikaraṇa, bringing in different topics. Nimbārka and Rāmānuja speak of the general concordance of the Vedānta texts in the last section, while Baladeva speaks of the significance of all names.

No less surprising is the procedure of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. Śaṅkara finishes with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, and takes the intervening four adhikaraṇa as concerned, not with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, but with the general concordance of the Vedānta texts, etc. Then, all of a sudden, he refers to the Sāṃkhya doctrine in the last adhikaraṇa.

¹ Ś.B. 1.4.28, p. 436; Bh. B. 1.4.27, p. 86.

² G.B. 1.4.28.

Bhāskara closely follows Śaṃkara. He too finishes with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, takes the intervening three adhikaraṇas as concerned with the general concordance of texts, but takes the last two adhikaraṇas as referring to the Sāṃkhya doctrine.

Śrīkaṇṭha is the most consistent of all. He finishes with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya doctrine in adhikaraṇa 3, once for all, and directs the remaining adhikaraṇas to other topics.

Résumé

The fourth section of the first chapter consists of:—

1. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka.
2. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṃkara.
3. 29 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja.
4. 27 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara.
5. 29 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha.
6. 28 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha split sūtra 26 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya into two separate sūtras, while Bhāskara takes the sūtras 17 and 18 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya as one sūtra.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FIRST QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled 'Smṛti'.
(Sūtras 1-2)

SŪTRA 1

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THERE WILL RESULT THE FAULT OF NOT LEAVING A ROOM FOR SMṚTI, (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR THERE WILL RESULT THE FAULT FOR LEAVING NO ROOM FOR (OTHER) SMṚTIS."

The interpretation of the Brahma-sūtras entitled: 'Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha', composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Now, it is being demonstrated in details how the stated concordance is free from all contradictions. If it be objected: There does exist a need for Smṛtis for confirming Scripture. Among these, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be accepted. It is not to be said that it, designating as it does a non-sentient cause, is not to be accepted for that reason—for, then, "there will result the fault of leaving no room for Smṛti"—(we reply:) 'no', for, then, there will result the contradiction of other Smṛtis which deal with a sentient cause mentioned in the Veda—such is the meaning of the text.

The commentary entitled 'Vedānta-kaustubha', composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

With a view to inducing one desiring salvation to the repeated practice of the hearing, thinking and the like of the Vedānta, revealing the qualities, nature and so on of Brahman,—which practice is conducive to the meditation on Brahman, the exclusive cause of a direct vision of Him,—the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman,—the Highest Person, different and non-different from all, free by nature from all faults, the one abode of a mass of auspicious qualities and the cause of the world,—has been shown in the previous chapter. Now, in this second chapter, contradictions are being removed. Thus, in the first quarter, the faults found by the opponents with our own view are refuted. In the second quarter, faults are found with the views of the opponents, based on a semblance of reason, (and not on real reason), with a view to inducing people to our own view. In the third quarter, it is shown in details how the scriptural

texts, regarding the origin of the great elements like the ether and the rest, are all free from contradictions; and, further, the order of creation and destruction, and the nature of the individual soul, are determined. In the fourth quarter, again, the contradictions among the texts, demonstrating the organs of the individual soul, are removed. Now, first, it is being demonstrated that our view is consistent with the Smṛtis as well.

It has been stated in the section treating of proof ¹ that Brahman, the cause of the world, has the Veda as His sole proof, since He cannot be known through any other source. And in the section, treating of concordance ², it has been established that there is concordance of all the Vedas with regard to Brahman alone. And, likewise, the meaning of the Veda being very difficult to be grasped without the help of Smṛtis, composed by those who are versed in the Veda, there is a need for Smṛtis as well. It has been declared by Smṛti itself that one, who is without the Smṛti, to be a one-eyed man, thus: 'Scripture and Smṛti are celebrated to be the two eyes of the wise. Deprived of one, one is said to be "one-eyed"; deprived of both, "blind"'. Hence, on the doubt, viz. whether the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti and the rest are to be accepted as true for the sake of making the Veda clear, or the Manu-Smṛti and the like,—if it be argued: The Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be accepted for the sake of making the Veda clear, the aim of the Veda being to impart self-knowledge to all. If unable to give rise to self-knowledge, the collected Vedic texts must all be simply fruitless like a cow yielding no milk. So why should a Smṛti, which is concerned with teaching self-knowledge, be disregarded by any seeker after knowledge? The Manu-Smṛti and the rest, on the other hand, aim simply at demonstrating the works which lead to results, here or hereafter. The Śvetāśvataras record the omniscience of Kapila in the passage: 'Who, in the beginning, bears in his thoughts the sage Kapila, the born, and sees him while being born' (Śvet. 5.2). Hence the Smṛti which is composed by an omniscient person must be accepted for knowing the principle of the soul. That part of Veda which teaches the principle of the soul should be understood in accordance with the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti alone. Thus, as the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti teaches a non-sentient cause, the doctrine of a sentient cause cannot be accepted. Otherwise, "there will result the fault of leaving no room for the Smṛti",

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.3.

² Vide Br. Sū. 1.1.4.

i.e. there must result the fault of leaving no room for a Smṛti which designates a non-sentient cause and is composed by an omniscient sage, celebrated in the Veda,—

(We reply:) ‘no’, such a *prima facie* view is not reasonable. Why? “Because there will result the fault of not leaving room for other Smṛtis”, i.e. because there will result the fault of leaving no room for the Smṛtis other than it, viz. the Manu-Smṛti and the rest which establish Brahman to be the sole cause and are based on Scripture. The opponent who is shouting on the ground of Smṛti can be silenced by that very Smṛti itself. Thus, the reverend Manu says: ‘He appeared as possessing effective powers, like the great elements and the rest, dispelling darkness’ (Manu 1.6¹), ‘He having intended (to be many), and desirous of creating various kinds of beings, created water in the beginning and left his power in it’ (Manu 1.8²). Āpastamba too says: ‘Living beings are the abode of him who dwells in all caves (viz. hearts), who is not killed and who is stainless’ (Āp. D.S. 1.22.4³), ‘From him arise all bodies. He alone is the source, constant, he is eternal’ (Āp. D.S. 1.23.2⁴). It is said in the Bhārata (i.e. Mahā-bhārata) in the Rāja-dharma: “You are its origin and the dissolution, O Kṛṣṇa! You alone create this universe in the beginning. And this universe is under your control, O Source of the Universe! Obeisance to you, O (Lord) with the bow, disc and sword in hands!” (Mahā. 12.1514⁵). In the Mokṣa-dharma⁶, it is said: “For he is the inner soul of beings, and called the knower of the field⁷. He is Nārāyaṇa, having the universe as his form, infinite, constant⁸. From him arose the unmanifest, having three guṇas, O best among the twice-born!” (Mahā. 12.12680⁹). In that very section, to the question: “O reverend Father! O supremely wise one! I wish to hear, in truth,

³ P. 39, lines 3-4.

¹ P. 5.

² P. 5.

⁴ P. 40, line 2.

⁵ P. 419, line 5, vol. 3.

⁶ The name of a section of the 12th book of the Mahā-bhārata, from Chap. 174 to the end.

⁷ I.e. the knower of the body.

⁸ This line is not found either in the Asiatic Society ed., or in the Vāṅgavāsī ed. Both read instead the line: ‘*Triguṇa-vyatirikto vai puruṣaś ceti kalpitaḥ*’. Vide Asiatic Society ed., p. 812, line 5, vol. 3. Vāṅgavāsī ed., p. 1800, lines 14-15.

⁹ P. 812, lines 5-6, vol. 3, Asiatic Society ed.

about Viṣṇu, with eyes like lotus, unchangeable, the creator who is not created, the origin and dissolution of beings, about Nārāyaṇa, Hṛṣikeśa, Govinda, the unconquered, about Keśava, O best among the Bharatas!" (Mahā. 12.7518-19¹), (the answer given was:) "The Highest Person, the great-souled one, the soul of beings, fashioned the great elements, the air, the light and likewise the water, and the ether and the sky" (Mahā. 12.7825²). In the Dāna-dharma, Śiva says: "Higher than even the reverend Father (i.e. Brahmā) is Hari, the eternal Person, Kṛṣṇa, of a golden appearance and arisen like the sun in the cloudless sky, designated as Śrīvatsa, Hṛṣikeśa worshipped by all the deities. Brahmā has sprung up from his belly,—likewise I from his forehead, the lights from the hairs on his head, the gods and the demons from his body-hairs, the sages have arisen from his body, likewise, the eternal worlds. He is the veritable abode of the reverend Father (i.e. Brahmā), as well as the abode of all the gods. He is the creator of this entire world, the Lord of all the three worlds, the destroyer of all beings, of the immobile as well as of the mobile. He is directly perceived at all times indeed by one who has conquered his passions. He is the Lord of the gods and higher than the high, omniscient, connected with all, moving everywhere and turned towards all. He is the Supreme Soul, Hṛṣikeśa, all-pervading, the Supreme Lord" (Mahā. 13.6507-6512³). In that very section, the omniscient Devavrata, too, says, beginning: "For I know Kṛṣṇa in truth" (Mahā. 13.7659⁴) and continuing: "Know everything, the movable, as well as the immovable, all souls and the universe as Kṛṣṇa.⁵ Whatever is honoured in the worlds as a meritorious act, whatever is auspicious or inauspicious,—all that is Keśava, the inconceivable, everything else is the reverse. Such a Keśava is self-born, He is Nārāyaṇa supreme and unchangeable; the middle, the beginning and the end of the universe which existed; knowable by all; the origin as well as the dissolution of beings"

¹ P. 631, lines 18-19, vol. 3.

² *Op. cit.*, line 25.

³ Pp. 237-238, vol. 4. Reading different in some places, viz. 'Sa hi deva-
varaḥ sāṅśād deva-nāthaḥ parantapaḥ. Sarvajñaḥ sa hi saṁśliṣṭaḥ . . .'
Vaṅgavāsī ed. reads *sarva-saṁśliṣṭaḥ* otherwise it is the same as the above.
P. 2006, vol. 2.

⁴ P. 256, line 26, vol. 4.

⁵ Reading: 'Sarvaṁ kṛtsnam . . . viśvam enam . . .'. P. 258, line 7.
Reading in the Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar. P. 2017.

(Mahā. 13.7391 ; 7399-7400¹). And the statements by Him whose feet are worshipped by all the composers of Smṛtis are as follows: “I am the source of all, from me everything arises” (Gītā 10.8), “I am the source, likewise, the dissolution of the entire universe” (Gītā 7.6). Parāśara, too, declares: “The universe has arisen from Viṣṇu, and in Him alone it is grounded. He is the cause of the subsistence and control of the universe and He is the universe” (V.P. 1.1.35²). The sense is that if the view of Kapila be accepted as conducive to the Vedānta, then all those above and other texts must be contradicted. But the Manu-Smṛti and others are acceptable, since they establish religious duties, which are meant to the knowledge of Brahman, designated in the Veda; since they establish the qualities, nature and the rest of Brahman; and since they are composed by those who know the Veda. And in the Veda the cause of the world is designated to be a sentient principle, in fact, none but Brahman. Because of their opposition to this, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti and the rest are not acceptable. As the reverend Manu says: ‘Whatever Smṛtis are outside the pale of the Veda, whatever heterodox doctrines there are,—all of them are fruitless after death; these Smṛtis are given to ignorance’ (Manu 12.95³). Further, the composer, too, of the Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda (viz. the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti) is a certain sage, called Kapila, like Kaṇāda and the rest, but is not the lord Kapila, called Vāsudeva. As is declared by the Padma-purāṇa: ‘Kapila, called Vāsudeva, told the principle of the Sāṃkhya, supported by the meaning of all the Vedas, to the gods like Brahmā and the rest, and likewise to Bhṛgu and others, likewise to Āsuri. Another Kapila told the Sāṃkhya, opposed to all the Vedas and supported by false arguments, to another Āsuri’. Kapila, mentioned in the scriptural text, should be known to be Hiraṇyagarbha.

1 P. 258, lines 7, 18-19. Reading: ‘*Etādṛśah, Keśavo’taś ca bhūyo Nārāyaṇaḥ . . . sambabhūṣatām . . .*’. Vaṅgavāsī ed. exactly similar, only ‘*bubhūṣatām*’ in place of ‘*sambabhūṣatām*’. P. 2017.

2 P. 8.

3 P. 483.

SŪTRA 2

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-PERCEPTION ON THE PART OF OTHERS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And on account of the non-perception on the part of others”, i.e. on the part of Manu and the rest, that the Veda is concerned with pradhāna, Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda is unauthentic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“And on account of the non-perception on the part of others”,—i.e. on the part of men like Manu and the rest, other than Kapila and best among those versed in the Vedas,¹—that the Veda is concerned with pradhāna, the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is to be disregarded. Hence, it is established that the rejection of the Smṛti which is opposed to the Veda is not in conflict with the stated concordance.

Here ends the section entitled ‘Smṛti’ (1).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. ‘On account of the non-perception (in Scripture and ordinary experience) of others (viz. of the principles of mahat and the rest, other than pradhāna), (the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is not to be accepted)’.²

Baladeva

His interpretation too is very similar to the above one; viz. ‘On account of the non-perception (in Scripture) of others (viz. of many other doctrines found in the Sāṃkhya system, such as, the doctrine that the souls are pure consciousness and all-pervasive, and so on)’.³

¹ I.e. as men like Manu and others reject pradhāna, pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world.

² Ś.B. 2.1.2, p. 443; Bh. B. 2.1.2, p. 88.

³ G.B. 2.1.2, p. 11, Chap. 1.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled: 'The refutation of the Yoga'. (Sūtra 3)

SŪTRA 3

"HEREBY THE YOGA IS REFUTED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

By the refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti, the Yoga-Smṛti, too is refuted.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author points out the unauthenticity of the Yoga-Smṛti.

This aphorism is of the form of a formal extension (atideśa). A formal extension means the intimation of similarity when such a similarity is not known. Thus, at first, the Yoga-Smṛti is taken to be concerned with making the Veda clear, accepting as it does the word 'Yoga', which is accepted by Scripture, too, in the text: 'This they think to be the Yoga, the firm holding back of the senses' (Kaṭha 6.11); and hence its similarity to the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti is not known. Therefore, this aphorism intimates the similarity of the Yoga-Smṛti to the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti. "Hereby", i.e. by this very refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Smṛti which establishes a non-sentient cause, the Yoga-Smṛti, too, should be known to be refuted. In the statement: "The Yoga is refuted", by the term "yoga", the Smṛti which establishes it is understood. The purpose of the mention of the term "Yoga" in the statement: 'The Yoga-Smṛti is refuted' is this: Although the Lord is admitted in the Yoga doctrine, yet He is not established primarily, as He is in the aphorism and texts like: 'Then, therefore, an enquiry into Brahman' (Br. Sū. 1.1.1), "'O, the soul, verily, should be seen'" (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6): The primacy of the Yoga alone is found in the beginning: 'Now, an instruction with regard to the Yoga' (Y.S. 1.1), and in the aphorism, laying down its definition, viz.: 'The Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the mind' (Y.S. 1.2¹). And, this mere suppression of the functions of the mind, devoid of any connection with the Lord, is, indeed, of no avail in crossing the world, any more than a dog's tail is in crossing the ocean.

So, it is to be rejected, opposed as it is to Scriptural and Smṛti texts like “O, the soul, verily, should be seen” (Brh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), ‘The knower of Brahman attains the highest’ (Tait. 2.1), “By knowing me, one attains peace” (Gītā 5.29), ‘The binder with the noose of the world, and the liberator from the noose of the world’, ‘This one thing is well-established that the object to be worshipped is Nārāyaṇa, Hari’ and so on. Salvation being impossible through a mere suppression of the functions of the mind, the Yoga doctrine which deals with the primacy of that only is, indeed, non-acceptable. Its view is that pradhāna, devoid of any connection with Brahman, is the material cause of the world, and the Lord is merely the efficient cause of the world; and this, too, being opposed to the Veda, is certainly unreasonable. There are many other faults in the Yoga doctrine, but they are not quoted here needlessly. And the term ‘Yoga’ found in Scripture and Smṛti, refers to the meditation and the rest on the Lord. The eulogizing statement in the Mokṣa-dharma, etc., on the contrary, is intended only for referring to that portion of Yoga, etc. which is not opposed to Scripture. Hence, it is established that the stated concordance, indicating the causality of Brahman, is not contradicted by the Yoga-Smṛti.

Here ends the section entitled ‘The refutation of the Yoga’ (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled ‘Difference’ (Sūtras 4-11). Prima facie view (Sūtras 4-5)

SŪTRA 4

“(THERE IS) NO (HAVING BRAHMAN AS THE CAUSE) ON ITS PART, ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE, (ITS) BEING SO (IS KNOWN) FROM THE TEXT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

We object¹ to your view on the ground of reason. The world has not Brahman as its material cause “on account of difference”.

¹ Correct reading: ‘*pratyavatiṣṭhate*’ which is translated here. Vide C.S.S. ed., p. 24 and Brindaban ed., p. 378.

And the difference is to be known also "from the text", viz. 'He became knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6 1).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the objection based on Smṛtis has been disposed of by the preceding two sections. Now, the objection based on reasoning is being disposed of.

It has been stated under the aphorism: 'From whom (arise) its origin and the rest' (Br. Sū. 1.1.2) that it (viz. the world) has Brahman for its material cause. The *prima facie* objector objects to it on the ground of reason thus: 'no'. This world has not Brahman for its material cause. Why? "On account of difference." That is, Brahman possesses the attributes of sentience, non-grossness, infinity, purity, and the rest, while the world possesses just the opposite attributes of non-sentience, grossness and so on,—on account of such a dissimilarity between the two. Whatever is different from something has not that for its material cause, just as the pot, which is different from the ether, has not the ether as its material cause; just as the pot, the dish and the rest, which are different from the potter, have not the potter as their material cause.

If it be objected. It is found that the attributes of a material cause recur in its effects as well. Similarly, in the case under discussion, too, Brahman is the material cause; and the universe, His effect, consisting of sentient beings like men, animals and the rest, must be similar to Him. Hence the reason (viz.: "On account of difference") does not hold good,—

(We reply) No, because that there do exist the attributes of non-sentience, grossness and the rest in the effect, viz.: in stones, wood and the rest, is known from the evidence of direct perception.

If it be objected: It is possible to imagine that there is sentience in them, too, though unmanifest; hence there is no difference.

(We reply:) No, because it is unreasonable to take what is known through direct perception to be otherwise on the ground of mere imagination.

The difference is known "from the text" as well,—this is stated by the phrase: "its being so", i.e. "its being so", or its difference, is known "from the text" as well, i.e. from the following texts: 'He

became Knowledge and non-knowledge' (Tait. 2.6), 'On the same tree, a person, immersed, grieves for his impotence, bewildered' (Mund. 3.1.2; Śvet. 4.7), 'And the soul, which is without the Lord, is bound, because of being an enjoyer' (Śvet. 1.8) and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this sūtra as forming one adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with demonstrating the eternity and infallibility of the Veda. He thus does not take this sūtra as representing a *prima facie* view. Thus, this sūtra means,—according to him,—'(The Veda is) not (unauthoritative like the Sāṃkhya and the rest), on account of (its) difference (from them), (i.e. because it is a non-human origin unlike the Sāṃkhya and the rest); (its) being so (i.e. its eternity) (is known) from the text'.¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 5

"BUT (THERE IS) THE DESIGNATION OF THE PRESIDING (DEITIES) ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY AND FOLLOWING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" in the texts: 'The earth spoke' (Tait. Saṃ. 5.5.2, 3²), 'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahma' (Brh. 6.1.7³) and so on, there is 'the designation of their presiding'⁴ deities, 'on account of the specification', mentioned in the passage: "Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"⁵ (Chānd. 6.3.2⁵); and 'on account of the following', or entering, mentioned in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth' (Ait. 2.4⁶).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz.: From the scriptural texts: 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Saṃ. 5.5.2, 3), 'The earth spoke' (Śat. Br.

¹ G.B. 2.1.4, p. 18, Chap. 2.

² P. 76, line 9, vol. 2.

³ Ś, R, B.

⁴ C.S.S. ed. reads 'tat-tat', meaning 'their respective deities', p. 24.

⁵ R, ŚK, B.

⁶ Ś, R, Bh, SK.

6.1.3, 4¹), 'The waters spoke' (Śat. Br. 6.1.3, 2²), 'These sense-organs, disputing about self-supremacy, went to Brahmā' (Bṛh. 6.1.7), 'They said to speech: "Do you sing for us"' (Bṛh. 1.3.2) and so on, it is known that of the effects too are sentient; and hence they have no difference from the material cause—

We reply: The word "but" disposes of the stated objection. There is no designation of sentience on the part of the effects, and so they cannot have Brahman for their material cause; but there is the designation of only the presiding deities of earth and the rest in the passages, 'The earth spoke to him' (Tait. Sam. 5.5.2, 3) and so on. Why? "On account of speciality and following", i.e. on account of the specification of the earth and the rest by the word 'deity' in the passage: "'Very well, let me enter into these three deities'" (Chānd. 6.3.2), and on account of the specifications of the sense-organs by the word 'deity' in the passages: 'These deities, verily, disputing about self-supremacy' (Kauṣ. 2.14), 'These deities, verily, having known superiority in the vital breath' (Kauṣ. 2.14); as well as 'on account of the following' of fire and the rest as the presiding deities of speech and the rest, i.e. on account of the scriptural mention of following, or entering, in the passage: 'Fire, becoming speech, entered the mouth,—the sun, becoming sight, the eyes' (Ait. 2.4). Hence the world being different from Brahman, Brahman is not its material cause.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Literal interpretation same, but import different, since he takes this Sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, not laying down a *prima facie* view, but the correct conclusion. Thus, the Sūtra means according to him " (If it be objected: How to reconcile the absurd sayings of the Vedas, such as 'Fire willed to be many' and so on?). We reply: (In those passages) there is the designation of the presiding (deities) (of fire and the rest), on account of speciality and following (i.e. entering into) ".³

¹ P. 505, line 12.

² *Op. cit.*, line 9.

³ G.B. 2.1.5, p. 18, Chap. 2.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sutras 6-7)

SŪTRA 6

“BUT (IT) IS SEEN.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: “It is seen” that there is the origin of hairs on the head and so on from a person from whom they are different, and of dung-beetles from the cow-dung from which they are different. Hence it is not to be said that the universe, because of being different from Brahman, has not Him as its material cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that such a *prima facie* view is based on a fallacious reason (viz. ‘on account of difference’).

The word “but” is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The statement that this universe has not Brahman as its material cause on account of being different from Him, is not tenable, since it “is seen” that there is the origin of nails, body-hairs and the rest from a person from whom they are different, and that of the dung-beetles from the cow-dung, from which they are different,—on account of this,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation same, but he takes this sūtra as forming an *adhikaraṇa* by itself.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 7

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (IN THAT CASE THE EFFECT MUST BE) NON-EXISTENT (WE REPLY :) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING A NEGATION MERELY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: If the effect be different from its material cause, it must be “non-existent” prior to its origination,—(we reply:) No such objection can be raised, “on account of there being a negation

merely", in the previous aphorism, of the rule that there is a similarity between the material cause and its effect in every respect.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Having admitted an absolute similarity between the material cause and its effect in the aphorism: '(There is) no (having Brahman for its cause) on its part, on account of difference' (Br. Sū. 2.1.4), it has been objected by the opponent that the world being different from Brahman, He is not its material cause with a view to disposing of that objection, it has been established in the aphorism: 'But (it) is seen' (Br. Sū. 2.1.6) that there can be a cause-effect relation even between two different objects. With regard to it, the question is whether prior to creation the universe was non-different from its cause, or different. What is your opinion? If you say: Non-different,—then, just as the origin of a different world is admitted, like the origin of hairs on the head and body hairs from a person from whom they are different, so why there may not be the origin of a similar world, like the origin of a gold-bracelet and the rest from gold?

If you say: Different,—then, the world must have a material cause different from Brahman, and hence pradhāna must be the cause of the world. If it be said that this cannot be admitted, as pradhāna has been already refuted,—(we point out) in the texts: 'Brahman¹ is one only, without second' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one' (Mahā. Up. 1.2), 'Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, without parts',—there is the mention of a single reality; and hence, it follows that there was the absence of anything else prior to creation. Therefore, the world must be non-existent prior to creation.

(Here ends the original *prima facie* view.)

(Author's conclusion.)

(We reply:) 'No'. Why? "On account of there being a negation merely." The aphorism 'But (it) is seen' (Br. Sū. 2.1.6) negates merely,—by way of mentioning the difference between the material cause and its effect,—the rule, admitted by the opponent, viz. that there is similarity between a material cause and its effect in every

¹ The word 'Brahman' is not included in the original text.

respect; but it never establishes any difference between the two in every respect. Hence, because of having Brahman as its soul, the universe is existent even during its causal state.

Or an alternative explanation of the phrase: "On account of there being a negation merely". The statement, viz. 'The universe is non-existent' is a negation merely, i.e. without any meaning, in accordance with the scriptural text: "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 6.2.1).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different, viz.: 'If it be said that (the effect) is non-existent (prior to its actual creation), (we reply) No, since (it) is a mere negation (without an object to be negated)'. That is, the negation by the opponent, viz. : 'The world is non-existent' has no object, for it certainly cannot have for its object the existence of the effect prior to its actual creation, as the effect always exists in its cause, whether before or after its actual creation.¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 8)

SŪTRA 8

"ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING THE CONSEQUENCE OF (BECOMING) LIKE THAT DURING DISSOLUTION, (THE DOCTRINE OF THE CAUSALITY OF BRAHMAN) IS INCONSISTENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An objection is raised: As at the time of dissolution, the cause, like the effect, will become non-sentient, the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe is "inconsistent".

Vedānta-kaustubha

An objection is raised once more.

It is objected: "Inconsistent", indeed, is the view which admits Brahman to be the material cause of the world—Brahman who

¹ Ś.B. 2.1.7, 'Pratiṣedham hīdaṁ nāsyā pratiṣedhasya pratiṣedhyam asti', p. 453.

possesses the attributes of sentience, infinity, freedom from sins and the rest, and is established by the scriptural texts: "Brahman is truth, intelligence, infinite" (Tait. 2.1), "Free from sins, ageless, deathless" (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3; Maitrī. 7.7), "Who is omniscient, all-knowing" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.9; 2.2.7) and so on. Why? "On account of there being the consequence of (becoming) like that during dissolution." That is, because "during dissolution", or during reabsorption, non-sentience, limitedness, impurity and the rest will occur on the part of the material cause as well, "like that", i.e. as on the part of the effect. The sense is that during dissolution, the world, possessing non-sentience and the rest, and merged into its material cause in an order reverse to that of creation, i.e. merged into Brahman, possessing the attribute of sentience and the rest, is sure to defile Him with its own attributes, as does butter-milk dropped in milk.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 9-10)

SŪTRA 9

"BUT NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING PARALLEL INSTANCES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The reply is as follows: There is indeed no "consequence of (becoming) like that". Just as the evolutes of the earth do not defile it when dissolved into it, so the universe, the evolute of Brahman, also does not.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author refutes the objection.

"But no", i.e. no such consequence follows, and hence our view does not involve any inconsistency. Why? An effect does not defile its material cause with its own attributes when dissolved into it, there being parallel instances to this effect. Just as the evolutes like bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, when dissolved, do not defile the lump of gold with their own attributes; and just as the evolutes of the earth, when dissolved into the earth, do not defile the earth with their own attributes, so this universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, when dissolved into Brahman, does not, indeed,

defile Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 10

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF OBJECTION TO HIS OWN VIEW.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Sāṃkhya, maintaining a doctrine opposed to the Veda, cannot raise any objection, since the stated objections apply to his own view as well.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that the Sāṃkhya cannot even object that there is any inconsistency in our view which is based on the Veda.

There is no inconsistency in our view based as it is on Scripture. It has been alleged by the Sāṃkhya, unacquainted as he is with the settled conclusion of the Vedānta, firstly, that a cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world is inappropriate, as there is a difference between the cause and the effect in this case; secondly, that, in our view, the effect becomes non-existent prior to creation, and thirdly, that Brahman becomes like the word during the time of dissolution. All these objections are of equal force against the Sāṃkhya doctrine as well. The sense is: The origin of the effect,—which possesses colour and the rest and possesses parts,—from pradhāna, which is colourless and devoid of parts, is admitted. Hence, a cause-effect relation between pradhāna and its effects is inappropriate, there being here a difference between the cause and the effect. There being nothing gross prior to creation, the effect itself becomes non-existent; and during dissolution, prakṛti, like the world, becomes gross.

COMPARISON

All others, except Baladeva, read: “sapakṣa-doṣāc ca”.¹

¹ Ś.B. 2.1.10, p. 8.5.7; Śrī. B. 2.1.10, p. 13, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.1.10, p. 91; ŚK. B. 2.1.10, p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

SŪTRA 11

“IF IT BE SAID THAT ON ACCOUNT ALSO OF REASONING HAVING NO SOLID GROUND, IT IS TO BE INFERRED OTHERWISE, (WE REPLY:) IN THAT WAY, TOO, THERE WILL BE THE CONSEQUENCE OF NON-RELEASE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On account also of the instability of reasoning, there is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion; since, if *pradhāna* and the rest be inferred to be the cause of the world by means of a strong reasoning, then a counter-argument is possible by means of another equally strong reasoning. As there will be the “consequence of non-release thus also”, owing to disagreement among the logicians, so, that alone which is mentioned in the *Veda* is acceptable—this is established.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The word “*api*” means ‘and’. There is no inconsistency in the stated conclusion, which is based on Scripture. There is inconsistency in the *Sāṃkhya* conclusion itself which is based on reasoning, since the stated objections apply thereto, “on account also of reasoning having no solid ground”, i.e. on account of the instability of reasoning. The sense is that the thing inferred by one expert logician is set aside by another, proved to be otherwise by another,—on account of the instability of reasoning in this way. But the thing mentioned in the *Vedānta* in the beginning and the end cannot be refuted even by hundreds of reasonings.

If it be objected: Even though reasonings like ‘on account of difference’¹ be refutable, having no solid ground, yet in order that there may not be any infinite regress, it is perfectly proper to infer, in that way, a non-sentient material cause of the non-sentient effects, like the ether and the rest—

(We reply:) “in that way too”, the primacy of reasoning is upheld, and hence the conclusion stated in the *Veda* is regarded as but of a secondary importance. As a consequence, non-release will result owing to the mutual opposition among *Kapila*, *Kaṇāda* and the rest. It cannot be said that if victory be won by one of them at some time or other, there will be no non-release as a consequence,—

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.4.

it being impossible for one among many persons to be ever-victorious. If it be said that the Supreme Soul is such, you fall in with our view; so be happy by giving up reasoning which is opposed to the Veda.

Thus the Lord Vāsudeva, the sole topic of all the Vedas, being established to be the material cause of the world, no opposition, based on reasoning which is opposed to the Veda is of any avail—this is established.

Here ends the section entitled “Difference” (3).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He reads: “Vimokṣa-prasaṅga” instead of “Anirmokṣa-prasaṅga”.¹

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They break it into two different sūtras—viz.: “Tarkāpratīṣṭhānād api” and “Anyathā . . . prasaṅgaḥ”.²

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled “The Non-acceptance of the rest”. (Sūtra 12)

SŪTRA 12

“HEREBY THE REMAINING (PERSONS) TOO WHO DO NOT ACCEPT (THE VEDA) ARE EXPLAINED (I.E. REFUTED).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Hereby”, i.e. by the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view, the remaining ones, i.e. others who maintain a cause which is opposed to the Veda, “too”, are refuted.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author is extending the above refutation to the remaining views.

“Hereby”, i.e. by the above refutation of the doctrine of pra-dhāna as the cause of the world, “the remaining (persons) who do not

¹ Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 458.

² Śrī. B., p. 13, Part 2; ŚK. B., p. 14, Parts 7 and 8.

accept (the Veda)", too, should be known to be refuted. The word "śiṣṭāḥ" means 'the remaining ones', i.e. persons other than Kapila¹ and Patañjali². The word "parigrahāḥ" means all who do not accept the Veda.³

It is thus established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not contradicted by their views as well.

Here ends the section entitled "The Non-acceptance of the rest" (4).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

According to them the word "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ" means (the doctrines like Atomism and the rest) which are not accepted by the wise.⁴

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Becoming the enjoyer". (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF (BRAHMAN) BECOMING AN ENJOYER, (THERE WILL BE) NON-DISTINCTION, (BETWEEN BRAHMAN AND THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL), WE REPLY: IT MAY BE AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that if Brahman be the material cause, then Brahman Himself will become an enjoyer of pleasures and pains in the form of the individual soul, so that there will be no distinction

¹ The founder of the *Śaṅkhyā* doctrine.

² The founder of the *Yoga* doctrine.

³ This explains the compound: "śiṣṭāparigrahāḥ".

⁴ Hence they explain the compound as "Śiṣṭaiḥ aparigrahāḥ" and not as "śiṣṭhāś ca aparigrahāś ca", as done by *Nimbārka*, *Śrīnivāsa*, *Rāmānuja* and *Baladeva*. Vide Ś.B. 2.1.11, p. 461; Bh. B. 2.1.12, p. 92; ŚK. B. 2.1.13, p. 18, Parts 7 and 8.

between the enjoyer (viz. the individual soul) and the controller (viz. Brahman) as well-known from the Veda,—

(We reply:) In spite of there being a non-distinction, there is a distinction as well between the two, as between the sea and the wave, and between the sun and its ray.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, having apprehended an objection once more, the author is disposing of that here.

If it be objected: If Brahman who is without an equal or a superior be the material cause of the world, then there must be no distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. Why? “On account of becoming the enjoyer.” That is, all effects whatsoever being non-different from their causes, the enjoyer, i.e. the individual soul, will become the object enjoyed; and the object enjoyed, i.e. the body, the sense-organs and the sense-objects, will become the enjoyer; and hence, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, well-known in ordinary life and in the Veda, will not be possible on this doctrine of the causality of Brahman. Moreover, there will not be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the Supreme Soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well-known, thus ‘The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the objects enjoyed’, and in the Veda too, thus: “Eats the sweet berry” (Mund. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6). Similarly, the distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, too, is well-known in ordinary life, as is evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures and pains as dependent on the Lord; and in the Veda too, thus: “He alone makes one do good deeds” (Kauṣ. 3.8), “The soul which is without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer” (Śvet. 1.8) and so on. Thus, “on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non-distinction”; and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman cannot be accepted,—

The author states the correct conclusion in the words “It may be, as in ordinary life”. That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed, be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as between the enjoyer and the controller, “as in ordinary life”. In

ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of clay as their material cause; bracelets, ear-rings and the rest, having gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the tree as their material cause, are all non-different from their respective causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular effects themselves. In exactly the same manner, there may be a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman as their material cause. Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction, there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller; just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. The same should be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too. Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference—non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections.¹

Here ends the section entitled “Becoming the enjoyer” (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different, viz. they interpret the sūtra like Śrīnivāsa, although while Śrīnivāsa understands the word “bhoktrāpatteḥ” to mean ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and vice versa, as well because the enjoyer will become the controller and vice versa’, they understand it to mean only ‘because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and vice versa’. Each develops his own peculiar theory in connection.²

¹ Note the different interpretations given by *Nimbārka* and *Śrīnivāsa*.

² Ś.B. 2.1.13, pp. 461 *et seq.*; Bh. B. 2.1.13, p. 92.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "The beginning". (Sūtras 14-19)

SŪTRA 14

"(THERE IS) NON-DIFFERENCE (OF THE EFFECT) FROM THAT (VIZ. THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE TEXTS) BEGINNING WITH THE WORD 'BEGINNING' AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "non-difference" between the effect and the cause, and not absolute difference. Why? On account of the texts: "'The effect having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay'" (Chānd. 6.1.4¹), "'All this has that for its soul. That is true . . . Thou art that'" (Chānd. 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10.3-6.16.3²), "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these three realities respectively.⁴ Here, on the other hand, the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, resulting from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the part of the former), has been established under the aphorism: "If it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent, (we reply:) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (Br. Sū. 2.1.7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that the effect is not non-different from the cause, but is something which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).⁵

The compound ("tad ananyatvam") is to be explained as follows: There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect; or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from

¹ Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

² Ś, R, Bh, ŚK, B.

³ R.

⁴ Vide e.g. V.K. 1.1.1, p. 11; 1.1.18, p. 32; 1.1.22, p. 36; 1.2.3, p. 50, etc. K.S.S.

⁵ This is the doctrine of *Asat-kārya-vāda*.

Brahman, the cause; or, there is non-difference of the effect from that, viz. the cause. That is, the effect, which is of the form of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms, and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the Supreme Cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, unlimited, denoted by words like 'one', 'without a second' and so on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected state, and prior to the entire universe. The author states the proof with regard to it in the words: "on account of (the texts) beginning with the word 'beginning' and the rest". (The compound "ārambhana-śabdādibhyaḥ" is to be explained thus:) The texts of which the beginning is the word 'beginning', on account of them. That is, on account of the texts: "The effect, having its beginning in speech, is a name, the reality is just the clay" (Chānd. 6.1.4), "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one, without a second" (Chānd. 6.2.1), "He thought, 'May I be many', may I procreate". He created the light' (Chānd. 6.2.3), "All that has this for its soul. That is true. That is the soul. Thou art that" (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1), "That was unmanifest then. It became manifest by name and form" (Brh. 1.4.7) and so on. There are many texts of such kinds which establish the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, but which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity.

Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the word 'beginning' (ārambhana) is as follows:

The Chandogas, having made an initial statement to the effect that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: "Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known" (Chānd. 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage: "Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of clay may be known,—the effect, having its beginning in speech is a name, the reality is just the clay" (Chānd. 6.1.4¹). That is, just as 'through one lump of clay' being known as clay, 'everything made of clay', i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since

¹ The passage is: "Yathā saumya! ekena mṛt-piṇḍena sarvaṃ mṛtmayam vijñātaṃ syāt, vācārambhanaṃ vikāro nāmadheyaṃ mṛtitikṛty-eva satyaṃ".

they are all made of clay;—for such a group of evolutes ‘has its beginning in speech’, i.e. is designated by speech. Speech is of two kinds: ‘effect’, i.e. meaning, and ‘name’, i.e. word. The function of speech rests on these two, viz. meaning and word, e.g. we say: ‘Fetch water by the pot’. Hence, ‘the truth’ is that the evolute, characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, having the name ‘pot’, and conducive to the function of fetching water and so on, is ‘just clay’. That is, the view that the effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind and the rest which are different from clay.¹ If the effect is to originate from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of the agent. So desist from further arguments.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Each commentator develops his peculiar theory in this connection. Śaṅkara understands the word “Ananyatva” as absolute identity, interprets the word ‘vācārambhaṇa’ to mean ‘that which begins from speech only, but does not exist in reality’, and thereby develops his theory of Vivarta at great length.²

Rāmānuja

He understands the word “ananyatva” as non-difference, like Nimbārka, but connects it with his peculiar doctrine of the soul-body relation between Brahman and the universe.³ He interprets the phrase: “vācārambhaṇa” as follows: ‘vācā’ means: on account of speech, i.e. on account of activity preceded by speech; ‘rambhaṇa’ means: what is touched. Hence the text means: On account of speech, (i.e. for the sake of certain activities, like the fetching of

¹ If the effect were absolutely different from its cause, then any and everything, e.g. wind, might very well have been conceived to be a pot. But this is never the case, since clay alone, and nothing else, is conceived to be so.

² “*Vācaiva kevalam asti . . . na tu vastu-vṛtteṇa vikāraḥ kaścid asti*”, etc. Ś.B. 2.1.14, p. 464.

³ Śrī. B. 2.1.15, pp. 39, 42, Part 2.

water and the rest,) there is touched (by the clay) an effect and a name; i.e. clay is transformed into a particular effect having a special name, in order that a certain activity may be accomplished.¹

Bhāskara

He, too, understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference. He criticizes the Śaṅkarite view at length and insists on the reality of difference,² and interprets the phrase "vācārambhāṇa" like Śrīnivāsa.

Śrīkaṇṭha

He, too, understands the word "ananyatva" as non-difference.³ He explains the phrase "vācārambhāṇa" in the next sūtra, and gives two alternative explanations, viz. "That which is the beginning, i.e. the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and practical activity".⁴ Hence, the text means that an effect (vikāra) is a name (nāma-dheya) which is the cause of speech and practical activity, i.e. of such expressions 'Fetch water in a pot' and so on. The second explanation is: "That which has speech for its beginning".⁵ Hence the text means that an effect (vikāra) is simply the object of such expressions: 'This is a pot', i.e. a special condition the clay has assumed for practical purposes, but is not a separate substance from the clay.

SŪTRA 15

"AND BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION (OF THE EFFECT) ON THE EXISTENCE (OF THE CAUSE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is non-difference between the cause and the effect, because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent.

¹ "Ārabhyate ālabhyate sprśate," etc. Śrī. B. 2.1.15, p. 40, Part 2.

² Bh. B. 2.1.14, pp. 93 *et seq.*

³ ŚK. B. 2.1.15, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8.

⁴ "Vācāyāḥ abhilāpārtha-kriyā-rūpa-vyavahārsya niṣpādakaṃ bhavati."

Op. cit. 2.1.16, p. 23, Parts 7 and 8.

⁵ Vācārambhā-viṣaya-mātram. *Op. cit.*

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also, says the author, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.

Whence is it known that there is non-difference between the effect and the cause? Because the effect is perceived, only when the cause is existent, in accordance with the scriptural text ‘“These beings, my dear, have the existent as their root”’ (Chānd. 6.8.4).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

They interpret the sūtra in just the opposite way, viz. “And because of the perception (of the cause) on the existence (of the effect)”. That is, the gold, which is the cause, is perceived when the ear-ring is present. That is, the gold alone is perceived in the ear-ring, and not the clay.¹

SŪTRA 16

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE POSTERIOR.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the existence” of the effect,—belonging to a posterior time,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence in the text: “Brahman, verily, was this in the beginning” (Brh. 1.4.10²), there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason too, there is non-difference between the effect and the cause.

“On account of the existence” of the effect,—which is “posterior” and denoted by the term ‘this’,—in the cause, owing to the designation of their co-inherence, in the texts ‘“The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chānd. 6.2.1), “Brahman, verily, was this

¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.16, p. 46, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.16, p. 22, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.1.15, p. 45, Chap. 2.

² Not quoted by others.

in the beginning" (Brh. 1.4.10), the non-difference between the effect and the cause is definitely ascertained.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 17 in both. They read "aparasya" in place of "avarasya" and take it to mean 'an effect'.¹

SŪTRA 17

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF WHAT IS NON-EXISTENT, (THE EFFECT IS) NOT (EXISTENT PRIOR TO CREATION) (WE REPLY:) NO, (SUCH A DESIGNATION IS) ON ACCOUNT OF A DIFFERENT ATTRIBUTE, THIS IS KNOWN FROM THE COMPLEMENTARY TEXT, FROM REASONING AND FROM ANOTHER TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is non-existent" in the passage: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1²), the effect does not exist prior to creation,—

(We reply:) "no". There is such a designation because of the subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known? "From the complementary passage," viz. "That was existent" (Chānd. 3.19.1³); "from the reasoning", viz. if a previously non-existent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley-sprout from fire? "and from another text", viz. 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning' (Chānd. 6.2.1⁴).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its

¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.17, p.47, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.1.17, p. 28, Parts 7 and 8.

² Ś, R, Bh. Correct quotation: "Asad eva". Vide Chānd. 3.19.1, p. 175.

³ Ś, Bh.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, B.

non-existence prior to creation, in the text: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1),—

(We reply :) "no", why? Because there is "such a designation" "on account of a different attribute". That is, the attribute of having name and form unmanifest is different from the attribute of having name and form manifest; and it is because of this different attribute that the world is designated thus in the text: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1), but is never denoted to be non-existent by nature.

If it be asked: Whence is this known? We reply: 'From the complementary passage.' For the complementary passage: "That was existent" (Chānd. 3.19.1), refers to the topic of our discussion, viz. the world, by the term 'that' and from this it is known that the term 'non-existent' in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with name and form unmanifest.

The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the effect, viz.: "From reasoning". That is, the existence of the effect is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained? We reply: On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being perceived. An agent, viz. a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of clay that is existent. Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,—(we reply :) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot which was unmanifest before is made manifest; hence the activity of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before.¹ It should be known that, on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not unprecedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand, does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,—for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight,

¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.28-30.

a different weight is never found.¹ Likewise, the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects. Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect² is unreasonable. The activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz. digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz. the pot and the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the consequence will be the origin of the pot through more activity, even in the absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the wise.

The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable.

The author states once more another reason for the existence of the effect, thus: "And from another text". The other text is the text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz.: "The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 6.2.1), which is other than the above quoted text, viz.: "The non-existent, verily, was the beginning" (Chānd. 3.19.1). Because of this too, it is the (pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. "Asad-vyapadeśāt . . . vākya-śeṣāt" and "Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca".³ Interpretation same.

¹ I.e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different.

² *Asat-kārya-vāda*.

³ Ś.B. 2.1.17 and 18, p. 475; Bh. B. 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; G.B. 2.1.17 and 18.

SŪTRA 18

“AND LIKE A PIECE OF CLOTH.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as a piece of cloth is at first rolled up, and afterwards spread out, so is the universe.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The sense is: Just as a piece of rolled up cloth, although not known to be a piece of cloth, does not, for that reason, become non-existent, but is indeed existent, existing in a different form, and when spread out once more, is known to be a piece of cloth,—so, indeed, prior to creation, the universe remains existent indeed, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest; and is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation, having its name and form manifest. Just as the drawn forth limbs of a tortoise are not perceived, even though existent, but do not become non-existent thereby and are known when stretched out again; and just as the banyan tree, existent in the seed at all times indeed in a subtle form, is manifested in a gross form, so it is the pre-existent universe alone which originates, in accordance with the Mahā-bhārata passage: “Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, draws them in again, so the soul of beings, having created beings, destroys them again” (Mahā. 12.7072b-7073a ¹) and the Viṣṇu-purāṇa passage: “Just as a gigantic banyan tree is contained in a small seed, so is the entire universe in you, the seed, during (the state of) contraction (viz. dissolution)”. (V.P. 1.12.666-67a ².)

SŪTRA 19

“AND JUST LIKE THE VITAL-BREATH AND THE REST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the vital-breath, having the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, etc. remains in its real form; and

¹ P. 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: “*śṛṣṭāni harate*”. Vaṅgavāsī ed. also, p. 1571.

² P. 108.

when the control removed, is instantly known in those respective forms,—so here too.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The sense is: Just as the vital-breath, having modes like the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, controlled by breath exercises, is existent indeed, though not known in the special forms of the prāṇa, apāna and the rest, and when freed from the control is known clearly in those respective forms,—so the effect, with its name and form unmanifest prior to creation, is not known through those respective names and forms. Hence it is established that the world is true like Brahman, having Him for its material cause, and is non-different from Brahman, though different from Him.

Here ends the section entitled “The beginning” (6).

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled “The designation of another”. (Sūtras 20–22)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 20)

SŪTRA 20

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF ANOTHER, THERE IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAULTS LIKE NOT DOING WHAT IS BENEFICIAL AND THE REST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An objection is raised: Since on the doctrine of the causality of Brahman the individual soul is established to be Brahman in the passage: “This soul is Brahman” (Bṛh. 2.5.9¹), there result “faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest” by reason of Brahman’s creating the world, which is an abode of all miseries.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view that there is an absolute difference between the cause and the effect has been disposed of above. Now, since there can be no

¹ R. ŚK.

suspicion of an absolute non-difference between the Sentient Being and the non-sentient, the author is here refuting only the view of those who suppose that there is an absolute identity between Brahman and the individual soul.¹

It may be objected: If Brahman be the creator of the world which is the site of the three kinds of miseries, there must be the "consequence of the fault of not doing what is beneficial". By the term "and the rest" (in the sūtra) the fault of doing what is not beneficial is understood. Why? "On account of the designation of another," i.e. on account of the designation of the individual soul as Brahman in the passage: "'Thou art that'" (Chānd. 6.8.7; 6.9.4, etc.), "This soul is Brahman" (Brh. 2.5.9) and so on. The sense is that the transmigratory soul, performing good and bad deeds and undergoing threefold pains, is not other than Brahman. Hence the stated faults must result on the part of Brahman, not subject to transmigratory existence.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 21 in his commentary. Like Nimbārka, Baladeva too begins a new adhikaraṇa here, but unlike Nimbārka continues it up to sūtra 33 (32 in Nimbārka). He takes this adhikaraṇa as concerned with showing that the Brahman, and not the individual soul, is the cause of the world. Thus, first, he takes this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a *prima facie* view (as according to Nimbārka), thus: "There will be the consequences of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest from the designation of another (i.e. if the individual soul be designated as the creator of the world)".² That is, if the individual soul were the creator of the world, it would not have created a world so full of miseries. Hence, Brahman, not the individual soul, must be the creator.

¹ I.e. the author is not trying to remove the suspicion of an absolute non-difference between Brahman and the material world,—since none is so foolish as to suppose that a Sentient Being and non-sentient object may be absolutely identical—but he is disposing only of the not unnatural belief of an absolute identity between Brahman and the individual soul.

² G.B. 2.1.21, pp. 52-53, Chap. 2.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 21-22)

SŪTRA 21

“BUT (BRAHMAN IS) SOMETHING MORE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE INDICATION OF DIFFERENCE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The refutation of this is as follows:

We hold that the creator of the world is Brahman, who is “something more” than, i.e. superior to, the embodied soul, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. “On account of the designation of difference” in the passage: “Who rules the soul within” (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30¹), there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Hence there cannot result the fault of not doing what is beneficial.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With regard to this *prima facie* view, the author states the correct conclusion.

The word “but” disposes of the *prima facie* view. Since we hold that Brahman,—omniscient, omnipotent, the Lord of all, without an equal or a superior, and the one identical material and efficient cause of the world,—is “something more”, i.e. superior to the embodied soul, the question of not doing what is beneficial does not arise. The reason of His being something more is stated in the phrase: “On account of the indication of difference”, i.e. on account of the indication of a difference between Brahman and the individual soul in the passages: “O, the self, verily, should be seen” (Bṛh. 2.4.5; 4.5.6), “The knower of Brahman attains the highest” (Tait. 2.1), ‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30). The sense is this: Just as in the passage: ‘All this, verily is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), it being impossible for the group of the non-sentient to be non-different from Brahman, its difference from Brahman is admitted by the phrase ‘emanating from Him’² so it being impossible for the

¹ P. 1074, line 18. R.

² The passage is: “All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him” (Chānd. 3.14.1).

individual soul, too, to be by nature non-different from Brahman on the authority of the stated scriptural text designating difference, it is declared to be non-different from Brahman, by such texts like “Thou art that” (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), only as having no existence and activity independently of Brahman, but not by nature. Thus, on account of the designation of difference, in spite of there being a non-difference between the two, faults like doing what is not beneficial do not arise.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation same, but in conclusion he adds, as usual, the explanation that it is only from the empirical point of view that we can speak of creation of a difference between the individual soul and Brahman; but from the transcendental point of view no question of creation arises at all.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 22

“AND (THE INDIVIDUAL SOULS ARE) LIKE STONES AND THE REST, THERE IS IMPOSSIBILITY OF THAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are the modifications of the earth, the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it does, some peculiar qualities of its own. Hence, the allegation by the opponent is an “impossible” one.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, just as in ordinary life, the stones like the diamond, the lapis lazuli, the ruby and the rest which are modifications of the earth, though non-different from the earth as consisting in earth, are yet different from the earth, possessing, as they do, their peculiar natures,—so is the case here. By the term “and the rest” the

¹ “*Tatra kuta eva sṛṣṭiḥ, kuto' vā hīta-kāraṇādāyo doṣāḥ?*” Ś.B. 2.1.22, p. 484.

modifications of the tree, such as the leaf and so on, are to be understood. That is, just as the leaf, though non-different from the tree, is yet not the tree, so is the case here. Or else, by the term "and the rest", the ray of the diamond and the rest is understood, for the ray, though non-different from the diamond, etc., is yet found to be different. Hence, just as the ray, though non-different from its substratum, is yet different from it, so it is appropriate to hold that the embodied soul is by nature different from Brahman, though it is at the same time non-different from Him as having Him for its soul. Hence, the respective difference between what is subject to transmigratory existence (viz. the individual soul) and what is not, (viz. Brahman) being thus established, there is no inconsistency here. Hence "there is impossibility of that", i.e. there is no possibility of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, as alleged by the opponent. Thus, it is established that there no contradiction is involved in our view.

Hence ends the section entitled "The designation of another" (7).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 23 in Rāmānuja's commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "Just (as it is impossible for non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest (to be identical with Brahman, so) there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an identity between the individual soul and Brahman)".¹

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 23 in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary too. "(Since the individual soul, possessed of little knowledge, is declared to be belonging to an absolutely different category from Brahman, the omniscient), just as (non-sentient objects) like stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of an absolute identity between the individual soul and Brahman)." ²

¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.23, p. 53, Part 2.

² ŚK. B. 2.1.23, p. 32, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 23 in his commentary. “(Since the individual soul, though sentient, is dependent) like (non-sentient objects like) stones and the rest, there is the impossibility of that (viz. of the individual souls being the creator of the world).”¹

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled “The Observation of Collection”. (Sūtras 23-24)

SŪTRA 23

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT ON ACCOUNT OF THE OBSERVATION OF COLLECTION, (BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CREATOR OF THE WORLD), (WE REPLY:) NO, FOR (HE TRANSFORMS HIMSELF) LIKE MILK.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that “on account of the observation of the collection” of many implements by potters and others, Brahman, who is without any external implement, is not the cause of the world—(we reply:) “no”, since Brahman transforms Himself “like milk”, possessing, as He does, powers peculiar to Him alone.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The objection, viz. if the universal Lord, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, the soul of all, and without an equal or a superior, be the creator of the world, there arises the faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest, has been refuted above on the ground that the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman as having Him as its soul, is yet subject to transmigratory existence as subject to beginningless karmas, and thus different from Him by nature. Now, the author is disposing of the following objection, viz. that Brahman is not the creator of the world on account of the absence of the collection of external implements.

The words “and the rest” are to be supplied from the last aphorism. The word “for” denotes the reason.

¹ G.B. 2.1.23, p. 56, Chap. 2.

If it be objected: In ordinary life, it is always found that external implements like stick and so on are employed for the production of effects like pots, etc. Hence, Brahman who has no helpers, is not the creator of the world. To the question: Whence is this known? We reply: That Brahman is without any helpers is definitely ascertained from the following texts, designating the impossibility of the existence of any kind of agent in the beginning: “The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second” (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘There was, verily, Nārāyaṇa, the one’ (Mahā. Up. 1.2), “Then there was Viṣṇu, Hari alone, the absolute”,—

(We reply:) “no”. Why? “Because” Brahman is “like milk”. Just as in ordinary life milk, water and the rest are transformed into the form of effects like sour milk, ice and so on,—there is no external implement here,—so Brahman, possessed of the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, is capable of being the one identical material and efficient cause of the world through His very nature. He has not to depend on the collection of accessories for creating the world, as declared by the text: “Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and power” (Śvet. 6.8).

Whey, on the other hand, is sometimes mixed with milk, simply for giving a certain flavour to it, and not for making it turn sour,¹ because we find that milk turns sour even when whey is absent from it, and that water and the rest do not turn into sour milk even when whey is present in them.

It is because the potters and others are mere efficient causes that they have to depend on clay, etc. for making pots, etc.; and it is because they lack the requisite power that they have to depend on the stick, the wheel and so on.

Although the facts mentioned in the Veda are ever-established, yet objections are being raised against them again and again for removing the doubts of those who are entitled to the study of it, for silencing the opponent and for making one understand the meaning of the Veda without a vestige of doubt.

¹ This replies to the objection, viz. that the above example of milk is not to the point, since milk is not transformed into sour milk by itself, but has to depend on whey.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 24 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "If it be objected that on account of the observation of the completion (of a piece of work by the individual soul,) (it cannot be likened to inert stones and the rest, but is a free agent), (we reply) no, for (the soul's power of action is) like (the cow's power of producing) milk".¹ That is, although the soul is an agent and can as such bring works to completion, yet it is not an independent agent, but has to depend on the Lord for its activities, just as the cow cannot by herself produce milk, but has to depend on the life-energy.

SŪTRA 24

"AS IN THE CASE OF THE GODS AND THE REST TOO IN (THEIR WORLD."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the gods and the rest create what they want through a mere wish, so does the Lord too.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. Milk and the rest are non-sentient, while Brahman is sentient; as such, the examples cited are not to the point,—the author replies here.

The word "too" suggests the possibility of an analogy with the sentient. The case in hand is analogous not merely to that of non-sentient objects, like milk, etc. as shown above, but is also analogous to that of the sentient, known from Scripture to be the power of the Lord. Just as "in the world", i.e. in the world of the gods and the rest, or in Scripture,—the cause of the beholding of all objects,—the gods, the fathers, the sages, the Nāgas and the rest, celebrated to be possessed of great powers, are found to create the objects which they want, as befitting time and need, through a mere wish; just as a spider acts by itself alone independently of any external implement, so the Highest Person, celebrated in all the worlds and Vedas as possessed of great

¹ G.B. 2.1.4, pp. 56-57, Chap. 1.

powers, omniscient, omnipotent and having true resolves, creates the whole group of effects through a mere wish. Hence, it is established that no contradiction is involved in our view simply because certain well-known implements are found employed in ordinary creations.

Here ends the section entitled "The observation of collection" (8).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 25 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: (The Lord though invisible, is the creator of the world,) just as the gods too (though invisible, are seen to work) in the world, (i.e. to produce rain and so on).¹

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "The consequence of the entire". (Sūtras 25-30)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 25)

SŪTRA 25

"(IF BRAHMAN BE THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE WORLD, THERE WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE ENTIRE (BRAHMAN BEING TRANSFORMED INTO THE WORLD), OR THE VIOLATION OF THE TEXT ABOUT (BRAHMAN'S) HAVING NO PARTS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An objection is raised:—

If Brahman be the material cause of the world, then if He be admitted to be without parts, there will be the "consequence of the entire" (Brahman being transformed into the world); if possessed of parts, then the scriptural texts about His having no parts will be contradicted.

¹ G.B. 2.1.25.

Vedānta-kaustubha

- Anticipating the objection,—viz. If Brahman be transformed into the form of the world absolutely independently of any external implement, then let Him not depend on His own powers as well. But since the view that Brahman is the material cause through His mere nature leads to the horns of a dilemma, He cannot reasonably be the material cause; and hence pradhāna alone must be the material cause,—the author is replying to it by pointing out that in the case of Brahman, external implements cannot be admitted, as they are not mentioned in Scriptures, and as they will make Brahman a dependent creator; and that His own powers, which are non-different from Him, may very well be admitted, as they have Scripture for their authority.

The *prima facie* view is as follows: Is Brahman,—knowable from the scriptural texts like: “The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second” (Chānd. 6.2.1), ‘The soul, verily, was this in the beginning, one only’ (Brh. 1.4.7) and so on, and transformed into the form of the effect,—without parts, or possessed of parts? If it be said: without parts, (we reply:) then the consequence will be that the entire Brahman will become the effect, as in the case of milk; there will not remain a transcendent Brahman, beyond transmigratory existence and to be approached by the freed; the scriptural texts designating Brahman as unintelligible will be contradicted; universal release will result; and Brahman will come to possess the attributes of grossness and the rest. If on the other hand, He be admitted to have parts, then there will not arise faults like the entire Brahman being transformed into the world, but the scriptural texts designating that Brahman, the cause of the world, has no parts will come to be contradicted, viz. the texts: “Without parts, without action, tranquil, faultless, stainless” (Śvet. 6.19), “For He is the celestial, incorporeal Person, the outside and the inside, unborn” (Muṇḍ. 2.1.2) and so on. So none but pradhāna can be the cause of the world.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary. He reads “vyakopa” instead of “Kopa”. Interpretation, too, is different, viz.: he takes this sūtra as setting forth the correct conclusion and not a *prima*

facie view, thus: ‘(If the individual soul be the creator of the world), then there will be the consequence of entire (absorption), or the contradiction of the texts (designating its) being without parts’. That is, if the individual soul be the creator, we must conclude that, in as much as it is without parts, its entire self is present in every act. But this is not really the case, e.g. while lifting a blade of grass, the individual soul does not employ its entire force to the act. Or, else we must conclude that the individual soul must be possessed of parts, which also goes against scriptural authority. Hence, we must conclude that the individual soul cannot be the creator.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 26–30)

SŪTRA 26

“BUT (THE ABOVE OBJECTION HAS NO FORCE) ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURE, SINCE (THE FACT THAT BRAHMAN IS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD IS) BASED ON SCRIPTURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The stated objection does not hold good. As the truth mentioned in the texts: ‘He wished “May I be many”’ (Tait. 2.6²), ‘He Himself created Himself’ (Tait. 2.7³), ‘He became existent and that’ (Tait. 2.6⁴), ‘So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person’ (Chānd. 3.12.6⁵), ‘Just as a spider creates, so from the Person⁶ the Universe originates’ (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7⁷) and so on, is based on Scripture itself—anything else has no basis to stand upon.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The word “but” is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. The entire Brahman is not transformed, nor is there any violation of texts. Why? “On account of Scripture.” That is, on account of the mass

¹ G.B. 2.1.26, pp. 58-59, Chap. 2.

³ *Op. cit.*

⁶ Correct quotation: “*Tathā akṣarād bhavati iha viśvam*”. Vide Muṇḍ.

1.1.7, p. 9.

⁷ Not quoted by others.

² Not quoted by others.

⁵ Ś.

of texts which declare that Brahman is the non-different material and efficient cause of the world, different from the world, possessed of powers which are transformed and so on. Such scriptural texts are: 'He wished "May I be many"' (Tait. 2.6), 'He Himself created Himself' (Tait. 2.7), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'Having created it, he entered into that very thing' (Tait. 2.6), 'That divinity thought: "Very well, let me enter into these three divinities"' (Chānd. 6.3.2), 'Having entered by this living soul' (Chānd. 6.3.2), 'Who abiding within the earth, . . . from the earth does not know' (Bṛh. 3.7.3), 'Entered within the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2¹), 'So much is His greatness, higher than that is the Person' (Chānd. 3.12.6) and so on. There is a Smṛti text as well, viz.: 'Having voluntarily entered into prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul), Hari shook the mutable and the immutable at the time of dissolution and creation' (V.P. 1.2.29²). Like a spider, Brahman is transformed into the form of the world, without waiting for external helpers. Hence there is no violation of the texts designating Him to be without parts. The scriptural text to this effect is as follows: 'Just as a spider creates and takes, just as hairs on the head and body-hairs arise from a person, and medicinal herbs from the earth, so this universe arises from the Imperishable' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.7). There is a Smṛti text as well, viz.: 'Just as a tortoise, having stretched out its limbs, again draws them in, so the Soul of beings, having created beings destroys them again' (Mahā. 12.7072b-7073a³). Brahman, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as His powers, is declared to be without parts and without limbs, because He has no parts and limbs as His material cause, as threads are of a piece of cloth.

If it be objected: If it be admitted that transformation means the projection of power, then there being no transformation of the real nature of the creator, what is the difference of this view from the views of the Sāṃkhyas and the rest? ⁴—(we reply:) Listen. The

¹ P. 191.

² P. 16.

³ P. 615, lines 24-25, vol. 3. Reading: "sṛṣṭāni harate". Vaṅgavāsī ed., also p. 1571.

⁴ I.e. according to the Sāṃkhyas, *pradhāna* is transformed into the world, while according to the Vedāntins also not Brahman Himself, but His power of the non-sentient (*acicchakti*)—which is *pradhāna*—is transformed into the world. Hence the two views come to the same thing.

Sāṃkhyas hold that the material cause of the world is a substance which is different from the puruṣa (or the soul) just as a lump of clay is different from a potter, which does not possess it (viz.: puruṣa) as its soul, and which is possessed of independent existence and activity. But Brahman, as admitted by the Vedāntins, is One alone. He transforms Himself into the form of non-sentient objects like the ether and the rest by projecting His power of the enjoyed (i.e. the acit-śakti); having projected the sentient power of the enjoyer (i.e. the cit-śakti) in the form of gods and the rest, and having entered within as their inner controller, makes them undergo the fruits of their respective works; and contracts them during the time of dissolution, as a tortoise does its limbs, and the sun its rays.

To the objection, viz. even if there be the collection of external helpers by Brahman, no contradiction arises in the case in hand; and hence pradhāna, established by the Tantra may be the external implement, suitable for the production of the world, just as clay is for the production of a pot. What is the use of a transformation consisting in the projection of powers?—the author replies: On this view, there will be contradiction of scriptural texts. This he says in the words: “Because of being based on Scripture”. Transformation consisting in the projection of powers is accepted, based as it is on Scripture. If implements like pradhāna and the rest be admitted, that view will have no basis to stand upon; and the consequence will be that Brahman will have to depend on another for His creation. Further, the following texts will come to be contradicted, viz. ‘All this has that for its soul’ (Chānd. 6.8.7 ch.), ‘All this, verily, is Brahman’ (Chānd. 3.14.1), ‘Which being known, all comes to be known’ and so on,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but he adds his usual explanation in conclusion that from the transcendental point of view, no question of creation arises at all and hence no question as to how, Brahman, who is partless is yet not transformed in His entirety.¹

¹ Ś.B. 2.1.27, p. 491.

Rāmānuja

Interpretation of the word “śabda-mūlatvāt” different,—viz. (The fact that Brahman is possessed of various powers) is based on Scripture.¹ According to Nimbārka, it means, as we have seen, “(The fact that Brahman creates the world, yet remains untransformed) is based on Scripture”²; while according to Śrīnivāsa: (The fact that transformation means nothing but projection of powers) is based on Scripture.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 27 in his commentary, viz. “(But the above objection does not apply to the case of the Lord, the real creator) on account of Scripture, because (the knowledge of Brahman) is based on Scripture”.³

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 27

“AND SINCE THESE VARIOUS (MODIFICATIONS) (ARE SEEN) IN THE SOUL ALSO.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

When various modifications are appropriate on the part of individual souls, like gods and the rest, how can they possibly be inappropriate on the part of the omnipotent Lord of all, the cause of the universe?

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is confirming the stated view on the rule of ‘how much more’?

No wonder that if the creation of the world be due to one who is possessed of true resolves, of inconceivable and infinite powers, and is unchangeable by nature, then faults like entire creator being transformed and so on never result,—“since”, i.e. because “in the soul too”, i.e. in the individual soul which has come to attain lordship, “this”, i.e. without there resulting any faults like entire transformation, “various” creations are seen in accordance with its own power.

¹ Śrī. B. 2.1.29, p. 60, Part 2.

² This is the interpretation of *Śaṅkara* as well.

³ G.B. 2.1.27, p. 60, Chap. 2.

The second "and" ("ca") is indicative of 'how much more'? (i.e. obviousness).¹

To begin with, the forms of swans and the rest, assumed by individual souls, are well-known in Scripture.²

The following Smṛti passages are indicative of the power of the king of gods: 'Now he changes into those particular forms repeatedly. He becomes a bearer of the crest and the thunder-bolt, armed with a bow, and wearing the ear-rings, then in an instant, he comes to look like a Caṇḍāla.³ Then, again, my son, he comes to be clad in bark, with a tuft of hair on the top of his head and matted hair. Then he comes to have a large body, becomes fine, likewise stout or thin. Again he changes himself as fair, dark, likewise black; ugly or handsome, likewise young or old; learned, dull or ignorant, likewise short or long. Then the performer of a hundred sacrifices becomes a high caste or a low caste. He assumes the forms of a parrot or a crow, man or cuckoo, and again assumes the forms of a lion, a tiger or an elephant', and so on.

The Smṛti passages concerned with power of the sun are as follows: 'The abode of many wonders is the revered Sun, from whom arise all beings, honoured in the three worlds', and so on. Similarly, the creative power of other gods may be known from Scripture itself.

The following Smṛti passage is indicative of the power of gods: 'They may make a non-god god, and a god non-god. When incensed, they may create rulers of worlds and other worlds'.

The following Smṛti passage designates the power Cyavana: 'O, the power of the Brahma-sage Cyavana, the great-soul! The ascetic can create other worlds, simply by wishing, through the power of austerities'.

The following Smṛti texts refer to the power of Vasiṣṭha's cow, viz. 'The cow, with her head and neck raised, look terrific, her eyes reddened with anger, and lowing repeatedly. Her body, blazing with anger, shone like mid-day sun. The cow created the Palhavas from her tail in great frequency in the form of the piling up of the

¹ I.e. if individual souls are capable of assuming various forms without themselves undergoing modifications, how much more so this must be the case with the Lord, the omnipotent Being. *Kaimutyaka-nyāya*.

² Vide, e.g. Chānd. 4.1.2, where certain divine sages are said to have assumed the form of swans. For fuller account of this story see V.K. 1.3.34.

³ An outcaste, born from a *Sūdra* father and a *Brāhmana* mother.

charcoal, as it were ¹; the Drāviḍas from her tail; the Śakas from her urine; the Yavanas from her womb; numerous Śabaras from her dung; the Cicukas, the Pulindas, the Ciṇas, the Hūnas, the Sakelaras from her foam as well as the Mlecchas of various kinds' (Mahā. 1.6679b-6680a, 6682-6683, 6685) and so on.

Similarly, other individual souls, too, possess the power of various kinds of creations, which are not quoted here for avoiding prolixity, and also because they are not suitable here. Even in eminent individual souls, the power of creating object is insignificant, befitting their own powers and only given by the Lord. It is not possible for even the freed soul to be the creator of the entire universe. This will be made clear in the aphorism: "Devoid of the activity regarding the universe" (Br. Sū. 4.4.17).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 28 in their commentaries. Interpretation different: viz. And thus in the soul (the attributes of the non-sentient are not found), for there are manifold (powers) (in different objects). That is, we find that the sentient individual soul, which is different from non-sentient objects, does not possess their attributes. Similarly, these non-sentient objects themselves, fire, water and the rest, which are different from one another, do not share one another's attributes, but have manifold attributes. In the very same manner Brahman who is different from both the sentient and the non-sentient does not possess their attributes, but numerous others not found in them.²

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. And thus (there are mysterious powers) in the soul (viz. Brahman), because various (powers) (belong to the tree of all desires, or to the philosopher's stone). That is, we believe, on the ground of Scripture alone, that the tree of all desires and the philosopher's stone possess mysterious powers, capable of giving rise to elephants, horses

¹ *Aṅgar-vṛṣ+ṇamul*. Here the suffix 'ṇamul' implies comparison in accordance with the rule Pāṇ. 3.4.45. ŚD. K. 3366, p. 714, vol. 2.

² Śrī. B. 2.1.28, pp. 60-61, Part 2; ŚK. B. 1.2.28, p. 39, Parts 7 and 8.

and the rest. So why should we not believe, on the very same ground, that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers? ¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 28

“AND BECAUSE THERE IS FAULT IN HIS OWN VIEW.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Let our view stand. Since the faults mentioned by you rebound to your own view, it is proper for you to keep silent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The particle “and” (“ca”) is meant for disposing of the doctrines which are opposed to the Vedānta. The Sāṃkhyas and the rest, who maintain doctrines opposed to the Vedānta, cannot find fault with our determination of the cause of the world. Why? “Because there is fault in their own views.” Thus, the Sāṃkhyas admit that pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas, and without parts, is transformed into mahat and the rest. This being so, the consequence is that faults like entire pradhāna being transformed and so on must pertain to their view as well. Since what is without parts cannot be transformed, pradhāna cannot also be the cause, otherwise there will result transformation on the part of puruṣa as well.

If it be argued: There are parts of pradhāna, viz. sattva, rajas and tamas, and hence the above fault does not result,—(we reply:) In that case, according to your view, pradhāna must be an effect, like a piece of cloth, and sattva and the rest, which are its parts, must be its cause, like threads.

If it be argued again: We do not admit that pradhāna has no form before, but is brought into existence by its parts, sattva and the rest, as a piece of cloth by the threads. What we hold is that pradhāna, already existent in its peculiar form, is the aggregate of sattva and the rest in a state of equilibrium,—(we reply:) This does not stand to reason. If this be so, then too, it must be admitted, according to

¹ G.B. 2.1.28, pp. 63-64, Chap. 2.

your view, that when in a state of equilibrium, sattva and the rest are pradhāna, and when in a state of non-equilibrium, they give rise to the world.

Moreover, if each of these be possessed of parts, there must follow infinite regress; but if they be without parts, there must result the violation of the respective difference between the cause and the effect, since there will be no distinction between the causal and the effected states of the aggregate of the sattva and the rest, which are devoid of parts.

Hereby, the doctrine of Atomism too should be known to be refuted.

COMPARISON

All others, except Baladeva, read "Sapakṣa-doṣāc ca".¹ Interpretation same.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: he does not take this sūtra to be referring to the Sāṃkhya view, but to the view that the individual soul, and not the Lord, is the creator of the world. Hence the sūtra means, according to him, "And because there is fault in his own view". That is, the objection raised by the opponent to our view, viz. if Brahman be the creator, the question arises whether He creates with His entire energy or a portion of it only, applies equally to the view that the individual soul is the creator; and while we can answer this objection, the opponent cannot.²

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 29

"AND THAT (DIVINITY) IS ENDOWED WITH ALL (POWERS), BECAUSE IT IS SEEN."³

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text: 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge

¹ G.B. 2.1.29.

² G.B. 2.1.28.

³ C.S.S. ed. leaves out the "ca", p. 29.

and power' (Śvet. 6.8¹), "that" divinity is "endowed with all powers", i.e. is able to do everything.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is demonstrating the omnipotence of the Highest Person.

The cause of the world, as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas and others, viz.: pradhāna and the rest, devoid of a multitude of powers, suitable for the production of the diverse and multiform world, does not stand to reason. But in the case in hand, the Divinity, worshipped by His own devotees who resort to none else, is "endowed with all", i.e. endowed with all powers; "and", i.e. hence, He alone is capable of being the cause, and not pradhāna and the rest. Why? "Because it is seen,—", i.e. (because) Scripture ("darśana") demonstrates it ("tad"),² viz. the divinity who is endowed with all powers;—i.e. because of the scriptural texts like: 'The own power of the divinity, hidden by his own qualities' (Śvet. 1.3), 'Supreme is His power, declared to be manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and action' (Śvet. 6.8), 'Possessed of true desires, possessed of true resolves' (Chānd. 8.1.5; 8.7.1, 3) and so on; and because of the Smṛti passage: 'Hundreds of positive powers like creation and the rest, which are inconceivable to the comprehension of all beings, may belong to Brahman, O best among the ascetics, as heat to fire' (V.P. 1.3.2³).

COMPARISON

All others read: "Sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt", omitting "sā". Śaṃkara and Bhāskara begin a new adhikaraṇa here, (ending with the next sūtra).

¹ R, Śk, B.

² This explains the compound "tad-darśanāt".

³ P. 22.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 30

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (BRAHMAN IS NOT THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD) BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY :) THAT HAS BEEN SAID."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that on account of the denial of His sense-organs in the text: 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8¹), it is not possible for one who is endowed with all powers to be the creator of the world—(we reply:) the answer to this has already been given.²

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Let Brahman be endowed with all powers; still, like milk, without implements such as basin, pot and the rest; like the seed, without implements, such as earth, water, and so on; and like gods and others without implements befitting particular places and times, He cannot consistently be the creator of effects, though possessed of powers, "because of the absence of sense-organs" on His part, i.e. because He is known to be devoid of sense-organs from the text: 'No action or sense-organ of Him exists' (Śvet. 6.8)—

(We reply:) The reply to this has been given in the aphorism: "Because of being based on Scripture" (Br. Sū. 21.1.26). The meaning of the above scriptural text is as follows: There exist 'no action',—i.e. that which is to be done for the purpose of obtaining bliss,—and 'sense-organ' for the production of desired for action, 'of him', i.e. of the Supreme Lord who is one mass of ever-present bliss, the Lord of all and the Creator of the world.³ There are scriptural texts to this effect, viz.: 'The soul, which consists of bliss' (Tait. 2.5), 'Filled with His own self alone', 'A flavour, verily, is He' (Tait. 2.7), 'Having all desires, having all odours, having all tasks' (Chānd. 3.14.2, 4), 'Without hands and feet, he is swift and a seizer; without eyes, he sees; without ears he hears' (Śvet. 3.19) and so on. The declaration by the Lord Himself, too, is as follows:

¹ R, ŚK, B.

² Vide Br. Sū. 2.1.26.

³ I.e. the Lord, who is ever blissful does not need to act for attaining any further bliss; and He has not to depend on the sense-organs for His action.

“I have no duties, whatsoever, O Pārtha, in the three world, nor anything unattained to be attained; yet I abide in action” (Gītā 3.22). Hence it is established that the above-mentioned faults pertain to the opponent’s view alone, but not to the conclusion established by the Vedānta.

Here ends the section entitled “The consequence of the entire” (9).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 31 in his commentary. The interpretation of the phrase “tad uktam” different, viz.: “that has been answered (by Scripture itself)”. That is the very same Upaniṣad (viz. Śvetāśvātara) which has been quoted by the opponent in support of his allegation that the Lord, devoid of sense-organs (viz. Śvet. 6.8), cannot act, answers to the objection by pointing out that though devoid of sense-organs, He can yet act (viz. Śvet. 3.19¹).

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled “Having a need”. (Sūtras 31-35)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 31)

SŪTRA 31

“(BRAHMAN IS) NOT (THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD), ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ACTIVITY OF AN AGENT) HAVING A NEED.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It may be objected: The Supreme Being who has all His desires eternally fulfilled, is not an agent. Why? “On account of the activity of an agent having a need.”

¹ G.B. 2.1.31, p. 67, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, a doubt is raised: Let this be so; yet there being no need on the part of Brahman,—who has His desires eternally fulfilled by themselves,—for creating the world, it is not created by Him.

The *prima facie* view is as follows: Creatorship of the world does not fit in on the part of Brahman. Why? “On account of the activity of the agent having a need”, and on account of there being no need on His part for creating the world, as He has His desires eternally fulfilled.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtras 32–35)

SŪTRA 32

“BUT, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE, (CREATION IS) A MERE SPORT (TO BRAHMAN).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

With regard to it, we reply: Such creation and the rest of the Supreme Being are like the mere sport of kings and so on, well-known in ordinary life.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is stating the correct conclusion.

The particle “but” is for disposing of the *prima facie* view. Just as, in ordinary life, the play of a universal monarch, who has attained lordship, with various kinds of dice, wooden balls and the rest, is a mere sport, without any desire indeed for fruit,—so this is a mere sport on the part of Brahman as well, i.e. a mere play with the creation of the universe and so on.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 33 in his commentary. Interpretation same, but the phrase: “lokavat” explained a little differently, thus: As in ordinary life a man, full of cheerfulness or on awakening from a sound sleep, dances about without any motive or need, but simply from the fulness of spirit, so is the case here.¹ Here Baladeva criticizes the

¹ G.B. 2.1.33, p. 71, Chap. 2.

Viśiṣṭādvaita illustration of a prince engaged in a game of balls (which is the illustration given us by Nimbārka as well as we have seen) by pointing out that such a game is not altogether motiveless, since the prince gets some pleasure from it.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 33

“(THERE ARE) NO INEQUALITY AND CRUELTY (ON THE PART OF BRAHMAN), BECAUSE OF (HIS) HAVING REGARD (FOR THE WORKS OF SOULS), FOR SO (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction and the rest, depend on the works of the individual souls themselves, and so they do not pertain to the creator of the origin and the rest of the world, as in the case of the cloud. “So” exactly the scriptural text: “One becomes good by good action, bad by bad action” (Bṛh. 3.2.13²) “shows”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It may be objected: If Brahman creates the universe in mere sport, He must be open to the charges of inequality and cruelty. He must be open to the charge of “inequality”, i.e. of creating an unequal world, creating as He does different grades of beings like gods, men, animals and so on. And, He must be open to the charge of “cruelty”, i.e. of heartlessness, creating as He does the universe which is an abode of three kinds of sufferings; making the individual souls, not attached to matter, enter into connection with it at the time of dissolution, and thereby causing them sufferings like old age, death, and the rest.

(We reply:) No. There cannot be any inequality and cruelty on the part of Brahman. Why? “On account of (His) having regard”, i.e. because in producing different beings like gods and the rest at the beginning of the creation of the universe, Brahman has regard for, i.e. takes into account, their respective works or karmas,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

² Ś, R.

just as the cloud in producing different kinds of shoots depends on their respective seeds.

If it be asked: Whence is this known? The author replies: "shows", i.e. the holy Scripture shows this thus: 'For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deed; he alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down, do bad deed' (Kauṣ. 3.8), 'One becomes good by good deeds, bad by bad deeds' (Bṛh. 3.2.13), 'The doer of good deeds becomes good, the doer of bad deeds becomes bad' (Bṛh. 4.4.5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva begin a new adhikaraṇa here.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (continued)

SŪTRA 34

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT THIS IS NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION OF WORKS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF BEGINNINGLESSNESS, AND (THIS) FITS IN, AND IS OBSERVED ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected that since the text: "'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning'" (Chānd. 6.2.1¹) declares the 'non-distinction' of works prior to creation, the Supreme Being's dependence on the works does not fit in,—(we reply:) "no", as works exist even then, the works done by the individual souls in previous births being eternal. And a prior creation "fits in", as a sudden subsequent creation is unreasonable.² And this is "observed also" in the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Rg. V. 10.190.3³) and so on.

¹ Ś, R, ŚK, B.

² I.e. since a subsequent creation cannot arise all on a sudden we have to admit that it arises from a prior creation.

³ Pp. 413-14.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The reason, viz. 'on account of dependence', does not fit in. Why? "On account of the non-distinction of works." That is, the non-distinction of the entire world prior to creation being ascertained from the text: "'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second'" (Chānd. 6.2.1), the non-distinction of the works of the individual souls, too, is ascertained. Hence, prior to creation, there are no works as the cause of the diversities of the objects to be created, on which Brahman might depend,—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "On account of the beginningless" of all. That is, the works, good and bad, done by the individual souls in a previous creation, become the cause of the diversities in a subsequent creation. "And" the continuity of creation "fits in" in accordance with the maxim of 'the seed and the shoot',¹ and in accordance with the above-mentioned difference between the manifest and unmanifest effect,² as well as because a sudden subsequent creation without a prior creation is inexplicable, this last reason being indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra). This is "observed also" in Scripture. That is, since the text: 'The creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before' (Ṛg.V. 10.190.3), teaches the existence of a prior creation, the eternity of the flow of creation is established. And in the scriptural and Smṛti texts like: 'With roots above, branches below is this eternal fig-tree' (Kāṭha 6.1), 'With roots above, branches below, the fig-tree is indestructible, they say' (Gītā 15.1), the reality as well of mundane existence, as having the Existent as its root, and as having the form of a continuous stream, is established. Previously, the effect has indeed been determined to be real.³ In the texts: 'Without beginning and without end' (Cūl. 5⁴), 'A wise man is not born, nor dies' (Kāṭha 2.18⁵), 'Know prakṛti (matter) and puruṣa (soul) to be both beginningless' (Gītā 13.19), the eternity, too, of the sentient and the non-sentient substances, which are the powers of the Supreme Cause, is established.

¹ I.e. just as it is impossible to say whether the seed is earlier or the shoot, so it is impossible to say whether *karmas* are the earlier or the *saṃsāra*. Hence they are taken to be beginningless.

² Vide V.K. 2.1.17-18.

³ Vide V.K. 2.1.14 ff.

⁴ Correct quotation: "Anādivatī". Vide p. 230.

⁵ Cf. a very similar passage in Gītā 2.20.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

He breaks this sūtra into two different sūtras—thus: “Na . . . anāditvāt”, and “upapadyate . . . ca”.¹

Bhāskara

He also breaks it into two different sūtras. Further he reads the first portion differently, thus: “Asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt”, (sūtra 35), “upapadyate . . . ca” (sūtra 36).²

Baladeva

He also breaks it into two different sūtras exactly after Śaṃkara. But he takes the first portion only, viz. “Na . . . anāditvāt” as indicated within the previous adhikaraṇa beginning a new adhikaraṇa with the second portion: “upapadyate . . . ca”, concerned with showing that the grace of the Lord is not partial. Hence it means, according to him: And (the special grace shown by the Lord to his devotees) fits in (since it is not arbitrary, but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves), and it is observed also (in Scripture).³

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 35

“AND BECAUSE OF THE FITTING IN OF ALL ATTRIBUTES.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And because of the fitting in of all the attributes” of a cause on the part of Brahman alone, it is established that our view is free from all contradictions.

Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

¹ Ś.B., pp. 498-499.

² Bh. B., p. 107.

³ G.B. 2.1.36, pp. 76-77, Chap. 2.

Veḍānta-kaustubha

“And on account of the fitting in.” That is, all the attributes, mentioned or not mentioned, befitting the cause of the world and inappropriate on the part of pradhāna and the rest,—fit in on the part of Brahman alone. Hence, it is established that the concordance of Scriptures with regard to Brahman is not contradicted by any means whatsoever.

Here ends the section entitled “Having a need” (10).

Here ends the first quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 37 in both the commentaries. They take this sūtra to be a new adhikaraṇa by itself.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. the same theme continued thus: And on account of the fitting in of all attributes (harmonious in themselves or not) (on the part of the Lord). That is, the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and mysterious powers, and hence it is possible for Him to possess, along with the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality, the attribute of showing special favour and partiality for his devotees as well.¹

Résumé

The first section of the second chapter contains—

1. 35 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 37 sūtras and 13 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
3. 36 sūtras and 10 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 37 sūtras and 12 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 36 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 37 sūtras and 11 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

¹ G.B. 2.1.37, p. 78, Chap. 2.

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide each of the sūtras 17 and 35 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras; while Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha divide sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

SECOND QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "the impossibility of arrangement". (Sūtras 1-10)

SŪTRA 1

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ARRANGEMENT ALSO, NOT THE INFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, knowable through inference¹ is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account also of the impossibility" of a varied "arrangement" from it, not acquainted with the arrangement of the objects to be created.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, with a view to inducing those who desire for salvation to the hearing, thinking and the like of the nature, attributes and the rest of the Supreme Person, it has been firmly established above by the reverend author of the aphorisms that Lord Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, omnipotent, the Lord of all, and the Supreme Person, is the cause of the origin and the rest of the world; and that the views of the opponents arise not supported by Scripture has been shown under the aphorism: "Because (the creator of the world) sees, (pradhāna is) not (the creator), (it is) non-scriptural" (Br. Sū. 1.1.5). Now, with a view to establishing the acceptability of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, the reverend author of the aphorisms is exposing, in this section, the fallaciousness of the arguments put forward by the opponents. It is not to be said that those who desire for release being benefitted through a mere exposition of the conclusion of the Vedāntins, what is the use of villifying the views of the opponents? Since just as when a man, giving up the most beneficial food, is about to take injurious poison and the like, people try to induce him to food and to

¹ See footnote 1, p. 42 of the book.

dissuade him from poison, etc. by pointing out the unwholesomeness of the latter, so the villification of the view of the opponents is justifiable for the purpose of preventing people from accepting the views which are opposed to the Veda, and for inducing those desiring for emancipation to our own view.

Now, the Sāṃkhyas, discarding the Highest Person, omnipotent and omniscient, as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, hold prakṛti, devoid of any connection with Him, non-sentient and the equilibrium of the three guṇas, to be the cause of the world. This has been said in the treatise treating of the sixty (categories) ¹: "The primary prakṛti (i.e. matter) is not an effect. There are seven, beginning with mahat, which are (both) causes and effects. There are sixteen which are effects (only). 'Puruṣa (i.e. soul) is neither a cause, nor an effect' (Sām. Kā. 3 ²). They state the five reasons for the existence of prakṛti thus: The cause is pradhāna, '(1) on account of the transformation of the divisions ³; (2) on account of concordance ⁴; (3) on account of the activity preceding from power ⁵; (4) on account of the distinction between the cause and the effect ⁶; (5) on account of the non-distinction of what is possessed of all form' (Sām. Kā. 15 ⁷). The word 'Vaiśva-rūpa' means the same as 'Viśva-rūpa' or what is possessed of all forms, i.e. the universe of varied configurations. Whatever is limited is due to a common cause, like pots and the rest.

¹ Peculiar to the Sāṃkhyas.

² P. 4.

³ I.e. on account of the limitedness (*pariṇāma*) of the effects (*bheda*) like mahat and the rest. Thus: Whatever is limited has a cause, like the pot.

The effects are limited.

∴ they have a cause, viz. *pradhāna*.

I.e. all the effects possess the common qualities of pleasure (*sattva*), pain (*rajas*) and delusion (*tamas*). Hence they must have a common cause which possesses all these qualities, viz. *pradhāna*.

⁴ I.e. the cause can give rise to the effect only if it has the requisite power. Now *pradhāna* alone has the power to give rise to *mahat* and the rest.

⁵ The difference of the effect from the cause proves the existence of the cause. Thus, the difference of the pot from a lump of clay, viz. the first can fetch water, the second not—proves that the pot has clay for its common cause. Similarly, from the mahat and the rest we argue to *pradhāna*, different from them.

⁶ I.e. the whole universe merges in a common cause during dissolution, and such a cause is *pradhāna*. Vide *Candrikā-vyākhyā* of Sām. Kā., pp. 18-19; also *Gauḍapāḍya-bhāṣya* on same, pp. 13-14.

⁷ P. 18.

Similarly, a mahat and ahaṁkāra, the five pure essences, the eleven sense-organs, and the five great elements which are limited are 'divisions'; they are due to one cause which is unlimited in space and time and the common substratum of three guṇas.¹ Whatever is observed to be connected with something else, is due to that one cause; as dishes and the rest, connected with the clay, are due to it. Similarly, the external and internal divisions, connected with pleasures (sattva), pain (rajas) and delusion (tamas) should properly be due to a common cause consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion.² Similarly, just as there is the origin of pots and the like from the power of the cause, so the origin of the effects like mahat and the rest, too, must be held to be due to the power of the cause. This being so, the cause, possessed of such a power, is pradhāna.³ Moreover, it is observed that there is a distinction between the effects, like ear-rings and the rest, and the cause, similar to them, such as gold and the rest, as well as a non-distinction. Similarly, there is both distinction and non-distinction on the part of the manifold universe. Through these two, a cause, viz. the unmanifest which is the substratum of all beings and consists of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, is inferred.⁴

On this suggestion, the author replies: "The inference", i.e. what is inferred, viz. pradhāna, not having Brahman as its common cause, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the impossibility of arrangement," i.e. because it is impossible that the arrangement of the world,—variegated by the aggregate of manifold objects of enjoyment, conforming to the diverse works of the souls,—can arise from pradhāna, not having Brahman for its cause, an object of inference, non-sentient and devoid of any knowledge of the objects to be created; as we see in ordinary life that the arrangement of manifold and variegated palaces, chariots, ornaments and the rest is due to one who is possessed of the knowledge of the objects to be created.

The particle "and" (in the sūtra) indicates that the reasons, intended for proving the existence of pradhāna, can very well be set aside by valid opposite arguments, since the following inference

¹ This explains the first reason.

² This explains the second reason.

³ This explains the third reason.

⁴ This explains the fourth and the fifth reasons.

establishes the non-validity of the object established (by the Sāṃkhya, viz. pradhāna):—

Pradhāna as admitted by the Sāṃkhyas and not having Brahman for its soul, is non-existent;

because it is not perceived.

Whatever is this (i.e. not perceived) is that (i.e. non-existent); like the sky-flower.

Whatever is not this (i.e. not non-perceived) is not that (i.e. not non-existent);

like the sun.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this and the next sūtra as one sūtra.

SŪTRA 2

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity (on its part), not the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase beginning with ‘on account of impossibility’ is to be supplied here. And because activity,—viz. spontaneous falling away from the state of the equilibrium of the three guṇas,—is impossible on the part of pradhāna which is non-sentient and an object of inference. Thus, pradhāna, knowable through inference, is not the cause of the world, since it is observed in ordinary life that non-sentient objects like chariots and the rest, are moved to action only when superintended by conscious beings.

SŪTRA 3

“AND IF IT BE ARGUED THAT (PRADHĀNA ACTS SPONTANEOUSLY) LIKE MILK AND WATER, (WE REPLY:) THERE TOO (LORD IS THE INCITER).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be argued that like milk, etc. pradhāna acts for the origin and the rest of the world by itself, (we reply:) that “there too” the Supreme Being is the inciter is learnt from the scriptural text: “Who abiding within water” (Bṛh. 3.7.4¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: How can it be said that on account of the impossibility of spontaneous activity on its part the non-sentient pradhāna is not the cause of the world? Just as milk, though non-sentient, is by itself transformed into the form of sour milk, and flows spontaneously for the nourishment of the calf; and just as water discharged from the cloud is transformed into the form of various saps of the earth, as well as into the forms of ice, bubble and the rest, and pours down spontaneously for the growth of plants and the rest, as well as flows on, so exactly pradhāna too, independent of a sentient being, having entered into a state of mutual inequality of the guṇas, is transformed into many forms,—

We reply: “There too”. That is, in the case of milk and the rest too, no activity is possible independently of a sentient being. On the contrary, milk and the rest attain the form of sour milk and so on only when superintended by a sentient being. It is the cow herself, fond of her calf, that makes the milk flow out of filial affection, and being liquid the milk oozes out. If it be argued that even when the calf is dead, the presence of the milk is observed, and hence to say that it is the cow that makes the milk flow out of filial affection does not stand to reason,—(we reply:) there is the flow of the milk then by reason of her remembrance of the calf, or else it is explicable on the ground of her love for her master.²

¹ Ś, R, Bh.

² I.e. the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she still remembers the calf, or because she loves her master and wants to be of benefit to him.

Water, too, comes to have the form of ice, bubble and the rest only when superintended by a conscious being; appears to be of the form of various saps through its contact with the earth; and flows on as dependent on a low ground¹ and on account of being liquid. Everything being superintended by a sentient being, the above examples all fit in, in accordance with the scriptural texts: 'Who abiding within water' (Bṛh. 3.7.4), "At the command of this Imperishable, Gārgi, some rivers flow to the east" (Bṛh. 3.8.9) and so on. Hence the inference (i.e. the inferrible *pradhāna*) is not the cause of the world.

SŪTRA 4

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A SEPARATE (ACCESSORY), (*PRADHĀNA* IS NOT THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DEPENDENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, is not the cause of the world. Why? "On account of the non-existence" of an accessory other than it, since according to you it does not depend on anything else.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the cause of the world is not the inference (i.e. the inferrible *pradhāna*). Why? "On account of the non-existence of what is different." That is, if *pradhāna*,—which is not superintended by an intelligent principle, but is independent, non-sentient and an object of inference,—be the cause of the world, there will be activity on its part at all times, and this being so, there would not be, at any time, what is different from activity, i.e. inactivity on its part.²

Or (an alternative explanation), the sense is: On account of the absence of an object to be instigated or of an instigator other than *pradhāna*. The reason for this, again, is: "on account of non-dependence", i.e. according to your view, as the creator of the world,

¹ I.e. the flowing of the water depends on its being on a sloping ground.

² I.e. there would be eternal creation and no dissolution.

pradhāna does not depend on an accessory. It cannot be said also that the variegated works are the instigator of pradhāna,—because works will then become the cause of the world, because the independence of pradhāna in creating the world will be set aside, and, finally, because this is impossible. Works, on the other hand, are not able to give even fruits like merit or demerit, pleasure or pain; their agent, too, does not obtain the fruit by himself. Hence, how can those works, performed by the individual souls who are vitiated by their contact with prakṛti or matter, be able to instigate pradhāna? The fact is that the works bear fruits through the wish of the Lord, and thus their agent obtains fruits, as declared by the Lord Himself: “Pleasure, pain, existence, non-existence, fear and absence of fear, non-violence, equanimity, contentment, penance, charity, fame and absence of fame,—the various states of beings arise from me alone” (Gītā 10. 4a-56). It is not to be said that pradhāna acts through its proximity to puruṣa,—for its proximity to puruṣa being eternal, its activity, too, must be eternal. This will be made clear in details under the aphorism: “As in the case of a man and stone” (Br. Sū. 2.2.7).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 3 in their commentaries. Their explanation is similar to the first explanation given by Śrīnivāsa, viz.: “Because of the non-existence of what is different (from creation, viz. dissolution), on account of (its) non-dependence (to anything else), (pradhāna is not the cause of the world)”¹.

SŪTRA 5

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-EXISTENCE ELSEWHERE, NOT LIKE GRASS AND THE REST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since there is no transformation of the grass and the rest, eaten by an ox, into the form of milk, it cannot be said that just as the grass

¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.3, p. 74, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.3, pp. 57-58, Parts 7 and 8.

and the rest, eaten by cows, etc. become milk by themselves, so the unmanifest, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Just as grass, water, etc. are transformed into the form of milk, so the unmanifest is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest, independently indeed of another efficient cause,—the author replies: “No”. This cannot be said. Why? “On account of the non-existence elsewhere,” i.e. because “elsewhere”, or in the case of oxen and the rest, other than that of cows, etc. there is no transformation of the grass, water and so on, eaten by them, into the form of milk. The particle “and” implies that since the transformation of the grass, etc., eaten by cows, into the form of milk is admitted to be due to an intelligent principle, likewise pradhāna, too, is transformed into the form of mahat and the rest as superintended by an intelligent principle alone, and not by itself.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of the sūtras 5–9 which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9. Interpretation same.

SŪTRA 6

“EVEN IF THERE BE THE ADMISSION (OF ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF PRADHĀNA, STILL THEN IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF A PURPOSE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Even if there be the admission” of activity on the part of pradhāna somehow or other, still pradhāna cannot be the cause, since a purpose for such an activity is impossible on its part, it being non-sentient.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been said under the aphorism: “And on account of activity” (Br. Sū. 2.2.2) that pradhāna has no power of independent activity, and hence is not the cause of the world. Now the author

points out here that "even if there be the admission of activity on its part per force¹, still then pradhāna is not capable of being the cause. Why? "On account of the absence of a purpose," that is, because there is no purpose for the creation of the world, seeing that the souls, merged in their own bliss, prior to creation, have no regard for enjoyment or emancipation; while pradhāna, being non-sentient, is not capable of having enjoyment and the rest. It cannot be said: What purpose can the Highest Person, who has all His desires fulfilled, have in creating the world?—since that has already been pointed out under the aphorism: "But as in ordinary life, a mere sport" (Br. Sū. 2.1.32).

Or (an alternative explanation of the phrase: "arthābhāvāt":) the sense is: On account of the absurdity of the statement, made per force (and not on the ground of reason), viz. 'Pradhāna acts by itself', just like the statement: 'The ether is running'.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They change the order of sūtras, which will be noticed at the end of sūtra 9.

SŪTRA 7

"IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF A MAN AND STONE,
(WE REPLY:) THEN ALSO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be argued that just as a blind man makes a lame man move, or the stone (i.e. the magnet) the iron, so does puruṣa move pradhāna, —(we reply:) in that case, the assumption of the non-activity (of puruṣa) will be contradicted, and pradhāna being something to be instigated by another will cease to be the primary cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: just as a lame man,—who has the power of vision, but is devoid of the power of motion,—lost accidentally from his caravan

¹ I.e. somehow or other.

and wishing to go to a desired place, on finding a blind man,—who has the power of motion, but is devoid of the power of vision,—makes him move by mounting on him; and just as the magnet makes the iron move, so exactly, though devoid of the power of action, the soul, possessed of the power of vision, makes *pradhāna*, devoid of the power of vision, move by its mere proximity. Hence, in spite of the non-sentience of *pradhāna*, the activities of creation and the rest, are possible on its part,—the answer is: “Then also”, i.e. even on the ground of such examples, no activity is possible on the part of the object exemplified, viz. *pradhāna*. Thus, if *puruṣa* be admitted to be the mover of *pradhāna*, then the initial proposition, viz. that *puruṣa* is not an agent, will come to be contradicted. If *pradhāna* be an object to be moved by *puruṣa*, then the initial proposition, viz. that *pradhāna* is by itself the cause of the world, will come to be contradicted. Although the power of motion is not manifest in a lame man, he being without legs, yet he directs the man, who has the power of motion, by means of speech. And the so-directed man, though not having the power of vision manifest because of his blindness, yet being a sentient being, moves in accordance with his (viz. the lame man’s) words. The stone (viz. the magnet), on the other hand, moves the iron (only) when brought into connection with it by a man, and the iron does not move by nature. Moreover, it has been said under the aphorism: “If it be argued: like milk and water, there too” (Br. Sū. 2.2.3), that everywhere and at all times the Omnipotent and Omniscient Being abides as the mover of all. Further, the proximity of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti* being eternal, there was no absence of such a proximity before. Hence the order of creation and dissolution, as well as the respective difference between bondage and release,—due to the proximity of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*—, are not possible; and there must result eternal activity and absence of dissolution. In the case in hand, on the contrary, there is no defect whatsoever, since it has been said that: “And that (divinity) is endowed with all (powers)” (Br. Sū. 2.1.29).

SŪTRA 8

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF BEING PREPON-
DERANT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

As it is impossible for the guṇas, which are in a state of equilibrium at the time of dissolution, to enter in a relation of mutual subordination and preponderance, so the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world. Why? “On account of the impossibility of being preponderant.” Thus, is pradhāna,—consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium, not regulated by an intelligent principle and established by inference as admitted by you,—transformed into the form of the world by means of entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas), or independently of any such state? If the first, then the preponderance of one among (these three guṇas) sattva, rajas and tamas, which are in a state of equilibrium prior to creation and are mutually independent, being impossible, it is not possible for pradhāna to be the cause of the world. If the second, then pradhāna, consisting of the three guṇas in a state of equilibrium and immutable, is not transformed into the form of the world all the more,—there being no state of inequality consisting in a mutual subordination and preponderance (of the guṇas).

It cannot be said also that at the time of creation there is a lapse from the state of equilibrium and the guṇas entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance, thereby the world arises,—for this leads to the horns of a dilemma. Thus, is it admitted by you that the lapse from the state of equilibrium, at that time, is spontaneous; or that it is due to the Omniscient Being? The first alternative is not valid because of the impossibility of a spontaneous lapse without a cause, and also because of the following inference:

Whatever has a cause has lapse,
like seeds and the rest.
Whatever has no cause has no lapse,
like the soul.

The second alternative, too, is not valid, because that is not admitted and because that will be falling in with the view of your opponents.

SŪTRA 9

“AND IF THERE BE AN INFERENCE IN ANOTHER WAY, (PRADHĀNA CANNOT STILL BE THE CAUSE) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF THE POWER OF BEING A KNOWER.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“And if there be an inference” with regard to pradhāna “in another way”, still then “on account of the absence of the power of being a knower” on the part of pradhāna, the world is not due to it.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as there may be the origin of effects, preceded by (pradhāna's) entering into a state of mutual subordination and preponderance in a way other than the stated, so if an inference be made with regard to pradhāna, still then “on account of the absence of the power of being a knower”, i.e. on account of pradhāna being devoid of the power of being a knower, the objections, viz. impossibility of arrangement and the rest, mentioned above, must remain in force. Hence the inference (i.e. the inferrible pradhāna) is not the cause of the world.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation same, but they read sūtras 5-9 in a different order.

Thus:—

<i>Nimbārka, etc.</i>	<i>Rāmānuja, etc.</i>
“Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .” (Sū. 5).	“Anyatra-bhāvāc ca . .” (Sū. 4).
“Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 6).	“Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 5).
“Puruṣāśmavat . .” (Sū. 7).	“Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 6).
“Aṅgitva . .” (Sū. 8).	“Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 7).
“Anyathānumitau . .” (Sū. 9).	“Abhyupagame . .” (Sū. 8).

SŪTRA 10

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION, (THE SĀṂKHYA DOCTRINE IS) INCONSISTENT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The view of Kapila is “inconsistent”, because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view of Kapila is “inconsistent” in every way. Why? Because of its opposition to the Vedānta,—that is, the Vedāntas, independent of all proofs, authoritative by themselves and eternally established, establish the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as the cause of the origin and the rest of the world, and the admission of the doctrine of a non-sentient cause is opposed to this,—because of that;—because of the rejection of a doctrine based on mere reasoning in the passage: ‘This knowledge is not attainable through reasoning’ (Kaṭha 2.9); and because of the opposition between its prior and subsequent (statements). Thus, they hold that puruṣa (or the soul) is all-pervading, devoid of attributes, mere consciousness, isolated (from prakṛti) by nature, non-attached like a lotus leaf¹ and inactive. Then again, they maintain also that prakṛti is an agent through its mere proximity to puruṣa; and that through the super-imposition of nescience that very same (puruṣa) comes to have the attributes of ‘being an agent’, ‘being an enjoyer’ and so on, to be afflicted by the three kinds of miseries,² and to be subject to transmigratory existence. Again, they teach that the salvation of puruṣa proceeds from the knowledge of prakṛti and puruṣa. Thus, a multitude of inconsistencies between prior and subsequent (statements) may be found there.

In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since in accordance with the Smṛti passages: “The evil-doers, the deluded, and the vilest men do not attain me,—they whose wisdom is destroyed by nescience and who have resorted to demoniacal nature” (Gītā 7.15), ‘Knowledge is enveloped by non-knowledge; thereby beings are deluded’

¹ I.e. just as a lotus leaf is not wetted by water, so the soul is not attached to anything.

² Viz. physical, mental and elemental.

(Gītā 5.15.), “At the end of many births, one who is possessed of knowledge attains me” (Gītā 7.19), “Those who attain me cross over this māyā” (Gītā 7.14), “Many, purified by the penance of knowledge come to attain my nature” (Gītā 4.10), the causes of bondage, as well as of salvation,—liberating the bound soul from its bondage, unprecedented, and characterized by the attainment of His nature,—is well-established, there is not even a shadow of any contradiction among prior and subsequent (statements). Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the concordance of the scriptural texts (with regard to Brahman) by the view of Kapila, which is opposed to the Veda and is set forward by means of fallacious reasoning.

Here ends the section entitled “The impossibility of arrangement” (1).

COMPARISON

While Nimbārka adduces two reasons as to why the Sāṃkhya doctrine is ‘inconsistent’, viz. (1) oppositon to the Vedānta, (2) internal contradictions,—others adduce only one, viz. Śaṃkara, Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva adduce the second,¹ Bhāskara adduces the first.² Hence they do not attach any special meaning to the particle “ca” in the sūtra.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “The great and the long”. (Sūtras 11–17)

SŪTRA 11

“FOR, JUST AS THE (ORIGIN) OF THE GREAT AND THE LONG FROM THE SHORT AND THE SPHERICAL (IS UNTENABLE) (SO EVERYTHING IS UNTENABLE IN THE VAIŚEṢIKA THEORY).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since if they be possessed of parts, then there will result an infinite regress; and if without parts, then it will be impossible for them

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.10, p. 513; Śrī. B. 2.2.9, pp. 78 ff., Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.9, p. 61, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.10, p. 96, Chap. 2.

² Bh. B., 2.2.10, p. 112.

to be the producer of other evolutes¹,—there is inconsistency in the origin of the binary compounds from the atoms; and there is all the more inconsistency in the origin of ternary compounds from these (binary compounds). Like this, everything admitted by the maintainers of the atomic view is inconsistent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. : Let pradhāna, not superintended by an intelligent principle, be not the cause of the world; but let the groups of atoms, under the control of the wish of the Supreme Lord, be the cause of the world,—the author is now pointing out the inconsistencies in the atomic doctrine as well.

The procedure of the atomists is the following: A substance produces another substance, a quality another quality; and the production of the effect proceeds from three causes, viz. the inherent, the non-inherent and efficient²; just as an effect, viz. a piece of cloth, is produced by the threads which are the inherent cause, by their mutual conjunction which is the non-inherent cause, and by the shuttle, the loom, the weaver and the rest, which are the efficient cause. Likewise, there are four kinds of atoms, distinguished as earth-atoms, water-atoms, fire-atoms and air-atoms; and they are eternal, without parts, possessed of colour and the rest, and spherical in extension, and remain without producing effects at the time of dissolution. At the time of creation, the atoms become the inherent cause for the production of the effect (viz. the world), their conjunction, the non-inherent cause, and the unseen principle³ the efficient cause. Thus, through the wish of the Lord, first motion arises in the air-atoms, then a conjunction (between them) and thereby an effect, viz. a binary compound, arises from two atoms; a ternary compound arises from three binary compounds; a quaternary compound arises from four ternary compounds, and so on; and through this process, finally, the great air arises and remains trembling in space. In the very same manner, fire arises from the fire-atoms and remains shining in the form of earthly fire and so on. In the very same manner, the great

¹ C.S.S. ed. reads "*parimāṇa*" instead of "*pariṇāma*", p. 31.

² *Samavāyīn, asamavāyīn, nimitta.*

³ I.e. the merit or demerit attaching to a man's conduct in one state of existence and the corresponding reward or punishment with which he is visited in another.

ocean arises from the water-atoms and remains flowing. In the very same manner, the great earth arises from the earth-atoms and remains immobile in the form of clay, stones and the rest. Again, the qualities of the effects arise from the qualities of the cause. Just as the qualities of a piece of cloth arise from the qualities of the thread,—a red cloth being found to arise from red threads,—so the qualities of whiteness and the like, inhering in the binary compounds and the rest, arise from the qualities of whiteness, etc. inhering in the atoms. But the combination of two simple atoms, producing a binary compound, produces different measures, viz. minuteness and shortness, in the binary compound, but do not produce sphericity, the measure of the simple atoms themselves,—because, then, there will result an intense fineness (on the part of the binary compound which it has not). Similarly, at the time of dissolution, too, through the wish of the Lord, there is motion in the atoms, thereby the dissolution of their conjunction, thereby the dissolution of the binary compounds and so on, and in this manner, finally, there is the dissolution of the earth and the rest.

This view is being refuted here. The particle “or” in the aphorism is meant for implying the aggregate (of defects in the atomic doctrine) left unsaid. The word ‘inconsistent’ is to be supplied from above. The phrase: “from the short and the spherical” is to be applied by dividing it in a compatible manner. This being so, like the doctrine of the origin of a short binary compound from two simple spherical atoms, and like the doctrine of the origin of the great and long ternary compounds from the short (binary compounds), everything else too, maintained by them (viz. the atomists), is inconsistent—this is the construction of the words of the aphorism.

The sense is this: The origin of binary compounds from atoms is impossible. That being impossible, the origin of the ternary compounds from the binary compounds is all the more impossible. In exactly the same manner, whatever is maintained by the atomists is simply inconsistent. Thus, it is observed that the parts, viz. the threads and the rest, produce a whole, viz. a piece of cloth, only by being conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts. An atom, too, is established to have six parts through its connection with the six quarters. As has been said: ‘An atom has six parts because of its simultaneous connection with the six (quarters)’. Hence, even the atoms must be productive of effects

as possessed of parts indeed. If they be so, then they themselves will become effects like the binary compounds because of possessing parts. And the parts of the atoms too,—conjoined (with one another) by means of their six sides which are their own parts, and establishing that the atoms have parts,—must have parts; that parts, again, further parts and so on, and thus there must be an infinite regress. If the atoms be admitted to be without parts, then if there be the conjunction of even a hundred atoms which fill no space, there will not be any extension different from that of a single atom, and hence there will never be (different kinds of extensions like) minuteness, shortness and the rest. Thus, the origin of the binary compounds is impossible; in their absence, the origin of the ternary compounds is impossible; and hence the origin of the world must be impossible.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Interpretation different. They take this sūtra as constituting an *adhikaraṇa* by itself, concerned with refuting the *Vaiśeṣika* objection, viz. that the qualities of the cause must inhere in the effect. Hence if the intelligent Brahman be the cause of the world, then the quality of intelligence must be found in the world. But since this is not the case, He is not its cause.¹ The answer is: Or just as (there is the origin of) big and long (ternary compounds) from minute and short (binary compounds) so there is the origin of the non-intelligent world from the intelligent Brahman.²

SŪTRA 12

“EVEN IN BOTH WAYS THERE IS NO ACTION (ON THE PART OF THE ATOMS), HENCE THERE IS THE ABSENCE OF THAT (VIZ. CREATION).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because it is impossible for the unseen principle to inhere in the atoms, as well as because it is impossible for it, connected with the

¹ Note that an exactly similar objection has been put forward and refuted under Br. Sū. 2.1.4–11. Hence there is no sense in repeating it here. As such *Nīmbārka's* way of interpreting seems preferable.

² Ś.B. 2.2.11, pp. 518-19; Bh. B. 2.2.11, pp. 113-14.

soul, to be the instigator of the motion of the atoms,—thus “even in both ways” the first motion of the atoms is not possible. “Hence there is the absence” of the creation of the world through the successive order of binary compounds and the rest, due to conjunction, which again is due to the motion of the atoms.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author is elucidating the statement (made in the last aphorism), viz. Like the (origin of) the great and the long, everything else, too, maintained by them, is inconsistent.

“Even in both ways”, no motion is possible in the atoms at the time of creation. “Hence”, i.e. for this reason, viz. on account of the impossibility of motion, “there is the absence of that”, i.e. of the origin and the rest of the world through the successive order of binary compounds, ternary compounds and so on, due to the conjunction of atoms. The phrase: “in both ways” means: Does the first motion (of the atoms) arise by itself, or through the atoms? The first alternative is not tenable, being impossible. Never does motion, arising by itself, proceed to bring water in a pitcher. It cannot be said also that it arises through a cause, because at that time (i.e. at the time of creation) there exist no human effort, vibration, impact and the rest (which might have been such a cause). The second alternative, too, is not tenable, because then the atoms must become sentient, it being impossible for non-sentient atoms to be the instigator of motion. In the building of a palace and the like, the stones and the rest do not themselves act in conjunction with other works (connected with the building).

Or ¹, (if it be said that) the motion which arises in the atoms at that time is caused by the unseen principle, (we reply): There is negation of motion “in either way”. Thus, does the unseen principle which causes the motion of the atoms inhere in the atoms, or in the individual soul? The first alternative is not tenable, because the unseen principle, being originated by the good and evil deeds of the individual souls, cannot reside in something non-sentient; because being non-sentient, it is not possible for the unforeseen principle to be the cause of motion; because the performance of good and evil

¹ An alternative explanation of the word “*Ubhayathā*”.

deeds being impossible on the part of atoms, the unseen principle must be necessarily admitted to be natural (to them), and in that case there will result the origin of motion at all times. The second alternative, too, is not tenable, because it is all the more impossible for the unseen principle, inhering in the individual soul, to urge the motion of the non-sentient (atoms). Thus, there is no motion "even in both ways".

"Or ¹ else no motion is possible, whether it be due to the individual soul, or due to the Lord. Thus, does the individual soul give rise to the first motion through its own destiny (*adr̥ṣṭa*), or through its proximity, or through its attribute of consciousness? Not the first, because of the above-mentioned fault. Not through its proximity also, because the proximity of the individual soul to the atoms being eternal, the consequence will be that it will ever give rise to the world. Nor even through consciousness, because of the absence of consciousness then. And motion does not proceed from the Lord as well. Is the Lord, according to your view, designated in the Veda or established by inference and the rest? If it be said: Designated in the Veda, then have faith in the procedure mentioned by Scripture thus: 'Everything has that for its soul' (*Chānd.* 6.8.7, etc.), 'He became existence and that' (*Tait.* 2.6), and being overwhelmed with the sentiment of love for Him, be free from affliction,—what is the use of your doctrine of atoms? If it be said: Established through inference and the rest,—(we reply:) that it (*viz.* inference) is not even established has been proved above.²

SŪTRA 13

"(THE VAISĒṢIKA DOCTRINE IS UNTENABLE) ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION OF THE RELATION OF INHERENCE, ON ACCOUNT OF AN INFINITE REGRESS (ARISING THEREFROM) BECAUSE OF SAMENESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account also of the admission of the relation of inherence," the doctrine of atoms is not possible, since just as a binary compound is connected with its own cause by the relation of inherence, being

¹ A third alternative explanation of the word "*Ubhayathā*".

² Vide V.K. 1.1.3.

absolutely different therefrom, so the relation of inherence itself, too, is to be connected with the two related objects by another relation of inherence, its absolute difference (from the two related objects) being the same; that, too, by another relation, and so on—thus there will be an infinite regress.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase: 'on account of the absence of that' is to be supplied.

For this reason also, the origin and the rest of the world in the successive order of the creation of binary compounds and the rest, due to the conjunction of the atoms is not possible. Why? "On account of the admission of the relation of inherence." Among separable objects, there is a relation of conjunction,¹ as between a rope and a pot. Among inseparable objects, on the other hand, there is a relation of inherence,² just as a piece of cloth exists in the threads by the relation of inherence, a pot in the two pot-sherds, cowness in a cow and whiteness and the rest in a piece of cloth. The relation between objects which are causes and effects is just this relation of inherence; and this relation is proclaimed to be one, eternal, and all-pervading like the ether;—on account of the admission of such a relation of inherence—this is the sense.

If it be asked: What objection is there if such a relation of inherence be admitted?—(the author) replies: "On account of an infinite regress because of sameness". That is, just as a binary compound, absolutely different from its inherent cause (viz. the two simple atoms), necessarily awaits a relation of inherence (for being connected with them), so the relation of inherence itself, being absolutely different from the two related objects, is to be connected with them by means of another relation of inherence,—“because of the sameness” of absolute difference (i.e. because there is absolute difference equally in both the cases, also because what is itself unrelated is never observed to be a relation)—that, too, by another relation of inherence, and that, too, and so on; thus “on account of infinite regress”, the atomic theory defeats itself.

¹ *Samyoga*.

² *Samavāya*.

SŪTRA 14

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE (OF) ETERNAL (ACTIVITY AND INACTIVITY) ALONE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the atoms be active by nature, there being the existence of (eternal) activity, there will result eternal creation; otherwise there will result eternal dissolution; and hence there is the absence of that (viz. creation).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this, too, the atomic theory is untenable. Why? If the atoms be admitted to be active by nature, then there being eternal activity alone, there cannot be dissolution. If, they be admitted to be inactive by nature, there being eternal inactivity alone, the absence of creation will necessarily result—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 13 in the commentaries of the first two. Interpretation different, viz. “(If the samavāya be admitted to be eternal, the terms related by it, viz. ternary compounds, etc., i.e. the world too must be) eternal indeed, on account of the existence (i.e. eternity of the samavāya)”¹

SŪTRA 15

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF (THE ATOMS) HAVING COLOUR AND SO ON, THE REVERSE (VIEW WOULD FOLLOW), BECAUSE OF OBSERVATION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the atoms having colour and the rest in accordance with the respective effects, there must be non-eternity, which is the “reverse” of eternity, (on their part), since pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are observed to be non-eternal. Otherwise, the effects must be devoid of colour, etc.

¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.13, p. 86, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.13, p. 75, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.14, p. 107, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Since the effects are possessed of colour, etc., the atoms, too, are admitted to be possessed of colour and so on.¹ Thus, since the four kinds of atoms are possessed of colour and so on, i.e. possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch,—non-eternity, the “reverse” of eternity, results, as pots and the rest, possessed of colour and so on, are found to be non-eternal. If they be not admitted to be possessed of colour and the like, then the fact that the effects are possessed of colour and so on will come to be contradicted, and the initial proposition: ‘Possessed of parts and eternal’ too will come to be contradicted. For this reason too, there is the absence of that (viz. creation),—this is the meaning of the particle “and”. The sense is that an unseen object cannot be determined in accordance with what is seen. Hence the cause of the world is to be understood in accordance with Scripture.

SŪTRA 16

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the atoms be possessed of more numerous qualities,² then the earth, water, fire and air will become similar. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities,³ then, too, all the different kinds of atoms being connected with one quality each, the earth and the rest too, having qualities corresponding to their causes, must be connected with one quality each,—this “on account of fault in both ways”, there is indeed the absence of that (viz. creation).

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also, the procedure admitted by the atomists is not possible. Why? Because whether the atoms be admitted to be possessed of more numerous qualities, or to be possessed of less numerous qualities, “in both ways”, too, there is fault. Since the

¹ An effect can have no qualities which the cause has not.

² I.e. every kind of atoms are possessed of the five qualities of colour and the rest.

³ I.e. each be possessed of its peculiar qualities.

qualities of the effect are due to the qualities of the cause, all the qualities of the cause, such as colour, taste and the rest, must attach to all the effects. As a result, there must be smell and taste in fire; colour, taste and smell in air; and the grossness on the part of the atoms, since the earth, which has the most numerous qualities, is observed to be gross. If they be possessed of less numerous qualities, then all must have one quality each. If this be so, then there must be touch in fire; colour and touch in water; colour, touch and taste in earth, because, those particular qualities are absent from those particular atoms. Otherwise, there will result everything everywhere.

If it be argued: that the earth is observed to be possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch; water to be endowed with the attributes of colour, taste and touch; the fire to be possessed of colour and touch; and the air is to be possessed of touch. Corresponding to these qualities, some atoms are supposed to be possessed of more numerous qualities, others less numerous. Hence the above objection cannot be raised,—

(We reply:) No; for in that case, too, those that have more numerous qualities will be deprived of their atomicity.¹ In the case in hand, on the other hand, there is no fault whatsoever, since the world has the omniscient and omnipotent Lord of all as its material cause.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in the commentaries of the first two.

Interpretation different—viz. an elucidation of the previous sūtra, viz. "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. either if the atoms be possessed of colour, etc., or if they be not. On the first, they cannot be eternal; on the second, their effects cannot be possessed of colour and the rest.²

¹ Since increase in qualities cannot take place unless there is a simultaneous increase in size.

² Śrī. B. 2.2.15, pp. 86-87, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.15, p. 77, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.16, p. 107, Chap. 2.

SŪTRA 17

“AND BECAUSE OF NON-ACCEPTANCE, (THERE MUST BE AN) ABSOLUTE DISREGARD (FOR THE ATOMIC THEORY).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because of the rejection of atomism by the wise, “an absolute disregard” for it is to be shown by those who are desirous of salvation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Certain portions,—such as the doctrine of a pre-existent cause and the rest,—of the doctrine of the causality of pradhāna, though rejected on the ground of its opposition to Scripture and reasoning, has been accepted by those who are versed in the Veda. But “because of the non-acceptance”, i.e. rejection, by the wise, in toto, of the doctrine of the causality of the atoms, imagined by the Vaiśeṣikas; because of its opposition to reasoning; and because of its opposition to the Veda, “there is an absolute disregard”,—i.e. the doctrine of the causality of atoms is to be disregarded by those who wish for the highest.

Hence it is established that there is no contradiction of the doctrine of the causality of Brahman by the doctrine of the causality of atoms which is to be rejected from a distance.

Here ends the section entitled “The great and the long” (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled “The aggregate”. (Sūtras 18-27)

SŪTRA 18

“EVEN IF THE AGGREGATE HAVING TWO CAUSES (BE ADMITTED), (THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THAT (VIZ. OF THE AGGREGATES).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author is refuting the view of Sugata.¹

Even if the aggregates of the element and the elemental, the mind and the mental be admitted, still then, on account of the non-

¹ I.e. of the Buddhists.

sentience of the objects aggregated, as well as on account of non-admission of another cause of the aggregation, the aggregates are not possible.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Kapila, the maintainer of the doctrine of pre-existing effects, holds that pradhāna, not having Brahman for its soul, is the cause of the world. He has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the doctrine of the causality of Brahman and the Vedic doctrine. Kaṇāda, inferior even to him in intelligence and the maintainer of the doctrine of non-existing effects, holds the cause of the world to be of various kinds¹; and hence he has been refuted by reason of maintaining what is opposed to the 'great'.² Now, the doctrine of the Buddhists, inferior to that even, is being refuted, on account of its similarity to that.³

The doctrine taught by the Buddha being interpreted differently, four views were propounded by his four classes of disciples. These followers are called, (1) Vaibhāṣika, (2) Sautrāntika, (3) Yogācāra, and (4) Mādhyamika. Among these, the first two maintain the reality of external objects. Among them, again, the first maintains that external objects are directly perceivable. According to him, external objects, like pots and the rest, are knowable by the evidence of direct perception. The other maintains that external objects are inferrible through cognitions. According to him, external objects like pots and rest, which are not directly perceived, are inferred through cognitions, produced in the forms of pots and so on and directly perceived. The third maintains the reality of cognitions alone without any substratum. He holds that external objects are like dreams. All of them maintain that the objects admitted by them are momentary. The view of the fourth is that everything is void. He holds that the continuous stream of cognitions, freed from object and subject-forms, persists from moment to moment of the basis of past impressions, like a lamp in a place sheltered from wind. But when past impressions are destroyed, it attains a complete extinction like the lamp itself; this attainment of non-existence is salvation. The others, on the other hand, hold that there is no interruption in the

¹ Viz. the four kinds of atoms.

² Vide Br. Sū. 2.2.17.

³ The Buddhists too admit the aggregation of atoms like the *Vaiśeṣikas*.

continuous stream of cognitions. Among them, the views of the Yogācāra and the Mādhyamika will be refuted later. But in this section, the views of the realists, viz. the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, are being refuted together.

Thus, they speak of five groups,¹ viz. colour, cognition, feeling, name and impression.² Among these, the colour-group consists in the four elements, like the earth and the rest, and the elemental in the form of the body, sense-organs, and sense-objects. Among these, the earth-atoms, possessed of colour, taste, smell and touch, and hard by nature, are aggregated into the form of the earth; the water-atoms, possessed of colour, taste and smell, and viscid by nature, are aggregated into the form of water; the fire-atoms, possessed of colour and touch, and hot by nature, are aggregated into the form of fire; likewise the air-atoms, possessed of touch and mobile by nature, are aggregated into the form of air; and the four elements, like the earth and the rest, are aggregated into the form of body, sense-organs and sense-objects. In this way, these four kinds of momentary atoms are held to be the cause of the aggregation of the elements and the elemental. The colour-group, consisting of the elements and the elemental and due to the atoms, is the external aggregate. The cognition-group consists in a stream of cognitions like the cognition of a pot, cognition of a piece of cloth, and so on, based on the internal cognition of the 'I', and subsisting uninterruptedly. This alone is the agent, the enjoyer and the soul, and from it alone all ordinary practical transactions proceed. The feeling-group consists in pleasurable or painful experiences. The name-group consists in the cognition of secondary marks, e.g. (in the cognition:) 'a cow possessed of auspiciousness', the cow is distinguished by the secondary mark of auspiciousness. The impression-group consists in the mental qualities of attachment, aversion, delusion, pride, malice; fear, grief, depression and so on. These last four kinds of groups are said to be the mind and the mental. Among these, the cognition-group is said to be the mind or the soul, others mental; and thus they are internally aggregated in such a way as to be the substratum of ordinary practical transactions. This is the internal aggregate, due to the four groups, beginning with the cognition-group. The soul and the ether, other than the

¹ *Skandha*.

² *Rūpa, vijñāna, vedanā, saṃjñā and saṃskāra*.

two aggregates, are non-existent by nature. These two aggregates make the course of mundane existence possible, and practical life being thus made possible, there is no need, it is thought, of an eternal soul.

(Correct conclusion.) With regard to it we reply: Even if there be the admission, in the above way, of aggregates, i.e. of groups having two causes, still then "there is the non-establishment of that",—i.e. establishment "of that", viz. of that which has two causes, too, is indeed impossible. The sense is: because the spontaneous aggregation of non-sentient objects, mutually independent, is not possible, and also because of their momentariness, the aggregate of the elements and the elemental, as well as the aggregate of the mind and the mental, are not possible. Further, because of the non-admission of a permanent enjoyer, of a sentient controller—one who brings about the aggregation, of an omniscient and universal Lord; as well as because of the consequence of the world becoming super-sensible by reason of the super-sensibleness of the atoms themselves, the course of mundane existence must disappear. The sense is that this view is faulty, since it rejects Brahman, taught by the beginningless Veda; since it admits the aggregates of atoms, unseen and unheard; and since a cause for the aggregation is impossible.

SŪTRA 19

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (ON ACCOUNT OF THE MUTUAL CAUSALITY (OF NESCIENCE AND THE REST), (THE AGGREGATION) IS POSSIBLE, (WE REPLY:) NO, BECAUSE OF (THEIR) NOT BEING THE CAUSE OF AGGREGATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It cannot also be that no account of the mutual causality of nescience, past impressions, cognition, name and form, six supports¹ and the rest, the aggregation and the rest, are possible,—for they, too, are not the causes of aggregation.

¹ *Avidyā, saṃskāra, vijñāna, nāma-rūpa, śaḍāyatana*, etc. For explanation, see below V.K.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: In spite of the non-admission of a sentient and omniscient being as bringing about the aggregation, no harm is done, since our view admits the mutual causality of nescience and the rest. That which goes towards the effect as its cause is 'pratyaya', i.e. the cause; the state of that, no account of that,¹ all aggregation and the rest become possible. Thus, nescience and the rest, functioning from all eternity, are admitted to be the causes of the continuous stream of cognitions. Among these, the word 'nescience' is denotative of error, such as, taking the non-permanent as permanent, taking what is not the way (to salvation) as the way and so on. Through it past impressions, consisting in attachment and so on to sense-objects like colour and the like, arises. It is through this that activity springs forth when occasion arises. Activity consists in good and bad deeds, in accordance with the declaration by the Buddha: 'There is action, there is result'. Through this alone cognition arises. Thence the four (elements like) the earth and the rest, the cause of the aggregate, viz. the body, arise, and that very thing is said to be name because of being the substratum of name. From them arises the body; from it the six supports, viz. the five organs of knowledge and the mind; from them touch; from it feeling, viz. pleasure, pain and the rest; from it nescience and the rest once more. Thus, the objects revolving unceasingly like water-wheels, aggregation is possible therefrom. Hence, everything in our doctrine is indeed consistent,—

(We reply:) "no". Why? "Because of (their) not being the cause of aggregation," i.e. because nescience and the rest are not the causes of aggregation; for it can by no means be said that nescience, consisting in the error of taking a person at a distance to be a post, is the cause of the aggregation of the already existing person. Likewise, attachment and the rest too, caused by it (viz. nescience), are not the cause of aggregation.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Baladeva

Reading different, viz. "Itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpatti mātra-nimittatvāt". Interpretation different accordingly: viz. "If it be said that because of the mutual causality (of nescience and the

¹ This explains the compound "*pratyayatvāt*".

rest), (aggregation is possible), (we reply:) no, because of (their) being the causes of the origin only (of the immediately subsequent effects, and not of aggregation)".¹

Bhāskara

Reading slightly different, viz.: "Itaretara-pratyaya-manyat-vāt . . .".²

SŪTRA 20

"AND BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE PRIOR ON THE PRODUCTION OF THE SUBSEQUENT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

For this reason, too, this doctrine is not reasonable,—since "on the production of the subsequent", there results the destruction of the prior, it being momentary.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued that as the prior is the cause of the production of the later, so our doctrine is consistent,—(we reply:) no. "Because of the cessation of the prior on the production of the subsequent."

In ordinary life, causality is observed to belong only to an existent lump of clay, the prior, at the time of the production of a pot, the subsequent. But on your view, on account of the momentariness of all existing objects, the prior moment is destroyed and cannot, therefore, be the cause of the subsequent moment. Here a momentary existence is said to be 'moment'. Now, to begin with, does the prior moment of the pot³ give rise to the subsequent effect which exists at the same time, or as itself unoriginated, or as itself destroyed? The first alternative is not tenable, because that (viz. the effect) also (will give rise to) another effect existing at the same time, that, too, to another and so on, and thus everything will last only for a moment simultaneously; and because the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. The

¹ S.B. 2.2.19, p. 537; G.B. 2.2.19, pp. 113-114, Chap. 2.

² Bh. B. 2.2.19, p. 117.

³ I.e. the prior momentary existence pot.

second alternative, too, is not tenable, that being impossible. Moreover, to say that (the cause) is unoriginated is to imply nothing but its non-existence; and if it (viz. non-existence) be a cause, then by reason of the absence of obstructions, there may be the origin of everything everywhere. The third alternative, too, is not tenable because the prior being destroyed, there will be again the origin of everything everywhere. It cannot be said that the prior momentary existence persists up to the origin of the subsequent momentary existence, for then, its momentariness will come to be abandoned.

SŪTRA 21

“(IF IT BE ADMITTED THAT THE EFFECT ORIGINATES) WHEN (THE CAUSE IS) NOT EXISTENT, (THEN THERE IS) THE CONTRADICTION OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, OTHERWISE THERE IS SIMULTANEOUSNESS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is non-existent, there must result the “contradiction of the initial proposition”, viz. that there is the origin of cognitions from four causes, viz. sense-organs, light, direction of the mind and sense-objects. On the admission of the origin of the effect when the cause is existent, there must be the origin of another momentary existence when the prior momentary existence is still present; and thus there must be “simultaneousness” according to your view, the maintainers of the doctrine of momentariness!

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author condemns the causeless origin of effects.

If it be argued that let there be the production of the subsequent (effect) without a cause, and this being so, the above objection cannot be raised—then we reply: If it be admitted that there is the origin of the effect even when the cause is non-existent, then there must be the “contradiction of the initial proposition”. Thus, there must be the “contradiction”, i.e. abandonment, of your initial proposition that in the production of cognitions, there are four causes, the main cause, viz. the sense-organs like the eyes and the rest; the auxiliary cause, viz. light; the immediate cause, viz. the direction of the mind;

and the supporting cause, viz. the sense-objects.¹ Moreover, even if the causeless origin of effect be admitted, the above-mentioned fault, viz. the origin of everything everywhere, remains unavoidable. If, again, to avoid this difficulty, the case be admitted to be "otherwise", i.e. if it be admitted that the effect originates when the cause is existent, then there must be "simultaneousness", i.e. there must be simultaneous existence of the cause and the effect. That is, the above-mentioned objection remains in force. Thus, does the prior momentary existence pot come to be the cause of another momentary existence pot at the time when it (the prior) itself exists, or does it become the cause of the subsequent moment,—which is being generated,—by lasting till the time of its production? In either case, there is simultaneousness. On the first alternative, all the momentary existences will come to be perceived at the same time, and the conventional distinction between the prior and the subsequent will come to an end. On the second alternative, their momentariness will be abolished, and owing to the persistence of two momentary existences, there must follow a simultaneous perception of two momentary existences in the same place.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

The meaning of the phrase "pratijñoparodhaḥ" different, viz. contradiction of the initial proposition (viz. that the world originates from the skandhas).²

SŪTRA 22

"(THERE IS) THE NON-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS DESTRUCTION³ ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-INTERRUPTION (OF THE STREAM OF COGNITIONS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no possibility for the causal or causeless destruction,⁴ because there is no possibility of an interruption of the continuous series and because there is a recognition of the members of the series.

¹ *Adhipati, sahakārin, samanantara, ālambana.*

² G.B. 2.2.21, pp. 115-16, Chap. 2.

³ *Prati-saṃkhyā* and *aprati-saṃkhyā.*

⁴ For explanation, see below V.K.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, first the (doctrine of) origin, admitted by the opponents, has been disposed of. Now the (doctrine of) destruction too, admitted by them, is being disposed of.

The destruction which is preceded by an act of thought is "conscious destruction"; destruction not so preceded is "unconscious destruction". These two kinds of destruction are admitted by them. Among these, the destruction of existing objects,—which is caused by the blow of a hammer and the rest, which consists of the termination of a series of similar momentary existences, and which is perceivable and gross,—is said to be preceded by an act of thought. The destruction of existent objects,—which is not perceivable, subtle, causeless and takes place in a series of similar momentary existences at every moment,—is said to be non-preceded by an act of thought. There is the "non-establishment", i.e. impossibility, of these two kinds of destruction with regard to the continuous series and the single members of the series. Why? "On account of the non-interruption of the series." First, no causal destruction of the series is possible. Thus, it being admitted by you that there is the destruction, at every moment of existing objects with regard to a prior member of the series, it is admitted that in spite of being destroyed, there is the origin from it of a subsequent (member) which is caused by it and is non-existent indeed. The sense is that in spite of a momentary member of the series being destroyed, at that moment, by the blow of a hammer and the rest, the origin of a subsequent member is possible, no account of the absence of impediments, and thereby a subsequent series being possible, the causal destruction of the series is not possible. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, origination and destruction are said to be the different states of clay and the rest that are indeed existent. But, on your view, the interruption of the continuous series is not possible even by the blow of a hundred hammers at all times—this is the sense.

Moreover, if there be the destruction of the last member of the series through a cause, then there cannot be properly the destruction of others, too, without causes, and hence there must result the perception of many pots in the place of one pot. It cannot be said also that they are subject to a causeless destruction, taking place at every moment in a series of similar momentary existences, and as such the

above objection cannot be raised,—for then such a destruction being possible on the part of the last member of the series, a causal destruction becomes meaningless. It cannot be said also that there is the origin of a series of dissimilar momentary existences through (the blow of) a hammer and the rest too, and as such the above objection cannot be raised,—because when the prior member is destroyed by a hammer and so on, too, there resulting the origin of a subsequent one, similar to it, by reason of the absence of contrary circumstances, there is no possibility for a series of dissimilar existences; and because of the absence of any reason for the origination of a series of dissimilar existences.

A causeless destruction of the series, too, is not possible, for then the disappearance of the entire universe will result.

In the same manner, these two (viz. the causeless and causal destructions) are not possible with regard to the single members of the series,—for if here the causeless destruction of particular members be admitted, then the destruction once more of the momentary members by the hammer and the rest will be impossible. A causeless destruction, too, cannot become the annihilator of existent objects, since single members of the series, like pots and the rest, are recognized.¹

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

Reading different, viz. “asambhavaḥ” in place of “avicchedāt”.²

SŪTRA 23

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF FAULT IN BOTH WAYS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because the series has no existence beyond the single members of the series, and because single members themselves are momentary,

¹ I.e. there can be no complete destruction of that which is, e.g. when a vessel of clay is smashed to pieces, we still perceive and recognize the material, viz. clay, which continues to exist.

² Bh. B. 2.2.22, p. 120.

their view, viz. that salvation is the cessation of nescience, too, is inconsistent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason also, the Buddhist view is inconsistent. Why? Because there is "fault" in their view of salvation even "in both ways". Thus, salvation is held by them to be the cessation of nescience and the rest. Is this (a cessation) of the series or of the single members of the series? Not the first, because as the series has no existence beyond the single members, it (viz. the cessation of the series) is incapable of (bringing about) salvation. Not the second, because the single members are momentary.

Moreover, is salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience and the rest, due to a cause or not? If the first, i.e. on the view: Salvation arises from the repeated practice of four-fold truths, viz. the truth that there is a cause, the truth that there is cessation, the truth that there is suffering and the truth that there is a path.¹ The truth that there is a cause means the knowledge, i.e. ascertainment, that everything has an origin. The truth that there is cessation means that everything is momentary. The truth that there is suffering means that everything is full of suffering. The truth that there is a path means that everything is void, everything is soulless,—on this view, the cessation of attachment and the rest being admitted to arise from these, the initial proposition, viz. that there is a causeless destruction, is set aside. If the second, the teaching of the means will become futile. And thus there is fault in both the ways.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 22 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz.: "Because there is fault in both ways", i.e. the Buddhist views of origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are both open to objections.²

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in the commentary of Bhāskara.

¹ *Samudāya, nirodha, duḥkha, mārga*.

² Śrī. B. 2.2.22, p. 93.

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 22 in his commentary too. His interpretation is also very similar to that of Rāmānuja, viz. on the Buddhist view, the originated effect is unreal, (since it passes away as soon as it arises); also the effect arises from non-existent cause (since the cause which is momentary is no more, when the effect comes to be). Hence the Buddhist view is untenable.¹

SŪTRA 24

“AND IN THE ETHER TOO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE NON-DISTINCTION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And the initial proposition enunciated by them was that there is non-existence “in the ether”;² and this is not reasonable, “on account of (its) non-distinction” from the earth and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

They maintain that the destruction of existing objects which is preceded by an act of thought, the destruction which is not preceded by an act of thought, and the ether,—these three are non-entities, and as such, non-definable, causeless and unreal. Among these, the two kinds of destruction have been disposed of. Incidentally, salvation, consisting in the cessation of nescience, has been condemned. Now, the reverend author of the aphorisms, maintaining the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture, is condemning the (doctrine of) the non-definableness of the ether, the remaining one.

The initial proposition of the non-substantiality of the ether is not reasonable, “on account of the non-distinction” of the ether, in point of substantiality, from the earth and the rest,—and just as terrestrial animals move on the earth, and the aquatic animals in water, so do the flying animals in the sky;—and also on account of the scriptural declaration of the producibleness of the ether, like other positive entities,—this is indicated by the particle “and” (in the sūtra),—in the passage: “From him arise the vital-breath, the

¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.22, p. 86, Parts 7 and 8.

² I.e. the ether is a non-entity.

mind, and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, the light, water and the earth, the supporter of all" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). The substantiality of the ether was approved by the Buddha as well, who said out of compassion: 'As long as there is the existence of the ether, and as long as there is the existence of the world, so long may there be the existence of me, the destroyer of the sufferings of the world'.

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 23 in Bhāskara.¹ Interpretation of the word "aviśeṣāt" different; viz. "from the same (scriptural text, viz. Tait. 2.1)" it is known that the ether like the air and the rest, arises from the soul.²

SŪTRA 25

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF REMEMBRANCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of the recognition, viz. 'This is that', this doctrine is untrue.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this too the doctrine of momentariness is not reasonable. Why? "On account of remembrance", i.e. on account of the remembrance of an entity, perceived by one. Hence an eternal soul, the experiencer, must of necessity be acknowledged, otherwise the cessation of all practical activities will result.

SŪTRA 26

"(THERE CAN BE NO ORIGINATION) FROM THE NON-EXISTENT, BECAUSE OF NON-OBSERVATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

An entity does not arise from a non-entity, "on account of non-observation".

¹ Written as sūtra 2.2.24 in conformity with *Samkara's* number.

² Bh. B. 2.2.23, p. 121.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It is assumed by the Buddhists that there is the origin of an entity from a non-entity. This is not reasonable. Why? Because the origin of pots and the rest from non-existent clay, etc. is never observed,—on the contrary, their origin from existent clay and the rest alone is observed.

COMPARISON**Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva**

This is sūtra 25 in the commentary of Śrīkaṇṭha. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here, ending with the next sūtra, concerned with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school of the realist Buddhists. According to him, the preceding sūtras are concerned with the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika school only. But Nimbārka refutes these two schools together.

Baladeva also takes this sūtra as concerned specially with the refutation of the Sautrāntika school, though he does not begin a new adhikaraṇa since he takes the next sūtra to be referring to both the schools equally.

They interpret the sūtra in the same manner, viz. ("There is no origin of things from) the non-existent, on account of non-perception". That is, the Sautrāntika view that an object is inferred from the impressions left on our mind by it is absurd, for a momentary, and as such a non-existent, something cannot produce any impressions.¹

SŪTRA 27

"AND THUS (THERE WILL BE) ACCOMPLISHMENT ON THE PART OF THE INACTIVE AS WELL."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Otherwise, there may be the "accomplishment" of ends like knowledge and the rest on the part of one who has not resorted to any means.

¹ ŚK. B. 2.2.25, p. 92, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.26, p. 122, Chap. 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, just as it is admitted by you that there is the origin of entity from non-entity, so there will result the "accomplishment" of the desired-for effects, through the mere non-existence of implements, even "on the part of the inactive", i.e. on the part of those who have discarded the implements leading to their desired ends. But there is never any attainment of knowledge and the rest by one who is inactive; and a perpetual religious student, leading a life of chastity¹ and unmarried, never gets a son. Hence, it is established that the demonstrated conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the views of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason.

Here ends the section entitled "The aggregate" (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "Perception". (Sūtras 28-31)

SŪTRA 28

"(THERE IS) NO NON-EXISTENCE (OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS), ON ACCOUNT OF PERCEPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is "no non-existence" of external objects as held by the maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone; but they are, indeed, existent. Why? "On account of perception."

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the view of the Yogācāra is being disposed of.

The Yogācāra Buddhist, the maintainer of the reality of consciousness alone, holds that those objects which are other than consciousness are all non-existent. Thus, to think that manifold external objects exist is an error. There are only manifold cognitions which are momentary, variegated, perceptible and have definite forms. Only cognitions like 'blue', 'yellow', which have definite forms, are revealed (directly to the mind). It must be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that the cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects

¹ *Naiṣṭhika*.

have forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects? It (viz. a cognition) being self-manifesting like a lamp, is directly perceived. If what is non-perceived be cognized, then there will be non-distinction between one's own cognitions and the cognitions of others. But there is indeed a distinction (between them). A man acts or refrains from acting on the basis of his own cognitions. This has been declared by Viprabhikṣu as well thus: 'There is no understanding of the meaning of what is non-perceived. The cognitive self, though non-divided, is yet looked upon by men of perverted understanding to be possessed of the differences of object perceived, the perceiver and consciousness'. Thus, the object-form is the object to be known, the perceiver-form is the act of knowledge, and his consciousness is the result, and thus these three are imagined in one and the same process of consciousness. Hence there are no external objects.

For this reason also (there are no external objects—viz.): On account of being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between 'blue' and its cognition. Whenever there is the cognition of blue, blue, too, is cognized at the very same moment. Hence, there is no difference between these two.

For this reason, too, (there are no external objects, viz.): The cognitions in our waking state are devoid of (i.e. do not correspond to) external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-cognitions and the rest.

If it be asked: How can there be a variety of cognitions in the absence of external objects? We reply: owing to the variety of the past impressions. The variety (of cognitions) is explicable by reason of the fact that the cognitions and the past impressions stand in the relation of mutual causes and effects, like the seed and the shoot.

(Correct conclusion.) On this suggestion, we reply: The non-existence of external objects is not possible. Why? "On account of perception," i.e. because of the direct perception of external objects, other than cognitions. Although the individual soul, having the stated marks, is eternal knowledge by nature and its attribute of knowledge, too, is indeed eternal like the ray of the sun, yet since it has its knowledge veiled by nescience due to the beginningless māyā,¹

¹ I.e. *prakṛti* or matter.

it errs in cognizing objects in birth after birth, as well as in one birth even. And it knows once more the sun and the rest, installed by the Highest Self, as well as the objects collected by its father and forefathers, which are all already existent, from the surrounding company of people. The sense is that, hence, there is no non-existence of the objects which are different from knowledge, the sun and the moon, fire, mountain, the earth, water, cow, horse and the rest being established on the ground of direct perception.

The argument,—viz. It is to be admitted certainly even by the maintainers of the reality of external objects that cognitions arising from the contact of sense-organs with those particular objects have the forms of those objects respectively. If this be so, then all practical transactions being possible through those forms alone, what is the use of imagining external objects?—is not tenable, since in the absence of objects, the cognitions of the objects cannot have forms similar to them. Thus, an external object is other than knowledge and its knowledge is other than it.

The argument—viz. that owing to their being uniformly perceived together, there is no difference between blue and its perception,—too, is not tenable, for there is an admission of difference through this very admission of a simultaneous perception.¹

SŪTRA 29

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF DISSIMILARITY, (THE WAKING COGNITIONS ARE) NOT LIKE DREAMS AND THE REST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions and the rest, on account of there being no parallelism between the two cases; as well as on account of dream-consciousness too, having a basis.

¹ That is, to say that A and B are perceived together is to say that there is a difference between them. Otherwise there is no sense in saying that A and B are perceived together.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the argument, viz. The cognitions in the waking state do not correspond to external objects, because they are mere cognitions, like the dream-cognitions and the rest, we reply:

It cannot be said that the cognitions in the waking state are without a basis "like dreams and the rest", i.e. like the dream-cognitions and the illusory cognitions. Why? "On account of dissimilarity," i.e. because there is dissimilarity between the cognitions in the waking state and the dream-cognitions, as the former are due to attentive sense-organs, while the latter to inattentive sense-organs; also because—as indicated by the particle "and" (in the sūtra)—even the dream-cognitions have bases.

SŪTRA 30

"THE EXISTENCE (OF PAST IMPRESSIONS) NOT (POSSIBLE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-PERCEPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Moreover, the "existence" of past impressions is admitted by you in order that there may be variety in knowledge; this is not possible, since according to your view, external objects are not perceived.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Moreover, if knowledge be without a basis, then its varieties, such as the knowledge of a pot, the knowledge of blue, the knowledge of yellow and so on, are not possible. If it be said that past impressions are the cause of the variety of knowledge,—(we reply): "the existence" of past impressions is not possible on your view. Why? "On account of non-perception", i.e. because of the non-perception of the cause of past impressions, or, because no such cause is possible on your view. The direct perception of external objects is the cause of past impressions, and that is not possible in your case, owing to your non-admission of external objects.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 29 in their commentaries. Interpretation slightly different, viz. "The existence (of cognition devoid of corresponding things) is not (possible), because of non-perception".¹

SŪTRA 31

"ON ACCOUNT OF MOMENTARINESS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no existence of past impressions, "on account of the momentariness" of their substratum on your view.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the existence of past impressions is not possible. Why? "On account of the momentariness" of their substratum, the receptacle-consciousness,² viz. the 'I'; as well as of the single members of the uninterrupted series. Hence, the variety of knowledge is due to the variety of objects. Therefore, it is established that the settled conclusion of Scripture is not contradicted by the Yogācāra view which is but a childish prattle.

Here ends the section entitled "Perception" (4)

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Baladeva

They add a "ca" at the end.³

¹ Śrī. B. 2.2.29, p. 102, Part 2; ŚK. B. 2.2.29, pp. 97-98, Parts 7 and 8.

² *Ālaya-vijñāna*. The *Vijñāna-skandha* consists of *vijñānas* or cognitions of two kinds, *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛtti-vijñāna*. The former consists of cognitions which refer to the 'I', the ego; while the latter those that refer to the so-called external objects.

³ Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 557; G.B. 2.2.31.

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "Inconsistency in every way". (Sūtra 32)

SŪTRA 32

"AND BECAUSE OF THE INCONSISTENCY (OF THE DOCTRINE OF A UNIVERSAL VOID) IN EVERY WAY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent "in every way", being opposed to the evidence of direct perception and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas, is being disposed of.

(The view is as follows:) All the objects mentioned in the sacred works composed by the omniscient one (viz. the Buddha), are simply for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples; but are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is inappropriate. (And if an entity arises from another entity, the question is:) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar to the latter or similar? If the first, then there will be the origin of everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result like the grinding of what has already been ground.¹ Owing to such inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable. Hence, the doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self-proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object perceived and so on are mere errors.

¹ I.e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second, there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

With regard to it we reply: The doctrine of universal void does not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition. "And on account of the inconsistency, in every way," of the doctrine of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,—because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it is in conflict with the Buddha's doctrine, establishing the *existence* of momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour of contradiction in the view of Scripture.

Here ends the section entitled "Inconsistency in every way" (5).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate refutation.¹

Bhāskara

This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of the sole reality of cognitions.²

¹ Vide Ś.B. 2.2.31, p. 558.

² Bh. B. 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with *Śaṃkara's* number), p. 125.

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Impossible in one". (Sūtras 33-36)

SŪTRA 33

"(THE JAINA DOCTRINE IS) NOT (TENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY (OF CONTRADICTORY ATTRIBUTES) IN ONE (AND THE SAME THING)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Jainas ascribe contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on to all things. This does not stand to reason, because the co-existence of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence and the rest, is impossible, like that of shadow and light.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The view of the Buddhists, who leave the hem of their lower garment loose and untucked, has been disposed of. Now the view of the Jainas, the naked, are being disposed of.

They hold that the universe comprises souls and non-souls, and is without a Lord. They maintain also that atoms are the causes of the world. They imagine couples of contradictory attributes, like existence and non-existence, in all the categories. Thus, according to them, there are seven categories, summing up all scriptural teachings, viz. soul, non-soul, influx (of foreign matter into the soul), (its) stoppage, freedom from decay, bondage and release.¹

Among these, the souls are sentient, and endowed with the attributes of knowledge, perception, happiness and strength. Thus, knowledge means the apprehension of the real nature of objects through the right discrimination between the soul and the non-soul. Perception means cognizing objects, being free from attachment and detachment. The souls in bondage have worldly happiness, while the freed souls have the happiness which inheres in themselves. Likewise strength means proper endurance. These souls are possessed of parts, and are of the size of the body. Among them, some are souls in bondage, some are freed souls, some are ever-perfect. The freed souls are omniscient and possessed of unsurpassed happiness.

¹ *Jīva, ajīva, āśrava, saṃvara, nirjara, bandha and mokṣa.*

The non-soul is the group of objects to be enjoyed by the souls. It is divided into merit, demerit, matter, time and space.¹ Thus, merit is a special kind of substance, inferrible from proper actions. Demerit is the cause of the existence of the non-freed. Matter is a substance possessed of colour, smell, taste and touch. It is of two kinds, viz. atoms, and their aggregates. The atoms are the causes of the earth and the rest; and they are not of four kinds, as held by the logicians, but are identical in nature. The distinctions of the earth and the rest are due to the modifications of these atoms. The four-fold elements beginning with the earth, as well as the body, the worlds and so on, are their aggregates. Time, on the other hand, is a special kind of substance which is the cause of the conventional distinctions of long, quick and fast and so on, and is atomic in form. Space is the absence of covering. It is of two kinds, viz. worldly-space which is mundane, and non-worldly-space,² which is the abode of the freed souls.

Influx means the activity of the sense-organs which causes a person to know³ sense-objects. Or else, influx means karma which complies to,⁴ i.e. follows after, pervading the agent (i.e. pertains to him).

Stoppage means that which stops⁵ the activities of the sense-organs, i.e. the stoppage of the sense-organs, consisting in a deep meditation.

Freedom from decay means that which destroys⁶ the prior-accumulated sins, i.e. austerities known from the teaching of the Arhatas, consisting in not bathing, not speaking, squatting on the thighs with the lower legs crossed over each other,⁷ eating what is spit out from the mouth, mounting on heated stone, plucking out the hairs on the head and so on.

Bondage means karma, and is of eight kinds. Among these, there are four destructive-karmas,⁸—viz. relating to the obscuration of knowledge, relating to the mental blindness of perception, relating to delusion, and relating to what hinders⁹—which obstruct the attributes of the souls, viz. knowledge, perception, happiness and strength.

¹ *Dharma, adharmā, pudgala, kāla and ākāśa.*

² *Lokākāśa and alokākāśa.*

³ *Āśravati iti āśrava.*

⁴ *Āśravati iti āśrava.*

⁵ *Samvṛṇoti iti samvara.*

⁶ *Nirjarayati iti Nirjara.*

⁷ *Vīrāsana.*

⁸ *Ghāti-karma.*

⁹ *Jñānāvaraṇīya, darśanāvaraṇīya, mohanīya and antarīya.*

And, there are four non-destructive karmas,¹—viz. relating to the knowable, relating to the name, relating to family descent and relating to life,²—which are the causes of the body, its sense of egoity, regard and disregard for the happiness and the rest due thereto.

On the cessation of bondage, there is salvation, or the manifestation of the natural and real nature of the soul through the grace of the ever-perfect Arhatas.

They have also a set of different categories, consisting in five ontological categories,³ viz. the category of the soul, the category of matter, the category of merit, the category of demerit and the category of space.⁴ The term ontological category (*astikāya*) is denotative of conventional objects occupying many places. (The compound 'jīvāstikāya' is to be explained as) a Karma-dhāraya thus: The soul is the category,⁵ and so on in all other cases too. To all these, they apply the system of seven paralogisms,⁶ viz. May be it is, may be it is not, may be it is not predicable, may be it is and is not, may be it is and is not predicable, may be it is not and is not predicable, may be it is, it is not, and is not predicable.⁷ (The compound 'Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya' is to be explained thus:) The aggregate of the seven dialectical formulæ is 'sapta-bhaṅgī',⁸ its reasoning' (*sapta-bhaṅgī-naya*). The word 'may' (*syāt*) is an indeclinable represented by a verbal ending, and should be understood to have the meaning of 'littleness'. Thus, it is to be construed as—It exists partly and does not exist partly, and so on. The sense is this: The whole mass of object, consisting of substances and modifications⁹ is variable. The form of the substance being one, permanent and conceivable as existent, existence, oneness, permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to it. The modifications are the particular states of the substance, having the forms of pots, pieces of cloth and the rest. And they being many,

¹ *Aghāti-karma*.

³ *Astikāya*.

² *Vedanīya, nāmika, gotrika, āyuska*.

⁴ *Jīvāstikāya, pudgalāstikāya, adharmāstikāya, ākāśastikāya*.

⁶ *Sapta-bhaṅgī-naya*.

⁵ *Jīvaś cāsau astikāyaś ca*.

⁷ *Syād asti, syān nāsti, syād avyaktavya, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād asti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syān nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvyaktavyaś ca*.

⁸ Here the ending 'ī' is in accordance with Pāṇ. 2.4.17; SD. K. 821, as modified by the *Vārttika-sūtra* of *Kātyāyana* 1556, "*Akārāntottarapado dviguḥ striyām iṣṭaḥ*". Vide B.M., p. 548, vol. 1.

⁹ *Dravya and paryyāya*.

non-permanent and conceivable as non-existent, non-existence, non-permanence and the rest are justifiable in reference to them.

With regard to it we reply: This cannot be said. Why? Because the seven-fold reasoning, like partly existent, partly non-existent and the rest, is not possible "in one object". The simultaneous co-existence of darkness and light is never seen or heard. In the same manner, couples of contradictory attributes like existence and non-existence and so on are indeed impossible in the same place.

If it be objected: Your own view, too, admits couples of contradictory attributes in one and the same substratum, e.g. in the text "All this, verily, is Brahman" (Chānd. 3.14.1), Unity is established; while in the texts: "The Lord of matter and soul, the Controller of the guṇas" (Śvet. 6.16), "Two birds" (Muṇḍ. 3.1.1; Śvet. 4.6), plurality is established,—(we reply:) No, because this view is not based on reasoning,¹ since the real view can be determined, as mutually non-contradictory, through Scripture alone. Thus, it being impossible for the entire universe, consisting of the sentient and the non-sentient, to be non-different from Brahman *by nature*, it is non-different from Him only as having its existence and activity under His control (*and not by nature*), as indicated by the phrase 'emanating from Him' and so on.² But there is indeed a difference of nature between the categories, viz. the sentient, the non-sentient and Brahman, because the texts designating duality, too, are no less authoritative,—just as leaves, flowers and the rest are different by nature from the tree and are non-different from it on account of having no separate existence; and just as in spite of the difference of the sense-organs from the vital-breath by nature, their non-difference from it, as being under its control, is not incompatible. In the same manner, the difference and non-difference between the Universe and Brahman are natural and established in Scripture and Smṛti. What contradiction is there? In the very same manner, the complementary passage confirms the relation of difference-non-difference between the Universe and Brahman. The phrase 'emanating from Him' (tajjātān) is denotative of the reason, (meaning) because it emanates from that

¹ So that it might be controverted by reason.

² The text is: "All this, verily, is Brahman, emanating from Him, disappearing into Him and breathing in Him" (Chānd. 3.14.1).

Supreme Cause (tajja), disappears in Him (talla) and breathes, i.e. acts in Him (tadana). The elision of the parts is in accordance with Vedic use.

Moreover, a single cause of the world being established by correct evidence, the causality of a plurality of atoms does not stand to reason, because that would involve unnecessary cumbrousness and also because causality is impossible on their parts, owing to their non-sentience.

Further, the one reality, knowable from the Veda, being the giver of salvation, it is difficult for salvation to result from the grace of the perfect souls,¹ that being impossible. Does the grace of the perfect souls depend on meditation or not? If the first, then, salvation cannot arise through the meditation on one perfect soul among many perfect souls of the same nature, for there will be the fault of disregarding many other equally perfect souls. If there be meditation on all, that would involve unnecessary complication. If it be said that there is one great (soul higher than the others), then you fall in with a theistic view. On the second alternative, the consequence would be a universal release. Moreover, there being no evidence of direct perception and the rest for the existence of perfect souls, it is impossible that salvation can result from their grace.

SŪTRA 34

“AND THUS (IF) THE SOUL (BE OF THE SIZE OF THE BODY) THERE IS NON-ENTIRETY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“Thus”, there must be incompleteness on the part of the soul, assumed to be of the size of the body, when it attains a large body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Just as their view is open to the objection that contradictory attributes are impossible on the part of one and the same substratum, so their view that the soul is of the size of the body, too, is open to

¹ *Siddhas* or semi-divine beings, supposed to be of great purity and holiness and characterized by the eight supernatural attributes.

serious objections. What objection? Listen! When the soul, which is of the size of the body, having left the body of an ant, attains the body of an elephant through the influence of its karmas, then there must be "non-entirety" on its part, i.e. it would not be able to fill up the whole of the elephant's body. And when the soul comes out of the body of the elephant, and enters into a small body, it would fail to be small like it.

SŪTRA 35

"NOR ALSO IS THERE NON-CONTRADICTION ON ACCOUNT OF MODIFICATION, ON ACCOUNT OF CHANGE AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It cannot be said also that the soul is possessed of parts which are subject to increase and decrease and hence there is no contradiction, —for then there will result the faults of change and the rest (on the part of the soul).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be said: The soul, according to us, is possessed of parts. There is an increment of its parts in the body of an elephant, and decrement in a small body. Thus "on account of modification", there is no contradiction", —(we reply:) This cannot be said. Why? "On account of change and the rest," i.e. because there will then result faults like change and the rest. If the soul be possessed of parts, on your view, then it must be mutable like the body and the rest and also non-eternal,—such and other faults would arise.

SŪTRA 36

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE PERMANENCY OF THE TWO (PRECEDING SIZES OF THE SOUL) OWING TO THE FINAL (SIZE), THERE IS NON-DISTINCTION (OF THE SIZE)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said: We admit that the "final" size of the soul is constant, and hence the initial and the intervening sizes too must be so,—(we reply:) then, there must be "non-distinction" everywhere, (and

hence) the doctrine (that the soul is of the) size of the body is set aside.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The size as well as the real nature (which the soul attains) during its state of salvation, after the destruction of the final body, are eternal. At that time there is no assumption of a subtle or gross body (by the soul), so there is no contraction or expansion of it. Thus, "on account of the permanency of the final" size, as well as of the real nature (of the soul), the permanency of both the initial and intervening (sizes) too is meant by the Arhatas; and hence there must be "non-distinction" everywhere,—this is the sense. In short, the soul must have a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a subtle body, in its state of bondage as well as in its state of release; and the doctrine that it is of the size of the body must be but a childish prattle. Hence, it is established that our conclusion is not contradicted by the view of the naked (i.e. the Jainas), based on error.

Here ends the section entitled "Impossible in one" (6).

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "On account of the non-distinction of the final state, (viz. salvation) (from the mundane state), both being permanent". That is, on the Jaina view, there is no difference between the state of release and the mundane state, because the former is, according to them, a constant progress upward, or remaining in the alokākāśa. Now, motion, whether in the world or upward is always mundane; and no one can possibly feel any pleasure in the state of constant motion, or in standing still in a place without any support. Hence there is no difference between release and bondage on this view.¹

¹ G.B. 2.2.36, pp. 145-146, Chap. 2.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "Pāśupati".
(Sūtras 37-41)

SŪTRA 37

"(THE DOCTRINE) OF THE LORD (IS UNTENABLE), ON ACCOUNT OF
INCONSISTENCY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The Pāśupata doctrine is to be rejected, because it is opposed to the Veda, which establishes a non-distinct efficient and material cause; and because it initiates a false faith.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the Pāśupata doctrine is being disposed of.

The maintainers of doctrines opposed to the Veda have been refuted above. The Māheśvaras, too, are such. They are of four kinds, viz. Kāpālas, Kālāmukhas, Pāśupatas and Śaivas. The basis of their doctrines is the treatise composed by Pāśupati. The 'Pañcādhyāyī'¹ is celebrated to be composed by the great Lord Pāśupati Himself. Five categories are mentioned there, viz. cause, effect, concentrated meditation, injunction, and end of suffering.² The cause is pradhāna and the Lord. Among them, pradhāna is supposed to be the material cause, the Lord the efficient cause. The effect is mahat and the rest. Concentrated meditation is stated in the passage; "Through the meditation on the Om-kāra once, one should hold (one's self)". Injunction consists in secret rituals like three ablutions and the rest. The end of suffering is salvation.

Among these, the Pāśupatas and the Kāpālas hold that during its state of bondage, the soul becomes (non-sentient) like a stone. And the Śaivas hold that the freed soul is consciousness. They have minor treatises of their own, designating their mutual differences.

These Māheśvaras, with their intelligence deluded by the Māyā of the Lord, maintain and practise, just as they like—as the means to the highest end—what is "opposed" to the Veda and not practised by the wise. As the Kāpālas say: "He who knows the six mudrās, he who is versed in the supreme mudrā, he attains nirvāṇa by

¹ Or having five chapters.

² Kāraṇa, Kāryya, Yoga, Vidhi, Duḥkhhānta.

meditating on himself as in the posture of *bhagāsana*. The necklace, the gold ornament, the ear-ring, head-jewel, ashes, and the holy thread are said to be the six *mudrās*. He whose body is marked with (*mudrās*) is not re-born on earth" and so on. Likewise, the *Kālamukhas* hold: "Using a skull (as the drinking vessel), besmearing one's self with the ashes of a dead body, eating the flesh of such a body, carrying a heavy stick, setting up a liquor-jar, worshipping the gods placed on it, and the rest, are means to obtaining all desired results in this world, as well as in the next". In the treatise of the *Śaivas*, too, it is said: "A bracelet made of the *Rudrākṣa*-beads on the arm, matted hair on the head, a skull, besmearing one's self with ashes", and so on.

Moreover, it is clearly demonstrated in the *Mahābhārata* in the story of the *Mātāṅga*, distressed by the sharp words of a she-ass¹ and so on, that it is very difficult for a man of another caste to obtain *Brāhmaṇa*-hood even by means of penance accumulated through thousands of years. But they hold that it is easily obtainable by a man of a different caste thus: "By merely entering in the initiatory ceremony, one becomes a *Brāhmaṇa* at once. By understanding the *Kāpāla* rite, a man becomes an ascetic".

(Correct conclusion:) With regard to this, we reply: "Of the Lord" and so on. The term 'no' is to be supplied. "Of the

¹ The story of *Mātāṅga* and the she-ass is as follows: Once *Mātāṅga*, who was endowed with all qualities and equal to a *Brāhmaṇa* by all means, while travelling on a swift chariot drawn by a young ass and its mother, mercilessly pierced the young ass in the nose again and again. Thereupon its mother, being much grieved, said to him that such an act certainly behoved a person who was born of a *Brāhmaṇa* mother and a *Caṇḍāla* father, but had he been the son of a *Brāhmaṇa* father his act would have been otherwise. Much aggrieved at this painful information, *Mātāṅga* determined to attain *Brāhmaṇa*-hood, left home immediately and engaged himself in a severe penance. Therefore *Indra* being pleased personally appeared before him to offer him a boon. *Mātāṅga* asked for *Brāhmaṇa*-hood, which however, *Indra* declined to grant by reason of the fact that he was the son of a *Caṇḍāla*. In spite of *Indra*'s straight denial, *Mātāṅga* went on performing austerities for a hundred years, standing on one leg only. Very much pleased, *Indra* appeared once again only to go back after saying that it was impossible for a *Caṇḍāla* to acquire *Brāhmaṇa*-hood, and that *Mātāṅga* was most unwise to undergo penance for it. This time *Mātāṅga* went on performing penance for a thousand years in the same way. Disappointed once more, he performed the severest penance by standing on one finger only. But in spite of this he was never able to attain his heart's desire, simply because he was a *Caṇḍāla* by birth. Vide *Mahā. 13.1870 ff.*, pp. 85 ff., vol. 4.

Lord," i.e. the view of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? "On account of inconsistency," i.e. because of the inconsistency in their view by reason of establishing two causes¹ in direct contradiction to the scriptural texts like "He thought: 'May I be many'" (Chānd. 6.2.3), 'He became existent and that' (Tait. 2.6), 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.). Moreover, since the practices like meditation preceded by the praṇava, besmearing one's self with the ashes of a corpse and so on, are mutually contradictory, their view is indeed inconsistent.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 34 in Bhāskara's Commentary. They do not take this adhikaraṇa as a refutation of the Pāsupata doctrine only, but of the Sāṃkhya-yoga as well, in fact of all the doctrines generally, which maintain the Lord to be the efficient cause only and not the material cause of the world.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

He takes this adhikaraṇa to be concerned with the refutation of the doctrine of the Ekadeśī Tāntrikas only or of those Śaivas according to whom the Lord is the efficient cause only, while Māyā is the material cause, śakti the instrument.³

SŪTRA 38

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And on account of the impossibility of relation" between Paśupati, the instigator who is without a body, and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, Paśupati is not the cause of the world.

¹ I.e. two causes of the world material and efficient, different from each other.

² Ś.B. 2.2.37, p. 566; Bh. B. 2.2.34 (written as 2.2.37 in conformity with Śaṅkara's number), p. 127.

³ ŚK. B. 2.3.37.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the doctrine of Paśupati is not justifiable. Why? A relation between Paśupati, the efficient cause, the instigator and pradhāna and the rest, to be instigated, must be admitted,—and this is impossible. Thus, the Māheśvaras are to be asked the following: Do you, sirs, follow Scripture or follow what is observed? If the first, then the stated conclusion, being opposed to Scripture, must be rejected. If the second, then it is observed that there is a relation between potters and the rest only who are possessed of bodies, and clay and so on. Hence no relation can be established between Paśupati who is without a body and pradhāna and the rest, by you, following what is observed. Hence it being not possible for a bodiless being to have any relation with pradhāna and the rest, to be their instigator and so on, he is not the cause of the world.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.

SŪTRA 39

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SUBSTRATUM (I.E. A BODY) (ON THE PART OF THE LORD).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the impossibility” of an eternal body—since it is opposed to what is observed,—as well as of a non-eternal one—since it arises later—Paśupati is not the cause of the world.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: Let him then have a body, and hence the above objection cannot be raised—(the author) replies:—

“The substratum” of all practical transactions is the body—on account of the impossibility of that, their view is not justifiable. Thus, the body of Paśupati cannot be eternal, because that is opposed to what is observed. Otherwise the bodies of potters and the rest, too, must become eternal. Again, his body cannot be non-eternal,

because a non-eternal body is not possible on the part of the cause of the world, because all the non-eternal objects arise later as effects, and because Paśupati, the cause, is prior to everything.¹

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Interpretation different, viz. "Because rulership (of pradhāna) and the rest is impossible (on the part of the Lord)". That is, pradhāna which is non-perceived and devoid of colour and the rest, cannot be ruled by the Lord, since it is found that clay and the rest alone, which are possessed of colour and so on, are ruled by potters, etc.²

Rāmānuja, Bhāskara, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "Because rulership (of pradhāna) is not possible (on the part of the Lord)". That is, Paśupati, who is bodiless cannot be the ruler of the pradhāna, for only embodied beings like potters and the rest can be rulers.³

SŪTRA 40

"IF IT BE ARGUED: AS IN THE CASE OF SENSE-ORGANS, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF ENJOYMENT AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is not possible to suppose that the Lord has sense-organs and body like the individual soul, for there will result enjoyment and the rest (on the part of the Lord).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: Just as the bodiless individual soul, existing from all eternity, has a relation with subsequent sense-organs and body, due to preceding sense-organs and body, so like it, Paśupati may have a

¹ I.e. non-eternal objects arise after creation. Hence Paśupati who is present before creation cannot possess a non-eternal body.

² Ś.B. 2.2.39, p. 570. See p. 656 under *Śaṃkara*.

³ Śrī. B. 2.2.36, p. 113, Part 1; Bh. B. 2.2.35 (written as 2.2.38), pp. 127-128; Śk. B. 2.2.36, p. 107, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.39.

relation with a body; and no objection can be raised here,—(we reply:) no. “On account of enjoyment and the rest.” The sense is this: If like the individual soul, the Lord, too, has such a relation with a body, then all the faults like experiencing pleasure and pain, and thereby being the agent of good or bad actions and the rest must pertain to Him also.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and others

Interpretation different, viz. “If it be argued: As in the case of sense-organs, (we reply:) no, on account of enjoyment and the rest”. That is, if it be argued that the Lord rules over *pradhāna* in the same way as the individual soul rules over its sense-organs,—we point out: In that case the Lord Himself must undergo pleasure and pain.¹

At the end of this sūtra, Śaṅkara gives an alternative explanation of this and the immediately preceding sūtras and this explanation tallies with that of Nimbārka.

SŪTRA 41

“(THERE WILL RESULT ON THIS VIEW) FINITUDE OR NON-OMNISCIENCE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If there be a connection between Him and the unseen principle,² consisting in merit and the rest, then there must be “finitude” and “non-omniscience” (on His part).

Vedānta-kaustubha

It cannot be said also: What objection can there be if enjoyment and the rest result on the part of the Lord? What can a snow-flake do when fallen on the sun?—for it is unreasonable. On account of performing good and bad deeds, due to nescience and the cause of transmigratory existence, and of undergoing their consequences, there must of course result “finitude”, i.e. liability to being created,

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.40, p. 570; Śrī. B. 2.2.37, p. 113, Part 2; Bh. B. 2.2.36 (written as 2.2.39), p. 128; Śk. B. 2.2.37, p. 108, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.2.40.

² *Adṛṣṭa*.

as well as "non-omniscience" on the part of the Lord; otherwise the individual soul, too, must cease to be subject to transmigratory existence,—so much in brief. Hence, it is established that the stated conclusion is not contradicted by the doctrine of the Māheśvaras.

Here ends the section entitled "Paśupati" (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

According to them, the particle "vā" means 'or' and not 'and' as held by Nimbārka. Interpretation different, viz. "(There must be) either finitude or non-omniscience". That is, the Lord must either define the measure of the individual souls, pradhāna and Himself, or not define them. If He does, then they become finite; if he does not, then the Lord becomes non-omniscient.¹

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "Impossibility of origin". (Sūtras 42-45)

SŪTRA 42

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF ORIGIN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Since the origin of the world from Śakti without Puruṣa is impossible, the doctrine, too, which maintains it as the cause is not valid.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the author is refuting, incidentally, the erroneous view of the Śāktas, viz. that Śakti alone is the producer of the world.

The particle 'no' is to be supplied.

Śakti is not the cause of the universe. Why? Because the origin of the universe from Śakti, without any connection with Puruṣa, is impossible. The consequence would be that the Śāktis, being independent of Puruṣa, would come to be perceived everywhere.

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.41, pp. 571 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.37 (written as 2.2.40), p. 128.

Or else,¹ because the origin of the world is impossible, it being eternal, Śakti cannot be its cause, there being no proof that the world is something produced. If it be said that the Veda is the proof—(we reply:) Let then the cause of the world be Brahman who is established by the Veda. The doctrine of the causality of Śakti which is without any basis is to be rejected.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this adhikaraṇa as concerned with the refutation of the Pañca-rātra system. Thus, according to them this sūtra means: “On account of the impossibility of origin”. That is, the Pañca-rātra doctrine holds that Saṅkaraśaṇa (the individual soul) springs from Vāsudeva (the Highest self), Pradyumna (the mind) from Saṅkaraśaṇa and Aniruddha (the principle of egoity) from Pradyumna, is not tenable, for the individual soul, which is eternal, cannot spring from the Highest soul.²

Rāmānuja

Rāmānuja also takes this adhikaraṇa as dealing with the Pañca-rātra doctrine, but not refuting, but establishing, it. Accordingly, he takes this and the next sūtra as laying down the *prima facie* view, the rest the correct conclusion. Interpretation like Śaṅkara and the rest.

SŪTRA 43

“AND THE SENSE-ORGAN OF THE CREATION (IS) NOT (POSSIBLE).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be said, there is a connection (between Śakti and Puruṣa,)—(we reply:) No “sense-organ” is possible on the part of Puruṣa at that time.

¹ An alternative explanation of the sūtra.

² Ś.B. 2.2.42, pp. 572 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.38 (written as 2.2.41), p. 128; ŚK. B. 2.2.39, p. 115, Parts 7 and 8.

Vedānta-kaustubha

(If it be argued:) There is a creator helping Śakti; and the fact that the world is something produced, too, is inferred on the analogy of what is directly perceived; hence the above objection cannot be raised,—then (we reply:) No “sense-organ” is possible on the part of the creator, since there is no sense-organ prior to creation. In its absence, it is not possible for Puruṣa to be a helper. Moreover, since there is no similarity of the ether and the rest with pots and so on, the fact that the former are something produced (like the latter) is by no means established. The term “and” (in the sūtra) implies that if there be Puruṣa as the creator, Śakti is no longer the cause.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Criticism of the Pañca-rātra view continued: “(There can be) no (origin) of the organ (viz. the mind) from the agent (viz. the individual soul)”.¹

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 40 in his commentary. As pointed out above, he takes this sūtra as laying down a *prima facie* view against the Pañca-rātra doctrine. Interpretation like Śaṃkara and others.²

SŪTRA 44

“OR IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SO ON,
THERE IS NO DENIAL OF THAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If there be the existence of natural intelligence and so on (on the part of Śakti), what contradiction can there be in its being the cause of the world? The doctrine of Śakti is set aside by itself through the admission of Brahman.

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.43, p. 574; Bh. B. 2.2.39 (written as 2.2.43), p. 129; Śk. B. 2.2.40, p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.

² Śrī. B. 2.2.40, p. 115, Part 2.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The term "or" has the meaning 'but'. Śakti is the abode of a mass of natural attributes like knowledge, strength and the rest, independent by nature of anything else, and self-relying. "If there be the existence," i.e. admission, "of knowledge and so on", in this manner, on the other hand, then "there is no denial of that", i.e. its causality is not denied. In this aphorism: "And endowed with all (attributes)" (Br. Sū. 2.1.29), there is designated a Deity, knowable through all the Vedāntas, and it is He that is admitted by you. He is not the power (Śakti) of any one, He is the Highest Deity, denoted by the word 'Brahman' and so on. The sense is that the doctrine of Śakti defeats itself.

COMPARISON

Saṃkara and Bhāskara

The criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine continued: viz. "(Even) if there be the existence of knowledge, there is no setting aside of that (viz. of the above objection)". That is, even if be said that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest are not the individual soul and so on, but divine beings, endowed with supreme knowledge and the rest, still then the objection stated before, viz. the impossibility of origination, remains in force.¹

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary. According to him this sūtra and the next set forth the correct conclusion against the above *prima facie* view, and defend the Pañca-rātra doctrine. Thus, it means: "If (Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest be) of the nature of knowledge and so on (i.e. of the Highest Lord), there is no contradiction of that". That is, the Pañca-rātra doctrine is not that individual soul arises from the Lord, the mind from the individual soul, and so on, but simply that the Highest Lord, viz. Vāsudeva, out of kindness for people, abides in a four-fold form, so that He may be easily accessible to His devotees.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 41 in his commentary as well. He takes it to be a *prima facie* view, viz. "If there be the assumption of intelligence and

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.44, pp. 574 ff.; Bh. B. 2.2.40 (written 2.2.44), p. 129.

² Śrī. B. 2.2.41, pp. 116-117, Part 2.

so on (i.e. of the forms of the individual soul and so on), there is no contradiction of that". That is, the opponents point out that they do not hold that there is the origin of the individual soul and the rest, but simply that Saṃkarṣaṇa and the rest assume the forms of the individual soul, etc., i.e. rule them. Hence the above objection cannot be raised.¹

Baladeva

Interpretation different: "If (the body of the Lord be of the) nature of intelligence and the rest, there is no contradiction of that". That is, if the *prima facie* objector points out that although the Lord cannot have a material body, yet He may have a non-material body composed of knowledge and so on, then we reply that if the Lord of the Śāktas be possessed of such a body, then we have no objection to their view, since it becomes identical with our doctrine of Brahman.

SŪTRA 45

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF CONTRADICTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And on account of being opposed to Scripture and Smṛti, the doctrine of Śakti is unauthoritative.

Here ends the second quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

And because of being opposed to the following scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'Person, verily, is all this' (Śvet. 3.15), 'Supreme is His power, declared to be of manifold; natural is the operation of His knowledge and strength' (Śvet. 6.8), "'I am the origin of all, everything originates from me'" (Gītā 10.8), and so on, the doctrine of

¹ Śk. B. 2.2.41, p. 116, Parts 7 and 8.

the causality of Śakti is not to be accepted by one who is desirous of salvation. Hence, it is established that the concordance of the scriptural texts with regard to Brahman, Lord Kṛṣṇa, the lord of all and the soul of all, is not contradicted by anything whatsoever.

Here ends the section entitled "Impossibility of origin" (8).

Here ends the second quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā, and composed by the reverend Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka, the teacher and founder of the sect of the venerable Sanatkumāra.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine concluded: "(The Pañca-rātra doctrine is to be rejected), because it is full of (inner) contradictions; and (because it contains passages opposed to the Veda)".¹

Rāmānuja

Right conclusion, in defence of the Pañca-rātra doctrine, ends here: "(The above objection cannot be raised) on account of the contradiction (i.e. because the Pañca-rātra doctrine itself controverts that the individual soul has an origin)".²

Bhāskara

This sūtra is not found in his commentary.

Śrīkaṇṭha

Criticism of the Pañca-rātra doctrine concluded: "(In reply to the above *prima facie* view, we point out although the contradiction with regard to the origin of the individual soul and the rest set aside by the above view, yet the Pañca-rātra doctrine is not to be accounted) on account of its opposition (to Scripture)."³

¹ Ś.B. 2.2.45, pp. 575-76.

² Śrī. B. 2.2.42, pp. 117 ff., Part 2.

³ Śk. B. 2.2.42, pp. 116-119, Parts 7 and 8.

Résumé

The second section of the second chapter contains:—

1. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
3. 42 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 40 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 42 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 45 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha read sūtras 1 and 2 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra; and omit sūtras 31 and 38 in Nimbārka-bhāṣya.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

THIRD QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The ether". (Sūtras 1-6)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 1)

SŪTRA 1

"THE ETHER (DOES) NOT (ORIGINATE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-MENTION IN SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That there is no contradiction in our own view has been proved by means of the views of the opponents. Now, it is being proved that there is no mutual non-contradiction among the scriptural texts.

"The ether" does "not" originate. Why? Because in the Chāndogya its origin is not mentioned.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, having demonstrated that the views of the opponents are based on a mere semblance of (and not real) reason, now with a view to generating intense reverence for Brahman, the cause of the world, on the part of those who are desirous of salvation, (the author) is demonstrating the origin of the ether and the rest, His effects, as well as the mutual consistency among the scriptural texts (about them).

On the doubt, viz. whether the ether originates or not, the *prima facie* view is as follows: "The ether" does not originate. Why? "On account of non-mention in Scripture." Thus in the Chāndogya, the creation of three only—viz. light, water and food, without the ether and the air, is mentioned in the section concerned about creation in the passage beginning: 'He created that Light' (Chānd. 6.2.3).

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 2)

SŪTRA 2

"BUT (THERE) IS (A TEXT DESIGNATING THE ORIGIN OF THE ETHER)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In the Taittirīyaka, there "is" a text designating the origin of the ether, viz. 'From the soul the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To this we reply:

The term "but" implies the acceptance of the correct conclusion. If it be objected that in the Chāndogya there is no text about the origin of ether, (we reply:) in the Taittirīya there "is" a text designating the origin of the ether, viz. "From this soul, verily, the ether originated (Tait. 2.1).

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 3-4)

SŪTRA 3

"(THE TEXT ABOUT THE ORIGIN OF THE ETHER IS) METAPHORICAL, ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY, AND ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because the origin of the ether, which is without parts, is impossible, and also because of the scriptural text: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is mortal' (Bṛh. 2.3.3²)—the text: 'The ether originated' (Tait. 2.1) is "metaphorical".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, intending to remove the apparent contradictions among those scriptural texts which designate the origin of the ether and those which do not, His Holiness here raises a doubt based on the view of those who hold that the ether does not originate.

An objection may be raised: The scriptural text designating the origin of the ether, viz. 'From this soul, verily, the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1), can be (only) "metaphorical", just as in ordinary life,

¹ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

the statement: 'The ether acts' is metaphorical. The reason for this is: "on account of impossibility", i.e. because the origin of the ether which without parts is impossible, seeing that the earth and the rest alone, which are possessed of parts, can originate from the atoms of the same class. The second reason is: "on account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the scriptural text: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is immortal' (Brh. 2.3.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

They divide this sūtra into two different sūtras—viz. "Gaṇya asambhavāt" and "Śabdāc ca".¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 4

"AND THERE MAY BE (THE USE) OF THE SAME (TERM 'ORIGINATED' IN TWO DIFFERENT SENSES), AS IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'BRAHMAN'."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the same term 'originated' "may be" used in a metaphorical sense with reference to the ether, and in a literal sense with reference to the subsequent (elements),² as in the case of: "Desire to enquire after Brahman by austerity, austerity is Brahman" (Tait. 3.2³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: How can one and the same word 'originated' be used in a metaphorical sense with reference to the ether, and in a literal sense with reference to what follows, we reply:

Just as in the text: 'Desire to know Brahman by austerity, austerity is Brahman' (Tait. 3.2), the word 'Brahman' is used in a figurative sense in reference to austerity, but in a literal sense as the object to be

¹ Ś.B., pp. 579-80; Bh. B., p. 130.

² Viz. the air, fire, water, earth, etc. mentioned in Tait. 2.1 subsequently to the ether. That is, the expression 'The ether originates' is to be understood metaphorically, while the expressions 'The air originates' and the rest literally.

³ Ś, Bh, Śk, B.

enquired into, so one and the same word 'originated' may be used in a figurative sense in reference to the ether, and in a literal sense in reference to what follows.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 5)

SŪTRA 5

"(THERE IS) NON-ABANDONMENT OF THE INITIAL PROPOSITION, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-SEPARATION (KNOWN) FROM SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the non-separation" of the mass of objects, beginning with the ether, from Brahman, there is no contradiction of the "initial proposition", viz. that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one. But if the ether be something non-originated, then it must be outside the sphere of knowable objects, and thereby the initial proposition will be set aside. The non-separation of everything from Brahman is known "from the scriptural text", viz. 'Everything has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7¹), and so on.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The Taittirīya-text, designating the origin of the ether, is literal and not figurative for the following reason: If the origin of the universe, beginning with the ether, be admitted, then "on account of the non-separation" or non-difference of the effect, or of the entire expanse of the universe beginning with the ether, from the object to be known, the cause, viz. Brahman,—as of the leaf from the tree,—then alone, there will be "non-abandonment" or acceptance of the initial proposition, viz. that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one, stated in the passage 'Whereby the unheard becomes heard, unthought becomes thought' (Chānd. 6.1.3); otherwise, the initial proposition will be abandoned.

The cause of non-separation is: "On account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the texts: 'The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second' (Chānd. 6.2.1), 'Everything has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.), and so on.

¹ Ś, Bh, B.

The allegation stated under the aphorism: 'Metaphorical, on account of impossibility and on account of scriptural text' (Br. Sū. 2.3.3), viz. that the origin of what is without parts being impossible, the scriptural text designating the origin of the ether is metaphorical,—is not tenable, since reasoning has no scope with regard to matters which are beyond the cognizance of the senses and are determined by Scripture. But how can then the text: 'The air and the atmosphere—this is immortal' (Brh. 2.3.3) be accountable? In this passage the permanency of the ether is established on the analogy of the statement 'The gods are immortal', and hence the immortality of the ether fits in.

The allegation made under the aphorism: "And there may be (the use) of the same (term in two different senses), as in the case of the word 'Brahman'" (Br. Sū. 2.3.4), too, is not tenable, since the word 'Brahman' being mentioned twice, the example is not to the point.¹

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They break this sūtra into two parts—viz. "Pratijñāhānir . . ." and "Śabdebhyaḥ". The meaning of the last portion is different, viz. (That the ether has an origin is known) from scriptural text (also).²

CORRECT CONCLUSION (end)

SŪTRA 6

"BUT AS FAR AS THERE IS EFFECT, THERE IS DIVISION, AS IN ORDINARY LIFE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author concludes: It being established by the texts: 'All this has that for its soul' (Chānd. 6.8.7, etc.³) and the rest that the

¹ In Tait. 2.1, the term 'originated' is mentioned only once; while in the analogical passage quoted, the term 'Brahman' is mentioned twice separately. Hence, while it may be said that of the two separately mentioned words 'Brahman', one is literal, the other figurative, it cannot be said that the word 'originated' which is mentioned only once, is simultaneously literal and figurative.

² Śrī. B. 125, Part 2; Śk. B., pp. 124-125, Parts 7 and 8.

³ R, Śk, B.

entire expanse of the universe, beginning with the ether, has Brahman for its soul, it is definitely ascertained that the ether is an effect. Likewise, it is known that "as far as there is effect" there is origin indeed.¹ The non-mention of the ether and the mention of light and the rest as objects to be created in the text: "He created that light" (Chānd. 6.2.3) fit in, "as in ordinary life". In ordinary life, when referring to the group of Devadatta's sons the origin of some of them is mentioned, thereby the origin of all the rest is mentioned.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. since in the Chāndogya there is no indication of the origin of the ether, the scriptural text designating origin is metaphorical,—(the author) replies:

The term "but" is for disposing of the objection. "As far as there is effect", i.e. the entire expanse of the universe, there is "division" indeed. The Chāndogya texts, viz. "The existent, alone, my dear, was this in the beginning" (Chānd. 6.2.1), and "Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown known" (Chānd. 6.1.3) designate (respectively) that everything, beginning with the ether, and denoted by the term 'this' consisted of the cause in essence prior to creation; and is knowable through the knowledge of the cause. Hence, in the Chāndogya the "division", i.e. the origin, of the entire expanse of the universe, beginning with the ether, from the cause, is indeed stated.

To the enquiry: Why then the origin of the light and the rest alone is mentioned, without any mention of the ether and the air?—we reply: "As in ordinary life". Just as in ordinary life, through the mention of the origin of some sons of a person, there may be the mention of the origin of all the rest, so through the statement of the origin of light and the rest, the origin of the ether and so on, too, is indeed mentioned. Hence, it is established that the ether has Brahman for its material cause.

Here ends the section entitled "The ether" (1).

¹ I.e. whatever is an effect has an origin.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 7 in their commentaries. The interpretation of the word “vibhāga” is different. According to them it means ‘division’, and not “origin” as held by Nimbārka. Thus they argue:—

Whatever is an effect is divided.

The ether is divided (from the earth and so on).

∴ the ether is an effect.¹

But Nimbārka argues:—

Whatever is an effect has an origin.

The ether is an effect.

∴ the ether has an origin.

Thus, they establish what Nimbārka assumes (viz. that the ether is an effect).

The interpretation of the phrase: “As in ordinary life” too is different, viz. they connect it with the preceding part of the sūtra, meaning—In ordinary life we observe that whatever is an effect is divided.

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled “The Air”.
(Sūtra 7)

SŪTRA 7

“HEREBY (THE ORIGIN OF) THE AIR (TOO) IS EXPLAINED.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

By this principle of the origin of the ether, the air, too, is explained.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Some may attribute eternity to the air on the ground of the texts: ‘The air and the atmosphere—this is immortal’ (Bṛh. 2.3.2), ‘The divinity which does not set is the air’ (Bṛh. 1.5.22) and so on. For disposing of this (view), the author says now:

“Hereby”, i.e. by the establishment of the origin of the ether, the origin of the “air”, too, should be known to be “explained”,

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.7, p. 586; Bh. B. 2.3.7, p. 131.

the refutation of the *prima facie* view being the same (in both cases). The denial of the dissolution (of the air) by the phrase 'does not set' is (only) relative. Hence, it is established that the air has an origin.

Here ends the section entitled "The Air" (2).

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "Non-origination". (Sūtra 8)

SŪTRA 8

"BUT THERE IS NON-ORIGINATION OF THE EXISTENT BEING, ON ACCOUNT OF IMPOSSIBILITY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is indeed "non-origination", i.e. non-production, "of the existent being", i.e. of Brahman, because the origin of the cause of the world is impossible.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author is removing the suspicion, viz. If even the ether and the air, designated by Scripture as immortal, be originated, then there may be the origin of Brahman too.

There is indeed "non-origin", i.e. no birth, of Brahman, the Highest Person. Why? "On account of impossibility," i.e. because the origin of the cause of all is impossible,—otherwise, there must be a cause of that too, a cause of that too and so on, and there must be an infinite regress;—because (He) is declared to be the cause of all by the text: 'He is the cause, the cause of the lord of causes'¹ (Śvet. 6.9); and because any other cause is excluded by the passage: 'Of him there is no producer and lord' (Śvet. 6.9). For this very reason, it is established that there is no origin of the Supreme Person, who is ever-present and unborn indeed, though declared by Scripture to be

¹ Correct quotation: "*Karṇādhīpādhīpa*", meaning 'The Lord of the lord of sense-organs, (viz. the individual soul)'. Vide Śvet. 6.9, p. 70.

manifold for the sake of producing effects, thus: 'Being unborn, he appears manifold' (Vj. S. 31.19b¹; Tait. Ār. 3.13.1b²).

Here ends the section entitled "Non-origination" (3).

COMPARISON

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 9 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different, viz.: But (if it be objected that qualities like touch, sound, etc., as well as space, time, number, size, etc., are not declared by Scripture to have an origin, and hence they must all be eternal,—then we reply: The eternity of what is existent (viz. qualities, etc.) is impossible, because of the non-fitting in (i.e. non-utility) (of the scriptural texts to declare their origin). That is, it is not at all necessary for Scripture to designate separately the origin of these *qualities*, etc. since it is quite sufficient to designate the origin of the *objects* alone, that implying the origin of the qualities simultaneously. Similarly, time is nothing but the motion of the sun and hence its origin, though not mentioned separately, is implied by the mention of the origin of the sun. Likewise the other things are to be explained. In conclusion Bhāskara criticizes Śaṅkara's interpretation of the sūtra,—which is identical with Nimbarka's.³

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The light". (Sūtras 9-13)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtras 9-12)

SŪTRA 9

"HENCE THE LIGHT (ORIGINATES FROM THE AIR), FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) DECLARES."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The light" originates from the air, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Fire from the air' (Tait. 2.1⁴).

¹ P. 857, line 17. Reading "*vijāyate*".

² P. 201. Reading *op. cit.*

³ Bh. B. 2.2.9, pp. 131-32.

⁴ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that everything except Brahman has origin, and that Brahman is untouched by the faults of producibility and the rest. Now, the problem is being considered, viz. whether each preceding object, or Brahman, its inner soul, is the cause of each succeeding object, to be produced successively.

On the doubt, viz. whether the light originates from the air or from Brahman, its (viz. the air's) inner soul,—the *prima facie* view is as follows: The light is an effect. Hence, it originates from the immediate cause air. The *prima facie* objector points out the authority for this thus: The Taittirīya text 'From the air fire' (Tait. 2.1) "declares that" alone.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 10 in the commentaries of the first two. They do not take this sūtra as laying down a *prima facie* view, but as the correct conclusion. It means, therefore: "The light (does not arise directly from the Lord, but from the air), for thus (Scripture) declares".¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 10

"WATER (ORIGINATES FROM THE LIGHT)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Water" originates from light, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Water from fire' (Tait. 2.1²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase: 'Hence, for thus' is to be supplied here. Hence, i.e. on account of the very proximity, water originates from light. The scriptural text: 'Water from fire' (Tait. 2.1³) declares that very thing.

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.10, p. 594; Bh. B. 2.3.10, p. 132; G.B. 2.3.9.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

³ *Op. cit.*

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 11 in the commentaries of the first two. As before they do not take this as a *prima facie* sūtra, but as a *siddhānta* one, meaning: "Water (originates from light)".¹

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (continued)

SŪTRA 11

"THE EARTH (ORIGINATES FROM WATER)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The earth originates from water, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'They (viz. waters) created food' (Chānd. 6.2.4²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The earth originates from water. The scriptural text: 'Those waters thought: "May we procreate". They created food' (Chānd. 6.2.4) declares this. Similarly, it should be known that everywhere the origin of the effect takes place from the immediately preceding cause.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This sūtra is not found in their commentaries.

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (concluded)

SŪTRA 12

"(THE WORD 'FOOD' DENOTES) THE EARTH, ON ACCOUNT OF SUBJECT-MATTER, COLOUR AND ANOTHER SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

By the term 'food' "the earth" is denoted, because the subject-matter is the (creation of the) great elements; because its colour is

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.11, p. 596; Bh. B. 2.3.11, p. 132; G.B. 2.3.10.

² R, Śk.

declared by the scriptural text: 'What is black is of the food' (Chānd. 6.4.1¹); and, finally, because of another scriptural text: 'The earth from water' (Tait. 2.1²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Incidentally, the meaning of the word 'food', mentioned in the scriptural text: 'They created the food' (Chānd. 6.2.4), is being indicated through the *prima facie* objector himself. In accordance with the complementary text, viz. 'Wherever it rains, then there is plenty of food' (Chānd. 6.2.4), rice, barley, and the like are not ment by the word 'food', but the earth alone is the object denoted by the word 'food'. Why? 'On account of subject-matter, colour, and another scriptural text,' that is, because in accordance with the text: 'He created that light, He created that water' (Chānd. 6.2.3), the subject-matter here is the origin of the great element; because in the complementary passage: 'That which is the red colour of fire is the colour of the light; that which is white is of water, that which is black is of the food' (Chānd. 6.4.1) the colour (of the earth is mentioned); and because there are other scriptural texts occurring in connection with the same topic, viz. 'Water from fire, the earth from water' (Tait. 2.1), 'What was the froth of the earth became solidified. That became the earth' (Bṛh. 1.2.2).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

This is sūtra 12 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 11 in the commentary of the last. Interpretation same, though not a *prima facie* view.

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF HIS DESIRE, ON ACCOUNT OF HIS MARK, HE (IS THE CREATOR)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The author states the correct conclusion. "On account of His desire," viz. "May I be many" (Chānd. 6.2.3), as well as on account

¹ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

² R, Bh, Śk, B.

of the scriptural text teaching Him,—the Supreme Person, their inner soul, is the creator of their effects.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the correct conclusion.

The *prima facie* view is rejected by the term “but”. “He” alone, i.e. Lord Vāsudeva, the supreme cause and the Lord of all and the inner soul of the air and the rest, is the creator of the effects like light and the rest. Why? “On account of His desire,” i.e. on account of the desire, or resolve, of Him, or of the Highest Person, viz.: “May I be many” (Chānd. 6.2.3); (and) “On account of His mark”, i.e. on account of the group of texts teaching Him, viz.: ‘Abiding within the earth’ (Brh. 3.7.3), ‘He who abiding within water’ (Brh. 3.7.4), ‘He who abiding within the light’ (Brh. 3.7.14), ‘He who abiding within the air’ (Brh. 3.7.7) ‘He who abiding within the ether’ (Brh. 3.7.12), ‘That itself created itself’ (Tait. 2.7) and so on. Hereby it should be known that in the passages: ‘That light thought’ (Chānd. 6.2.3), ‘Those waters perceived’ (Chānd. 6.2.4) and so on too, the thinking of the Supreme Being alone (is mentioned). Hence, it is established that no independent creatorship belongs to anything else,—it is the Supreme Soul alone who is the primary creator everywhere.

Here ends the section entitled “The light” (4).

COMPARISON

All others read “Tad-abhidhyānād eva tu”, adding an “eva”.

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation same, though they do not take this sūtra as answering to a *prima facie* view. This sūtra, according to them, removes the suspicion, that might have arisen from the above designation of the successive production of elements, viz. that the elements give rise to other elements by themselves. The fact is that it is the Lord himself abiding within those elements that gives rise to the next effect.¹

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.13, pp. 598 ff.; Bh. B. 2.3.13, p. 133; G.B. 2.3.12.

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "The reverse". (Sūtra 14)

SŪTRA 14

"BUT THE ORDER (OF DISSOLUTION) (IS) REVERSE TO THAT, AND (THIS) FITS IN."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The order of dissolution is reverse "to that", i.e. to the order of creation", in accordance with the scriptural text: 'The earth merged in water' (Subāla 2.4¹). "And" this "fits in" on the principle of salt and water.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, the order of the origin of elements has been determined in brief. Now, incidentally, their order of dissolution is being determined.

On the doubt as to whether the order of dissolution is the same as the order of creation, or reverse, the suggestion being: Since even when the prior created object is destroyed, the posterior one is possible, (dissolution takes place) through the same order as that of origination alone.—

(The author) states the correct conclusion: "But the order is reverse to that". The order of dissolution must be understood to be the "reverse" "to that", i.e. to the order of the origination of objects, which is mentioned in Scripture in the text: 'From this soul, verily, the ether originated, from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the fire water, from water the earth' (Tait. 2.1), "What was, then, existent?" He said, to them: "Neither being, nor non-being, nor being and non-being. From him darkness arises, from darkness bhūtādi,² from bhūtādi the ether, from the ether the air, from the air the fire, from the fire water, from water the earth. That egg arose" (Subāla 1.1-3); and which is established by a thousand Smṛti passages, viz. 'The divinity is without beginning and without end, likewise, indivisible, ageless, immortal; celebrated to be unmanifest, constant, likewise undecaying, and immortal; sprung up from whom beings are born and die. That divinity first created what is called mahat from name, the great ahaṃkāra as well. Mahat

¹ P. 465.

² Or the *tāmasa ahaṃkāra*. Vide V.R.M., p. 25.

created ahaṁkāra. Then the Lord, the Master, who is the support of all elements, (created) what is celebrated to be the ether. From the ether originated water, from water fire and air, then from the conjunction of fire and air the earth originated', and so on. And this "fits in" on the ground of the scriptural text: 'The earth merges in water, water merges in the fire, the fire merges in the air, the air merges in the ether, the ether into the sense-organs, the sense-organs in the subtle essences, the subtle essences in bhūtādi, bhūtādi in mahat, mahat in the unmanifest' (Subāla 2.4); on the ground of the following Smṛti passage, viz. 'The earth, the support of the world, merges, divine sage, in water, water merges in the fire, the fire merges in the air'; and on the ground of observing salt, ice and the like to be dissolved into water. What is not mentioned, by the text about creation, in the order of the origination of prakṛti, mahat, ahaṁkāra, the ether and so on, is to be supplied from the text about dissolution; i.e. the construction is: 'The ether (merges in) the sense-organs, the sense-organs in the subtle essences, the subtle essences in bhūtādi'. The ether merges in the subtle essences, the subtle essences merge in bhūtādi, i.e. in tāmasa ahaṁkāra, the sense-organs in sense-organs, i.e. in the rājasa ahaṁkāra,—since here by the word 'sense-organ' ahaṁkāra is understood there being non-difference between cause and effect. The plural number, viz. 'subtle essences' is meant for showing that the dissolution of the earth and the rest takes place through the subtle essences of smell and the rest. On account of the three-foldness of ahaṁkāra, the plural number, viz. 'In the sense-organs', has been used. Thus, it is established that dissolution, taking place in the above inverted order, is not contradicted by anything whatsoever.

Here ends the section entitled "The reverse" (5).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in Rāmānuja's commentary. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, concerned with the order of dissolution, but continues the topic of the order of evolution. Thus the sūtra means according to him: And the order (of the origination of the vital-breath and the rest), on the contrary, (stated) in a reverse order (to

the real order of succession) fits in (only if there be the origination of all effects directly) from thence (i.e. Brahman).

That is, in Scripture we have many passages which designate the vital-breath and the rest as rising directly from Brahman, in opposition to the real order of evolution, viz. prakṛti, mahat, and so on; and these texts are explicable only on the supposition that everything really arises from Brahman directly.¹

This is sūtra 13 in Baladeva's commentary, who follows Rāmānuja exactly with the difference that he takes this sūtra as constituting an adhikaraṇa by itself.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 15 in his commentary, reading different, viz. substitutes "pāraṃparyeṇa", in place of "viparyyayeṇa". Interpretation too different, viz. he begins a new adhikaraṇa here, ending with the next sūtra, and concerned with the question of the origin of sense-organs, mind and the like,—which according to Nimbārka begins with the next sūtra.³

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "Knowledge which intervenes". (Sūtra 15)

SŪTRA 15

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT KNOWLEDGE AND MIND (MUST BE PLACED) BETWEEN (BRAHMAN AND THE ELEMENTS) ON ACCOUNT OF ITS INDICATION (IN SCRIPTURAL TEXT), (AND THAT THE ABOVE ORDER OF CREATION IS SET ASIDE) BY (THIS) ORDER, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF NON-DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: "On account of the indication", viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3⁴), "knowledge and mind" must be between Brahman and the elements; and "by the order" obtained in this way the above-mentioned order is contradicted,—

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.15, p. 131, Part 2.

² G.B. 2.3.13, p. 177, Chap. 2.

³ Śk. B. 2.3.15, pp. 135-36, Parts 7 and 8.

⁴ Ś, R, B, Śk, B.

(We reply:) “no”, because the above text is not concerned with a specific order, and because the text: ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all sense-organs’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) (is concerned with laying down only) “the non-difference” of the origin of knowledge and mind as well as of the ether and the rest from Brahman alone.¹ In the text under discussion, viz.: ‘From this soul, verily, the ether originated’ (Tait. 2.1²), establishing the order of the creation of elements,—in between the soul and the ether, the categories of the unmanifest, mahat and ahaṁkāra, well-known from texts concerned with the orders of creation and dissolution and figuratively implied by the phrase “knowledge and mind” (in the sūtra), are to be known,—so much in brief.

Vedānta-kaustubha

With a view to encouraging meditation, and generating reverence for Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, the place from which the world emanates and into which it enters; as well as for generating an aversion to the world, the orders of creation and dissolution have been determined. Now, the order of the origin of knowledge and mind, which promote meditation, is being established in harmony with the order of the origin of elements.

If it be objected: The above-mentioned order of the origin of elements is set aside by the order of the origin of knowledge and mind. Thus, knowledge is that through which a thing is known, i.e. sense-organ. The sense-organs and the mind must be in between Brahman and the elements. Why? “On account of its indication.” An indication (liṅga) or a mark is that through which something is painted,³ i.e. known, an indication of that, i.e. of creation, on account of that;⁴ that is, on account of the scriptural text indicating their creation, viz. ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the mind, and all sense-organs, the ether, the air, the fire, water and the earth, the support of all’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3). Hence the above-mentioned order is set aside by it.—

¹ I.e. the above Muṇḍ. text simply shows that just as the ether, etc. rise from Brahman, so exactly do the sense-organs, the mind, etc. too,—but does not lay down a definite order of creation. See V.K. below.

² Not quoted by others in this connection.

³ Root $\sqrt{\text{liṅg}}$ = to paint.

⁴ This explains the compound “*tal-liṅgāt*”.

(We reply:) "No". Why? "On account of non-difference," i.e. because of the non-difference of the origin of knowledge and mind, as well as of the ether and the rest, from Brahman alone. The text: 'From him arise the vital-breath' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) and so on simply points out that there is the origin of *all* from Brahman, and is not set aside by the above-mentioned order. In the very same manner, scriptural texts like: 'He created the vital-breath, from the vital-breath reverence, the ether, the air, the fire, water, the earth, the sense-organs, the mind, food' (Prašna 6.4) and so on, designate that everything arises from Brahman, and do not set forth a particular order. The meaning of the word 'vital-breath' in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) will become clear later on.¹ And, thus it is established that in the aphorism: "But there is" (Br. Sū. 2.3.2), only a portion (of the real order of creation) has been mentioned by the author of the aphorisms. So, in the abridged texts designating the order of the origination of elements, such as: 'From the soul the ether originated' (Tait. 2.1) and so on, the portions not mentioned, viz. prakṛti, mahat and the rest, established by other texts concerned about creation and dissolution, and figuratively implied by the phrase "knowledge and mind" (in the sūtra), are necessarily understood; but there is no contradiction whatsoever of the texts designating the order of the origination of elements by other texts.

Here ends the section entitled "Knowledge which intervenes" (6).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

The interpretation of the word "aviśeṣāt" different, viz. "On account of the non-difference (of the organs from the elements)". That is, the organs being of the same nature as the elements, the origination of the former is the same as that of the latter, and not different.²

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.4.9.

² Ś.B. 2.3.15, p. 602.

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The soul".
(Sūtras 16-17)

SŪTRA 16

"BUT THAT DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS BEING BORN OR DYING) MUST DEPEND ON (I.E. REFER TO) THE MOBILE AND IMMOBILE (BODIES), (IT IS) METAPHORICAL (IN REFERENCE TO THE SOUL), BECAUSE (THERE IS) THE EXISTENCE (OF BIRTH AND DEATH) IF THERE BE THE EXISTENCE OF THAT (I.E. THE BODY)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The nature of the individual soul is being determined now. "The designation" like: 'Devadatta is born and dead' is metaphorical, and as such "depends on the mobile and the immobile",—there being the "existence" of birth and death when there is the "existence" of the body.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out above that the ether and the rest originate from Brahman, the unborn, the highest. Now the problem is being considered, viz. whether like them the individual soul, too, is something to be produced or not.

The word 'soul' is to be supplied from the immediately following aphorism. On the doubt, viz. whether the 'soul', i.e. the individual soul, originates or not, the *prima facie* view: viz. In conformity with the designation, viz. 'Devadatta is born and dead', the soul is born and dies,—is disposed of by the term "but". This conventional designation of the origination and dissolution of the soul "must be metaphorical", i.e. is figurative in reference to the individual soul. To the enquiry: In reference to what then is it literal?—(the author) replies: "Dependent on the mobile and the immobile", i.e. it refers to the bodies of the movable and the immovable. Why? "Because (there is) existence, if there be the existence of that," i.e. because there can be origination and dissolution only if there be the existence of that, i.e. the body, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'This person being born and obtaining a body . . . He departing and dying' (Brh. 4.3.8).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 17 in his commentary. He does not begin a new adhikaraṇa here, but concludes the topic of the order of evolution.

He reads both "bhākta" and "abhākta" and gives two explanations accordingly. Thus: (1) But the designation which depends on (i.e. refers to) the movable and the immovable must be secondary, because of being permeated by the being of that (viz. Brahman). (Here he reads "bhākta".) That is, all the words denoting movable and immovable objects are only secondary with regard to those objects, but really denote Brahman, since all objects are modes of Brahman, (2) or, all the terms denoting movable and immovable objects are primary with regard to Brahman, because the denotative power of all terms depends on the being of Brahman. (Here he reads "abhākta".)¹

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 17 in his commentary as well. He reads "abhākta", takes this sūtra as an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets it exactly like Rāmānuja.²

Baladeva

This is sūtra 15 in his commentary. He also reads "abhākta", takes it as an adhikaraṇa by itself, and interprets on the whole like Rāmānuja. Only the interpretation of the word "tad-bhāva-bhāvitvāt" is different; viz. "But the designation dependent on (i.e. referring to) the movable and the immovable must be primary (with regard to the Lord), because that fact (tad-bhāva) (viz. the fact that all words really denote the Lord) is something that follows in future (i.e. is not directly known at once, but is a matter which one comes to know after studying Scripture)".³

SŪTRA 17

"THE SOUL (DOES) NOT (ORIGINATE), ON ACCOUNT OF NON-MENTION IN SCRIPTURE, AND ON ACCOUNT OF ETERNITY (KNOWN) THEREFROM (I.E. FROM SCRIPTURAL TEXTS)."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual "soul" does not originate. Why? Because there is no text about its having origin by nature; and because from

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.17, pp. 132-33, Part 2.

² Śk. B. 2.3.17, pp. 138-39, Parts 7 and 8.

³ G.B. 2.3.15, pp. 181-82, Chap. 2.

the scriptural texts: 'A wise man is neither born nor dies' (Kaṭha. 2.18¹), 'Eternal among the eternal' (Kaṭha. 5.13²), 'An unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying' (Śvet. 4.5³) and so on, the eternity of the individual soul is known.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be argued: In conformity with the texts: 'One desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Sam. 2.5.5⁴), etc., which lay down the means to attaining lordship in the next world, let the designation: 'Devadatta is born and dead' refer to the birth and death of the body. But like the ether and the rest, birth and death must pertain to the individual soul as well at the time of creation and dissolution (respectively). Thus there is no conflict whatsoever with any text.—

We reply: "Not, the soul, on account of non-mention in Scripture". The singular number 'soul' implies the class,⁵ in accordance with the scriptural text teaching the plurality of souls, viz. 'Eternal among the eternal, conscious among the conscious' (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), and in accordance with the aphorism, to be mentioned hereafter, viz. "And on account of non-continuity, there is no confusion" (Br. Sū. 2.3.48). The soul is not born, nor dies. Why? 'On account of non-mention in Scripture', i.e. because there are no scriptural texts designating the birth and death (of the soul) at the time of creation and dissolution; and, because on the contrary, "the eternity" of the soul is known "therefrom", i.e. from the scriptural texts like: "Imperishable, verily, O! is this soul, possessing the virtue of being indestructible" (Bṛh. 4.5.14), 'A wise man is neither born, nor dies' (Kaṭha. 2.8), 'Eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious, the one among the many, who bestows objects of desires' (Kaṭha. 5.13; Śvet. 6.13), 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1.9), 'One unborn one, verily, lies by, enjoying. Another unborn one leaves her who has been enjoyed' (Śvet. 4.5) and so on; as well as from the following Smṛti passages, viz. "Nor at any time, verily, was

¹ Ś, R, Śk, B.

³ Not quoted by others.

⁵ And not that there is only one soul.

² R, Śk, B.

⁴ P. 208, line 27, vol. 2.

I not, nor you, nor these lords of men; nor, verily, shall we ever not be hereafter” (Gītā 2.12), “Unborn, eternal, constant and ancient, he is not killed when the body is killed” (Gītā 2.20), “Who knows him to be imperishable, eternal, unborn and immutable, how can that man kill one, O Pārtha, or cause one to be killed?” (Gītā 2.21) and so on.

If it be objected: There are scriptural texts designating the origin of the world together with the sentient, such as, ‘All come forth from this soul’, ‘Born of whom, the progenitress of the universe let loose the souls with water on the earth’ (Mahānār. 1.4), ‘The lord of beings created beings’ (Tait. Br. 1.1.10, 1¹) ‘All these beings, my dear, have Being as their root, Being as their abode, Being as their support’ (Chānd. 6.8.4), “From whom, verily, these beings arise, through whom they live when born, to whom they go and enter” (Tait. 3.1) and so on. Hence, the denial of birth and death of the individual soul is not reasonable. For this very reason, the initial proposition that through the knowledge of one there is the knowledge of all, is established,—

(We reply:) “No”, because the quoted texts teach that individual soul has an origin, which (is not *actual* origin, but simply) consists in the expansion of its knowledge, caused by its connection with the body, subsequent to its giving up its real nature at the time of dissolution. If this be so, then the individual soul too being an effect of Brahman, the above initial proposition is established. And hence, it is established that Brahman, who in His causal state possesses the non-divided names and forms as His powers and is without an equal or a superior,—in accordance with the text: “The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning, one only, without a second” (Chānd. 6.2.1),—comes Himself, as possessed of the manifest names and forms as His powers at the time of the production of effects, to abide as three-fold, viz. in the forms of the enjoyer (i.e. the cit), the object enjoyed (i.e. the acit) and the controller (i.e. Brahman). There is no contradiction here by any text whatever.

Here ends the section entitled “The soul” (7).

¹ P. 23, line 16, vol. 1.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

They read “śruteḥ” instead of “aśruteḥ”¹. Interpretation same.

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled “The knower”. (Sūtra 18)

SŪTRA 18

“(THE SOUL IS) A KNOWER, FOR THAT VERY REASON.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul, which is an ego, is a knower.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been pointed out that the soul does not originate like the ether and the rest, since it is eternal, as established by Scripture. Now, incidentally, its nature, etc. are being determined.

The word ‘soul’ is to be supplied from the preceding aphorism. By the phrase “for this reason”, the reason mentioned by the term ‘therefrom’ (in the preceding sūtra) is referred to. On the doubt, viz. whether the soul is non-sentient by nature, but possessed of the attribute of knowledge or mere consciousness, or knowledge by nature yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower,—the Vaiśeṣikas² and the like hold that it is non-sentient, yet possessed of the attribute of knowledge; while the Sāṃkhya and the rest hold that the soul is mere consciousness.

With regard to it we reply: “A knower”, i.e. the individual soul is nothing but a knower, i.e. nothing but knowledge by nature, yet possessed of (the attribute of) being a knower. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts, viz. ‘Here this person becomes self-illuminating’ (Brh. 4.3.9, 14), ‘The person who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light in the heart’ (Brh. 4.3.7), ‘There is no annihilation of the knowledge of

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.18, p. 136, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.18, p. 140, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.16.

² Vide V. Sū. 3.1.18, and *Śaṅkara Miśra’s* commentary, p. 161.

the knower, because of his imperishability' (Brh. 4.3.30), '“Whereby should one know, O! the knower?”' (Brh. 2.4.14; 4.5.15), 'This person simply knows', 'For he is the one who sees, . . .¹ hears, smells, . . .² thinks, conceives, does, the intelligent self' (Prašna 4.9) and so on.

The doctrine of the non-sentient soul, on the other hand, is to be rejected,—because then the attribute of knowledge by itself, being the effector of all practical transactions, will come to attain primacy; and hence the non-sentient substratum of the attribute (viz. the soul), being non-labile to salvation or bondage, virtue or vice, will come to be non-primary or useless like the nipple on the neck of a goat;³ and finally, because of its opposition to Scripture.

The doctrine of mere consciousness, too, is to be rejected, because if consciousness be all-pervading, then there will be no perception of the pleasure and the like pertaining to the entire body; but if it be atomic in size, then there will be no experience of the pleasure and the like pertaining to hands, feet and so on.

Hence it is established that this soul, known through self-consciousness, is knowledge by nature and a knower.

Here ends the section entitled “The knower” (8).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

Interpretation different—viz. he interprets the word “jñā” as eternal consciousness and not as a knower.⁴

¹ Touches.

² Tastes.

³ An emblem of any useless or worthless object or person.

⁴ Ś.B. 2.2.18, p. 609.

Adhikaraṇa 9: The section entitled "Departure". (Sūtras 19-31)

SŪTRA 19

"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS ATOMIC ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION) OF DEPARTURE, GOING AND RETURNING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul is atomic, because in the texts: 'By that light this soul departs through the eye, or through the head, or through other parts of the body' (Brh. 4.4.2¹), 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2²), 'Having come back from that world to this world for action' (Brh. 4.4.6³) and so on, there is the mention "of departure, going and returning".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, it has been proved that the individual soul is eternal and a knower. Now its size is being determined.

On the doubt, viz. whether this soul is of a middle size,⁴ or of an all-pervading size, or of an atomic size,—if it be suggested: It must be of a middle size, since pleasure and the rest are experienced all over the body. Or, it must be of an all-pervading size,—

We reply: The individual soul is capable "of departing, going and returning". These three are not possible if it be all-pervading. Moreover, if it be all-pervading, then experiences of pleasure and the like will result everywhere. If, on the other hand, it be of a middle size, then it must be non-eternal. Hence, the atomicity of the soul is the only remaining alternative. In the passage: 'When he departs from this body, he departs together with all these' (Kauṣ. 3.3⁵), its departure is mentioned. In the passage: 'Whoever, verily, depart from this world, all go to the moon alone' (Kauṣ. 1.2), its going is mentioned. And, in the passage: 'Having come back from that world to this world for action' (Brh. 4.4.6), its returning is mentioned.

¹ R, Śk, B.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

³ Ś, R, Śk, B.

⁴ I.e. of the size of the body.

⁵ Note that *Nimbārka* quotes a different text here.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

He takes sūtras 19-27 as laying down the *prima facie* view. Literal interpretation same.

SŪTRA 20

“AND (THERE IS POSSIBILITY) OF THE SUBSEQUENT TWO (VIZ. GOING AND RETURNING) THROUGH ONE’S SELF.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Sometimes departing may be possible on the part of even one who is not moving, as in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village.¹ But, since there is possibility “of the subsequent two through one’s self” alone, the individual soul is atomic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

As in the case of the cessation of the rulership of a village, departing, which consists in the cessation of the rulership of the body, may sometimes be possible on the part of the soul even when it is not moving. But, since there can be the accomplishment “of the subsequent two”, viz. going and returning”, “through one’s self” alone, it is established that the individual soul is atomic.

SŪTRA 21

“IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE SOUL IS) NOT ATOMIC, BECAUSE OF THE SCRIPTURAL MENTION OF WHAT IS NOT THAT, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE TOPIC BEING SOMETHING ELSE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: In accordance with the text, referring to the individual soul and designating “what is not that”, viz.: ‘He, verily, is the great’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22²), the individual soul is “not atomic”,—

¹ I.e. when somebody ceases to be the ruler of a village, he may be said to ‘go out’.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

(we reply:) “no”, because in the middle, the topic is the Supreme Soul.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: The individual soul is “not atomic”. Why? “Because of the scriptural mention of what is not that,”—“that” means atomicity, “what is not that” means non-atomicity, on account of the scriptural mention of that,¹—i.e. because in connection with the discourse on the individual soul, viz. ‘He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the soul’ (Bṛh. 4.3.7), there is the mention of greatness in the scriptural text: ‘He, verily, is the great, unborn soul’ (Bṛh. 4.4.25),—

(We reply:) “No”. Why? “On account of the topic being something else,” i.e. because the topic is here something other than the individual soul referred to in the beginning, i.e. the Supreme Soul, who is the topic to be established in the middle of the section, in the text: ‘By whom the soul has been found and realized’ (Bṛh. 4.4.13).

SŪTRA 22

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORD ITSELF AND OF MEASURE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the word itself (viz. ‘atomic’) and of measure,” mentioned (respectively) in the texts: ‘This atomic soul’ (Mund. 3.1.9²), ‘An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold’ (Śvet. 5.9³), the individual soul is atomic.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The phrase: “the word itself” means the word which is denotative of its own atomicity. The word “measure” means the measure which is separated from ⁴ all gross measures, i.e. an intensely minute measure. On account of these two, the individual soul is atomic. The word itself is mentioned in the text: ‘This *atomic* soul in which the five-fold vital-breath has entered is to be known by means of thought’ (Mund.

¹ This explains the compound “*atachruteḥ*”.

² Ś, R, B, Śk, B.

³ Ś, R, Bh, B.

⁴ *Uddhṛtya mānam* = *Unmānam*.

3.1.9). The measure is mentioned in the text: 'An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundred-fold' (Śvet. 5.9) 'For the lower one is seen to be like the point of the spoke of a wheel only' (Śvet. 5.8).

SŪTRA 23

"NON-CONTRADICTION, AS IN THE CASE OF THE SANDAL-PASTE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as a drop of sandal-paste, though occupying one spot of the body, refreshes the entire body, so exactly does the soul illuminate. Hence, the experience of pleasure and the like over the whole body is not inconsistent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: If the soul be atomic in size, then how can pleasure and the like be experienced over the whole body?—we reply: There is no such contradiction. Just as one drop of yellow sandal-paste, occupying one spot of the body, produces, through its own quality, a pleasurable sensation extending over the entire body, so the soul too, occupying one spot of the body, experiences, through its own quality, the pleasure and the like extending over the entire body, in accordance with the Smṛti passage: 'This soul, though only atomic, abides pervading its own body, as does a drop of yellow sandal-paste, pervading the body'. For this very reason it has been said by the Lord too: "Just as one sun illuminates this entire world, so the field-owner (i.e. the soul) illuminates the entire field (i.e. the body), O Bhārata!"' (Gitā 13.33).

SŪTRA 24

"IF IT BE OBJECTED THAT (THE TWO CASES ARE NOT PARALLEL) ON ACCOUNT OF THE SPECIALITY OF ABODE, (WE REPLY:) NO, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADMISSION (OF AN ABODE, VIZ.) IN THE HEART CERTAINLY."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: The example of the sandal-paste is not appropriate, "on account of the speciality of abode",—it is directly

observed that the drop of sandal-paste occupies one spot of the body; but it is not known that the individual soul occupies one part of the body, since consciousness is experienced everywhere,—on account of such a difference of abode between the two,—

(We reply :) “No”. Why? “On account of the admission,” viz. that the soul, atomic in size, abides in one part of the body, i.e. “in the heart”, by the scriptural text: ‘He who is made of knowledge among the vital-breaths, who is the light within the heart’ (Bṛh. 4.4.22). The meaning of the term “certainly” is that it is the attribute of knowledge (and not the atomic soul itself) which abides in the whole body.

SŪTRA 25

“OR THROUGH ATTRIBUTE, LIKE LIGHT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The illumination of the body takes place only through the attribute of the soul, like the light of a lamp and the like in a room.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. the doctrine that there is a relation of attribute and substratum (between knowledge and the soul) is not proper, since our purpose is served by the very nature only (of the soul),—(the author) replies:

The term “or” is for disposing of the objection. The sense is that the experience of the pleasure and the like, pertaining to the entire body, by the atomic soul, occupying one part of the body, is possible through its attribute of knowledge which is all-pervading “As in ordinary life.” In ordinary life, a gem, the sun, a light and so on, though occupying one place, illuminate many places, as the case may be, through their attribute alone. Or else, (the combination) may be disjoined as: “as in the case of light”, i.e. like the light of gems and the rest. The doctrine of an attributeless soul, as admitted by the Sāṃkhya, has been disposed of above.¹

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara reads “lokavat”, all others “ālokavat”.

¹ Vide V.K. 1.3.18.

SŪTRA 26

"THE EXTENDING BEYOND (OF KNOWLEDGE) IS AS IN THE CASE OF SMELL, FOR THIS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

But the "extending beyond" of the attribute of knowledge fits in "as in the case of smell". The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-hairs and finger nails' (Kauṣ. 4.20¹) "shows" the individual soul to be the substratum of such an attribute.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"The extending" of the attribute of knowledge beyond the soul, its substratum which is situated within the heart, i.e. its occupying a larger space, is "as in the case of smell", i.e. is just like smell occupying a larger space than the flower which occupies a smaller space. The scriptural text: 'He has entered here up to the body-hairs and finger-nails' (Kauṣ. 4.2.0) "shows" the soul's pervasion over the entire body by means of its attribute of knowledge, extending over a larger space.

COMPARISON

Saṃkara and Bhaskara

They break this sūtra into two different ones, viz. "Vyatireko gandhavat" and "Tathā ca darśayati".²

Rāmānuja

He too reads "ca" in place of "hi", but does not break it into two sūtras.

SŪTRA 27

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Although there is no distinction between the soul and its knowledge in respect of being knowledge, yet a relation of substratum and

¹ Not quoted by others. For correct quotation vide Kauṣ., p. 141.

² Ś.B., pp. 615-16; Bh. B., p. 136.

attribute (between them) is indeed proper. Why? "On account of the separate teaching," viz.: "Having mounted the body by means of intelligence" (Kauṣ. 3.6¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. Let knowledge be the essence of the soul. Hence here the distinction,—viz. the substratum is atomic, the attribute all-pervading,—is not proper,—(the author) replies here.

"On account of the separate teaching" of the attribute from the substratum, the soul, in the passages: 'Having mounted the body by means of intelligence' (Kauṣ. 3.6), 'Having taken by his intelligence the intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17). That is, in spite of there being no distinction between the two in respect of being knowledge, there can very well be a relation of substratum and attribute between them, since it is mentioned in Scripture. Equality of nature does not necessarily mean identity, since it is found that in spite of there being no distinction between light and its substratum,—both being equally light,—there is still a difference between them.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 26 in his commentary, interpretation different. It answers to the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute of the soul. Hence the sūtra: "Intelligence is a permanent attribute of the soul) since there is a separate (i.e. distinct) statement (in Scripture to that effect)".²

SŪTRA 28

"BUT THERE IS THAT DESIGNATION ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOUL'S) HAVING THAT ATTRIBUTE AS ITS ESSENCE, AS IN THE CASE OF THE INTELLIGENT BEING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"As in the case of the intelligent one," i.e. (just as Brahman is said to be great, because He is possessed of great attributes, on the

¹ Ś.

² G.B. 2.3.26, p. 197, Chap. 2.

ground of etymology thus) 'Brahman' is one in whom there are great qualities,¹ so the soul has been designated as "Eternal, all-pervading" (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6²), because of possessing great attributes. In the first case, the Intelligent Being, great by Himself, is great by reason of His attributes too. In the second case, on the other hand, the individual soul, atomic in size, is great by reason of its attribute only,—this is the distinction.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. If the individual soul be atomic by nature, then the texts which establish its all-pervasiveness must be contradicted, such as: 'Eternal, all-pervasive, omnipresent, extremely subtle' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), 'Eternal, all-pervasive, immobile' (Gītā 2.24) and so on,—the author replies: No.

The term "but" is for disposing of the objection. On account of having an all-pervasive attribute as its very essence, "that designation", viz. the designation of the all-pervasiveness of the soul, such as: 'Eternal, all-pervasive' (Muṇḍ. 1.1.6), fits in. "As in the case of the intelligent being." Greatness is said to belong to the Intelligent Being through His connection with great attributes as well, in accordance with the saying: 'Brahman' is one in whom there are great attributes. The Intelligent Being being great *by nature* as well, the example holds good only partially.³ Similarly, there is this designation of the all-pervasiveness (of the soul) on the ground of its all-pervasive attribute only, and not *by nature*. This should be understood here: Vāsudeva, the Highest Person, is without an equal and a superior and all-pervasive, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Nothing is observed to be either equal to Him or higher than Him' (Śvet. 6.8). The all-pervasiveness of others, such as, prakṛti, time, and the attribute of the individual soul (viz. knowledge), is relative (and not absolute). There are contraction and expansion of even such an attribute which is peculiar to the individual soul, and eternal, in accordance with the declarations by the Lord Himself: "Knowledge is enveloped by

¹ *Br̥h + man.*

² Not quoted by others.

³ I.e. the case of *Brahman* and the individual soul are not parallel in all respects, but in some respects only. The former is great by nature, as well as great by attributes; while the latter is atomic by nature yet great by attributes. Hence the two cases are parallel only in respect of the second point, and not of the first as evident.

nescience. Thereby beings are deluded'' (Gītā 5.15), ''In whom that nescience has been destroyed by knowledge, in them knowledge shines forth like the sun, O Bhārata!'' (Gītā 5.16¹).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He takes this and the following three sūtras as laying down the correct conclusion, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive, in answer to the *prima facie* view set forth in ten sūtras above. Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: ''But there is that designation (of the atomicity of the soul) on account of its having that attribute (viz. buddhi) as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent being''. That is, just as Brahman, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic for the purpose of meditation, so the individual soul, though all-pervading, is designated to be atomic through its limiting adjunct of buddhi.²

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 29 in the commentaries of the first two, and sūtra 27 in the commentary of the last. Baladeva leaves out ''tu''. Interpretation different—viz. ''But there is that designation (i.e. the designation of the soul as knowledge) on account of its having that attribute as its essence, as in the case of the intelligent one''. That is, just as the Lord, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, so the individual soul too, though a knower, is sometimes designated as knowledge, since it possesses knowledge as its essential attribute.³ They continue the same topic in the following four sūtras, although literal interpretation is the same.

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 29 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. Here he points out that the atomicity of the soul, considered so long, is not the real form of the soul, but only its transmigratory

1 Correct quotation: ''*Prakāśayati tatparam*'' . Vide Gītā, 5.16, p. 303.

2 Ś.B. 2.3.29, pp. 616 ff.

3 Śrī. B. 2.3.29, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.29, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.27, p. 198, Chap. 2.

form. Here he follows Śaṅkara, and points out that just as the all-pervading Brahman is said to be atomic in reference to His abode, viz. the heart, so the all-pervading soul is said to be atomic through its attributes of passion and the rest.¹

SŪTRA 29

“ALSO BECAUSE OF LASTING AS LONG AS THE SOUL DOES, THERE IS NO FAULT, BECAUSE IT IS SEEN.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness, due to its attribute, is not inconsistent. “Also because of” the attribute lasting as long as the soul does, there is no fault, because it is seen”;² i.e. because it is found in the passage: “For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperishable, indeed. O! is this soul” (Bṛh. 4.3.30³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. The attribute of the soul being sometimes present and sometimes not, its all-pervasiveness due thereto vanishes, and as such the designation of its all-pervasiveness is open to objections —(the author) replies:

The term “also” is meant for disposing of the objection. The soul is indeed eternal. As its attribute too “lasts as long as the soul does”, i.e. is an eternal attribute accompanying the soul, so the designation of the soul's all-pervasiveness is not open to objections, because we find that there are texts designating the attribute as lasting as long as the soul does, such as: “For there is no cessation of the knowledge of the knower, because of his imperishability. Imperishable, verily, O! is this soul” (Bṛh. 4.3.30).

¹ Bh. B. 2.3.29, p. 137.

² C.S.S. ed., p. 440, omits the whole sentence which is but a repetition of the sūtra itself. The other edition retains it.

³ Not quoted by others.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary. Interpretation different. Śaṅkara continues the same theme, and points out that the soul's connection with buddhi lasts so long as the transmigratory state does.¹

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 30 in their commentaries as well. The interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that all cows, hornless and so on, are called 'cow' (since they all possess the generic character of cowness).²

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 30 in his commentary too. Interpretation different, viz. like Śaṅkara's.³

Baladeva

This is sūtra 28 in his commentary. Interpretation of the word "tad-darśanāt" different, viz. because it is seen that the sun and its light are co-eternal, and that the sun is both light and the illuminator.⁴

SŪTRA 30

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPROPRIATENESS OF MANIFESTATION OF THAT WHICH IS EXISTENT, AS IN THE CASE OF VIRILITY AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

During the waking state there is the "manifestation" "of this", i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last so long as the soul itself does; just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood.

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.30, pp. 619 ff.

² Śrī. B. 2.3.30, p. 144, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.30, p. 147, Parts 7 and 8.

³ Bh. B. 2.3.30, pp. 137-38.

⁴ G.B. 2.3.28.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if knowledge, the attribute of the soul, be eternal, then why should there be no perception of it during the states of deep sleep and the rest?—(the author) replies:

The term “but” implies emphasis. Knowledge, the attribute of the soul, does last as long as the soul itself does. Why? “On account of the appropriateness of the manifestation of that which is existent.” That is, the attribute of knowledge, which is “existent indeed”, i.e. is present indeed, in a non-manifest form during the states of deep sleep and the rest is manifested during the waking state,—just as in youth there is the manifestation of “virility and so on” which are existent indeed during childhood. By the phrase “and so on” the natural qualities of magnanimity, good conduct and the like are to be understood.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 31 in their commentaries. Interpretation different, they continue the same theme—viz. the soul’s connection with buddhi exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc. and is manifested in the state of waking.¹

SŪTRA 31

“OTHERWISE THERE (WILL BE) THE CONSEQUENCE OF ETERNAL PERCEPTION AND NON-PERCEPTION, OR A RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE ONE OR THE OTHER.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must all become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettered or eternally free,—thus there must be “a restriction with regard to the one or the other”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.31, p. 621; Bh. B. 2.3.31, p. 138.

consciousness. "Otherwise," i.e. on any view other than our view, viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size, i.e. on the doctrine that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be the "consequence of eternal perception and non-perception". On account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be perception; on account of the existence of mundane existence, non-perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and release, "or a restriction with regard to the one or the other". On our view, on the other hand, the individual soul being of the size of an atom, going and returning, being enveloped and being unenveloped, the object to be approached and the one approaching, are all possible, and hence the respective difference between bondage and release, too, is possible. But on your view, there will result one or the other only of bondage and release, having the stated marks. There must be eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness merely and immobile; or there must be salvation alone,—such a restriction will result. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by nature and atomic in size.

Here ends the section entitled "Departure" (9).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 32 in their commentaries. Interpretation different as before. They adduce here an argument for the existence of buddhi, being connected with which the all-pervading soul becomes atomic. Thus: (The existence of buddhi must be admitted) otherwise there will be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception . . .¹

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 622; Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138.

Adhikaraṇa 10: The section entitled "The agent". (Sūtras 32-39)

SŪTRA 32

"(THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IS) AN AGENT, BECAUSE OF SCRIPTURE HAVING A SENSE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul indeed is "an agent", because the scriptural texts, informing us about the means to enjoyment and salvation, such as: 'One desiring heaven should perform a sacrifice' (Tait. Sam. 2.5.5¹), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman'² and so on, have a sense.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now incidentally, the problem whether the soul is an agent is being discussed.

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is an agent or not,—if the *prima facie* view be as follows: In the Kāṭha-vallī it is denied that the individual soul is an agent, thus: 'If the killer thinks to kill, if the killed thinks himself killed, both these do not know. This one does not kill, nor is killed' (Kāṭha. 2.19); and it has been declared by the Lord too: "All actions are done by the guṇas of prakṛti. The soul, deluded by egoism, thinks: 'I am the agent'" (Gītā 3.27). Hence, the guṇas alone are agents, but never the soul,—

We reply: The soul alone is the agent. Why? "Because of Scripture having a sense", i.e. because the scriptural texts, teaching the means which are dependent on sentient beings, subject to enjoyment and salvation, viz. 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a hundred years' (Īśā. 2), 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Sam. 2.5.5), 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman', 'Let one worship calmly' (Chānd. 3.14.1) and so on, have a sense. If those non-sentient objects (viz. the guṇas) be the agent, the scriptural texts teaching the means must be senseless.

The (above-quoted) scriptural text, on the other hand, shows that the soul being eternal cannot be killed; but it is not by any means

¹ R, B, p. 208, line 27, vol. 2.

² R, B.

concerned with denying that the soul is an agent. The Smṛti passage, too, shows only that the soul, which is deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti, is an agent of mundane activities through those guṇas. And, this has been stated by the Lord Himself thus: “Those deluded by the guṇas of prakṛti are attached to the activities of the guṇas” (Gītā 3.2.9). If the guṇas be the agent and not the soul, then the following statements will be nullified: viz. “But if you will not carry on this righteous warfare” (Gītā 2.33), “For through action alone Janaka and the rest have attained to perfection. Having an eye to the good of the world also, you should perform action” (Gītā 3.20), “Whatever you do, whatever you eat, whatever you offer, whatever you give, whatever you practise as penance,—make that an offering to me” (Gītā 9.27), “I am firm, with my doubts removed. I will do according to your word” (Gītā 18.73) and so on.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 33 in their commentaries. Literal interpretation same, but they hold that the soul's state of being an agent is not natural, but due to limiting adjuncts.¹ The same remarks apply to the following three sūtras also, which will not be noted separately.

SŪTRA 33

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE TEACHING OF (THE SOUL'S) MOVING ABOUT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the teaching of (the soul's) moving about,” in the passage: He moves around in his own body as desired” (Brh. 2.1.18²), it is an agent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“On account of the teaching” of the soul's “moving about,” i.e. of its roaming around, in the passages: ‘He, the immortal, goes

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.32, p. 623; Bh. B. 2.3.32, p. 138. For the different senses of the word ‘*upādhi*’ in the systems of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, see Bh. B., etc.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk.

wherever he wishes' (Bṛh. 4.3.12), 'He moves around in his own body as desired' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), the individual soul is an agent,—this is the sense.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They take this sūtra and the next as one sūtra by reversing the order and adding a "ca" thus: "Upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca".¹

SŪTRA 34

"ON ACCOUNT OF TAKING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Because of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) thus: 'So exactly he, having taken the senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18).

Vedānta-kaustubha

On account of the scriptural mention of the taking (by the soul) in the passage which introduces the topic thus: 'Just as a king', and continues: 'So exactly does he, having taken these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.18), 'Having taken by his intelligence of these senses' (Bṛh. 2.1.17), the individual soul is an agent.

SŪTRA 35

"ALSO ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION (OF THE SOUL AS AN AGENT) WITH REGARD TO ACTIONS, OTHERWISE, (THERE WILL BE) REVERSAL OF DESCRIPTION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Also on account of the designation (of the soul) as an agent" thus: 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2.5²), the soul is an agent. If by the word 'understanding' buddhi be understood and not the individual soul, the instrumental case would have been used.³

¹ Śrī. B., p. 152, Part 2; Śk., B., p. 153, Parts 7 and 8.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

³ I.e. the instrumental case 'vijñānena' would have been used.

Vedānta-kaustubha

“Also on account of the designation” of the individual soul, denoted by the term ‘knowledge’, as an agent of ordinary and Vedic “actions” thus: ‘Understanding performs a sacrifice, performs actions as well’ (Tait. 2.5), the individual soul is an agent.

If it be objected: By the term ‘understanding’ buddhi is to be understood and not the individual soul,—(the author) replies: “Otherwise, i.e. if by the term ‘understanding’ the individual soul be not understood, but buddhi is understood, then there must be “reversal of the description”, i.e. buddhi being the instrument, there must have been the designation of an instrument thus: ‘by understanding’. But there is no such designation. Hence, here is a designation of an agent by the stated case-ending, viz. ‘Understanding’. Hence the individual soul is an agent. _____

SŪTRA 36

“THERE IS NO RESTRICTION AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“There is no restriction” with regard to the actions based on the perception of their fruits.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if the individual soul be the agent, then having taken into consideration the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works, and being disgusted with the evil, it, with a view to obtaining the good, ought to do what is conducive to the latter,—(the author) replies:

“As in the case of perception.” Just as there is the perception of the good and the evil which are the fruits of good and evil works performed previously, so there is “no restriction” with regard to works, since we find that people are by chance sometimes inclined to what is beneficial and sometimes to what is not beneficial.¹

¹ I.e. although a man perceives the good and evil results of his past acts, yet there is no fixed rule that he always afterwards does what is good and avoids what is bad. As he is ruled by external circumstances, he may sometimes be inclined to what is bad, though knowing from his past experiences that such acts lead to harmful consequences.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 37 in his commentary. Interpretation different, viz. "As in the case of perception, there is non-restriction (with regard to actions)". That is, just as the soul, though free with regard to perceptions, sometimes perceives what is good, and sometimes what is bad, so the soul, though free to act, sometimes does what is good, and sometimes what is bad.¹

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 36 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 35 in the commentary of the last. They interpret it as following: (If prakṛti were the agent and not the individual soul, then there would be) non-restriction (of actions) as in the case of perception". That is, just as it has been shown ² that if the soul be all-pervasive no definite perception will be possible, so if prakṛti be the agent, no definite activity will be possible, since prakṛti being all-pervading and common to all, all activities would produce results in the case of all souls, or produce no results in the case of any one.³

SŪTRA 37

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE REVERSAL OF POWER."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If buddhi be the agent, then its instrumental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Hence the individual soul is the agent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. in the text 'Understanding performs a sacrifice' (Tait. 2.5), by the word 'understanding' buddhi alone is to be understood, and it is the agent. Hence there instrumental case has not been used ⁴—(the author) replies:

¹ Ś. B. 2.3.37, p. 625.

² Under Śrī. B. 2.3.32; Śk. B. 2.3.32; G.B. 2.3.30.

³ Śrī. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.36, p. 153, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.35, p. 208, Chap. 2.

⁴ Vide V.P.S. 2.3.35 above.

The individual soul alone is the agent. If buddhi be admitted to be the agent, then "on account of the reversal of power", its instrumental power will cease, and it must come to have the power of an agent. Moreover, if buddhi be the agent, then the power of enjoyment, too, must pertain to it alone. This being so, bondage and release must result on the part of buddhi alone.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 37 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 36 in the commentary of the last. Their interpretation is similar to the last portion of Śrīnivāsa's interpretation, viz. that if buddhi or prakṛti be the agent, the power of enjoyment too must belong to it.¹

SŪTRA 38

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF DEEP CONCENTRATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If the soul be not an agent, then "the absence of deep concentration", due to something which is absolutely different from the non-sentient,² will result; and hence the soul is the agent.

Vedānta-kaustubha

"Deep concentration" means abiding as having Brahman for one's soul, after meditating on one's own form,—distinct from the body, sense-organs, mind and intelligence,—preceded by the stopping of the functions of the mind. As the "absence of such a deep concentration", the means to salvation, will result, if the individual soul be not an agent,—it is known that the individual soul alone is the agent.

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.37, p. 153, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.37, p. 154, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.3.36, pp. 208-9, Chap. 2.

² *Acetana-mātrāt*, i.e. from even the slightest portion of the non-sentient.

SŪTRA 39

“AND LIKE A CARPENTER, IN BOTH WAYS.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The soul acts or does not act according to its own wish, “like a carpenter”, and as such a situation is possible “in both ways”. If buddhi be the agent, then there being the absence of desire and the like on its part, there will be the absence of such a situation.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The soul,—the nature of which is to act or abstain from acting, and which is possessed of the attributes of ‘being an agent’ and so on, lasting so long as it itself does,—though connected with a group of instruments like speech and the like, performs action or does not perform action according to its wish, and thus if the soul be an agent a situation is possible “in both ways”,—just as a carpenter, though provided with instruments like axe and the rest, constructs chariots, etc., according to his wish. But acting or refraining from action is not possible on the part of buddhi, which is an instrument like the axe, by reason of its non-sentience. On account of the eternity of its proximity to a sentient being, as well as on account of the absence, on its part,—of any desire—the cause of action or inaction,—there must be either eternal activity or eternal non-activity, on its part. Hence, it is established that the soul alone is the agent.

Here ends the section entitled “The agent” (10).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

This is sūtra 40 in their commentaries. Interpretation absolutely different. They take it to be forming an adhikaraṇa by itself, concerned with the question whether the individual soul is an agent by nature or as connected with limiting adjuncts, and accept the second alternative. Hence the parallel instance: “i.e. yathā ca takṣā” is interpreted differently by them thus: In ordinary life a carpenter is miserable and so long as he is an agent, i.e. works with his tools,

etc. But when he returns home, lays aside his tools and is no longer an agent, he becomes happy. In the very same manner the soul suffers so long as it is an agent through nescience, but when it returns home, i.e. realizes its real state, frees itself from sense-organs and so on, and ceases to be an agent, it becomes happy.¹

Baladeva

This is sūtra 38 in his commentary. He takes it to be an *adhikaraṇa* by itself. Interpretation different, viz. "And like the carpenter (the soul is active) in two ways". That is, the carpenter is an indirect agent through the medium of its instruments, and also a direct agent in handling those instruments themselves. Similarly, the soul is an indirect agent through its sense-organs, and is also a direct agent in the act of controlling those sense-organs.²

Adhikaraṇa 11: The section entitled "Under the control of the Highest". (Sūtras 40-41)

SŪTRA 40

"BUT (THE AGENTSHIP OF THE SOUL PROCEEDS) FROM THE HIGHEST, BECAUSE THAT IS TAUGHT BY SCRIPTURE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The agentship of that individual soul proceeds "from the Highest" as its cause, in accordance with the scriptural text "Entered within, the ruler of men" (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2³).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the problem is being discussed whether the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest Soul, or independently.

On the doubt, viz. whether the stated agentship of the individual soul is under its own control or under the control of the Highest Soul, if the *prima facie* view be: Under its own control alone. In ordinary

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.40, pp. 628-29; Bh. B. 2.3.40, p. 139.

² G.B. 2.3.38, p. 120, Chap. 2.

³ R., p. 181.

life, a man engages himself to tilling and the like by himself out of desire for crops, but does not wait for the Highest,—

We reply: The agentship of the individual soul proceeds “from the Highest” as its cause. Why? On the ground of the following scriptural texts: ‘For he alone makes one, whom he wishes to raise up from these worlds, do good deeds. He alone makes one, whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds’ (Kauṣ. 3.8), ‘Entered within, the ruler of men’ (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2), ‘Who rules the soul within’ (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30¹) and so on; as well as on the ground of the Smṛti passages, viz.: “And I am situated within the heart of all. From me proceed memory, knowledge and their absence” (Gītā 15.15).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

Literal interpretation same, although as before they are speaking of the soul’s agentship being due to limiting adjuncts. The same remarks apply to their interpretation of the next sūtra.

SŪTRA 41

“BUT (THE LORD MAKES THE SOUL ACT) HAVING REGARD TO THE EFFORTS MADE, ON ACCOUNT OF THE FUTILITY OF WHAT IS ENJOINED AND WHAT IS PROHIBITED AND SO ON.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The term “but” is meant for disposing of the fault of inequality. The Highest Being, who has “regard” for the works done by the individual soul, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, “on account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited”.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. if the Supreme Soul be the instigator, then He must be open to the charge of inequality and rest,—the author, replies:

¹ P. 1074, line 18.

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the above objection. The Supreme Soul, who has "regard" for, i.e. takes into account, the efforts made by the individual soul, i.e. for its good and bad deeds, makes it do good deeds and the rest in another birth too, and gives it pleasure and the like accordingly. Hence, He cannot be charged with partiality, etc.

If it be asked: Why should the Supreme Being take into account the efforts made by the individual soul?—the author replies: "On account of the futility of what is enjoined and what is prohibited". If the Highest Person takes into account the efforts made by the soul, then alone, injunctions and prohibitions, such as, 'One who desires for heaven should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice' (Āp. Ś. S. 10.2.1¹), "A Brāhmaṇa must not be killed" and so on, do not become futile. The meaning of the phrase, "and so on" is that faults like: suffering arising from good deeds, and happiness arising from bad deeds, and so on, result. Since the Supreme Soul takes into account the works done by souls, He cannot, by any means, be charged with inequality, etc., though He is the instigator of what is enjoined and what is prohibited, and is, thereby, the bestower of favour and disfavour. Under the aphorism: "(There are) no inequality and cruelty (on the part of the Lord), because of (His) having regard (for the works of souls)" (Br. Sū. 2.1.33), it has been said that no inequality and the rest pertain to the Highest in His creation of the variegated world—this is the distinction.² Hence, the Highest Person, omnipotent and the Lord of all, is the instigator of good deeds and the rest in accordance with the good and bad deeds performed before, and is the giver of fruits accordingly to them. Thus, it is established that the individual soul is an agent as controlled by the Highest.

Here ends the section entitled "The Highest" (11).

¹ P. 209, vol. 2.

² I.e. there is no repetition here, since under Br. Sū. 2.1.33 it has been shown that the Lord is not partial as a *creator*, whereas it is being shown here that He is not partial as an *instigator* to action.

Adhikaraṇa 12: The section entitled "A part". (Sūtras 42-52)

SŪTRA 42

"(THE INDIVIDUAL IS) A PART (OF BRAHMAN), ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF VARIETY, AND OTHERWISE, ALSO SOME READ (THAT BRAHMAN IS OF) THE NATURE OF FISHERMEN, GAMBLERS AND THE REST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The individual soul is a part of the Supreme Soul, in accordance with the designation of difference in texts like: 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1.9) and so on¹; and on account of the designation of non-difference in texts like: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.). And "also" the Ātharvaṇikas "read" that Brahman is of "the nature of fishermen, gamblers and the rest", thus: "Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".²

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been pointed out that the agentship of the individual soul is under the control of Brahman. Now, the author is pointing out the relation between the two, consistently with the scriptural texts designating both difference and non-difference.

On the doubt, viz. whether the individual soul is different from Brahman or non-different from Him, or a part of Brahman and as such both different and non-different from Him,—if it be suggested: The individual soul must be different from Brahman, as a man is from the king, because the texts designating non-difference are figurative and because a non-difference between the non-knowing and the all-knowing is impossible. Or, it must be non-different only (from Brahman), because the scriptural texts designating difference are figurative. There being a mutual opposition between difference and non-difference, of either the texts about difference or the texts about non-difference must certainly be metaphorical,—

¹ R.

² Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

We reply: The individual soul is neither absolutely different from the Highest Person, nor absolutely non-different from Him, but is a part of the Highest Self, in accordance with the scriptural text: "For he is a part of the Highest". A 'part' means a 'power', in accordance with the scriptural text: "This individual soul, a power of the Highest, is small in power and not independent". A 'part' should not be understood here as a portion, actually severed like a portion of wealth and the rest; for if the individual soul be a portion cut off from Brahman, then texts like 'Without part' (Śvet. 6.19) and the like, will be contradicted; and because if it be like a portion of wealth, there will result an absolute difference (between Brahman and the soul) and hence the texts like: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.) will be set aside. (The true view is:) The individual soul is, by nature, different from the Supreme Person, predicated to be the whole, and the ocean of a mass of attributes like omniscience and the rest,—since it is predicated to be a part, and is subject to bondage and release. But it is yet non-different from Him, as its existence and activity are under the control of the whole. Why? "On account of the designation of variety", i.e. on account of the designation of difference; "and otherwise", i.e. and on account of the designation of non-difference. The sense is that the two kinds of texts being of equal force, there is a natural difference—non-difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Soul. The following are designations of difference: 'Who rules the soul within' (Śat. Br. 14.6.7, 30¹), 'Entered within, the ruler of men' (Tait. Ār. 3.11.1, 2²), 'The soul, verily, is supreme, self-dependent, possessed of superior qualities', 'The individual soul is possessed of little power, not self-dependent, lowly', 'The two unborn ones, the knower and the non-knower, the lord and the non-lord' (Śvet. 1.9) and so on. The following are designations of non-difference: 'Thou art that' (Chānd. 6.8.6, etc.), 'This soul is Brahman' (Brh. 2.5.19; 4.4.5), 'I am Brahman' (Brh. 1.4.10) and so on. And "also" the followers of one branch, viz. the Ātharvanikas, "read" that Brahman is of the "nature of fishermen, gamblers and the like" thus: "Brahman are these fishermen, Brahman are the slaves, Brahman are these gamblers".

¹ P. 1074, line 18.

² P. 181.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

Literal interpretation same, although as usual Śaṃkara holds that the soul is not a *real* part of Brahman, but a part *as it were*.¹ The same remarks apply to the following two sūtras.

SŪTRA 43

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE WORDING OF A SACRED TEXT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the wording of the sacred text,” viz. ‘A foot of him are all beings’ (Ṛg. V. 10.90.3²; Chānd. 3.12.6), the individual soul is a part of Brahman.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The individual soul is nothing but a part of the Supreme Soul. Why? Also “on account of the wording of the sacred text”: ‘A foot of him are all beings, three feet of him are immortal in the heaven’ (Ṛg. V. 10.90.3; Chānd. 3.12.6). A ‘feet’ means a ‘part’.

SŪTRA 44

“AND, MOREOVER, (IT IS) DECLARED BY SMṚTI.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It is declared by Smṛti also that the individual soul is a part of Brahman thus: “A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal” (Gitā 15.7³).

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.43, p. 636.

² P. 349, line 19.

Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

Vedānta-kaustubha

It has been declared in a Smṛti passage by the Highest Person Himself that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, thus: “A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal” (Gitā 15.7).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

He omits the “ca”.¹

SŪTRA 45

“BUT LIKE LIGHT AND THE REST, NOT SO THE HIGHEST.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Though the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Person, yet the whole (i.e. the Lord) does not experience pleasure and pain, just as “light and the rest” are devoid of the virtue or vice inhering in their parts.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. then the virtue or vice pertaining to the individual soul may belong to the Supreme Soul too, seeing that a part has no separate existence from the whole,—the author replies here:

“The Highest,” i.e. the Supreme Soul, does “not” become “so”, i.e. does not come to share the virtue and vice pertaining to the individual soul. The author states a parallel instance: “Like light and the rest”, i.e. just as “light”, i.e. the sun and the rest, are not touched by the attributes of their rays which are their parts, i.e. by their contact and the rest with pure and impure objects. By the phrase: “and the rest”, the ether and the like are understood; i.e. just as the ether and the like are not touched by the good qualities found in the sound of conch-shell, cuckoos and so on, nor by the bad qualities found in the sound of crows and the like. The term “but” is suggestive of the absence of an intermixture of the attributes of the part and the whole. The objections, resulting from the apprehension

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.44, p. 161, Part 2.

that the Highest Being is subject to karmas by reason of His connection with the hearts of individual souls which are subject to karmas, have been disposed of, on the ground that the Lord is not subject to karmas, under the aphorism: "Enjoyment results" (Br. Sū. 1.2.8). Under the aphorism: "Not even on account of place" (Br. Sū. 3.2.1), we shall dispose of (the objection based on Brahman's being connected with 'places', viz. the hearts) on the ground that the Lord, having the 'places' by nature, is yet not subject to karmas. Here, on the other hand, it should be known that the objections raised on the ground of His own parts are disposed of.¹

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. The general import of the sūtra, as well as the interpretation of the phrase: i.e. "prakāśādivat" different. He develops his doctrine of upādhi here. Thus, the sūtra means, according to him: Just as the light of the sun and the moon, pervading the entire expanse of the ether, appears to be straight or bent accordingly as the limiting adjunct with which it is in contact, viz. finger, etc. are straight or bent, but does not become so really; or just as the ether, though imagined to move when jars are moving, does not really move; or just as the sun does not really tremble when its images on water tremble, so although the individual soul undergoes pleasure and pain, Brahman does not, since the soul is but a fictitious part of Brahman, due to limiting adjuncts, and not a real part.²

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They too develop here their peculiar theory of Viśiṣṭādvaita. Thus, the sūtra means, according to them: "(The individual soul is a part of Brahman) as light and the rest (of the sun, etc. is of the sun and so on), not so the highest (i.e. Brahman is not of the same nature

¹ I.e. there is no repetition here. Under Br. Sū. 1.2.8, it has been shown that Brahman, though connected with the *hearts* of individual souls is not subject to their pleasures and pain. In this sūtra it is shown that Brahman, though connected with the individual souls as their *whole*, is not yet subject to their pleasure and pain. And under Br. Sū. 3.2.1, it will be shown that Brahman, though the *inner controller*, is not subject to the states and faults of souls.

² Ś.B. 2.3.46, pp. 638-639.

as the soul)". That is, the soul is a part of Brahman in the sense of being an attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*) of Brahman; and just as the attribute and its substratum are not identical, so the soul and Brahman are not.¹ They continue the same topic in the following two sūtras.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 44 in his commentary. Interpretation absolutely different. He begins a new *adhikaraṇa* here (five sūtras) concerned with the question of the Lord's incarnations. Thus, this sūtra means, according to him: "But supreme (incarnations of the Lord are) not so; (i.e. parts of the Lord as the individual souls are), as in the case of light". That is, just as though the sun and the fire-fly are both called 'light', yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the sun, so though the incarnations and ordinary individual souls are both called 'parts' of the Lord, yet the word has a different meaning when applied to the incarnations, i.e. it means then the entire Lord.²

SŪTRA 46

"AND SMṚTIS DECLARE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"And Smṛtis declare": 'Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water.³ The active self, on the other hand, is something different, who is subject to bondage and release' (Mahā. 12.13754-13755⁴).

Vedānta-kaustubha

The sages also declare that the part alone is subject to the fruits of action done by itself, but not the whole, thus: 'Of these, He who is the Supreme Soul is declared to be eternal and free from the properties of matter, and He is not touched by the fruits too, just as a lotus-leaf is not touched by water.—The active self, on the other hand,

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.45, pp. 161-62, Parts 7 and 8.

² G.B. 2.3.44, pp. 223-24, Chap. 2.

³ One line omitted.

⁴ P. 852, lines 9-10, vol. 3.

is something different, who is subject to bondage and release. He is subject to seventeen rāsis (Mahā. 12.13754-56a). It has been declared by Scripture, too, thus 'Of the two, one eats the sweet berry, the other, without eating looks on' (Śvet. 4.6; Muṇḍ. 3.1.1).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They quote from Smṛti to show that the soul is the attribute of the Lord.¹

Baladeva

He quotes from Smṛti to show that the incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense the individual souls are.²

SŪTRA 47

"INJUNCTION AND PROHIBITION (FIT IN) ON ACCOUNT OF (THE SOULS') CONNECTION WITH BODIES, AS IN THE CASE OF FIRE AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"Injunction and prohibition" like 'One who is desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Saṃ. 2.5.5³), 'A Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice' (Tait. Saṃ. 7.1.1⁴) and so on do indeed fit in, on account of the connection of the individual souls with different bodies, in spite of their being an equality among them as parts of Brahman; just as fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya,⁵ but not from the crematory; or just as water and the like, touched by clean persons, pots and so on are accepted and not others.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If the individual souls be all equal as parts and the rest of Brahman, then to whom can the injunctions and prohibitions refer? Listen! In spite of their sameness, injunctions and prohibitions like: 'One

¹ Śrī. B. 2.3.46, p. 162, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.3.46, p. 160, Parts 7 and 8.

² G.B. 2.3.45.

³ P. 208, line 27, vol. 2. Not quoted by others.

⁴ P. 241, line 21, vol. 2. Not quoted by others.

⁵ A *Brāhmaṇa* versed in the *Veda*.

desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices' (Tait. Sam. 2.5.5), 'Hence a Śūdra is not to be initiated to a sacrifice' (Tait. Sam. 7.1.1) fit in on account of their connection with different bodies, "as in the case of fire and so on", i.e. just as in spite of being the same, fire is brought from the house of a Śrotriya, but one from crematory and the like is rejected; and just as the urine and excrement of cows and the like are enjoined as holy, but those very things of different animals are rejected.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara and Bhāskara

He develops in this connection his doctrine of Adhyāsa.¹ Bhāskara too speaks of his peculiar doctrine of Upādhi.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 46 in his commentary. He continues the same theme,—viz. the distinction between incarnations and ordinary individuals. He interprets the sūtra thus: (In the case of individual souls there are) injunctions and prohibitions, on account of (their) connection with bodies, as in the case of light (i.e. the eye).² That is, the individual soul, though a part of the Lord, is yet connected with nescience and a body, and is as such under the control of the Lord for its activity and inactivity and so on. But an incarnation, though a part of the Lord, is not under His control; just as the eye or the power of vision, though a part of the sun, depends upon the permission, i.e. the presence, of the sun for its activity or otherwise, but a ray of the sun, as a part of the sun, is identical with it, and does not depend upon any permission and the like of the sun.

SŪTRA 48

"AND ON ACCOUNT OF NON-EXTENSION THERE IS NO EXTENSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In spite of the fact that the individual souls are parts of the all-pervasive Being, and in spite of the fact that they themselves are

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.48, pp. 640 ff.; Bh. B. 2.3.48, p. 142.

² G.B. 2.3.46, pp. 226-27, Chap. 2.

all-pervasive by reason of their (all-pervasive) attribute (of knowledge),¹ the individual souls, being atomic by nature, are not all-pervasive; and as such there is no confusion among karmas.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. On your view, too, on account of being parts of the all-pervasive Being, as well as on account of possessing an all-pervasive attribute, all the souls come to experience the pleasures and the like in all the bodies; and as such a confusion among karmas, as well as a confusion among the enjoyments of their fruits will result. Hence, as the view that the soul is a part of the all-pervading Brahman, is atomic by itself and is all-pervasive by reason of its attribute, involves unnecessary complications, so Kapila's doctrine of the soul, viz. that the soul is all-pervasive by itself, is more acceptable,—the author replies here:

“On account of the non-extension,” i.e. non-all-pervasiveness of the souls,—mutually distinct by reason of being atomic, and distinct also from the Whole (i.e. the Lord) by being predicated as parts,—“there is no confusion”. The term “and” indicates the contraction of the soul's knowledge during its state of bondage.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 47 in his commentary. The same topic continued: “And on account of the non-extension (i.e. incompleteness of the individual soul, there is) no (possibility of) a confusion (between it and an incarnation)”. That is, the soul is atomic and not full and perfect like an incarnation, hence different from him.²

SŪTRA 49

“AND (THE DOCTRINES OF THE ALL-PERVASIVENESS OF THE SOUL) ARE FALLACIES MERELY.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

And the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of the opponents like Kapila and others are “fallacious merely”, since,

¹ Vide V.P.S. 2.3.28.

² G.B. 2.3.47, p. 227, Chap. 2.

on those views, there results a confusion (among karmas and so on of the souls).

Vedānta-kaustubha

But the doctrines of an all-pervasive soul and the rest of Kāpila, Kaṇāda and so on are “fallacious merely”, as they have no (scriptural) basis, and as, on these views, there a confusion among all practical transactions will result. By the term “and” it is indicated that such teachers simply delude people.

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He reads “ābhāsaḥ” in place of “ābhāsāḥ”. Interpretation absolutely different, viz. “(The individual soul is) only a reflection (of Brahman)”. Thus, here he develops his doctrine of Pratibimba.¹

Rāmānuja

He reads “ābhāsaḥ”, and interprets the sūtra thus: “(The view that Brahman is obscured by limiting adjunct or nescience) is simply a fallacy”. He accepts the alternative reading “ābhāsāḥ” too and points out that in that case the sūtra will mean: “(The various reasons advanced by the supporters of the above doctrine) are simply fallacies”.²

Bhāskara

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He substitutes “vā” in place of “ca”. He, also, like Rāmānuja, directs this sūtra against the Śaṅkarite view, thus: “(Nesciences are) simply fallacies”.³

Śrīkaṇṭha

He too directs this sūtra against the Śaṅkarite view, interpreting it like Rāmānuja’s second interpretation.⁴

Baladeva

This is sūtra 48 in his commentary. He reads “ābhāsaḥ”. The same topic continued, viz. “(The reason adduced by the *prima facie*

¹ Ś.B. 2.3.50, pp. 642.

³ Bh. B. 2.3.50, p. 142.

² Śrī. B. 2.3.49, p. 163, Part 2.

⁴ Śk. B. 2.3.49, p. 161, Parts 7 and 8.

objector to prove the similarity of the soul with the incarnation) is a mere fallacy". That is, the argument:

The soul is a part of the Lord.

The incarnation is a part of the Lord.

∴ the soul is equal to the incarnation,

evidently involves the logical fallacy of undistributed middle.¹

SŪTRA 50

"BECAUSE OF THE NON-RESTRICTION WITH REGARD TO THE
UNSEEN PRINCIPLE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, confusion is unavoidable even if recourse be taken to the unseen principle, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle".

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the argument, viz. there is no confusion among all practical transactions on our view too, since the unseen principle is the regulator, —the author replies:

Confusion results indeed on the view of the opponents, "because of the non-restriction with regard to the unseen principle", viz. to whom may the unforeseen principle, generated in the vicinity of all the all-pervasive souls, belong and to whom not.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation same, only they direct this and the remaining sūtras to the refutation of the Śaṅkarite view, and not to the view of Kapila and others.

Baladeva

This is sūtra 50 in his commentary. He begins a new adhikaraṇa here (three sūtras), concerned with proving the mutual difference among the individual souls. Thus, this sūtra means, according to

¹ G.B. 2.3.48, p. 228, Chap. 2.

him: “(The individual souls, though similar in their essential nature, are yet different from one another) on account of the non-determinateness (i.e. non-similarity) of (their) destinies”.¹

SŪTRA 51

“AND IT IS SO EVEN WITH REGARD TO DETERMINATION AND THE LIKE.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is no restriction “even with regard to determinations and the like”, such as: ‘I shall do this and not that’.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the argument, viz. A restriction is possible, viz. the unseen principle belongs to one who has the determination: ‘I shall do this and not that’,—the author replies here:

“Determination” means resolution. By the phrase “and the like” reverence and so on are understood. There is, indeed, no restriction with regard to the unseen principle even in the case of resolution, reverence and the rest.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. He continues the same theme, viz. “And thus (the individual souls are different) with regard to (their) desire and the rest also”. That is, adṛṣṭa or the unseen principle is the ultimate cause which determines the difference between the souls, and not their desires, inclinations and the like, which are only the secondary causes.²

¹ G.B. 2.3.49, p. 229, Chap. 2.

² G.B. 2.3.50, p. 230, Chap. 2.

SŪTRA 52

"IF IT BE OBJECTED: ON ACCOUNT OF PLACE, (WE REPLY:) NO,
ON ACCOUNT OF INCLUSION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be argued that "on account of the place" of the self, situated within its own body, everything is consistent,—(we reply:) "no". "On account of the inclusion" therein of the places of all the souls.

Here ends the third quarter in the second chapter of the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, an interpretation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts, and composed by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: A definite restriction is possible with regard to determinations and the rest, "on account of place", i.e. it is in the region of the soul, situated within its own body alone, that the conjunction of the mind (with the soul) takes place,—on account of such a place of the soul,—(we reply:) "no", "on account of the inclusion" therein of the places of other souls too. The sense is this: Since all the souls are connected with one and the same mind, the determinations and the rest, due to the conjunction of the mind (with the soul), must be common to all; and hence the unseen principle, due to them, must indeed be common to all. This being so, the confusion among all practical transactions remains as before. Hence, it is established that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva, is atomic in size, knowledge by nature, possessed of the attributes of 'being an agent', 'being a knower' and so on and different in every body.

Here ends the section entitled "A part" (12).

Here ends the third quarter of the second chapter in the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā and composed by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

This is sūtra 51 in his commentary. The same topic continued: "If it be objected (that the difference among the individual souls is) due to the difference of (their) environments, (we reply:) no, because (the difference of environments, such as heaven, hell, and different lots in the world) are included under (i.e. due to) *adṛṣṭa*". That is, finally, *adṛṣṭa* or the unseen principle is the cause of the difference among the souls.¹

Résumé

The third quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 52 sūtras and 12 *adhikaraṇas*, according to Nimbārka;
2. 53 sūtras and 17 *adhikaraṇas*, according to Śaṅkara;
3. 52 sūtras and 7 *adhikaraṇas*, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 53 sūtras and 17 *adhikaraṇas*, according to Bhāskara;
5. 52 sūtras and 12 *adhikaraṇas*, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 51 sūtras and 11 *adhikaraṇas*, according to Baladeva.

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara break each of the sūtras 3 and 26 in Nimbārka's commentary into two different ones, and omit sūtra 11.

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha break sūtra 5 in Nimbārka's commentary into two different sūtras, and take sūtras 33 and 34 in it as one sūtra, reversing the order.

Baladeva omits sūtra 11 in Nimbārka's commentary.

¹ G.B. 2.3.51, p. 230, Chap. 2.

SECOND CHAPTER (Adhyāya)

FOURTH QUARTER (Pāda)

Adhikaraṇa 1: The section entitled "The origin of the sense-organs". (Sūtras 1-4)

SŪTRA 1

"LIKEWISE THE SENSE-ORGANS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The origin of the organs is being considered. The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

In the preceding quarter, the absence of any contradiction among the scriptural texts regarding the ether and the rest has been shown. Now, the author is showing the non-contradictory nature of the scriptural texts regarding the organs of the individual soul.

On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs originate or not, the *prima facie* view is as follows: In the discussions about origin, e.g. in the scriptural text: 'From this soul the ether has originated' (Tait. 2.1), there is no mention of the origin of the sense-organs; and in the scriptural text: "The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning". Then they said: "What was that non-existent"? "The sages, verily, were the non-existent in the beginning." Then they said: "Who were those sages". "The sense-organs, verily, were the sages" (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1¹), the sense-organs are declared to exist prior to creation; hence they do not originate.

With regard to it, we reply: Just as the elements like the ether and the rest, mentioned in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air, fire' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), originate, "so the sense-organs", too, originate.

¹ P. 499, lines 1-2.

COMPARISON

Śrīkaṇṭha

Interpretation different, viz. he takes it to be setting down the *prima facie* view thus: ‘(Just as the individual soul is eternal) so are the sense-organs ¹ (as declared by Scripture ²)’.

SŪTRA 2

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A SECONDARY (ORIGIN).”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

It cannot be said also that in the section concerned with creation, e.g. in the passage: “From the self the ether has originated” (Tait. 2.1), there being no mention of the origin of the organs, the text regarding the origin of the organs is secondary,—“on account of the impossibility of a secondary” (origin). That is, the sense-organs must have origin, as the majority of scriptural texts designate such an origin, and as, otherwise, the initial proposition that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one will come to be contradicted.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having rejected the doubt,—viz. by reason of its opposition to the scriptural text: “The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning” (Tait. 2.7), the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs is secondary,—the author states the reason for the view that the sense-organs, too, originate.

The compound “gaṇyāsambhava” is to be explained as ‘impossibility of a secondary (origin)’, i.e. the scriptural text about the origin of the sense-organs cannot be secondary. Hence the sense-organs do originate. If it be asked: Why impossible?—(we reply:) Because the scriptural text about origin can be understood literally, because there are numerous scriptural texts regarding such an origin, and because otherwise the initial proposition will come to be contradicted, i.e. because there are numerous scriptural texts designating origination, such as: ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the

¹ Śk. B. 2.4.1, p. 168.

² I.e. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1—quoted by Śrīnivāsa.

mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), 'Just as small sparks come forth from fire, so exactly do all the sense-organs from this soul' (Brh. 2.1.20), 'Seven sense-organs arise' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.7). Having made the initial assertion, viz. that there is the knowledge of one through the knowledge of all thus: "What being known, sir, all this comes to be known?" (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the text goes on to declare, in order to prove it, that 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3) and so on. This initial proposition is proved only if all the effects, like the sense-organs and the rest, are admitted to have Him as their material cause. The scriptural text: 'The non-existent alone was this in the beginning' (Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1), on the other hand, is to be explained as referring to the cause. Hence there is no contradiction.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

He takes this and the next sūtra as one sūtra. Interpretation different, viz. "(The plural number in the text¹) is secondary, because of impossibility", i.e. because prior to creation Brahman alone exists.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

He regards this sūtra as answering the *prima facie* objection. He too like Rāmānuja takes this and the next sūtra as forming a single sūtra, and interprets it just like Rāmānuja.

Baladeva

Interpretation just like Rāmānuja's.

¹ Viz. Śat. Br. 6.1.1, 1. See *Śrīnivāsa* above. It has been stated under the previous sūtra that the words 'sense-organs' and 'sages' in that passage denote *Brahman*. But how then to account for the plural number?—to this question the present sūtra replies.

² Śrī. B. 2.4.2, p. 170, Part 2.

SŪTRA 3

“AND ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIRECT MENTION (IN) THAT OF WHAT IS PRIOR.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the direct mention,” in that text, of the verb,—used in its primary sense in connection with the ether and the rest,—in reference to the sense-organs as well, the origin of the sense-organs is primary.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the origin of the sense-organs is primary,—so says the author.

“On account of the direct mention,” in “that”, i.e. in the text: ‘From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air’ (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), of the word ‘arises’,—used in its primary sense with reference to the ether and so on,—with reference to the sense-organs, mentioned even prior to the ether and the rest,—the scriptural text designating the origin of the sense-organs is, indeed, primary. It is not possible that one and the same word ‘arises’ is used in a secondary sense with reference to the sense-organs, and in a primary sense with reference to the ether and the rest. For this reason too, it is used in a primary sense alone in both the cases.

COMPARISON

Baladeva

Interpretation exactly like Rāmānuja’s second half of the preceding sūtra.¹

SŪTRA 4

“ON ACCOUNT OF SPEECH BEING PRECEDED BY THAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The sense-organs originate like the ether and the rest because of the mention of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food in the passage: “The mind, my dear, is

¹ G.B. 2.4.3, p. 234. Chap. 2.

composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is composed of light” (Chānd. 6.5.4¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the allegation, viz. that in the section treating of creation, the origin of the sense-organs is not mentioned,—the author replies here:

On account of the mention in the Chāndogya of speech, the vital-breath and the mind as preceded by light, water and food respectively, having Brahman for their material cause, thus: “The mind, my dear, is composed of food, the vital-breath is composed of water, speech is composed of light” (Chānd. 6.5.4), there is origin (of the sense-organs). Hence it is established that the sense-organs do originate on the ground of the following reasons, viz. there is the mention of the origin (of the sense-organs) in the section treating of origin too, there are also numerous texts designating the origin of the sense-organs, and, finally, the initial assertion too that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one is established only on this view.

Here ends the section entitled “The origin of the sense-organs” (2).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja

This is sūtra 3 in his commentary. Interpretation different. He continues the same topic, viz. that the word ‘prāṇa’ in the above passage does not stand for the sense-organs, but for Brahman. Hence the sūtra: “Because of speech (i.e. names of objects) being preceded by that (viz. the existence of those objects)”. That is, names of objects pre-suppose the existence of objects. But prior to creation there were no objects, and hence no speech or organs of speech and so on.²

Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 3 in his commentary too. Interpretation similar to Rāmānuja’s, viz. “Because of speech (i.e. names and forms) being preceded by that (i.e. by the creation by the Lord).³

¹ Ś. B.

² Śrī. B. 2.4.3, pp. 170-71, Chap. 2.

³ Śk. B. 2.4.3, p. 167, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

He also continues the same topic thus: "Because of speech (i.e. Brahman) being prior to that (viz. pradhāna and rest) ".¹

Adhikaraṇa 2: The section entitled "The going of the seven". (Sūtras 5-6)

PRIMA FACIE VIEW (Sūtra 5)

SŪTRA 5

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE GOING OF THE SEVEN, AND ON ACCOUNT OF BEING SPECIFIED."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

On the doubt, viz. whether they are seven or eleven, the *prima facie* view is as follows: Because of the going (of the sense-organs), mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out all the sense-organs go out' (Brh. 4.4.2²), and because of their being specified as seven only in that very passage: 'He does not see,—does not smell,—does not taste,—does not speak,—does not hear,—does not think,—does not touch' (Brh. 4.4.2³), the sense-organs are seven only.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, desirous of determining the number of the sense-organs, the author is stating the *prima facie* view with a view to removing the contradictions among the texts about it.

On the doubt, viz. whether these sense-organs are seven or eleven, (the *prima facie* objector replies:) "Because of the going of seven", mentioned in the passage: 'The vital-breath going out, all the sense-organs go out' (Brh. 4.4.2), they are seven only. How is it known that seven alone go out? "Because of (their) being specified," i.e. because in the passage: "When the person in the sun moves about back, then he becomes non-knowing of forms, he becomes one,

¹ G.B. 2.4.4, p. 235, Chap. 2.

² B.

³ Not quoted by others. The phrase: "*ivi āhuḥ ekī-bhavati*" is to be supplied in each dotted portion.

he does not see, does not smell, does not taste, does not speak, does not hear, does not think, does not touch' (Bṛh. 4.4.1-2), only seven, like the eye, etc., are specified.

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara

According to him "gateḥ" = avagateḥ, i.e. because of understanding.¹

CORRECT CONCLUSION (Sūtra 6)

SŪTRA 6

"BUT (THERE ARE) HANDS AND THE REST, (THESE ADDITIONAL SENSE-ORGANS) BEING ESTABLISHED, THEREFORE (THAT) IS NOT SO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The correct conclusion is as follows: It being definitely ascertained from the passage: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense' (Bṛh. 3.2.8²) and so on, that there are more than seven, it is not to be thought there are only seven sense-organs. In accordance with the scriptural passage: 'There are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.9.4³), there are eleven sense-organs.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author states the right conclusion.

The term "but" intimates the blindness of the *prima facie* opponent. In the scriptural text: 'The hand, verily, is an organ of sense. It is seized by action as an over-sense-organ, for by the hands one performs action' (Bṛh. 3.2.8), "the hands and the rest", over and above the seven, are mentioned. "Therefore" the hands and the rest, over and above the seven, "being established", and in the passage: 'All the sense-organs go out' (Bṛh. 4.4.2) the going out of all the sense-organs being not specified, it cannot be thought that there are only seven of them. But the fact is that there are eleven sense-organs in accordance with the scriptural and Smṛti texts: 'There

¹ Ś.B. 2.4.5, p. 653.

² Ś, Bh, B.

³ *Op. cit.*

are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Brh. 3.2.8), 'The sense-organs are ten and one' (Gītā 15.5). Among these, five are organs of knowledge, viz. ear, skin, eye, tongue and nose. They have five objects, viz. sound and the rest. Five are organs of action, viz. speech, hands, feet, organ of elimination and organ of generation. They have five objects like word and the rest. The internal organ is the mind, the cause of resolution and the rest. In this way it is established that there are altogether eleven sense-organs.

Here ends the section entitled "The going of the seven" (2).

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

This is sūtra 5 in the commentaries of the first two, but sūtra 6 in the commentary of the last. Interpretation of the word "sthite" different, viz. "because of abiding (in the body and assisting the soul).¹

Adhikaraṇa 3: The section entitled "The atomicity of the sense-organs". (Sūtra 7)

SŪTRA 7

"AND ATOMIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text regarding going out, viz.: 'All the sense-organs go out' (Brh. 4.4.2²), the sense-organs are "atomic".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author is showing the size of the sense-organs.

On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs are atomic or all-pervading, the Sāṃkhyas maintain that they are all-pervasive, being effects of the unlimited ahaṃkāra. In accordance with the scriptural

¹ Śrī. B. 2.4.5, p. 173, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.4.5, p. 169, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.4.6.

² R, Śk, B.

text also: 'These are equal and infinite' (Brh. 1.5.13), they are certainly all-pervading, this is the *prima facie* view.

The correct conclusion is that in conformity with the scriptural text about their going out, viz.: 'The vital-breath going out, all the sense-organs go out' (Brh. 4.4.2), they are atomic. There is no fixed rule that unlimited effects arise from what is unlimited, it being found that a small flower arises from a huge tree and so on. The above-quoted scriptural text, on the other hand, simply lays down that the sense-organs are innumerable, or serves the purpose of meditation, mentioned in the scriptural text: 'Now who, verily, meditates on these, the infinite' (Brh. 1.5.13). Hence it is established that the sense-organs are atomic.

Here ends the section entitled "The atomicity of the
sense-organs" (3).

Adhikaraṇa 4: The section entitled "The origin of the chief vital-breath". (Sūtra 8)

SŪTRA 8

"AND THE BEST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"The best," i.e. the chief vital-breath, mentioned in the scriptural text: 'The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best' (Chānd. 5.1.1¹), originates like the great elements. Why? In conformity with the same scriptural text, viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, incidentally, the origin of the chief vital-breath is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the chief vital-breath, the cause of the subsistence of body and mentioned in the scriptural text, viz.: 'The vital-breath, verily, is the oldest and the best' (Chānd. 5.1.1), originates like the great elements,—if it be suggested: It does not originate. Why? Because in the text: 'There was neither death, nor the immortal, nor then a sign of night or day. That one breathed

without wind by its self-power. There was, verily, nothing whatsoever other than it, or higher' (Ṛg. V. 10.129.2¹), by the words 'was breathing', meaning 'He existed breathing', the motion of the vital-breath at the time of the universal dissolution is designated.

We reply: "The chief too", i.e. the chief vital-breath, too, originates like the elements and the rest, since in the scriptural text: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), like the origin of the great elements and the rest, the origin of the chief vital-breath, too, is mentioned; and since it is known that prior to creation there was unity alone and no diversity.

The meaning of the text: 'There was neither death' (Ṛg. V. 10.129.2), on the other hand, is as follows: 'Then', i.e. at the time of the universal dissolution, 'there was no death', the killer. There was 'no immortal with self-power', i.e. there was no food of the gods (amṛta) together with the food of fathers (svadhā). There was neither the moon, the sign of the night, nor the sun, the sign of the day. 'That one,' i.e. Brahman alone, the seed of the universe, 'breathed', i.e. existed. Of what nature was He? 'Breathless,' i.e. without effects like the air and the rest, viz. in His causal state. There was nothing other than Him, i.e. Brahman.

Hence it is established that like the ether and the rest, the chief vital-breath too originates from Brahman.

Here ends the section entitled "The origin of the chief vital-breath" (4).

Adhikaraṇa 5: The section entitled "The air and function". (Sūtras 9-12)

SŪTRA 9

"(THE VITAL-BREATH IS) NOT AIR AND FUNCTION, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SEPARATE TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The vital-breath is "not" mere "air", nor a sense-organ, nor a "function" (of the sense-organs). But we hold that the vital-breath

¹ P. 387, lines 21-23.

is nothing but air that has assumed a different condition, "on account of the separate teaching", viz. 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the author is stating the nature of the chief vital-breath.

On the doubt, viz. whether the vital-breath, the oldest, is the air, one of the great elements, or the general function of the sense-organs, or nothing but the great element air that has assumed a different condition, if it be suggested: In accordance with the statement, viz.: "What is the vital-breath that is the air. This air is five-fold, prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna",¹ it is nothing but the air. Or else, the vital-breath is the common function of the sense-organs as held by the Sāṃkhya² and is of five kinds,—

We reply: The vital-breath is "not the air" simply, nor a general mode consisting in the function of the sense-organs. Why? "On account of the separate teaching," i.e. because in the text: 'From him arise the vital breath, the mind and all the sense-organs, the ether, the air' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), the vital-breath is taught as something different from the second great element air and from the sense-organs. If the vital-breath be mere air, then this separate designation would be set aside. And, if it be a mere mode of the sense-organs, then, too, its separate designation from the possessors of the mode (viz. the sense-organs) would be futile, as what arises separately being itself an object, cannot be the function of other objects like the sense-organs. The vital-breath, thus, is nothing but the great element air that has assumed a different condition, this being the only alternative left. Hereby, any conflict with the text 'What is the vital-breath that is the air', too, is avoided.

¹ For the nature and function of these five modes, see V.R.M.

² Vide Sāṃ. Sū. 2.31.

SŪTRA 10

"BUT LIKE THE EYES AND THE REST, (THE VITAL-BREATH IS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE SOUL), BECAUSE OF BEING AN OBJECT TO BE TAUGHT TOGETHER WITH THEM AND SO ON."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Though the best, the vital-breath is but a special instrument of the individual soul, "like the eyes and the rest". Why? "On account of being an object to be taught and so on," i.e. on account of the teaching of the vital-breath together with the eyes and the rest in the dialogue among the sense-organs and so on.

The author shows that the vital-breath, being under the control of the individual soul, is serviceable to the soul like the eyes and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The meaning of the term "but" is that in spite of its superiority to the sense-organs, no independence is possible on the part of the vital-breath, as is possible on the part of the individual soul. The vital-breath is "like the eyes and the rest". That is, just as the eyes and the rest are instruments of the individual soul, so the vital-breath is a special instrument of the individual soul. To the question: Whence is it known that it is an instrument of the soul?—We reply: "Because of being an object to be taught together with them", i.e. because of the teaching of the vital-breath together with them, i.e. together with the eyes and the rest, in the dialogue among the sense-organs. By the phrase: "and so on", reasons like non-sentience, incapability of self-dependence and the rest are implied.

SŪTRA 11

"AND (THERE IS) NO FAULT ON THE GROUND OF (ITS) NOT BEING A SENSE-ORGAN, FOR THUS (SCRIPTURE) SHOWS."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

If it be objected: If the vital-breath be an instrument of the individual soul, then there being no activity suitable to it, there must be fault "on the ground of (its) not being a sense-organ",—

(We reply:) “no”, since the scriptural text: “I alone, dividing myself five-fold, support and hold the body” (Prašna 2.3¹), “shows” that the holding up of the body is the peculiar function of the vital-breath.

Vedānta-kaustubha

If it be objected: Just as one can be a perceiver only if there be some object to be perceived, so a thing may be an instrument only if there be some function to be accomplished by it; and this is not found. Hence the vital-breath cannot be a sense-organ. Thus, as the vital-breath is not a sense-organ, so if it be an instrument of the individual soul, it is but a futile one,—

We reply: “No”. There is no such fault. “For,” i.e. since, in order that the vital-breath may be serviceable as an instrument of the individual soul, the holy Scripture “shows”, under the dialogue among the sense-organs, that a purpose is served by the vital-breath as well—one that cannot be served by the sense-organs,—viz. the holding up of the body and the sense-organs: ‘The chief vital-breath said to them: “Do not fall in delusion. It is I alone who, dividing myself five-fold, support and hold the body”’ (Prašna 2.3).

COMPARISON

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara

According to them the word “akaraṇatvāt” answers the *prima facie*, viz. that if the vital-breath be an organ of the soul, then there must be a sense-object for it, like colour for the eyes and so on. The answer is that there need be no sense-object, since the vital-breath is not an organ like the eyes and the rest. Still it is not devoid of a function, the holding of the body being its special function.²

Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha and Baladeva

According to them, the word “akaraṇatvāt” means: “On account of not having a function”. That is, no objection can be raised on

¹ Ś.

² Ś.B. 2.4.11, pp. 662-63; Bh. B. 2.4.11, p. 148.

the ground that the vital-breath has no special activity, for it does have a special function.¹

SŪTRA 12

“(THE VITAL-BREATH) HAVING FIVE MODES IS DESIGNATED LIKE THE MIND.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

Just as the mind having many modes serves the individual soul through its own modes like desire and the rest, so the vital-breath, too, “having five modes, is designated” as serving the soul through its modes like apāna and the rest.

Vedānta-kaustubha

The author points out that the same vital-breath is designated as manifold through the difference of modes, but these latter are not separate entities. The vital-breath does not serve the soul by only holding up the body, but by other functions too.

Just as in conformity with the text: ‘Desire, resolution, doubt, faith,—², firmness, lack of firmness, bashfulness, meditation, fear,—all these are the mind alone’ (Brh. 1.5.3), the mind alone, possessed of desire and the rest as its modes, serves the individual soul through its own modes, but desire, resolution and the rest are not special kinds of entities, so by the text: ‘The prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna—all these are the vital-breath’ (Brh. 1.5.3), the vital-breath alone “is designated as having five modes”. The apāna and the rest are the modes of the vital-breath itself, but not separate entities, and it serves the soul through its own modes,—this is the sense. This being so, it is established that the vital-breath is the air itself that has assumed a different condition, an instrument of the individual soul, possessed of many modes and is the best.

Here ends the section entitled “The air and function” (5).

¹ Śrī. B. 2.4.10, p. 177, Part 2, Madras ed.; Śk. B. 2.4.10, p. 174, Parts 7 and 8; G.B. 2.4.11.

² “Lack of faith.”

Adhikaraṇa 6: The section entitled "The atomicity of the best". (Sūtra 13)

SŪTRA 13

"AND ATOMIC."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

In accordance with the scriptural text designating departure, the vital-breath, too, is "atomic".

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now the size of the chief vital-breath is being considered.

On the doubt, viz. whether the chief vital-breath is great in size or atomic,—if the suggestion be: In accordance with the scriptural texts: 'Everything is installed in the vital-breath' (Prašna 2.6), "For all this is covered by the vital-breath", it is great in size,—

We reply: The vital-breath, the best, too, should be known to be "atomic", in accordance with the scriptural text: "He going out, the vital-breath goes out after him" (Brh. 4.4.2). The above scriptural texts, on the other hand, refer to the vital-breath in its collective aspect. Hence, it is established that the best (viz. the chief vital-breath) is atomic.

Here ends the section entitled "The atomicity of the best" (6).

Adhikaraṇa 7: The section entitled "The superintending of fire and the rest". (Sūtras 14-18)

SŪTRA 14

"BUT THE SUPERINTENDING OF FIRE AND THE REST, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DECLARATION OF THAT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The sense-organs proceed to their respective functions as initiated by the divinities like fire and the rest, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'Fire becoming speech entered into the mouth' (Ait. 1.2.4¹).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Now, the activity of the sense-organs is being discussed.

On the doubt, viz. whether the sense-organs like the eye and the rest proceed to their respective objects through their own power alone, or as initiated by their respective presiding divinities,—the suggestion being: Through their own power, in accordance with the scriptural text: 'For by the eyes one sees colours' (Brh. 3.9.20),—

We reply: "Fire and so on". The term "but" is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. Speech and the rest function only as superintended by fire and so on, i.e. by the divinities like fire and so on. The word "superintending" means that which is superintended or initiated, i.e. an object to be initiated. Just as chariots and the rest move as superintended by charioteers and others, so is the case here. Why? "On account of the declaration of that", i.e. "on account of the declaration", or mention, in the sacred text, "of that" or of the fact of their being superintended by fire and the rest,¹ thus: 'Fire becoming speech entered into the mouth, the air becoming the vital-breath entered into the nose, the sun becoming sight entered into the eyes' (Ait. 1.2.4). If there be no relation of the initiated and the initiator, the entering of the fire and the rest must become meaningless. The scriptural text: 'For by the eyes' (Brh. 3.9.20) and so on should be known to have served its purpose by proving simply that the eyes and the rest are sense-organs.

COMPARISON

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

They read this and the next sūtra as one sūtra, interpreting it differently thus: "But the rule of the fire and the rest with the bearer of the vital-breath (i.e. the individual soul) (over the sense-organs is) on account of the thinking of that (viz. the Lord), in accordance with scriptural text." That is, we learn from Scripture that the fire-god and the rest, as well as the individual soul rule over the sense-organs, but their rule depends on the will of the Lord.²

¹ This explains the compound "*tad-āmananāt*".

² Śrī. B. 2.4.14, pp. 181-82, Part 1, Madras ed.; Śk. B. 2.4.14, p. 178, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. "But the light (jyotiḥ) is the prime ruler (ādyadhiṣṭhāna), on account of the declaration of that." That is, the Lord is the primary initiator of the sense-organs, while the fire-god and the rest, and the individual soul are secondary initiators.¹

SŪTRA 15

"WITH THE POSSESSOR OF THE VITAL-BREATH, ON ACCOUNT OF SCRIPTURAL TEXT."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

There is a servant-master relation between the sense-organs and the individual soul alone. The soul is the enjoyer, "on account of the scriptural text": 'Now where the eye has entered into the ether, that is the seeing person: the eye is for seeing' (Chānd. 8.12.4²).

Vedānta-kaustubha

If this be so, then enjoyment, too, may pertain to the gods,—to this the author replies:

The possessor of the vital-breath is one who has the vital-breath, the cause of the holding up of the body and the sense-organs. The sense-organs have a servant-master relation "with the possessor of the vital-breath", i.e. with the individual soul. This being so, the possessor of the vital-breath alone is the enjoyer of objects through the sense-organs,—this is the sense. Why? "On account of scriptural text", i.e. on account of the scriptural text: 'Now, where the eye has entered into the ether, that is the seeing person; the eye is for seeing' (Chānd. 8.12.4).

¹ G.B. 2.4.14, p. 249, Chap. 2.

² Ś, B.

SŪTRA 16

“ON ACCOUNT OF THE ETERNITY OF THAT.”

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

“On account of the eternity” of the above relationship with the individual soul alone, but not with the presiding deities.

Vedānta-kaustubha

For this reason, too, the enjoyer of the fruits, accomplishable by the sense-organs, is their master, the possessor of the vital-breath alone; but their presiding deities are not such enjoyers, “on account of the eternity of that”, i.e. because there is an eternal relation between the sense-organs and the possessor of the vital-breath alone, as proved by the scriptural text: ‘He going out the vital-breath goes out after him. The vital-breath going out all the sense-organs go out after it’ (Brh. 4.4.2). The gods, on the other hand, abide in highest lordship, and not in what is wretched (viz. the body), in accordance with the scriptural text: ‘Evil, verily, does not approach the gods’ (Brh. 1.5.20 1).

COMPARISON

All others add a “ca” in the middle thus: “Tasya ca nityatvāt”.

Śaṅkara

The interpretation of the word “tasya” different, viz.: “Because of the eternity of that (viz. of the individual soul)”. That is, the individual soul alone abides permanently in the body as the enjoyer, but the deities cannot do so.²

Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha

This is sūtra 14 in their commentaries. Interpretation different: On account of the eternity of that (viz. of the attribute of being ruled by the Lord). That is, all objects are eternally ruled by the Lord alone. Hence it follows that the rule of the sense-organs by the deities and the individual soul really depends upon the will of the Lord.³

¹ Reading: “pāpam” and not “anagham”. Vide Brh. 1.5.20, p. 70.

² Ś.B. 2.4.16, pp. 667-68.

³ Śrī. B. 2.4.14, p. 182, Part 2; Śk. B. 2.4.14, pp. 178-79, Parts 7 and 8.

Baladeva

Interpretation different, viz. And on account of the eternity of that, (i.e. of the relationship between the Lord and the gods). That is, there being an eternal relation between the gods and the Lord, the real ruler, the gods rule the sense-organs and so on, through the mere will of the Lord.¹

SŪTRA 17

"THEY (ARE) SENSE-ORGANS, ON ACCOUNT OF THE DESIGNATION OF THOSE AS OTHER THAN THE BEST."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the designation of those," i.e. of sense-organs, as different from the chief in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3²), "they", i.e. the sense-organs, are different entities called 'sense-organs', but not particular modes of the chief.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Apprehending the objection, viz. in conformity with the scriptural text: "Come, let us all become a form of him." Of him alone, they became a form' (Bṛh. 1.5.21³), other sense-organs, like the eye and the rest, are different modes of the chief vital-breath. They are not separate entities and cannot, therefore, have a separate relation with the possessor of the vital-breath (viz. the individual soul), our purpose being served if they have a relation with the vital-breath alone,—the author replies here.

"On account of the designation of those," i.e. of them "as different from the chief" vital-breath in the passage: 'From him arise the vital-breath, the mind and all the sense-organs' (Muṇḍ. 2.1.3), separate entities indeed are designated by the scriptural text: 'Those prāṇas

¹ G.B. 2.4.16, p. 250, Chap. 2.

² Ś. Bh, B.

³ Vide Bṛh. 1.5.21 for the story. When the different sense-organs were created by *Prajāpati*, death came and overcame them all, with the exception of the vital-breath. Thereupon, the sense-organs decided to assume the form of the vital-breath.

other than the chief, are the sense-organs'. Otherwise, the eye and the rest too being understood—like apāna and so on—simply by the phrase: 'From him arise the vital-breath', the separate mention: 'and all the sense-organs' must be meaningless. Hence the sense-organs being separate entities, their relation with the possessor of the vital-breath or the individual soul must be depicted to be certainly different from their relation with the vital-breath.

It cannot be said also that the mind too, which is separately designated, cannot be a sense-organ,—since in accordance with the Smṛti passages, viz.: "The sense-organs of which the mind is the sixth" (Gītā 15.7), "The sense-organs are ten and one" (Gītā 13.6), as well as in accordance with the scriptural text: 'There are ten sense-organs in a person, the soul is the eleventh' (Bṛh. 3.9.4), the mind as well is admitted to be a sense-organ. The separate designation of the mind, too, is not futile, since the mind being the leader of the sense-organs in conformity with the text: "And of the sense-organs, I am the mind" (Gītā 10.22), such a separate mention has a meaning. By the scriptural text: "Come let us assume all become a form of him alone" (Bṛh. 1.5.21), on the other hand, it is denoted simply that the activities of the sense-organs are under the control of the vital-breath. The sense-organs, also, being under the vital-breath, are called 'vital-breaths',¹ just as in the text: 'All this verily, is Brahman' (Chānd. 3.14.1), the term 'Brahman' has been applied to the world, it being under His control.

SŪTRA 18

"ON ACCOUNT OF THE SCRIPTURAL TEXT REGARDING DIFFERENCE AND ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENCE."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"On account of the scriptural mention of the difference" of the chief vital-breath from speech and the rest at the end of the section treating of speech, etc. thus: 'Then, verily, they said to the breath in the mouth' (Bṛh. 1.3.7²); "and on account of the difference" of the sense-organs, the apprehenders of sense-objects, from the best vital-breath, the cause of the subsistence of the body, the sense-organs and the rest,—they are separate entities.

¹ Prāṇa.

² Ś, Bh.

Vedānta-kaustubha

Having begun thus: 'They said to speech' (Brh. 1.3.2), and having concluded the section treating of speech and the rest, destroyed by the demons, Scripture goes on to declare the chief vital-breath as different from the sense-organs like speech, etc. in a passage in a different section: 'Then, verily, they said to the breath in the mouth' (Brh. 1.3.7). There is also a great difference between them, such as: the best vital-breath is the cause of the holding up of the body, the sense-organs and so on, while the sense-organs have speech and the rest for their objects, and so on. Hence, the sense-organs are different from the chief vital-breath,—this is the sense. Thus it is established that the sense-organs¹,—presided over by the gods, connected with the individual soul, and denoted by the term 'sense-organ',—are different from the best vital-breath.

Here ends the section entitled "The superintending of fire and the rest" (7).

COMPARISON

Śaṃkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva

They divide this sūtra into two different sūtras, thus: "Bheda-śruteḥ" and "Vailakṣaṇāc ca".

Adhikaraṇa 8: The section entitled "The making of name and form". (Sūtras 19-21)

SŪTRA 19

"BUT THE MAKING OF NAME AND FORM (IS THE FUNCTION) OF HIM WHO RENDERS TRIPARTITE, ON ACCOUNT OF TEACHING."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

The evolution of names and forms too,—mentioned in the texts: 'That divinity thought: "Come, let me, having entered into these

¹ Prāṇas.

three deities with this living soul, evolve name and forms”’ (Chānd. 6.3.2¹), ““Let me make each of them tripartite”’ (Chānd. 6.3.3²)—is the work of the Supreme Being alone “who renders tripartite”. He alone who made each of the deities tripartite is the creator of names and forms like fire, sun and the rest. Why? Because beginning thus: ‘That divinity’ (Chānd. 6.3.2), the text goes on to teach that the evolution (of names and forms) is due to the Supreme Deity thus: ““Let me, having entered with this living soul, evolve name and form”’³ (Chānd. 6.3.2).

Vedānta-kaustubha

Thus, there being an enquiry with regard to the characteristic marks of the object which one should desire to enquire into (viz. Brahman), it has been established in the preceding chapter⁴, that He is the cause of the world. Here, on the other hand, with a view to confirming it and demonstrating the cause of the world as held by us, it has been firmly established, after an examination of the cause as designated by others,⁵ that the ether and the rest are created by Brahman. Then, the author is, now, removing a doubt as to whether the evolution of name and form is due to the Supreme Brahman—a doubt arising from the word ‘individual soul’ in the scriptural text to be cited hereafter.

The evolution of name and form is mentioned in the Chāndogya, under the section teaching of the Existent, in the passages: ‘That divinity thought: “Come, let me, having entered into these three deities with the living soul (jīvātman), evolve name and form”’ (Chānd. 6.3.2), ““Let me make each of them tripartite”’ (Chānd. 6.3.3). The question is: Is this evolution due to the individual soul or to the Supreme Soul? If it be suggested: To the individual soul alone, as indicated by the phrase: ‘having entered with this living soul’,—

We reply: The word “but” is meant for disposing of the *prima facie* view. “The making of name and form,” i.e. the evolution of name and form, can be the work “of one who renders tripartite”, i.e. of the Supreme Soul alone, omniscient and omnipotent who made

¹ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

³ Ś, R, Bh, Śk, B.

⁵ In the 2nd *pāda* of the 2nd chap.

² *Op. cit.*

⁴ Vide Br. Śū. 1.1.2.

each of the deities tripartite. Why? Having begun thus: "That divinity thought" (Chānd. 6.3.2), the text goes on to designate,—through the use of the first person: "Let *me* evolve name and form" (Chānd. 6.3.2),—the Lord's resolve to evolve names and forms thus: "Let me make each of them tripartite" (Chānd. 6.3.3). Then, for fulfilling this desire, having made each of the deities tripartite prior to the creation of the egg, having then created the egg, and having then entered therein, He made names and forms. The scriptural text about tripartition secondarily implies the process of making each element five-fold. Thus, as the Supreme Brahman alone, who renders tripartite, has been designated as the creator of names and forms; and as the individual soul is incapable of creating names and forms, the evolution is due to the former alone. The motive for using the term 'individual soul' (jīvātman) here will be made clear by the aphorism: "For (Brahman is) without form" (Br. Sū. 3.2.14).

SŪTRA 20

"FLESH AND THE REST ARE OF AN EARTHLY NATURE, IN ACCORDANCE WITH SCRIPTURAL TEXT, AND THE OTHER TOO."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

That in the body there are the evolutes of fire, water and food, made tripartite, may be ascertained from scriptural text itself, viz. 'From the earth the excreta, flesh and the mind; from water urine, blood and the vital-breath; from fire the bones, marrow and speech'.¹

Vedānta-kaustubha

With a view to exhibiting the worthlessness of the physical body, the author is demonstrating that the evolutes of the fire, water and earth, made tripartite, pertain to the body.

"Flesh and the rest" should be known, "in accordance with scriptural text", "to be of an earthly nature", i.e. to be arising from, the earth, made tripartite, and of the form of rice, barley and so on consumed by the embodied soul. By the phrase: "and so on", the excreta and the mind are to be understood. The scriptural text is to the effect: 'The food which is consumed becomes three-fold.

¹ Not quoted by others.

That which is its grossest portion becomes the excreta; that which is the medium, the flesh; that which is the finest, the mind' (Chānd. 6.5.1). Similarly, the three evolutes of each "of the other two also", i.e. of water and fire, are to be understood. The urine, blood and the vital-breath,—these are the evolutes of water. The bones, marrow and speech,—these are the evolutes of fire. Here, the vital-breath is taken to be an evolute of water, only because it depends on water for its existence, the vital-breath being really but a special state of the air itself.¹ Likewise, the designation of the earthly nature of the mind is only meant for showing that its well-being depends to the consumption of food.² The evolutes of fire, too, are to be understood in a similar manner.

SŪTRA 21

"BUT ON ACCOUNT OF SPECIALITY, (THERE IS) THAT DESIGNATION, THAT DESIGNATION."

Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha

"But" they are regarded as different is on the ground of the preponderance of parts.

Here ends the fourth quarter of the second chapter in the Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, the explanation of the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā texts by the reverend Nimbārka.

Vedānta-kaustubha

To the objection, viz. What is the ground of distinguishing among the evolutes of these three elements, made tripartite,—the author replies:

The term "but" is meant for disposing of the objection. On account of the preponderance of one element,³ "the designation", viz. that this is an evolute of this, this of that and so on, is proper.

¹ Vide Br. Sū. 2.4.9.

² Vide the story of *Svetaketu* who failed to remember and recite the *R̥g-verses* and so on when he was fasting, but remembered and answered everything when he took food. Vide Chānd. 6.8.7.

³ This explains the compound "Vaiśeṣyāt".

The repetition indicates the conclusion of the chapter. Hence it is established that there is no contradiction whatsoever among the scriptural texts which are in concordance with regard to Brahman, Lord Vāsudeva.

Here ends the section entitled "The making of name and form" (8).

Here ends the fourth quarter of the second chapter of the holy Vedānta-kaustubha, a commentary on the Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā by the reverend teacher Śrīnivāsa, dwelling under the lotus-feet of the holy Nimbārka, the founder and the teacher of the sect of the venerable Sanatkumāra.

Here ends the second chapter entitled "Non-contradiction".

Résumé

The fourth quarter of the second chapter contains—

1. 21 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Nimbārka;
2. 22 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Śaṅkara;
3. 19 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Rāmānuja;
4. 22 sūtras and 9 adhikaraṇas, according to Bhāskara;
5. 19 sūtras and 8 adhikaraṇas, according to Śrīkaṇṭha;
6. 22 sūtras and 15 adhikaraṇas, according to Baladeva.

Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva divide sūtra 18 in Nimbārka's commentary into two separate sūtras. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha take sūtras 2 and 3 in Nimbārka's commentary as one sūtra, also sūtras 14 and 15 as one sūtra.

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